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Abstract	  	  This	  dissertation	  investigates	  how	  actors	  without	  the	  means	  of	  state	  power	  can	  affect	  the	  behavior	  of	  warring	  parties	  in	  order	  to	  end	  civil	  conflicts.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  intervention	  and	  mediation	  literature,	  I	  propose	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  presents	  causal	  mechanisms	  for	  various	  forms	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  to	  contribute	  to	  conflict	  resolution.	  The	  research	  distinguishes	  between	  direct	  mediation,	  capacity-­‐building,	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  approaches,	  and	  analyzes	  the	  approaches’	  potential	  contributions	  to	  shorter	  wars	  and	  more	  sustainable	  peace.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  be	  substitutes	  for	  governmental	  or	  inter-­‐governmental	  mediators.	  They	  derive	  legitimacy	  from	  long-­‐standing	  relations	  with	  the	  conflict	  parties,	  and	  their	  claims	  to	  neutrality	  are	  more	  believable	  than	  those	  of	  powerful	  states	  with	  strong	  national	  interests.	  Further,	  a	  confidential	  and	  deliberate	  process	  can	  lead	  to	  more	  stable	  agreements.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  NGOs	  and	  others	  can	  prepare	  or	  enhance	  ongoing	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  by	  giving	  parties	  the	  tools	  they	  need	  to	  engage	  with	  each	  other	  constructively,	  and	  by	  improving	  attitudes	  and	  changing	  perceptions.	  The	  data	  collected	  for	  this	  dissertation	  allows	  me	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  for	  the	  sample	  of	  African	  internal	  conflicts	  (1990-­‐2010)	  with	  econometric	  means.	  Results	  confirm	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  a	  significant	  precursor	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  I	  find	  further	  that	  conflict	  dyads	  that	  experience	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  one	  year	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  Unofficial	  diplomacy	  is	  significantly	  related	  to	  lower	  conflict	  severity,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  a	  more	  stable	  post-­‐conflict	  peace.	  The	  findings	  challenge	  the	  common	  assumption	  that	  governments	  are	  the	  only	  actors	  in	  international	  relations	  that	  matter.	  In	  fact,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  make	  important	  contributions	  to	  conflict	  resolution,	  and	  conflict	  parties	  as	  well	  as	  governmental	  mediators	  should	  consider	  cooperating	  with	  them	  in	  their	  search	  for	  peace.	  	  	  Conflict	  management,	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  civil	  conflict,	  interventions	  	  	  
	  	   1	  
Chapter	  1	  -­‐	  Introduction	  
Puzzle	  and	  research	  question	  The	  civil	  war	  in	  Mozambique	  ended	  in	  1992	  after	  the	  religious	  organization	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  successfully	  mediated	  a	  peace	  agreement	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  rebel	  group	  Renamo	  (Crocker	  et	  al.	  1999).	  In	  1996,	  a	  consortium	  of	  academic	  and	  professional	  conflict	  management	  organizations	  conducted	  problem-­‐solving	  and	  reconciliation	  workshops	  for	  rebel	  and	  government	  representatives	  in	  Liberia’s	  ongoing	  war	  (Carter	  Center	  1996).	  During	  one	  episode	  of	  Burundi’s	  protracted	  civil	  conflict	  from	  1995-­‐1998,	  more	  than	  30	  nongovernmental	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  were	  active	  in	  various	  conflict	  resolution	  programs	  (Hara	  1999).	  These	  are	  some	  examples	  of	  the	  increasingly	  common	  involvement	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  conflict	  management.	  A	  growing	  number	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs),	  academic	  groups,	  religious	  institutions	  and	  other	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  active	  in	  mediating	  civil	  conflicts,	  claiming	  that	  their	  initiatives	  will	  help	  end	  hostilities,	  negotiate	  peace,	  and	  contribute	  to	  reconciliation.	  Their	  approaches	  range	  from	  mediating	  peace	  negotiations	  to	  peace	  education	  for	  children,	  from	  media	  training	  to	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  for	  government	  and	  rebel	  representatives.	  Considering	  the	  relative	  powerlessness	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  entities,	  I	  ask	  whether	  -­‐	  and	  how	  -­‐	  conflict	  management	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  civil	  conflict.	  This	  dissertation	  project	  poses	  the	  questions:	  Do	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  have	  measurable	  effects	  on	  conflict	  dynamics,	  including	  conflict	  severity,	  duration,	  outcome	  and	  the	  durability	  of	  post-­‐war	  peace?	  And	  which	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  attributes	  or	  approaches	  have	  the	  strongest	  effects?	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The	  engagement	  of	  International	  Alert	  (IA),	  a	  conflict	  resolution	  organization	  based	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  in	  Sierra	  Leone’s	  civil	  war	  illustrates	  my	  motivating	  questions:	  The	  Revolutionary	  United	  Front	  (RUF)	  emerged	  in	  1991	  in	  response	  to	  corruption,	  weak	  state	  structures,	  and	  increasing	  ethnic	  tensions.	  Initial	  RUF	  success	  on	  the	  battlefield	  and	  widespread	  atrocities	  against	  civilians	  committed	  by	  both	  sides	  soon	  engulfed	  the	  country	  in	  war.	  Both	  before	  and	  after	  a	  military	  coup	  in	  April	  1992,	  any	  openings	  for	  talks	  between	  the	  two	  sides	  were	  ignored	  (UCDP	  Conflict	  Encyclopedia).	  Only	  in	  late	  1994	  did	  the	  government	  begin	  to	  call	  for	  peace	  talks	  and	  employed	  the	  United	  Nations’	  good	  offices	  to	  open	  small-­‐scale	  contacts.	  The	  RUF	  rebel	  commander	  Foday	  Sankoh,	  however,	  rejected	  the	  UN’s	  efforts.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  official	  mediation	  efforts	  fell	  on	  deaf	  ears,	  International	  Alert	  began	  its	  unofficial	  diplomacy	  in	  Sierra	  Leone.	  	  They	  managed	  to	  hold	  preliminary	  talks	  with	  government	  representatives	  and	  RUF	  commanders	  in	  1994	  and	  even	  organized	  (together	  with	  the	  Nairobi	  Peace	  Initiative,	  another	  conflict	  resolution	  NGO)	  a	  conflict	  resolution	  workshop	  for	  RUF	  representatives	  (CEWS	  1999).	  	  From	  this	  initial	  work	  grew	  a	  more	  substantial	  involvement	  for	  IA.	  The	  organization	  acted	  as	  mediator	  when	  RUF	  took	  hostages	  in	  April	  1995.	  And	  in	  preparation	  for	  formal	  negotiation	  it	  provided	  technical	  assistance	  to	  the	  rebels,	  who	  had	  little	  knowledge	  of	  official	  diplomacy	  (Posthumus	  1999b).	  While	  IA	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  taking	  a	  partisan	  approach	  to	  its	  advisory	  role	  instead	  of	  being	  an	  honest	  broker,	  even	  critics	  acknowledge	  the	  organization’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  facilitation	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  (Sorbe	  et	  al.	  1997).	  	  Why	  was	  International	  Alert	  able	  to	  engage	  the	  rebels	  where	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  others	  could	  not?	  And	  how	  can	  groups	  like	  IA	  be	  successful?	  They	  managed	  to	  convince	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rebel	  leaders	  that	  negotiations	  were	  preferable	  to	  continued	  war,	  and	  with	  their	  help	  negotiations	  ended	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement	  (which,	  however,	  did	  not	  bring	  the	  desired	  long-­‐term	  peace	  and	  stability	  –	  Sierra	  Leone	  experienced	  renewed	  war	  in	  1997).	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  consider	  the	  qualities	  that	  make	  non-­‐state	  actors	  like	  International	  Alert	  attractive	  conflict	  managers.	  Then	  I	  propose	  causal	  pathways	  how	  these	  attributes	  and	  activities	  are	  linked	  to	  specific	  conflict	  outcomes.	  Despite	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  peace	  efforts	  (more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  conflicts	  included	  in	  this	  dissertation	  research	  experience	  some	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  as	  defined	  here),	  current	  research	  has	  yet	  to	  address	  in	  any	  systematic	  matter	  how	  successful	  non-­‐governmental	  initiatives	  are	  in	  ending	  civil	  conflict	  in	  Africa.	  Almost	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  opened	  space	  both	  for	  internal	  conflicts	  to	  receive	  international	  attention	  and	  for	  more	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  to	  carve	  out	  niches	  in	  peace-­‐making	  activities,	  this	  dissertation	  applies	  rigorous	  academic	  methods	  and	  systematically	  evaluates	  the	  contributions	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  to	  conflict	  resolution.1	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  analyze	  how	  conflict	  resolution	  initiatives	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  affect	  processes	  and	  outcomes	  of	  civil	  wars.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  project	  collects	  new	  data	  on	  NGO	  mediation	  and	  mediation	  training	  in	  37	  African	  civil	  conflicts	  since	  1990.	  Generalization	  of	  statistical	  findings	  across	  diverse	  cases	  is	  always	  problematic,	  but	  focusing	  on	  one	  geographic	  region	  gives	  me	  confidence	  that	  any	  findings	  can	  be	  applied	  at	  least	  across	  this	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  And	  the	  African	  continent	  has	  experienced	  a	  higher	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Conflict	  resolution,	  conflict	  management,	  and	  mediation	  are	  distinct	  concepts,	  with	  mediation	  being	  one	  form	  of	  conflict	  management,	  and	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict	  the	  ultimate	  goal.	  Both	  policy	  papers	  and	  academic	  writing	  often	  use	  the	  terms	  interchangeably.	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proportion	  of	  internal	  conflicts	  than	  other	  regions,	  especially	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Considering	  the	  continuing	  need	  for	  conflict	  management	  and	  peace-­‐building	  in	  Africa,	  a	  study	  of	  peacemaking	  on	  the	  continent	  is	  timely	  and	  important,	  even	  if	  conclusions	  and	  policy	  prescriptions	  drawn	  from	  studying	  a	  geographically	  restricted	  sample	  cannot	  automatically	  be	  applied	  beyond	  the	  region.	  It	  makes	  sense	  to	  analyze	  African	  conflicts	  separately	  from	  other	  regions,	  because	  of	  a	  number	  of	  characteristics	  shared	  by	  many	  countries	  of	  the	  continent:	  a	  history	  of	  European	  colonization,	  often	  combined	  with	  arbitrarily	  drawn	  territorial	  borders	  and	  ethnic	  distinctions;	  slow	  rates	  of	  post-­‐independence	  development;	  weak	  political	  institutions,	  often	  depended	  on	  patrimonial	  structures;	  scenes	  for	  proxy	  wars	  between	  the	  super	  powers	  that	  were	  ignored	  once	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended.	  	  Statistical	  models	  assess	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  interventions	  lead	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  by	  governments	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations;	  whether	  they	  change	  the	  duration	  or	  severity	  of	  conflicts;	  and	  whether	  a	  peace	  spell	  following	  an	  episode	  that	  saw	  NGO	  mediation	  will	  be	  more	  durable	  than	  peace	  following	  an	  episode	  that	  did	  not	  see	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  This	  study	  integrates	  different	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  resolution	  efforts	  (mediation,	  capacity-­‐building,	  and	  problem-­‐solving)	  into	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  study	  of	  mediation,	  civil	  war	  duration,	  conflict	  severity	  and	  the	  chances	  for	  a	  durable	  peace.	  	  The	  contribution	  of	  the	  research	  is	  threefold.	  First,	  it	  adds	  to	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  state	  in	  international	  relations.	  Confirmation	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  underlines	  that	  a	  more	  complete	  and	  more	  accurate	  model	  of	  civil	  war	  interventions,	  and	  international	  relations	  in	  general,	  demands	  a	  theory	  that	  acknowledges	  non-­‐state	  actors’	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contributions.	  System-­‐level	  or	  state-­‐level	  theories	  are	  unable	  to	  comprehensively	  explain	  the	  dynamics	  of	  conflicts	  and	  interventions.	  My	  research	  shows	  that	  even	  a	  third-­‐party	  government’s	  decision	  to	  diplomatically	  intervene	  in	  an	  internal	  conflict	  may	  be	  impacted	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  specifically	  their	  preparatory	  conflict	  management.	  The	  rate	  of	  success	  of	  official	  mediation	  is	  also	  impacted	  by	  NGO	  initiatives	  (more	  wars	  end	  in	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  if	  they	  see	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management).	  While	  states	  remain	  the	  dominant	  actors	  in	  international	  relations,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  a	  large	  enough	  independent	  effect	  on	  civil	  conflicts	  that	  theories	  ignoring	  them	  are	  incomplete.	  Second,	  the	  dissertation	  fills	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  mediation,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  connecting	  the	  research	  program	  on	  diplomatic	  interventions	  to	  the	  field	  of	  conflict	  resolution.	  Theories	  on	  weak	  mediators,	  those	  that	  consider	  the	  question,	  among	  others,	  why	  actors	  without	  the	  trappings	  of	  state	  power	  are	  invited	  to	  mediate,	  are	  bolstered	  and	  expanded.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  specific	  non-­‐state	  interventions	  are	  considered	  quantitatively.	  The	  study	  also	  provides	  new	  data	  to	  account	  for	  the	  causal	  pathways.	  Data	  collected	  for	  this	  study	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  address	  additional	  questions	  related	  to	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  For	  example,	  one	  might	  develop	  models	  that	  test	  which	  type	  of	  organization	  would	  be	  most	  appropriate	  to	  engage	  in	  peace-­‐making	  initiatives	  at	  specific	  times	  during	  the	  course	  of	  conflicts.	  	  Third,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  study.	  Parties	  involved	  in	  a	  violent	  conflict,	  who	  have	  resisted	  non-­‐state	  intervention,	  should	  be	  more	  open	  to	  such	  initiatives.	  Especially	  rebel	  groups	  with	  little	  experience	  in	  negotiation	  and	  non-­‐violent	  bargaining	  can	  benefit	  from	  training	  and	  advice.	  The	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government	  side	  should	  encourage	  such	  engagement,	  as	  peace	  agreements	  that	  are	  signed	  by	  informed	  and	  able	  opponents	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  stable.	  NGOs	  and	  other	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  managers	  benefit	  from	  cross-­‐sectional	  comparisons	  beyond	  internal	  project	  evaluations.	  My	  models	  consider	  which	  type	  of	  organization	  and	  which	  approach	  may	  be	  more	  effective.	  For	  the	  sample	  I	  find	  a	  strong	  association	  between	  religious	  organizations	  and	  conflict	  termination,	  which	  indicates	  that	  cultural	  legitimacy	  and	  insider	  status	  might	  be	  more	  important	  to	  conflict	  parties	  than	  expertise	  and	  neutrality.	  I	  further	  confirm	  that	  capacity-­‐building	  is	  a	  useful	  tool.	  Preparing	  belligerents	  for	  negotiations	  is	  a	  task	  that	  NGOs	  are	  better	  equipped	  to	  execute	  than	  governments,	  but	  that	  can	  enhance	  government	  interventions.	  The	  findings	  validate	  the	  current	  emphasis	  on	  capacity-­‐building	  over	  direct	  mediation	  by	  outside	  groups.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  a	  precursor	  to	  official	  mediation	  led	  by	  governments	  or	  IGOs.	  That	  means	  that	  high-­‐level	  mediators	  should	  coordinate	  with	  NGOs	  to	  assure	  conflict	  parties	  are	  well-­‐prepared	  for	  successful	  negotiations.	  My	  statistical	  models	  show	  a	  stronger	  relation	  between	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  mediation	  by	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  than	  mediation	  by	  third-­‐party	  governments.	  They	  also	  do	  not	  find	  a	  significant	  relation	  between	  preparatory	  training	  and	  governmental	  mediation.	  Governments	  that	  intervene	  in	  conflicts	  have	  different	  motivations	  to	  do	  so	  than	  IGOs,	  but	  they	  nevertheless	  should	  consider	  coordination	  with	  groups	  providing	  advice	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  in	  order	  to	  bolster	  the	  chances	  of	  mediation	  success.	  Overall,	  the	  study’s	  results	  can	  contribute	  to	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  within	  organizations	  and	  governments	  and	  potentially	  make	  peace-­‐making	  efforts	  more	  effective.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  results	  indicate	  that	  non-­‐state	  interventions	  should	  be	  carefully	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planned,	  and	  be	  coordinated	  (e.g.	  capacity-­‐building	  for	  negotiation	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  conflict	  termination	  if	  it	  is	  followed	  by	  mediation).	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  internal	  conflicts,	  finding	  even	  weak	  effects	  indicating	  that	  a	  conflict	  may	  be	  a	  little	  shorter,	  or	  a	  little	  less	  brutal,	  because	  of	  certain	  conflict-­‐management	  initiatives	  is	  noteworthy	  -­‐	  in	  reality	  these	  results	  point	  to	  ways	  to	  save	  lives.	  
How	  non-­‐state	  actors	  contribute	  to	  conflict	  resolution	  A	  mediated	  process	  may	  have	  a	  number	  of	  advantages	  for	  the	  conflict	  parties	  over	  unmediated	  negotiations:	  First,	  mediators	  assist	  parties	  in	  overcoming	  problems	  of	  asymmetric	  information	  (Kydd	  2003,	  Princen	  1992,	  Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1985).	  Second,	  third	  parties	  change	  the	  cost	  of	  conflict,	  either	  by	  increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  continuing	  conflict	  or	  by	  providing	  incentives	  for	  cooperation	  (Beardsley	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Quinn	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1985).	  And	  third,	  they	  provide	  help	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  peace	  agreements	  and	  security	  guarantees	  (Bercovitch	  1997,	  Svensson	  2007,	  Walter	  2002).	  Touval	  and	  Zartman	  (1985)	  consider	  a	  number	  of	  activities	  mediators	  use	  to	  address	  the	  key	  obstacles	  to	  conflict	  resolution	  	  (information,	  costs,	  commitment):	  facilitation	  enables	  communication	  between	  opponents,	  for	  example	  by	  acting	  as	  go-­‐between	  or	  by	  providing	  a	  neutral	  space	  for	  a	  meeting.	  Formulation	  refers	  to	  mediators	  putting	  forward	  settlement	  terms	  or	  outsiders	  helping	  parties	  developing	  compromise	  solutions.	  They	  generate	  thinking	  “outside	  of	  the	  box”	  in	  order	  to	  change	  the	  cost	  analyses	  of	  the	  opponents.	  And	  lastly,	  mediators	  may	  manipulate:	  they	  can	  apply	  pressure	  on	  one	  or	  both	  sides	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  or	  they	  can	  guarantee	  its	  implementation.	  In	  most	  cases,	  only	  states	  have	  the	  leverage	  to	  provide	  guarantees	  regarding	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  mediation	  outcome	  (Walter	  2002,	  Beardsley	  2013).	  But	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  distinct	  advantages	  that	  can	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make	  them	  the	  more	  effective	  mediator	  choice.	  Figure	  1	  illustrates	  how	  their	  unique	  attributes	  fit	  within	  the	  larger	  mediation	  framework.	  
Figure	  1:	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  negotiation	  stages	  	  	  	   Negotiation	  stages	  	   Before	   During	   After	  
Core	  Problem	   Information	  -­‐ no	  existing	  lines	  of	  communication	  -­‐ no	  neutral	  space	  -­‐ meeting	  is	  concession	  (bestows	  legitimacy)	  	  
Costs	  -­‐ uneven	  playing	  field	  -­‐ reluctance	  to	  explore	  compromise	  (may	  be	  held	  against	  party	  by	  opponents	  or	  supporters)	  	  
Commitment	  	  -­‐	  lack	  of	  trust	  -­‐	  other	  side	  might	  renege	  	  
Mediator	  
contribution	  
Facilitation	  -­‐ create	  space	  -­‐ initiate	  communication	   Formulation	  -­‐ develop	  framework	  for	  solution	  -­‐ propose	  solutions	   Manipulation	  -­‐ provide	  incentives	  -­‐ security	  guarantees	  
Non-­‐state	  actors’	  
advantage	  
Legitimacy	  -­‐ knowledge	  of	  place	  -­‐	  interaction	  does	  not	  bestow	  legitimacy	  to	  opponent	  -­‐ neutrality,	  no	  vested	  interest	  -­‐ 	  
Innovation	  /	  Confidentiality	  -­‐ expertise	  -­‐ new	  ideas	  -­‐ creative	  approaches	  -­‐ not	  bound	  to	  protocol	  -­‐ no	  enforcement	  threat	  -­‐ less	  time	  pressure	  -­‐ no	  posturing	  
Grassroots	  engagement	  -­‐	  reconciliation	  	  
(not	  part	  of	  current	  
research	  project)	  
	  While	  the	  literature	  acknowledges	  potential	  effectiveness	  of	  “weak”	  mediators	  (Dunn	  and	  Kriesberg	  2002,	  Beardsley	  2009,	  Boehmelt	  2010),	  the	  specific	  activities	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  how	  they	  influence	  conflict	  dynamics	  remains	  underexplored.	  In	  this	  dissertation	  I	  propose	  theoretical	  models	  that	  link	  individual	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  attributes	  and	  approaches	  to	  changes	  in	  and	  outcomes	  of	  conflicts,	  as	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  2	  (next	  page).	  	  	  Considering	  the	  advantages	  in	  leverage	  state	  mediators	  have,	  high-­‐level	  diplomacy	  has	  been	  found	  to	  lead	  more	  reliably	  to	  conflict	  termination	  than	  unofficial	  diplomacy	  (Boehmelt	  2010).	  The	  occurrence	  of	  mediation	  by	  states	  of	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  (IGOs)	  is	  therefore	  an	  important	  development	  in	  a	  conflict,	  one	  that,	  as	  I	  propose,	  becomes	  more	  likely	  with	  the	  involvement	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  managers.	  They	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prepare	  the	  way	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  cases	  where	  state	  actors	  were	  reluctant	  to	  get	  involved,	  or	  shame	  third-­‐party	  governments	  into	  action	  by	  going	  where	  they	  do	  not.	  They	  get	  conflict	  parties	  ready	  for	  negotiations,	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  of	  success,	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  likelihood	  that	  states	  and	  IGOs	  will	  take	  over	  the	  process.	  And	  they	  help	  belligerents	  to	  acknowledge	  each	  other’s	  grievances,	  change	  confrontational	  to	  cooperative	  mindsets	  and	  build	  willingness	  towards	  a	  negotiated	  settlement.	  
Figure	  2:	  How	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  lead	  to	  outcomes	  
Non-­‐state	  activity	   effects	   Outcome	  	  Direct	  mediation	  	  	  Capacity	  building	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  	  
putting	  conflict	  on	  states’	  agenda	  prepare	  ground	  	  	  give	  parties	  tools	  for	  negotiations,	  build	  confidence	  	  improve	  attitudes	  clarify	  red	  lines	  
Mediation	   by	   states	   and	  IGOs	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  	  Capacity	  building	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  
unconventional	  approaches	  and	  low-­‐pressure	  process	  lead	  to	  success	  	  prepare	  for	  negotiation	  that	  ends	  war	  	  reduce	  tension,	  build	  trust	  
Conflict	  termination	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  	  
negotiation	  rounds	  interrupt	  fighting	  	  gestures	  of	  goodwill	  	  personal	  connections	  changing	  perceptions	  
Decline	  in	  severity	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  	  	  Capacity	  building	  	  	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  
less	  time-­‐pressure	  and	  more	  confidentiality	  more	  focused	  on	  resolution	  of	  underlying	  issues	  expertise,	  local	  knowledge	  	  	  familiarity	  with	  conflict-­‐resolution	  mechanisms	  applicable	  to	  post-­‐war	  conflict	  situations	  (alternatives	  to	  violence)	  	  trust,	  collaborative	  spirit,	  personal	  connections	  	  
Sustainable	  peace	  
	  	   Bringing	  out	  the	  end	  of	  a	  violent	  conflict	  is	  the	  professed	  goal	  of	  most	  conflict	  management	  efforts.	  I	  consider	  various	  causal	  pathways	  that	  link	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  resolution	  to	  conflict	  termination.	  Mediation	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  directly	  lead	  to	  peace,	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or	  more	  indirectly,	  capacity-­‐building	  and	  unofficial	  interaction	  can	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  will	  occur,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  end	  the	  war.	  	  	   Besides	  ending	  a	  conflict	  outright,	  lowering	  its	  death	  toll	  should	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  successful	  conflict	  management	  outcome.	  Rounds	  of	  negotiations	  are	  often	  accompanied	  by	  short-­‐term	  ceasefires	  that	  could	  lower	  the	  overall	  battle-­‐death	  count.	  Participation	  in	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  can	  motivate	  opponents	  to	  show	  gestures	  of	  good	  will.	  Also,	  confidence-­‐building	  measures	  may	  positively	  affect	  belligerents	  attitudes	  towards	  each	  other,	  lowering	  the	  level	  of	  animosity.	  	  Lastly,	  post-­‐conflict	  stability	  is	  an	  important	  measure	  of	  conflict	  management	  success.	  The	  unique	  attributes	  of	  non-­‐state	  peacemaking	  can	  lead	  to	  better	  agreements,	  better	  chances	  that	  the	  agreements	  are	  honored	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  and	  lower	  probabilities	  of	  relapse	  into	  war.	  The	  empirical	  chapters	  of	  the	  dissertation	  will	  explore	  the	  various	  pathways	  in	  more	  detail.	  Figure	  3	  (next	  page)	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  proposed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  Necessary	  for	  testing	  them	  are	  a	  stringent	  definition	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  activities	  included	  in	  my	  analysis.	  
Conceptualizing	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  	  
Definition	  	  Considering	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives,	  the	  time	  is	  ripe	  for	  a	  more	  systematic	  approach	  to	  their	  evaluation.	  Beyond	  individual	  case	  studies,	  quantitative	  measures	  should	  be	  able	  to	  test	  assertions	  about	  the	  impact	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  resolution	  can	  have	  on	  civil	  conflicts.	  The	  reviewed	  literature	  (Chapter	  2)	  suggests	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  can	  have	  both	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects	  on	  civil	  wars.	  I	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formulate	  testable	  hypotheses	  below,	  but	  first	  I	  put	  forward	  my	  definition	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management,	  T2+:	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Summary	  of	  Hypotheses	  	  
Argument	   Hypothesis	   Expectation	   Chapter	  Support	  
Direct	  effects	  of	  
T2+	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  High-­‐level	  negotiations	   H1	   High-­‐level	  negotiations	  are	  more	  likely	  in	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  T2+	  than	  in	  those	  that	  do	  not,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  NGOs	  training	  initiatives	  will	  be	  more	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  than	  other	  T2+	  efforts	  (direct	  mediation	  or	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops),	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  Onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  if	  NGOs	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  conduct	  T2+	  than	  if	  religious	  T2+	  organizations	  (or	  none)	  are	  active,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  
3	   Yes	  	  Partial	  	  	  No	  	  	  	  Termination	   H2	   A	  civil	  conflict	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  does	  not,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  A	  conflict	  that	  experiences	  direct	  mediation	  by	  T2+	  organizations	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  does	  not	  see	  T2+	  mediation,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  A	  conflict	  that	  sees	  T2+	  led	  by	  religious	  organizations	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  does	  see	  T2+	  led	  by	  professional	  NGOs,	  all	  else	  being	  equal. A	  conflict	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  sees	  T2+	  led	  by	  religious	  NGOs,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  
4	   Yes	  	  No	  	  Yes	  	  	  No	  	  	  	  Outcome	   H3	   A	  negotiated	  settlement	  of	  a	  civil	  conflict	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  if	  the	  conflict	  episode	  sees	  T2+	  diplomacy,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  Among	   conflicts	   that	   end	   in	   a	   negotiated	   settlement,	   those	   that	  experience	  T2+	  will	  be	  shorter	   than	  those	  that	  do	  not,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  
4	   Partial	  	  Yes	  
	  	  	  Severity	   H4	   A	  dyad	  year	  in	  which	  T2+	  mediation	  happens	  will	  be	  lower	  in	  intensity	  (number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths)	  than	  dyad	  years	  that	  do	  not	  see	  T2+,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  A	  civil	  conflict	  dyad	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  training	  in	  one	  year	  will	  subsequently	  decrease	  in	  intensity	  (number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths).	  The	  duration	  of	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  and	  the	  conflict’s	  intensity	  level	  will	  be	  negatively	  correlated.	  
5	   Partial	  	  Partial	  	  No	  
Post-­‐conflict	  
effects	  of	  T2+	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  Durable	  peace	   H5	   Conflicts	  that	  experience	  T2+	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  see	  new	  outbreaks	  of	  conflict	  Number	  and	  duration	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  will	  be	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  renewed	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  conflict	  termination.	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Any	  conflict	  management	   initiative	   that	   is	   led	  by	  an	   individual	  or	   organization	   not	   directly	   tied	   to	   a	   government	   or	   an	  intergovernmental	   organization	   (although	   they	   may	   receive	  funding	  from	  official	  sources)	  and	  targets	  the	  leadership	  level	  –	  current	  negotiators	  and	  those	  who	  advise	  them	  -­‐	  of	  parties	  in	  an	  ongoing	  conflict.	  This	  definition	  includes	  the	  classic	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  tools	  of	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and	  similar	  meetings	  of	  conflict	  parties	  on	  neutral	  ground,	  but	  also	  negotiation	  training	  and	  support,	  as	  well	  as	  actual	  mediation.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  are	  the	  initiatives	  that	  aim	  to	  directly	  influence	  conflict	  parties’	  relations	  with	  each	  other:	  they	  are	  either	  programs	  where	  opponents	  come	  face-­‐to-­‐face,	  or	  where	  one	  side	  is	  prepared	  for	  high-­‐level	  meetings.	  	  Many	  recent	  NGO	  initiatives	  place	  less	  emphasis	  on	  outsider	  intervention	  and,	  instead,	  consider	  how	  they	  can	  prepare	  locals	  for	  conflict	  resolution	  (Ramsbotham	  et	  al.	  2011).	  One	  reason	  is	  that	  especially	  in	  internal	  conflicts	  power	  disparity	  between	  government	  actors	  and	  rebels	  can	  block	  the	  search	  for	  a	  solution	  (Babbitt	  2009).	  For	  example,	  the	  non-­‐profit	  diplomatic	  advisory	  group	  Independent	  Diplomat	  (ID)	  was	  founded	  explicitly	  to	  address	  the	  lack	  of	  experience	  and	  knowledge	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  in	  regards	  to	  official	  diplomacy’s	  ways,	  means	  and	  culture.	  Another	  incentive	  for	  local	  ownership	  is	  the	  need	  for	  deep	  knowledge	  of	  the	  local	  conflict	  context,	  something	  outsiders	  rarely	  have	  (David	  Smock,	  USIP,	  phone	  interview	  August	  15,	  2013).	  Because	  of	  the	  theoretical	  and	  operational	  focus	  on	  capacity	  building	  I	  include	  training	  (for	  persons	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  level)	  into	  my	  definition	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  Earlier	  assessments	  of	  interactive	  conflict	  resolution	  have	  excluded	  grassroots	  efforts	  or	  diaspora	  consultations	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  “most	  dialogues	  do	  not	  have	  the	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objective	  of	  directly	  affecting	  the	  interaction	  of	  parties”	  (Fisher	  1997).	  This	  leads	  me	  to	  exclude	  peace-­‐building	  measures	  on	  the	  grassroots	  level	  (e.g.	  summer	  camps	  for	  children	  from	  populations	  in	  conflict).	  That	  being	  said,	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  belittle	  the	  importance	  of	  grassroots	  peace	  building.	  In	  fact,	  recent	  research	  indicates	  that	  initiatives	  on	  the	  local	  level	  are	  essential	  for	  peace:	  Autesserre’s	  (2010)	  study	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  international	  peace	  building	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  from	  2003	  to	  2006	  claims	  that	  the	  top-­‐down	  approach	  adopted	  by	  governments,	  donors	  and	  most	  NGOs	  left	  the	  DRC’s	  transition	  to	  peace	  susceptible	  to	  violent	  eruptions	  caused	  by	  conflicts	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  She	  advocates	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  peace	  building	  approach	  to	  complement	  existing	  top-­‐down	  strategies.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  my	  search	  for	  track-­‐two+	  diplomacy	  (which	  she	  would	  group	  under	  “top-­‐down	  approach”)	  I	  noted	  many	  organizations	  engaged	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  bottom-­‐up	  work	  Autessere	  deems	  necessary	  for	  sustainable	  peace.	  In	  fact,	  one	  interviewee	  pointed	  out	  that	  “We	  just	  did	  a	  desk	  review	  to	  identify	  NGOs	  that	  currently	  have	  a	  regional	  focus	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  alone	  and	  found	  over	  140	  organizations”	  (Mark	  Rogers,	  Life	  and	  Peace	  Institute,	  email	  from	  April	  2,	  2013).	  I	  omit	  these	  initiatives	  from	  my	  study	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  resolution	  because	  of	  their	  long-­‐term	  focus.	  I	  look	  instead	  at	  projects	  that	  try	  to	  end	  on-­‐going	  fighting.	  However,	  a	  full	  picture	  of	  the	  effects	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  have	  on	  civil	  conflicts,	  especially	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  research	  question	  of	  when	  peace	  agreements	  succeed	  or	  fail,	  will	  only	  emerge	  when	  grassroots	  efforts	  are	  included	  in	  models	  of	  peace	  making.	  	  Mediation	  efforts	  undertaken	  by	  individuals	  connected	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  OSCE	  or	  other	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  are	  not	  included	  in	  my	  coding,	  either.	  They	  are	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy,	  not	  track-­‐two,	  because	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  are	  a	  collective	  of	  individual	  member	  nation	  states.	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There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  non-­‐state	  actors	  involved	  in	  conflict	  management	  initiatives,	  as	  Diamond	  and	  McDonald’s	  (1996)	  model	  of	  nine	  tracks	  of	  diplomacy	  indicates.	  Some	  of	  those	  are	  subsumed	  under	  my	  definition,	  e.g.	  churches,	  as	  long	  as	  their	  projects	  target	  the	  leadership	  level	  of	  a	  conflict	  party.	  Others,	  like	  the	  media	  and	  business,	  are	  excluded.	  I	  argue	  that	  media	  reporting	  can	  exacerbate	  or	  alleviate	  conflicts,	  and	  there	  are	  many	  projects	  that	  target	  issues	  of	  incitement.	  But	  the	  media’s	  role	  primarily	  is	  to	  report	  on	  conflicts,	  less	  so	  to	  actively	  engage	  a	  government	  or	  rebel	  group	  in	  conflict	  management.	  Business	  representatives	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  mediation.2	  If	  business	  activities	  are	  threatened	  by	  conflict,	  business	  leaders	  have	  a	  tangible	  interest	  in	  ending	  the	  ongoing	  violence.	  And	  especially	  in	  countries	  that	  are	  economically	  dependent	  on	  only	  a	  few	  industries	  these	  corporations	  will	  have	  access	  to	  some	  or	  all	  parties	  in	  the	  conflict	  and	  they	  may	  have	  considerable	  influence.	  Government	  and	  rebel	  leaders	  may	  listen	  to	  them.	  But	  they	  can	  also	  be	  the	  source	  of	  conflict,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  Niger	  delta	  where	  the	  activities	  of	  foreign	  oil	  companies	  have	  incited	  violence	  from	  local	  groups.	  And	  the	  interests	  that	  lead	  to	  corporations	  or	  company	  owners	  asserting	  their	  influence	  are	  not	  always	  centered	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peace	  making.	  Corporations	  may	  in	  fact	  exacerbate	  conflicts	  if	  they	  favor	  one	  side	  in	  the	  conflict	  (e.g.	  Global	  Witness	  1998).	  This	  dissertation	  looks	  only	  at	  actors	  whose	  explicit	  goal	  –	  in	  fact	  their	  “mission	  statement”	  –	  is	  to	  resolve	  conflicts.	  
A	  new	  dataset	  Large-­‐N	  studies	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  conflict	  management	  efforts	  are	  rare.	  They	  rely	  on	  datasets	  compiled	  from	  public	  sources	  (e.g.	  Bercovitch	  1999	  uses	  Keesing's	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  good	  example	  is	  “Tiny”	  Rowland,	  the	  CEO	  of	  the	  British	  multinational	  corporation	  Lonhro,	  who	  acted	  as	  go-­‐between	  in	  Mozambique,	  and	  even	  provided	  transport	  for	  rebel	  leaders	  to	  negotiations	  (Vines	  1998).	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Archives,	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  the	  London	  Times	  and	  Reuters).	  But	  most	  track-­‐two	  efforts,	  like	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops,	  do	  not	  make	  front-­‐page	  news.	  I	  believe	  by	  expanding	  the	  available	  data	  with	  information	  collected	  from	  other	  sources,	  namely	  case	  studies	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  information	  gathered	  from	  NGO	  practitioners,	  I	  can	  more	  comprehensively	  analyze	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.3	  
	   Research	  of	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  that	  includes	  non-­‐state	  actors	  as	  interveners	  has	  in	  the	  past	  primarily	  relied	  on	  two	  data	  sources:	  Bercovitch’s	  (1999)	  International	  Conflict	  Management	  (ICM)	  dataset	  and	  Regan	  et	  al.’s	  (2009)	  Diplomatic	  Interventions	  in	  Civil	  Wars.	  Both	  datasets	  include	  individuals	  or	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations.	  The	  difference	  between	  these	  existing	  sources	  and	  my	  new	  dataset	  is	  threefold:	  first,	  ICM	  and	  Regan	  et	  al.	  have	  higher	  thresholds	  in	  regards	  to	  annual	  battle	  deaths.	  They	  include	  conflicts	  that	  exceed	  1,000	  or	  200	  fatalities,	  respectively.	  Additionally,	  ICM	  includes	  civil	  wars	  only	  when	  they	  create	  the	  threat	  of	  interstate	  war.	  Considering	  that	  today	  most	  conflicts	  are	  internal	  and	  often	  low-­‐intensity	  –	  but	  go	  on	  over	  many	  years	  and	  are	  responsible	  for	  much	  death	  and	  destruction	  –	  I	  find	  it	  important	  to	  include	  low-­‐intensity	  conflicts	  into	  any	  analysis	  of	  war.4	  	  Second,	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  listed	  in	  the	  databanks	  is	  limited	  to	  actual	  mediation	  events.	  DeRouen	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  Civil	  War	  Mediation	  (CWM)	  dataset	  includes	  low-­‐intensity	  conflicts,	  but,	  like	  the	  other	  existing	  datasets,	  only	  counts	  mediation.	  I	  argue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I	  will	  still	  miss	  cases	  of	  secret	  conflict	  management,	  especially	  if	  they	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  results	  that	  parties	  and	  organizations	  are	  comfortable	  publicizing.	  This	  can	  introduce	  selection	  bias	  towards	  successful	  initiatives.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  possibly	  incomplete	  sample	  should	  underestimate	  the	  significance	  of	  interventions.	  4	  Following	  the	  UCDP/PRIO	  Armed	  Conflict	  Database	  Codebook	  (UCDP	  2011a),	  I	  include	  conflicts	  between	  a	  government	  and	  domestic	  opposition	  that	  results	  in	  at	  least	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  a	  year	  (Gleditsch	  et	  al.	  2002,	  Themnér	  and	  Wallensteen	  2013).	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that	  if	  we	  want	  to	  broaden	  our	  understanding	  of	  how	  NGOs	  and	  others	  can	  contribute	  to	  peace,	  we	  need	  to	  assess	  a	  fuller	  range	  of	  their	  activities.	  And	  third,	  Bercovitch	  as	  well	  as	  Regan	  et	  al.	  and	  DeRouen	  et	  al.	  rely	  solely	  on	  news	  sources	  for	  the	  information	  included	  in	  their	  data.	  Another	  noteworthy	  effort	  is	  the	  UCDP	  Managing	  Intrastate	  Conflict	  (MIC)	  Dataset	  (Melander	  and	  von	  Uexküll	  2011).	  It	  includes	  low-­‐intensity	  conflicts	  and	  has	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  conflict	  management	  than	  other	  data	  collections.	  Specifically,	  it	  includes	  references	  to	  non-­‐state	  mediation.	  Many	  of	  the	  NGO	  efforts	  included	  in	  their	  data	  are	  also	  part	  of	  my	  data.	  However,	  the	  MIC	  data	  rely	  on	  media	  coverage	  alone	  to	  identify	  relevant	  events,	  missing	  most	  capacity-­‐building	  exercises.	  MIC	  code	  NGO	  conflict	  management	  (as	  defined	  here)	  in	  13	  of	  the	  conflicts	  I	  study;	  I	  find	  it	  in	  20	  conflicts.	  	  
Data	  collection	  	   While	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  broad	  palette	  of	  NGO	  activities	  warrants	  attention	  and	  study,	  this	  dissertation	  focuses	  on	  the	  subset	  of	  what	  I	  call	  track-­‐two	  plus	  (T2+),	  as	  defined	  and	  elaborated	  above.	  Looking	  at	  each	  conflict	  individually	  I	  executed	  a	  number	  of	  web	  searches	  to	  identify	  organizations	  that	  have	  been	  active	  in	  conflict	  management	  in	  each	  specific	  conflict	  (a	  coding	  example	  is	  included	  in	  the	  appendix).	  To	  do	  so	  I	  used	  three	  online	  search	  engines:	  LexisNexis	  Academic,	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  Archive,	  and	  Google	  Scholar.	  The	  former	  pick	  up	  those	  initiatives	  that	  receive	  some	  public	  attention;	  the	  latter	  allows	  me	  to	  filter	  through	  academic	  writings	  in	  search	  for	  case	  studies	  of	  mediation	  and	  conflict	  management.	  I	  also	  found	  several	  practitioners’	  efforts	  at	  mapping	  the	  NGO	  conflict	  resolution	  field,	  including	  Carter	  Center	  (1996),	  Mekenkamp	  et	  al.	  (1999),	  Herrberg	  and	  Kumpulainen	  (2008)	  and	  Fisas	  (2010).	  I	  consulted	  these	  sources	  for	  each	  conflict.	  Once	  I	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identified	  a	  list	  of	  organizations	  that	  were	  active	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  conflict,	  I	  refered	  to	  their	  websites	  and	  online	  material	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  work	  falls	  under	  my	  definition	  of	  T2+.	  Where	  detailed	  reports	  of	  relevant	  projects	  were	  not	  available	  I	  contacted	  organizations	  directly	  by	  email	  and/or	  phone,	  requested	  annual	  reports	  and	  conducted	  interviews	  whenever	  possible.	  However,	  the	  response	  rate	  was	  low,	  and	  some	  organizations	  were	  no	  longer	  operational	  or	  I	  could	  not	  find	  any	  contact	  information,	  making	  the	  sample	  potentially	  incomplete.	  Another	  limitation	  is	  that	  a	  number	  of	  NGO	  efforts	  are	  confidential	  by	  nature	  and	  those	  active	  in	  these	  initiatives	  are	  not	  at	  liberty	  to	  discuss	  their	  work	  (though	  my	  focus	  on	  past	  conflicts	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  organizations	  to	  share	  some	  information	  with	  me).	  Furthermore,	  academic	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  are	  underrepresented.	  Individuals	  active	  in	  conflict	  management	  who	  are	  connected	  to	  academic	  institutions	  often	  are	  seconded	  to	  other	  organizations	  for	  the	  time	  they	  work	  on	  a	  particular	  conflict.	  Individuals	  who	  mediate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  personal	  connection	  to	  one	  particular	  leader	  and	  without	  institutional	  support	  will	  only	  be	  listed	  if	  the	  effort	  was	  successful	  or	  at	  least	  garnered	  some	  attention	  by	  media	  or	  academics.	  	  Despite	  the	  difficulties	  in	  data	  collection	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  have	  a	  representative	  sample.	  It	  includes	  religious,	  professional	  and	  academic	  organizations;	  local	  and	  international	  ones;	  some	  with	  large	  operational	  budgets	  and	  some	  individuals.	  One	  might	  wonder	  if	  such	  disparate	  groups	  can	  usefully	  be	  compared.	  For	  example,	  international	  organizations	  have	  advantages	  over	  governmental	  mediators	  that	  are	  different	  from	  local	  peace	  efforts.	  While	  the	  foreign	  group	  may	  draw	  legitimacy	  from	  its	  expertise,	  track-­‐record	  and/or	  neutrality,	  the	  domestic	  conflict	  manager	  is	  a	  cultural	  insider	  who	  has	  to	  live	  with	  the	  results	  of	  any	  peace	  process	  (Wehr	  and	  Lederach	  1991,	  Svensson	  2013).	  While	  these	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are	  important	  distinctions,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  main	  advantages	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  mediation	  are	  present	  in	  all	  cases,	  for	  example	  that	  engagement	  with	  the	  enemy	  does	  not	  bestow	  legitimacy	  on	  the	  opponent.	  A	  list	  of	  all	  organizations	  included	  in	  the	  study	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  appendix,	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  the	  data	  follow	  below.	  
Examples	  	  	  I	  divide	  the	  types	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  included	  in	  the	  dataset	  into	  four	  categories:	  1)	  direct	  mediation,	  2)	  mediation	  support,	  3)	  problem-­‐solving	  workshop	  and	  high-­‐level	  dialogue,	  and	  4)	  training	  and	  capacity-­‐building,	  although	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  they	  are	  not	  always	  mutually	  exclusive.	  Later	  in	  this	  section	  I	  use	  initiatives	  in	  the	  civil	  conflict	  in	  Sudan	  to	  illustrate	  the	  different	  approaches.	  “Direct	  mediation”	  refers	  to	  assisted	  negotiations,	  where	  an	  outside	  party	  supports	  the	  process	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval	  2007).	  The	  form	  the	  support	  can	  take	  varies	  from	  facilitation	  of	  talks	  to	  formulating	  solutions.	  The	  conflict	  parties	  either	  meet	  face-­‐to-­‐face,	  or	  the	  mediator	  shuttles	  between	  them,	  but	  both	  sides	  agree	  on	  the	  role	  the	  third	  party	  is	  playing	  in	  the	  bargaining	  process.	  	  NGOs’	  efforts	  are	  coded	  as	  “mediation-­‐support”	  if	  they	  happen	  in	  the	  facilitation	  stage,	  attempting	  to	  move	  belligerents	  to	  the	  negotiation	  table,	  or	  if	  they	  happen	  concurrent	  with	  ongoing	  negotiations,	  but	  without	  the	  NGO	  as	  the	  designated	  mediator.	  This	  includes	  helping	  to	  set	  terms	  for	  negotiations,	  for	  example	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  go-­‐between	  for	  rebels	  and	  government	  actors.	  It	  further	  includes	  logistical	  support,	  e.g.	  providing	  a	  location	  for	  the	  opponents	  to	  meet.	  In	  some	  cases,	  NGOs	  have	  acted	  as	  witnesses	  to	  official	  negotiations.	  The	  third	  category,	  “problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and	  dialogue	  sessions,”	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  what	  Joseph	  Montville	  describes	  as	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy:	  “unofficial,	  non-­‐structured	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interaction”	  (Davidson	  and	  Montville	  1982,	  155)	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  changing	  the	  psychological	  dynamics	  of	  a	  conflict.	  Essential	  to	  these	  initiatives	  are	  confidentiality	  or	  even	  secrecy	  –	  anything	  can	  be	  said	  without	  exposure	  to	  the	  media	  or	  even	  constituencies	  at	  home.	  Examples	  are	  retreats	  for	  leaders,	  simulations	  in	  which	  parties	  may	  take	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  other	  side,	  and	  structured	  discussions	  in	  which	  parties	  have	  to	  hear	  each	  other	  out	  and	  acknowledge	  (though	  not	  accept)	  the	  other’s	  position.	  	  “Capacity-­‐building”	  is	  often	  characterized	  by	  its	  unilateral	  approach.	  While	  some	  negotiation	  workshops	  train	  both	  government	  and	  rebel	  leaders	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  most	  training	  initiatives	  focus	  on	  one	  side.	  In	  my	  coding	  for	  this	  category	  I	  also	  include	  efforts	  to	  reconcile	  different	  factions	  of	  a	  rebel	  movement,	  in	  cases	  where	  organizers	  see	  this	  reconciliation	  as	  an	  essential	  step	  towards	  finding	  a	  unified	  position	  for	  subsequent	  negotiations	  with	  the	  government,	  and	  thus	  towards	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict.	  It	  also	  includes	  support	  to	  one	  side	  of	  the	  conflict,	  for	  example	  by	  providing	  research	  to	  a	  conflict	  party	  in	  preparation	  for	  negotiations	  (e.g.	  Independent	  Diplomat’s	  work	  in	  gathering	  relevant	  insights	  regarding	  the	  diplomatic	  circumstances	  and	  options	  for	  actors	  like	  the	  Polisario	  Front	  in	  Western	  Sahara).	  	  The	  long-­‐lasting	  civil	  conflict	  in	  Sudan	  has	  experienced	  all	  four	  types	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  approaches.5	  In	  1995,	  former	  US	  president	  Jimmy	  Carter	  acted	  as	  mediator	  and	  secured	  a	  ceasefire	  between	  the	  government	  in	  Khartoum	  and	  rebels	  in	  South	  Sudan	  (van	  de	  Veen	  1999).	  He	  communicated	  with	  both	  sides	  and	  put	  forward	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The	  war	  over	  South	  Sudan’s	  secession	  and	  the	  conflict	  in	  Darfur	  have	  the	  same	  identifying	  number	  in	  the	  UCDP/PRIO	  dataset.	  I	  focus	  here	  on	  Darfur,	  but	  include	  an	  example	  of	  direct	  NGO	  mediation	  in	  the	  North-­‐South	  conflict	  because	  there	  is	  none	  for	  Darfur	  –	  the	  African	  Union	  and	  Sudan’s	  neighbors	  were	  relatively	  quick	  to	  offer	  mediation	  in	  Darfur,	  while	  NGOs	  focused	  on	  other	  T2+	  approaches.	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own	  proposal	  –	  a	  conditional,	  short-­‐term	  cessation	  of	  violence	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  public	  health	  campaign	  –	  which	  was	  accepted	  by	  government	  and	  opposition.	  Providing	  support	  for	  other	  actors’	  mediation	  efforts,	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  participated	  as	  observers	  in	  the	  2006	  Abuja	  peace	  talks	  between	  Khartoum	  and	  Darfur	  rebel	  groups.	  They	  made	  clear	  that	  in	  this	  case	  they	  would	  “not	  be	  taking	  part	  in	  any	  direct	  mediation,”	  leaving	  it	  to	  the	  African	  Union	  (Catholic	  Herald	  2005).	  Instead,	  they	  acted	  as	  observers	  of	  the	  process.	  Demonstrating	  that	  NGOs	  often	  use	  a	  mixed	  approach	  in	  their	  work,	  Sant’Egidio	  used	  the	  insights	  gained	  from	  the	  observation	  of	  earlier	  rounds	  of	  talks	  to	  subsequently	  train	  participants	  and	  prepare	  them	  for	  the	  next	  negotiation	  date	  (Catholic	  Herald	  2005).	  In	  2011,	  the	  Sudan	  Task	  Force	  at	  George	  Mason	  University’s	  School	  of	  Conflict	  Analysis	  and	  Resolution	  brought	  together	  representatives	  of	  various	  groups	  active	  in	  the	  Darfur	  region	  with	  Sudanese	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  workshop	  “designed	  to	  complement	  the	  official	  negotiations	  […],	  offering	  a	  forum	  for	  mutual	  conflict	  analysis	  and	  creative	  problem	  solving	  that	  avoids	  the	  constraints	  and	  pressures	  often	  associated	  with	  formal	  negotiations”	  (http://scar.gmu.edu/sudan-­‐task-­‐group/11766,	  accessed	  March	  12,	  2014).	  	  Lastly,	  the	  conflict	  in	  Darfur	  experienced	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  capacity-­‐building	  initiatives.	  A	  partial	  list	  includes:	  a	  2007	  initiative	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  Humanitarian	  Dialogue	  “aimed	  at	  building	  greater	  coherence	  within	  the	  opposition	  movements	  […].	  The	  overall	  aim	  of	  the	  HD	  Centre’s	  initiative	  was	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  SLM	  factions	  to	  re-­‐unite	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  comprehensive	  participation	  of	  the	  SLM	  in	  the	  process”	  (HD	  Centre	  2007);	  a	  July	  2008	  training	  workshop	  on	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  peacebuilding	  by	  the	  Mediation	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Support	  Project,	  organized	  a	  for	  the	  Sudan	  Liberation	  Movement,	  SLM	  (http://peacemediation.ch/tailor-­‐made-­‐trainings/sudandarfur,	  accessed	  March	  12,	  2014);	  a	  2009	  workshop	  developed	  by	  George	  Mason	  University’s	  Sudan	  Task	  Force	  with	  the	  “purpose	  […]	  to	  open	  the	  channels	  of	  communication,	  reconcile	  differences,	  foster	  a	  better	  understanding,	  and	  promote	  common	  ground	  among	  the	  movements,	  as	  a	  prelude	  to	  the	  future	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Government	  of	  Sudan”	  (http://scar.gmu.edu/sudan-­‐task-­‐group/11766,	  accessed	  March	  12,	  2014).	  
Descriptive	  data	   	  	   In	  the	  time	  period	  under	  observation	  –	  1990-­‐2010	  –	  I	  count	  76	  T2+	  efforts	  in	  21	  African	  civil	  conflicts,	  executed	  by	  44	  different	  organizations.	  Sixteen	  conflicts	  did	  not	  experience	  any	  T2+	  efforts.	  37	  rebel	  groups	  participated	  in	  the	  NGO	  initiatives.	  Figure	  4	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  initiatives	  over	  the	  time	  under	  observation.	  
Figure	  4:	  Number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  over	  time	  





No.	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  starting	  this	  time	  period	  No.	  of	  T2+	  mediation	  
No.	  of	  capacity-­‐building	  initiatives	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The	  conflict	  with	  most	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  efforts	  is	  the	  war	  in	  Sudan,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  longest-­‐lasting	  conflict	  in	  the	  sample.	  I	  code	  16	  T2+	  initiatives	  in	  Sudan.	  Burundi	  follows	  with	  15,	  then	  Uganda	  with	  11.	  The	  other	  conflicts	  experience	  one	  to	  four	  initiatives	  each.	  Figure	  5	  illustrates	  the	  approaches	  used	  in	  the	  different	  conflicts.	  Nine	  of	  the	  efforts	  in	  Sudan	  concerned	  the	  break-­‐away	  region	  of	  South	  Sudan,	  six	  the	  conflict	  in	  Darfur	  and	  one	  was	  more	  general	  capacity-­‐building	  for	  the	  government.	  Nine	  of	  the	  T2+	  initiatives	  in	  Uganda	  targeted	  the	  LRA.	  
Figure	  5:	  T2+	  initiatives	  by	  conflict	  





other	  Uganda	  Burundi	  Sudan	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approaches).	  From	  2000	  to	  2010,	  there	  are	  ten	  instances	  of	  direct	  mediation	  and	  21	  projects	  focusing	  on	  capacity	  building.	  	  
Figure	  6:	  T2+	  Approaches	  
	  24	  of	  the	  76	  NGO	  efforts	  were	  led	  by	  organizations	  or	  individuals	  affiliated	  with	  a	  religion.6	  The	  Catholic	  lay	  organization	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  alone	  is	  responsible	  for	  11	  peace	  initiatives.	  Other	  religiously	  motivated	  groups	  or	  initiatives	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  are	  inter-­‐faith	  committees	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Liberia,	  the	  Swedish	  Life	  and	  Peace	  Institute,	  Norwegian	  Church	  Aid,	  Pax	  Christi,	  and	  local	  church	  leaders	  in	  Guinea,	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo.	  	  Groups	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  (Carter,	  Nyerere,	  Moi)	  executed	  14	  initiatives;	  eight	  of	  those	  were	  direct	  mediations.	  Religious	  groups	  initiated	  11	  of	  the	  26	  direct	  mediations.	  Figure	  7	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  different	  activities	  for	  religiously	  motivated	  organizations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  There	  are	  a	  few	  individuals	  on	  my	  T2+	  list.	  I	  included	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  if	  they	  worked	  independently	  from	  an	  intergovernmental	  organization,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  individuals	  when	  there	  was	  information	  about	  their	  activities	  (e.g.	  the	  Bishop	  of	  Bissau,	  Settimio	  Ferrazzetta,	  mediated	  in	  the	  1998	  crisis	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau.)	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Figure	  7:	  T2+	  approaches	  by	  religious	  organizations	  ("mixed	  approach"	  is	  broken	  down	  to	  individual	  activities)	  
	  
	  
Roadmap	  	  The	  dissertation	  is	  divided	  into	  seven	  chapters	  and	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  the	  next	  chapter	  contains	  a	  review	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature,	  placing	  my	  questions	  and	  subsequent	  analyses	  into	  the	  fold	  of	  existing	  research.	  My	  work	  draws	  from	  a	  number	  of	  different	  research	  programs,	  including	  literature	  of	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  in	  civil	  wars,	  peace	  durability,	  non-­‐official	  diplomacy	  and	  mediation.	  The	  civil	  war	  literature	  has	  produced	  interesting	  research	  on	  the	  influences	  outsiders	  have	  on	  internal	  wars,	  including	  on	  civil	  war	  duration	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  societies.	  The	  mediation	  literature	  looks	  closer	  at	  non-­‐violent	  intervention	  methods,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  identity	  of	  mediators	  and	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  search	  for	  a	  settlement.	  Both	  civil	  war	  and	  mediation	  scholars	  increasingly	  use	  large-­‐N	  studies	  to	  test	  their	  hypotheses.	  The	  research	  program	  on	  tracks	  of	  diplomacy	  is	  smaller	  and	  primarily	  based	  on	  case	  studies.	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Instead	  of	  a	  separate	  theory	  chapter,	  I	  introduce	  arguments,	  theoretical	  models	  and	  testable	  hypotheses	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapters	  3	  through	  6,	  immediately	  followed	  by	  the	  empirical	  tests.	  An	  overview	  of	  all	  hypotheses	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  appendix.	  	  Chapter	  3	  focuses	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  I	  argue	  that	  non-­‐official	  diplomacy	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  dissertation	  will	  happen	  at	  times	  concurrent	  with,	  in	  place	  of,	  or	  in	  sequence	  with	  mediation	  by	  states	  or	  intergovernmental	  organizations.	  I	  consider	  which	  NGO	  activities	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  and	  whether	  the	  subset	  of	  organizations	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  are	  particularly	  likely	  precursors	  for	  high	  diplomacy.	  Chapter	  4	  considers	  the	  effect	  NGO	  mediation	  has	  on	  conflict	  termination	  and	  outcome.	  If	  the	  raison	  d’être	  of	  T2+	  organizations	  is	  to	  end	  wars,	  then	  their	  success	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  conflicts	  in	  which	  NGOs	  intervene	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  Separately,	  I	  consider	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  specific	  outcome	  of	  peace	  agreements.	  Chapter	  5	  tests	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  decreases	  conflict	  severity.	  A	  decline	  in	  the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  can	  be	  a	  direct	  outcome	  of	  an	  intervention,	  for	  example	  when	  a	  mediation	  initiative	  is	  accompanied	  by	  a	  temporary	  ceasefire.	  Or,	  as	  I	  hypothesize	  in	  this	  chapter,	  NGO	  efforts	  at	  changing	  the	  parties	  perception	  of	  each	  other	  and	  improving	  relations	  could	  show	  effects	  in	  that	  the	  conflict	  slowly	  becomes	  less	  deadly.	  One	  sub-­‐hypothesis	  considers	  the	  potential	  importance	  of	  number	  and	  duration	  of	  T2+	  programs	  for	  conflict	  severity.	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Chapter	  6	  analyzes	  potential	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  NGO	  mediation,	  proposing	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  during	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  will	  make	  subsequent	  peace	  more	  durable.	  Previous	  literature	  has	  found	  conflicting	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  long-­‐term	  success	  of	  mediation.	  Often	  mediation	  leads	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  agreement	  that	  eventually	  falls	  apart.	  My	  theory	  posits	  that	  mediation	  processes	  involving	  T2+	  should	  be	  more	  stable	  than	  those	  without	  T2+	  because	  of	  the	  unique	  contributions	  of	  non-­‐state	  peace	  making.	  I	  test	  whether	  terminated	  conflicts	  that	  at	  some	  point	  experienced	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  return	  to	  war	  than	  those	  conflicts	  not	  seeing	  T2+	  and	  whether	  the	  number	  and	  duration	  of	  NGO	  efforts	  are	  significant	  predictors	  for	  peace	  stability.	  All	  empirical	  chapters	  end	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  findings	  therein	  and	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  implications	  drawn	  from	  them.	  The	  concluding	  chapter	  (chapter	  7)	  reviews	  the	  results	  and	  lays	  out	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  dissertations’	  contributions	  to	  theory	  and	  practice.	  	  An	  astounding	  number	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  dispute	  resolution.	  Most	  internal	  conflicts	  see	  at	  least	  some	  conflict	  management	  activity	  spearheaded	  by	  NGOs,	  churches,	  and	  others.	  This	  dissertation	  acknowledges	  this	  reality	  and	  proposes	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  relates	  unofficial	  diplomacy	  to	  conflict	  duration,	  severity	  and	  other	  conflict	  dynamics.	  The	  tests	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  drawn	  from	  this	  framework	  are	  an	  important	  extension	  of	  research	  programs	  introduced	  in	  the	  literature	  chapter.	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Literature	  
Introduction	  	  There	  are	  several	  research	  programs	  that	  lend	  themselves	  to	  addressing	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  conflict	  resolution:	  the	  literature	  on	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  in	  wars;	  mediation	  and	  conflict	  resolution;	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  international	  relations.	  While	  drawing	  on	  all	  of	  these	  areas,	  this	  study	  is	  primarily	  grounded	  in	  the	  literature	  dealing	  with	  third-­‐party	  interventions,	  specifically	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  in	  civil	  wars.	  This	  research	  program	  has	  contributed	  much	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  influence	  outsiders	  have	  on	  conflict	  dynamics.	  Recent	  work	  deals	  primarily	  with	  civil	  conflicts,	  which	  are	  the	  predominant	  form	  of	  conflicts	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world.	  This	  literature	  systematically	  addresses	  the	  important	  questions	  of	  whether	  interventions	  by	  third	  parties	  shorten	  the	  duration	  of	  conflicts,	  how	  they	  influence	  conflict	  dynamics	  like	  the	  severity	  of	  fighting,	  and	  how	  third	  parties	  can	  make	  peace	  more	  sustainable.	  However,	  scholars	  in	  this	  tradition	  have	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  third	  parties	  that	  are	  not	  states	  or	  intergovernmental	  organizations.	  I	  address	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  literature,	  among	  others	  by	  drawing	  on	  case	  study	  approaches	  favored	  by	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  early	  mediation	  scholars.	  This	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  The	  section	  following	  the	  introduction	  reviews	  the	  literature	  on	  civil	  wars	  and	  the	  factors	  impacting	  their	  duration,	  outcome,	  severity,	  and	  the	  potential	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  violence	  after	  the	  conflict	  parties	  sign	  an	  agreement.	  The	  next	  section	  focuses	  on	  third-­‐party	  interventions,	  one	  element	  found	  in	  previous	  research	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  civil	  war	  duration.	  The	  fourth	  section	  addresses	  one	  particular	  type	  of	  third-­‐party	  interventions:	  mediation,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  non-­‐state	  actor	  conflict	  resolution.	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This	  section	  also	  considers	  the	  issue	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  international	  relations	  theory	  and	  practice.	  Particular	  emphasis	  is	  given	  to	  literature	  discussing	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  conflict	  management.	  The	  section	  reviews	  previous	  concepts	  of	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  and	  place	  it	  in	  the	  larger	  literature.	  The	  conclusion	  addresses	  the	  inter-­‐connection	  of	  the	  different	  strands	  of	  research	  as	  well	  as	  the	  gaps	  my	  dissertation	  aims	  to	  close.	  	  
Civil	  wars	  
Definition	  	  A	  civil	  war	  is	  “armed	  combat	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  recognized	  sovereign	  entity	  between	  parties	  subject	  to	  a	  common	  authority	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  hostilities”	  (Kalyvas	  2006).	  While	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  civil	  war	  is	  hardly	  new,	  scholarly	  interest	  in	  it	  has	  expanded	  significantly	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Comparative	  studies	  of	  ethnic	  conflict	  received	  new	  relevance	  with	  the	  wars	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  during	  the	  1990s	  (Gurr	  2000,	  Mueller	  2000,	  Gagnon	  2004).	  Further,	  the	  continuing	  decline	  in	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  conflict	  led	  international	  relations	  researchers	  to	  shift	  their	  focus	  from	  inter-­‐state	  to	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts.7	  The	  boom	  of	  studies	  of	  civil	  wars	  has	  tackled	  the	  causes	  of	  civil	  war	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  2004,	  Blimes	  2006,	  Hegre	  and	  Sambanis	  2006,	  Jakobsen	  et	  al.	  2013;	  see	  Dixon	  2009a	  for	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  pertinent	  quantitative	  literature),	  determinates	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  conflicts	  (Kalyvas	  and	  Kocher	  2007,	  Humphreys	  and	  Weinstein	  2008),	  termination	  (see	  Dixon	  2009b	  for	  an	  overview)	  and,	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In	  2012,	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  (UCDP)	  recorded	  only	  one	  inter-­‐state	  war	  –	  between	  Sudan	  and	  South	  Sudan	  –	  but	  23	  intra-­‐state,	  and	  eight	  internationalized	  armed	  conflicts.	  Thirteen	  of	  those	  conflicts	  were	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (UCDP/PRIO	  Armed	  Conflict	  Dataset	  v.4-­‐2013).	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large	  number	  of	  studies,	  duration	  (Balch-­‐Lindsay	  and	  Enterline	  2000,	  Elbadawi	  and	  Sambanis	  2000,	  Collier	  et	  al	  2004,	  Regan	  and	  Aydin	  2006,	  Kirschner	  2010).	  	  
Duration	  	  Brandt	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  give	  three	  explanations	  for	  the	  preoccupation	  with	  civil	  war	  duration:	  civil	  wars	  tend	  to	  last	  longer	  than	  inter-­‐state	  wars,	  so	  that	  they	  accumulate	  over	  time,	  leading	  to	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  overall	  wars	  in	  the	  world;	  longer	  duration	  of	  conflicts	  exacerbates	  their	  overall	  destructiveness	  and	  increase	  casualty	  rates;	  duration	  and	  outcome	  are	  intimately	  linked	  and	  the	  longer	  a	  war	  lasts	  the	  less	  likely	  is	  a	  decisive	  victory	  of	  either	  side.	  	  A	  number	  of	  factors	  have	  been	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  determining	  the	  length	  of	  civil	  wars,	  including	  characteristics	  of	  the	  conflict	  parties,	  the	  conflict	  itself,	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  outsiders.	  According	  to	  Collier	  et	  al.	  (2004),	  lower	  opportunity	  costs	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  will	  spur	  unrest	  and	  contribute	  to	  longer	  wars.	  They	  also	  find	  significant	  effects	  of	  rebel	  financial	  opportunities,	  in	  particular	  lootable	  natural	  resources,	  which	  can	  sustain	  rebellions	  long-­‐term.	  Geography	  can	  be	  an	  important	  factor:	  control	  over	  terrain	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  access	  gives	  fighters	  safe	  havens	  (Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003).	  Similarly,	  rebels	  with	  access	  to	  bases	  in	  neighboring	  countries	  can	  regroup	  easily	  (Salehyan	  2009).	  Cunningham	  (2006)	  explains	  the	  variation	  in	  duration	  with	  the	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  who	  have	  to	  approve	  a	  potential	  settlement:	  the	  more	  parties	  are	  involved,	  the	  more	  difficult	  are	  negotiated	  outcomes.8	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Shirkey	  (2012)	  puts	  forward	  a	  similar	  argument	  regarding	  interstate	  wars:	  when	  states	  enter	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  they	  will	  prolong	  it	  by	  introducing	  new	  issues	  to	  be	  bargained	  over.	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Besides	  physical	  factors,	  psychology	  may	  influence	  the	  length	  of	  conflicts.	  Elbadawi	  and	  Sambanis	  (2000)	  argue	  that	  identity-­‐driven	  wars	  last	  longer	  than	  those	  that	  are	  motivated	  by	  political	  considerations	  alone.	  In	  ethnically	  heterogeneous	  countries	  appeals	  to	  ethnic	  identity	  may	  be	  a	  good	  recruitment	  tool	  for	  insurgents.	  The	  correlation	  between	  ethnic	  motivation	  and	  war	  duration	  has	  been	  confirmed	  by	  other	  studies,	  e.g.	  Montalvo	  and	  Reynal-­‐Querol	  (2007).	  A	  related	  argument	  proposes	  that	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  opponent’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  can	  prolong	  strife	  (Walter	  2002,	  Kirschner	  2010).	  In	  ethnic	  confrontations,	  fear	  of	  the	  other	  groups	  may	  be	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  dispel.	  Outside	  support	  and	  monitoring	  can	  help	  to	  overcome	  information	  and	  commitment	  problems,	  thus	  potentially	  leading	  to	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  more	  sustainable	  peace	  (Walter	  2002).	  Other	  effects	  of	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  are	  discussed	  below.	  	  There	  are	  no	  consistent	  results	  regarding	  the	  effect	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  conflict	  has	  on	  war	  duration,	  but	  one	  study	  finds	  a	  curvilinear	  relationship,	  implying	  that	  very	  high	  and	  very	  low	  levels	  of	  atrocities	  are	  correlated	  with	  shorter	  wars	  than	  moderate	  levels	  of	  atrocities	  (Kirschner	  2007).	  Extreme	  violence	  may	  lead	  to	  war	  fatigue	  and	  an	  increased	  interest	  in	  ceasefire	  and	  peace	  negotiations	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  receiving	  party.	  Conversely,	  it	  could	  entrench	  the	  adversaries	  and	  make	  finding	  common	  ground	  much	  harder.	  
Outcome	  Many	  studies	  point	  to	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  conflict	  duration	  and	  outcome	  (e.g.	  DeRouen	  and	  Sobek	  2004,	  Brandt	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Cunningham	  et	  al.	  2009).	  DeRouen	  and	  Sobek’s	  (2004)	  competing	  risks	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  rebel	  victory	  is	  exceedingly	  small	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  war,	  but	  increases	  substantially	  over	  time.	  The	  dynamic	  is	  the	  opposite	  for	  government	  victory:	  as	  the	  war	  drags	  on,	  the	  chance	  for	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military	  victory	  decreases	  for	  the	  government.	  Longer	  conflicts	  sow	  doubts	  in	  the	  government’s	  strength,	  and	  give	  rebels	  time	  to	  mobilize	  support.	  	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  Brandt	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  find	  that	  a	  decisive	  victory	  on	  either	  side	  becomes	  less	  likely	  over	  time.	  This	  finding	  leads	  to	  an	  interesting	  conclusion:	  the	  less	  likely	  a	  victory	  of	  either	  side	  becomes,	  the	  more	  likely	  is	  the	  development	  of	  a	  “hurting	  stalemate”	  –	  and	  the	  more	  probable	  are	  some	  sort	  of	  negotiations	  (the	  increased	  likelihood	  of	  conflict	  termination	  by	  treaty	  supports	  this	  argument,	  DeRouen	  and	  Sobek	  2004),	  possibly	  with	  third-­‐party	  mediation.	  Besides	  conflict	  duration	  itself,	  how	  a	  conflict	  ends	  depends	  on	  the	  opponents	  capabilities,	  regime	  type,	  rebel	  identities,	  and	  help	  from	  outside.	  	  State	  capacity	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  government	  victory,	  but	  results	  are	  mixed:	  DeRouen	  and	  Sobek	  (2004)	  do	  not	  find	  that	  army	  size	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  government	  victory,	  but	  Mason	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  and	  Brandt	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  find	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis.	  The	  literature	  is	  more	  consistent	  regarding	  rebel	  capability.	  Rebel	  capacity	  relative	  to	  government	  forces	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  military	  rebel	  victory	  and	  shortens	  the	  conflict	  duration	  (Gent	  2008,	  Cunningham	  at	  al.	  2013).	  	  Democratic	  states	  face	  greater	  constraints	  in	  dealing	  with	  rebellions.	  In	  fact,	  previous	  research	  argues	  that	  democracies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  lose	  wars	  against	  weaker	  opponents	  because	  of	  the	  expectations	  (and	  casualty	  sensitivity)	  of	  their	  citizens	  (Merom	  2003).	  Addressing	  identity	  issues	  that	  have	  seen	  little	  mention	  in	  the	  civil	  war	  outcome	  literature,	  Svensson	  (2007a)	  explains	  that	  negotiated	  settlements	  are	  less	  likely	  if	  one	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party’s	  demands	  are	  grounded	  in	  religious	  beliefs	  because	  compromise	  is	  impossible	  on	  indivisible	  issues.	  	  Outside	  influences	  can	  affect	  conflict	  outcomes,	  too.	  Military	  support	  for	  one	  side	  can	  tip	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  supported	  party.	  Gent	  (2008)	  proposes	  that	  support	  for	  the	  challengers	  will	  make	  rebel	  victory	  more	  likely.	  DeRouen	  and	  Sobek	  (2009)	  show	  that	  involvement	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  conflict	  ends	  in	  a	  truce	  or	  treaty.	  
Severity	  Civil	  war	  severity	  is	  less	  studied	  than	  duration.	  Yet	  even	  within	  the	  small	  body	  of	  literature	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  severity	  varies.	  Some	  authors	  rely	  on	  battle	  deaths	  counts	  (Lacina	  2006,	  Heger	  and	  Saleyan	  2007,	  Lujala	  2009),	  others	  focus	  on	  civilian	  deaths	  (Azam	  2002,	  Valentino	  et	  al	  2004,	  Kalyvas	  2009),	  or	  the	  occurrence	  of	  atrocities	  and	  genocide	  (Krain	  1997,	  Harff	  2003).	  These	  varying	  definitions	  may	  account	  for	  divergent	  findings.	  There	  is	  some	  agreement	  that	  regime	  type,	  military	  quality	  and	  natural	  resources	  deposits	  are	  contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  number	  of	  violent	  deaths	  in	  a	  civil	  conflict.	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  state	  at	  war	  seems	  the	  most	  important	  determinant	  for	  civil	  war	  severity.	  Of	  all	  countries	  that	  experience	  civil	  war,	  conflicts	  in	  democracies	  are	  associated	  with	  fewer	  battle	  deaths	  (Lacina	  2006).	  Heger	  and	  Saleyhan	  (2007)	  argue	  that	  the	  comparatively	  larger	  size	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  in	  a	  democracy	  will	  constrain	  leaders.	  Also,	  smaller	  governing	  coalitions	  usually	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  and	  are	  thus	  more	  likely	  to	  go	  along	  with	  increased	  government	  repression	  in	  order	  to	  (politically	  and	  physically)	  survive.	  This	  finding	  supports	  Harff’s	  (2003)	  results	  that	  regimes	  built	  on	  the	  support	  of	  a	  small	  ethnic	  group	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  escalate	  an	  internal	  conflict	  to	  genocide.	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  Besides	  the	  internal	  balance	  of	  power	  prior	  to	  the	  conflict,	  third-­‐party	  involvement	  during	  the	  war	  may	  affect	  the	  severity	  of	  conflicts.	  Specifically,	  military	  assistance	  to	  the	  government	  and	  the	  increased	  military	  advantage	  this	  brings	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  more	  battle	  deaths	  (Lacina	  2006).9	  Similarly,	  as	  rebels	  gain	  strength	  relative	  to	  the	  government,	  battles	  become	  more	  intense	  and	  more	  people	  die	  (Heger	  and	  Saleyhan	  2007).	  	  One	  way	  to	  sustain	  a	  rebellion	  is	  the	  extraction	  of	  lootable	  resources.	  There	  are	  two	  theories	  in	  which	  natural	  resources	  might	  be	  linked	  to	  conflict	  severity:	  if	  “greed”	  is	  the	  primary	  motivation	  for	  civil	  conflict,	  then	  fighting	  should	  be	  spatial	  and	  temporally	  limited,	  but	  difficult	  to	  end	  (Addison,	  Le	  Billon	  and	  Murshed	  2003).	  However,	  violence	  against	  civilians	  in	  the	  extraction	  zone	  might	  be	  particularly	  brutal	  if	  rebels	  are	  not	  reliant	  on	  them	  for	  support	  and	  are	  only	  looking	  out	  for	  their	  personal	  short-­‐term	  gain	  (Weinstein	  2007).	  Lujala	  (2009)	  finds	  that	  conflicts	  in	  areas	  where	  drugs	  are	  grown	  is	  less	  bloody,	  while	  diamonds,	  oil	  or	  gas	  within	  the	  conflict	  zone	  are	  associated	  with	  more	  battle	  deaths.	  
Sustainable	  peace	  Some	  factors	  that	  play	  a	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  during	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  have	  been	  found	  to	  also	  affect	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  eventual	  truce	  to	  hold.	  Although	  in	  most	  internal	  conflicts	  the	  warring	  parties	  sign	  peace	  agreements	  at	  some	  point,	  a	  substantial	  percentage	  of	  these	  conflicts	  descend	  into	  violence	  again	  within	  five	  years	  (Licklider	  1995).	  Thirty-­‐six	  per	  cent	  of	  African	  civil	  conflicts	  from	  1990	  to	  2010	  experienced	  a	  relapse	  into	  violence	  after	  the	  fighting	  had	  stopped.	  Some	  wars	  see	  only	  a	  brief	  interruption	  in	  the	  fighting	  for	  a	  month	  or	  a	  year.	  Others	  seemingly	  end	  for	  good,	  just	  to	  re-­‐start	  years	  afterwards.	  Because	  of	  an	  increasing	  awareness	  that	  peace	  after	  conflict	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  I	  did	  not	  find	  any	  analysis	  of	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  non-­‐violent	  interventions	  on	  civil	  war	  severity.	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fragile	  and	  often	  does	  not	  last,	  conflict	  resolution	  practitioners,	  diplomats	  and	  researchers	  have	  widened	  their	  focus	  beyond	  the	  matter	  of	  getting	  warring	  parties	  to	  sign	  an	  agreement.	  What	  are	  the	  factors	  that	  make	  some	  ceasefires	  permanent	  and	  others	  fall	  apart,	  some	  conflicts	  end	  for	  good	  and	  others	  reemerge?	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  the	  willingness	  or	  capability	  for	  peace	  are	  just	  not	  there	  (Zartman	  1985);	  there	  may	  be	  spoilers	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  continuing	  war	  –	  especially	  in	  conflicts	  that	  were	  fought	  by	  more	  than	  two	  parties	  (Stedman	  1997,	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000).	  Meddling	  neighbors	  (Downs	  and	  Stedman	  2002)	  or	  the	  availability	  of	  lootable	  resources	  can	  fuel	  continuing	  violence	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  2002,	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2006).	  Studies	  have	  explored	  whether	  conflicts	  over	  more	  intractable	  issues,	  namely	  identity,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  resume,	  with	  some	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  (Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000).	  Gurses	  and	  Rost	  (2013)	  find	  support	  for	  their	  hypothesis	  that	  government	  discrimination	  against	  ethnic	  groups	  involved	  in	  prior	  conflict	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  reemergence	  of	  violence.	  The	  intensity	  of	  the	  fighting	  preceding	  any	  agreement	  could	  influence	  the	  durability	  of	  any	  peace:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  higher	  death	  tolls	  will	  make	  reconciliation	  with	  the	  other	  side	  more	  difficult	  (Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000).	  Conversely,	  extreme	  violence	  could	  lead	  to	  war	  weariness	  and	  to	  a	  stronger	  commitment	  to	  a	  durable	  peace	  (Fortna	  2004a).	  	  	  According	  to	  Walter	  (2002)	  durable	  peace	  is	  a	  three-­‐step	  process:	  first,	  belligerents	  have	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  sit	  down	  and	  negotiate;	  second,	  they	  have	  to	  find	  an	  acceptable	  compromise	  solution;	  third,	  the	  negotiated	  agreement	  has	  to	  be	  implemented.	  Some	  wars	  end	  without	  a	  peace	  agreement	  when	  one	  side	  wins	  outright.	  Studies	  have	  found	  that	  these	  decisive	  victories	  lead	  to	  more	  stable	  peace	  (Licklider	  1995,	  Fortna	  2004a,	  Toft	  2010).	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Military	  stalemate	  and	  compromises	  may	  leave	  parties	  wondering	  whether	  they	  can	  win	  the	  next	  round	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  In	  this	  case,	  they	  will	  be	  less	  committed	  to	  upholding	  any	  agreement.	  	  Badran	  (2014)	  posits	  that	  peace	  agreements	  are	  more	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  sustainable	  peace	  than	  military	  victory	  if	  they	  are	  designed	  strongly,	  i.e.	  if	  they	  contain	  detailed	  structural	  and	  procedural	  provisions.	  Regarding	  the	  content	  of	  peace	  plans,	  certain	  mechanisms,	  power-­‐sharing	  agreements	  in	  particular,	  have	  been	  found	  to	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  a	  successful	  implementation	  (Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  2007,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010).10	  Proponents	  of	  power-­‐sharing	  mechanisms	  argue	  that	  joint	  government	  responsibilities	  require	  a	  collaborative	  spirit.	  Thus,	  belligerents	  need	  to	  change	  their	  confrontational	  approach	  and	  develop	  a	  positive	  sum	  perception	  of	  political	  interactions	  (Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  2007,	  318).	  	  	  The	  process	  of	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  will	  be	  correlated	  with	  its	  success,	  too.	  Opponents	  may	  sign	  a	  pact	  that	  in	  the	  moment	  seems	  to	  address	  all	  their	  concerns,	  but	  one	  or	  more	  parties	  might	  renege	  after	  the	  signing	  ceremony.	  Reneging	  may	  occur	  when	  the	  signatory	  has	  not	  spoken	  for	  all	  factions	  in	  his	  party,	  or	  has	  overstepped	  his	  mandate	  or	  conceded	  too	  much.	  DeRouen	  and	  Chowdry	  (2013)	  propose	  that	  outside	  mediation	  will	  decrease	  the	  risk	  of	  new	  conflict	  following	  a	  peace	  agreement.	  The	  authors	  explain	  that	  mediation	  in	  the	  negotiation	  phase	  can	  enhance	  the	  chances	  of	  success	  in	  the	  implementation	  phase	  by	  alleviating	  mistrust	  between	  the	  parties.11	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Yet,	  DeRouen,	  Wallensteen	  and	  Lea	  (2009)	  do	  not	  find	  that	  power-­‐sharing	  provisions	  lead	  to	  longer-­‐lasting	  peace.	  11	  Conflictingly,	  Quinn	  et	  al.’s	  (2013)	  study	  of	  mediation	  in	  ethnic	  intrastate	  conflict	  in	  Africa	  finds	  that	  while	  mediation	  in	  a	  crisis	  leads	  to	  formal	  agreements,	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  significant	  correlation	  between	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Even	  if	  a	  successfully	  negotiated	  treaty	  officially	  terminates	  a	  war,	  sustainable	  peace	  also	  needs	  success	  in	  the	  implementation	  stage.	  Walter	  (2002)	  argues	  that	  in	  civil	  conflict	  settings	  requirements	  of	  demobilization	  and	  disarmament	  from	  the	  side	  of	  the	  rebels	  leaves	  them	  extremely	  vulnerable	  to	  government	  surprise	  attacks	  during	  the	  early	  implementation	  period.	  Walter	  finds	  that	  agreements	  that	  include	  third-­‐party	  security	  guarantees	  and	  credible	  third-­‐party	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  will	  increase	  the	  probability	  that	  peace	  treaties	  will	  survive.	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  (2010)	  add	  that	  third	  parties	  can	  help	  overcome	  information	  asymmetries	  that	  might	  threaten	  the	  stability	  of	  agreements.	  Research	  on	  United	  Nations	  peacekeeping	  missions	  concurs	  that	  peace	  is	  more	  durable	  if	  the	  UN	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  implementation	  phase	  (Fortna	  2008,	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000,	  Gilligan	  and	  Sergenti	  2008).	  	  	  Many	  failed,	  and	  most	  successful,	  peace	  agreements	  were	  brokered	  by	  outsiders	  (Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2006).	  Autesserre	  (2010)	  explains	  the	  bad	  track	  record	  of	  international	  mediators	  in	  regards	  to	  long-­‐term	  conflict	  resolution	  with	  a	  misguided	  international	  peace-­‐building	  culture	  that	  focuses	  on	  national-­‐level	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  rushed	  elections.	  A	  third-­‐party	  intervention	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  short-­‐term	  truce,	  but	  the	  peacekeeping	  intervention’s	  commitment	  will	  be	  questioned	  if	  too	  few	  resources	  (human	  or	  personnel)	  are	  allocated	  (Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2006,	  Beardsley	  2013).	  In	  some	  cases,	  domestic	  interests	  of	  the	  states	  involved	  in	  the	  peacekeeping	  effort	  may	  trump	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  country	  in	  transition	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1996).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  mediation	  and	  long-­‐term	  conflict	  resolution.	  See	  also	  Beardsley	  (2012)	  and	  below	  for	  more	  on	  mediation’s	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  effects.	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This	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  makes	  one	  thing	  clear:	  third	  parties	  –	  from	  mediators	  of	  all	  stripes	  to	  United	  Nations	  peacekeeping	  forces	  –	  are	  common,	  and	  often	  necessary	  to	  bring	  about	  and	  implement	  peace	  agreements	  (though	  they	  rarely	  do	  a	  good	  job	  at	  the	  implementation	  phase).	  Guaranteeing	  peace	  agreements	  (Walter	  2002)	  is	  one	  of	  many	  types	  of	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  in	  ongoing	  conflicts.	  
Third-­‐party	  intervention	  in	  civil	  wars	  	  	   A	  third-­‐party	  intervention	  is	  an	  action	  by	  a	  foreign	  actor	  who	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  party	  to	  a	  conflict.	  According	  to	  Regan	  (2000,	  9)	  “intervention	  is	  the	  use	  of	  one	  state’s	  resources	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  influence	  the	  internal	  conflict	  of	  another	  state.”	  This	  definition	  underlines	  the	  initial	  focus	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  state	  interventions,	  but	  Regan	  mentions	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  non-­‐state	  intervention,	  for	  example	  actions	  taken	  by	  intergovernmental	  organizations.	  Research	  on	  third-­‐party	  intervention	  has	  primarily	  focused	  on	  biased	  military	  and	  economic	  intervention	  in	  times	  of	  active	  fighting	  (e.g.	  Regan	  2000,	  Cunningham	  2010).	  But	  interventions	  may	  happen	  at	  any	  time:	  before	  a	  violent	  conflict	  breaks	  out	  (Regan	  2010),	  when	  parties	  are	  looking	  for	  a	  peace-­‐broker	  (Bercovitch	  and	  Schneider	  2000),	  and	  after	  a	  peace	  treaty	  has	  signed	  (Walter	  2002).	  They	  can	  occur	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  conflict,	  or	  as	  neutral	  interventions.	  The	  latter	  are	  often	  considered	  under	  the	  category	  of	  “diplomatic	  interventions”	  (Regan	  et	  al.	  2009).	  This	  subset	  of	  interventions	  includes	  third-­‐party	  mediation	  attempts,	  international	  forums,	  and	  the	  recall	  of	  ambassadors.	  While	  most	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  interventions	  in	  their	  dataset	  are	  state-­‐driven,	  they	  include	  mediation	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  Most	  studies	  to-­‐date,	  however,	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  states	  as	  intervener	  (e.g.	  Regan	  2000,	  Gleditsch	  and	  Beardsley	  2004,	  Cunningham	  2010).	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   Major	  –	  and	  interwined	  -­‐	  questions	  addressed	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  include	  who	  intervenes	  and	  why	  (Carment	  and	  James	  1996,	  Regan	  2000,	  Findley	  and	  Teo	  2006,	  Aydin	  2010),	  and	  especially	  whether	  interventions	  shorten	  conflicts	  or	  maybe	  prolong	  them	  (Balch-­‐Lindsay	  and	  Enterline,	  2000,	  Elbadawi	  and	  Sambanis	  2000).	  Most	  interventions	  -­‐	  at	  least	  publicly	  acknowledged	  ones	  –	  are	  conducted	  with	  the	  expressed	  goal	  to	  end	  an	  ongoing	  conflict;	  to	  end	  the	  violence,	  avert	  humanitarian	  disasters,	  etc.,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  always	  succeed	  in	  this.	  A	  number	  of	  studies	  find	  that	  outside	  interventions	  in	  fact	  tend	  to	  prolong	  civil	  wars	  (e.g.	  Balch-­‐Lindsay	  and	  Enterline	  2000,	  Regan	  2002).	  However,	  Regan	  (2002)	  points	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  endogeneity.	  Interventions	  may	  not	  prolong	  wars	  after	  all,	  but	  instead	  interveners	  choose	  to	  intervene	  in	  particularly	  protracted	  conflicts	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  end	  without	  external	  intervention.	  Type	  and	  timing	  of	  the	  interventions	  matter:	  United	  Nations	  peace-­‐keeping	  interventions,	  a	  special	  type	  of	  third-­‐party	  intervention,	  decrease	  the	  expected	  time	  until	  a	  truce	  or	  treaty	  (DeRouen	  and	  Sobek	  2004).	  Balch-­‐Lindsay	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  limit	  their	  observations	  to	  military	  interventions	  and	  find	  that	  interventions	  make	  military	  victory	  by	  the	  supported	  party	  more	  likely.	  Balanced	  military	  interventions	  make	  a	  negotiated	  outcome	  much	  less	  likely	  and	  favor	  continuation	  of	  the	  fighting.	  When	  we	  consider	  that	  those	  states	  that	  intervene	  in	  conflict	  have	  their	  own	  interests	  that	  not	  necessarily	  include	  a	  speedy	  end	  to	  the	  war,	  findings	  that	  military	  interventions	  prolong	  wars	  are	  less	  surprising	  (Cunningham	  2010).	  	  Regan	  and	  Aydin	  (2006)	  argue	  that	  diplomatic	  (primarily	  mediation)	  attempts	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  shorter	  civil	  wars.	  They	  also	  calculate	  that	  economic	  interventions	  can	  substantially	  shorten	  conflicts	  if	  they	  are	  used	  in	  connection	  with	  diplomatic	  interventions.	  As	  for	  the	  timing	  of	  interventions,	  Regan	  and	  Aydin	  explain	  that	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diplomatic	  interventions	  are	  most	  effective	  in	  the	  “middle	  stages”	  of	  a	  conflict.12	  Further	  information	  about	  mediation	  as	  a	  conflict	  management	  mechanism	  can	  be	  gleamed	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  mediation	  and	  conflict	  resolution.	  
Mediation	  and	  other	  conflict	  management	  
Defining	  mediation	  Mediation,	  the	  most	  common	  conflict	  management	  strategy	  in	  international	  conflicts,	  is	  defined	  as	  	  “a	  process	   of	   conflict	  management,	   related	   to	  but	  distinct	   from	   the	  parties’	  own	  negotiations,	  where	  those	  in	  conflict	  seek	  the	  assistance	  of,	  or	  accept	  an	  offer	   of	   help	   from,	   an	   outsider	   (whether	   an	   individual,	   an	   organization,	   a	  group,	   or	   a	   state)	   to	   change	   their	   perceptions	   or	   behavior,	   and	   to	   do	   so	  without	   resorting	   to	   physical	   force	   or	   invoking	   the	   authority	   of	   law”	  (Bercovitch	  2007,	  167-­‐168).	  As	  in	  the	  intervention	  literature,	  questions	  regarding	  mediation	  fall	  into	  three	  categories:	  What	  are	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  mediator?	  What	  are	  the	  motives	  of	  the	  conflict	  parties	  to	  accept	  mediation	  (Bercovitch	  and	  Schneider	  2000,	  Greig	  and	  Regan	  2008)?	  Is	  mediation	  successful	  in	  ending	  the	  conflict?	  	  
Defining	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  Besides	  direct	  mediation,	  non-­‐governmental	  groups	  also	  undertake	  other	  conflict	  management	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  efforts,	  including	  “track-­‐two	  diplomacy.”	  The	  concept	  of	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  was	  introduced	  in	  1981	  by	  Joseph	  Montville	  and	  refers	  in	  its	  basic	  form	  to	  “unofficial,	  non-­‐structured	  interaction”	  (Davidson	  and	  Montville	  1981,	  155).	  Montville	  analyzes	  conflicts	  from	  a	  psychological	  perspective	  and	  suggests	  that	  unofficial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  finding	  is	  not	  helpful	  for	  policy	  prescription,	  as	  we	  only	  can	  know	  post	  hoc	  when	  a	  conflict	  is	  in	  this	  phase.	  It	  also	  contradicts	  Regan	  and	  Stam	  (2000)	  who	  find	  that	  mediation	  efforts	  in	  interstate	  conflicts	  shorten	  disputes	  if	  they	  happen	  early	  or	  late	  in	  the	  conflict,	  but	  may	  have	  little	  effect	  in	  the	  intermediate	  part.	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efforts,	  from	  cultural	  exchange	  programs	  to	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  in	  a	  non-­‐threatening	  environment,	  could	  support	  official	  diplomatic	  efforts	  by	  exposing	  adversaries’	  common	  humanity.	  Definitions	  of	  the	  concept	  vary.	  Çelik	  and	  Blum	  (2007,	  53),	  for	  example,	  define	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  as	  “informal	  attempts,	  involving	  small	  numbers	  of	  individuals,	  with	  the	  […]	  objectives	  of	  changing	  perceptions,	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes.”	  	  An	  ambitious	  effort	  to	  develop	  a	  systematic	  framework	  for	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  was	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Institute	  for	  Multi-­‐Track	  Diplomacy	  (Diamond	  and	  McDonald	  1996).	  The	  authors’	  main	  argument	  is	  that	  one	  label	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  all	  unofficial	  diplomatic	  activities,	  so	  they	  split	  the	  field	  of	  track	  two	  into	  nine	  streams,	  including	  conflict	  resolution	  professionals,	  business,	  religion,	  media,	  training,	  etc.	  They	  furthermore	  insist	  that	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy,	  the	  official	  government	  interaction,	  is	  only	  one	  track	  among	  many	  and	  has	  no	  hierarchical	  priority.	  Important	  as	  a	  first	  attempt	  to	  bring	  order	  in	  the	  track-­‐two	  world,	  Diamond	  and	  McDonald’s	  framework	  nevertheless	  did	  not	  catch	  on.	  One	  may	  debate	  whether	  the	  nine	  categories	  are	  necessary	  and	  helpful.	  Furthermore,	  the	  classification	  of	  official	  diplomacy	  as	  just	  one	  of	  nine	  equally	  important	  tracks	  is	  questionable	  or	  maybe	  even	  naïve.	  Montville	  (1981,	  155)	  was	  very	  clear	  that	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  cannot	  replace	  official	  diplomacy:	  “reasonable	  and	  altruistic	  interaction	  with	  foreign	  countries	  cannot	  be	  an	  alternative	  to	  traditional	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy,	  with	  its	  official	  posturing	  and	  its	  underlying	  threat	  of	  the	  use	  of	  force.”	  Thus,	  track	  two	  has	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  complementary	  to	  track	  one.	  Unofficial	  and	  official	  efforts	  may	  address	  the	  same	  conflict	  simultaneously	  or	  sequentially.	  Other	  extensions	  of	  the	  concept	  introduce	  “track	  1.5”,	  or	  “private	  diplomacy”	  (Herrberg	  2008),	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs)	  with	  the	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goal	  of	  conflict-­‐resolution	  (pursuing	  it	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  mechanisms),	  who	  closely	  interact	  with	  track-­‐one	  official	  diplomacy.	  Classic	  track-­‐two	  modes	  of	  operation	  often	  are	  centered	  on	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  (developed	  by	  John	  Burton	  and	  advanced	  by	  Herbert	  Kelman,	  see	  Fisher	  1997),	  facilitations	  (Edward	  Azar	  was	  a	  pioneer)	  or	  human	  relations	  seminars	  (Leonard	  Doob).	  Examples	  include:	  Burton’s	  workshops	  with	  representatives	  of	  Malaysia,	  Indonesia	  and	  Singapore	  in	  the	  1960s	  which	  developed	  a	  framework	  for	  settlement	  of	  the	  conflict	  (Burton	  1969),	  Azar’s	  forums	  with	  British	  and	  Argentine	  delegates	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Azar	  1990),	  and	  a	  number	  of	  initiatives	  in	  the	  Israeli-­‐Palestinian	  conflict	  (e.g.	  Kelman	  1992,	  1995).	  Workshops	  bring	  together	  participants	  from	  conflicting	  parties	  and	  challenge	  them	  to	  change	  their	  perceptions	  about	  the	  conflict	  (Smock	  2002).	  A	  negotiation	  phase	  follows	  the	  workshop,	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  finding	  novel	  solutions.	  Agreements	  are	  not	  binding,	  but	  can	  inform	  official	  negotiations	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  if	  breakthroughs	  are	  reached	  in	  the	  track-­‐two	  process.	  Participants	  of	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  often	  are	  –	  or	  become	  –	  part	  of	  the	  official	  negotiation	  team	  of	  their	  party.	  Single	  and	  comparative	  case	  studies	  find	  that	  workshops	  and	  similar	  track-­‐two	  methods	  can	  build	  the	  foundation	  needed	  to	  embark	  on	  official	  peace-­‐making	  efforts	  –	  they	  improve	  attitudes,	  increase	  understanding,	  and	  consider	  practical	  measures	  -­‐	  or	  they	  can	  provide	  blueprints	  for	  negotiated	  settlements	  (Fisher	  1997).	  Daniel	  Lieberfeld’s	  (2002,	  355)	  study	  of	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  in	  South	  Africa	  (1984-­‐1990)	  concludes	  that	  “Track-­‐two	  talks	  are	  credited	  with	  chancing	  the	  political	  risks	  and	  rewards	  of	  official	  talks	  by	  legitimizing	  the	  negotiation	  option	  and	  desensitizing	  each	  side’s	  constituents	  to	  talks	  with	  the	  enemy,	  [and]	  by	  building	  latent	  support	  for	  track-­‐one	  negotiations,	  …”	  
	  	   42	  
Mediator	  entry	  	  Bercovitch	  and	  Schneider	  (2000)	  develop	  an	  expected-­‐utility	  model	  that	  examines	  the	  identity	  of	  mediators	  and	  which	  factors	  determine	  the	  choice	  of	  mediators.	  They	  find	  that	  the	  mediation	  market	  is	  dominated	  by	  powerful	  states	  (almost	  50	  percent	  of	  all	  mandates).	  A	  state’s	  power	  and	  influence	  make	  it	  a	  sought-­‐after	  mediator.	  This	  finding	  is	  easily	  explained	  if	  we	  understand	  mediation	  as	  a	  process	  of	  bargaining	  that	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  resources/leverage.	  Third	  parties	  can	  change	  the	  costs	  of	  conflict	  to	  the	  conflict	  parties,	  either	  by	  increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  continuing	  conflict	  or	  by	  providing	  incentives	  for	  cooperation	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1985,	  Carnevale	  1986,	  Smith	  and	  Stam	  2003,	  Schrodt	  and	  Gerner	  2004,	  Wilkenfeld	  et	  al.	  2005,	  Beardsley	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Quinn	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Rauchhaus	  2006).	  They	  can	  also	  provide	  help	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  peace	  agreements	  (Young	  1967,	  Lake	  and	  Rothchild	  1996,	  Bercovitch	  1997,	  Svensson	  2007b).	  Another	  form	  of	  leverage	  is	  information.	  Mediators	  can	  assist	  parties	  in	  overcoming	  problems	  of	  asymmetric	  information	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1985,	  Kydd	  2003,	  Princen	  1992).	  But	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  mediator	  has	  to	  have	  access	  to	  more	  information	  than	  the	  parties	  themselves.	  Usually,	  that	  requires	  superior	  intelligence	  capabilities.	  Neutrality	  of	  the	  mediating	  party	  is	  not	  a	  prerequisite:	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  found	  to	  be	  of	  little	  importance	  for	  a	  mediator	  (Kydd	  2003).	  Zartman	  and	  Touval	  (2001)	  explain	  that	  a	  mediator	  with	  close	  ties	  to	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  may	  be	  more	  motivated	  and	  thus	  more	  effective.	  An	  example	  of	  his	  mechanism	  is	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  diaspora	  in	  conflict	  resolution.	  Baser	  and	  Swain	  (2008)	  argue	  that	  the	  diaspora	  can	  contribute	  to	  third-­‐party	  mediation,	  not	  despite	  of,	  but	  because	  of	  their	  personal	  ties	  to	  conflict	  parties	  and	  local	  knowledge.	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While	  resources	  and	  clout	  make	  some	  states	  attractive	  mediators,	  they	  are	  not	  always	  eager	  to	  act	  as	  such.	  Successful	  mediation	  raises	  a	  mediator’s	  reputation;	  therefore	  mediation	  is	  more	  likely	  in	  crises	  that	  promise	  resolution	  (Greig	  2005).	  Consequently,	  the	  longer	  a	  conflict	  has	  lasted	  already,	  and	  the	  more	  intractable	  it	  becomes,	  the	  less	  willing	  outside	  governments	  are	  to	  get	  involved	  and	  risk	  mediation	  failure	  (Touval	  and	  Zartman	  1985,	  Bercovitch	  and	  Langley	  1993).	  A	  high	  level	  of	  violence	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  conflict	  intransigence,	  but	  the	  potential	  damage	  to	  the	  outsider’s	  reputation	  for	  failing	  to	  address	  the	  humanitarian	  crisis	  outweighs	  the	  risk	  of	  failure.	  Thus,	  increased	  conflict	  severity	  is	  correlated	  with	  mediation	  onset	  (Greig	  2005,	  Beardsley	  et	  al.	  2006,	  Beardsley	  2010).	  	  
Entry	  for	  non-­‐state	  mediators	  	  The	  focus	  on	  power	  and	  the	  negligence	  of	  neutrality,	  a	  characteristic	  more	  often	  ascribed	  to	  NGOs	  than	  to	  states,	  makes	  the	  mediation	  market	  harder	  to	  penetrate	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  Transnational	  organizations	  are	  rarely	  chosen	  as	  mediators	  (29	  out	  of	  723	  mediation	  mandates	  were	  given	  to	  NGOs,	  38	  to	  individuals)	  (Bercovitch	  Schneider	  2000).	  Maundi	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  support	  this	  view.	  They	  analyze	  mediation	  processes	  in	  internal	  African	  conflicts,	  focusing	  on	  the	  premediation	  phase	  (considering	  who	  is	  being	  invited	  to	  mediate)	  and	  conclude	  that	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  they	  performed,	  	  “there	   has	   been	   a	   pronounced	   dominance	   of	   Track	   One	   entry.	   Those	   who	   have	  attempted	  entry	  have	  generally	  been	  either	  states	  or	  regional	  organizations,	   those	  who	  have	  achieved	  entry	  have	  all	   been	  officials	   and	   those	  who	  have	   succeeded	   in	  their	  mediation	  have	  all	  been	  state	  actors”	  (p.198).	  	  More	  comprehensive	  examinations	  of	  mediation	  events	  find	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  do	  mediate,	  but	  not	  often.	  Oeberg	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  find	  that	  five	  percent	  of	  the	  instances	  of	  early	  conflict	  prevention	  in	  ethnic	  crises	  (1990-­‐98)	  they	  observe	  are	  conducted	  by	  “prominent	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individuals”,	  e.g.	  leaders	  of	  the	  Catholic	  Church.	  DeRouen	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  dataset	  of	  civil	  war	  mediation	  events	  shows	  six	  percent	  of	  cases	  include	  NGO	  and	  private	  mediation.	  	  If	  leverage	  is	  so	  important,	  why	  might	  conflict	  parties	  opt	  for	  what	  has	  been	  dubbed	  “weak	  mediators”	  (Beardsley	  2009)	  like	  non-­‐governmental	  actors?	  The	  choice	  of	  mediator	  depends	  on	  both	  the	  supply	  and	  the	  demand	  side	  of	  the	  mediation	  market.	  First,	  those	  third	  parties	  that	  could	  exercise	  leverage	  described	  above	  may	  not	  be	  interested	  in	  getting	  involved.	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  majority	  of	  conflicts	  have	  been	  intra-­‐state	  rather	  than	  inter-­‐state.13	  Zartman	  (2007,	  9)	  refers	  to	  the	  “absence	  of	  established	  systems	  of	  order	  and	  consensus	  on	  solutions”	  which	  leaves	  decision-­‐makers	  uncertain	  about	  their	  own	  interests,	  legitimacy,	  and	  how	  they	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  conflicts.	  When	  they	  do	  decide	  to	  intervene,	  the	  warring	  government	  could	  see	  offers	  from	  outside	  states	  to	  mediate	  in	  the	  conflict	  as	  undermining	  their	  sovereignty	  or	  bestowing	  international	  legitimacy	  on	  an	  enemy	  they	  refuse	  to	  recognize.	  NGOs	  may	  be	  less	  threatening	  to	  sovereignty	  and	  more	  willing	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  conflicts	  that	  major	  interveners	  do	  not	  care	  about.	  	   Second	  (still	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  mediation),	  there	  are	  more	  “weak	  mediators”	  available	  today	  than	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  field	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  conflict	  resolution	  has	  expanded	  tremendously	  since	  1990.	  14	  The	  changing	  nature	  of	  war,	  and	  the	  international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  From	  1988-­‐2008,	  UCDP/PRIO	  counts	  11	  interstate	  wars	  with	  combined	  25	  conflict	  years,	  and	  123	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  with	  818	  conflict	  years	  (Gleditsch	  et	  al.	  2002).	  14	  A	  side	  note	  on	  the	  motives	  of	  non-­‐state	  mediators:	  Many	  of	  these	  organizations	  are	  based	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  but	  pursue	  projects	  in	  conflict	  zones	  in	  the	  Global	  South.	  While	  the	  motivation	  for	  this	  engagement	  will	  differ	  for	  individual	  participants,	  globalization	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  knowledge	  about	  hitherto	  lesser-­‐known	  regions	  and	  wars	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  many	  citizens	  in	  industrialized	  societies	  developed	  post-­‐material	  values	  (Ingelhart	  1971)	  that	  make	  paying	  attention	  to	  problems	  beyond	  their	  borders	  and	  trying	  to	  address	  them	  (by	  actively	  working	  to	  remedy	  them	  or	  by	  contributing	  to	  international	  causes)	  less	  unusual.	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system	  in	  general,	  opens	  up	  previously	  blocked	  opportunities	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  security	  realm.	  States	  have	  never	  been	  the	  only	  actors	  in	  international	  relations,	  and	  increasingly	  non-­‐state	  entities	  encroach	  on	  previously	  government-­‐controlled	  foreign	  relations.	  Non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs)	  are	  a	  prime	  example.	  They	  participate	  in	  multilateral	  negotiations	  (Betsill	  and	  Corell	  2008),	  and	  organize	  campaigns	  to	  address	  local	  or	  international	  issues,	  from	  debt	  relief	  (Donnelly	  2002)	  to	  human	  rights	  violations	  (Burgerman	  1998).	  Many	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  today	  allow	  for	  access	  to	  their	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  for	  NGOs	  (Willets	  2000,	  Joensson	  and	  Tallberg	  2010).	  However,	  states	  remain	  the	  primary	  force	  in	  international	  relations,	  for	  the	  most	  part.	  The	  fact	  that	  non-­‐state	  participation	  varies	  by	  issue	  areas	  indicates	  that	  national	  governments	  remain	  in	  control:	  they	  allow	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  play	  a	  role	  when	  it	  is	  beneficial	  for	  them,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  detrimental	  to	  the	  states’	  interests,	  and	  keep	  them	  out	  of	  areas	  deemed	  essential	  to	  national	  security.	  Steffek’s	  (2010)	  comparison	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations’	  access	  to	  international	  institutions	  finds	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  easy	  access	  to	  organizations	  dealing	  with	  issues	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  environment	  and	  human	  rights,	  while	  access	  to	  security	  issues	  is	  medium	  to	  low,	  and	  access	  to	  finance	  matters	  is	  lower	  even.	  He	  argues	  that	  states	  have	  little	  incentives	  to	  open	  up	  areas	  of	  “high	  politics”	  to	  civil	  society	  organizations.	  His	  case	  study	  of	  NATO	  confirms	  that	  the	  need	  for	  secrecy	  inhibits	  cooperation	  with	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  but	  he	  also	  finds	  that	  a	  shift	  in	  NATO	  operations	  following	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  include	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  and	  stabilization	  –	  areas	  that	  are	  less	  sensitive	  to	  intelligence	  breaches	  and	  where	  NGOs	  may	  have	  valuable	  expertise	  to	  offer	  –	  has	  led	  to	  slightly	  more	  interactions.	  Mediation	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  was	  rare	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  although	  it	  did	  occur.	  Examples	  include	  the	  Vatican	  mediating	  between	  Argentina	  and	  Chile	  (Princen	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1992)	  and	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross’	  involvement	  in	  Africa	  (Forsythe	  1985).	  Today	  the	  presence	  of	  NGOs	  addressing	  conflicts	  is	  widespread	  enough	  that	  Crocker	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  refer	  to	  them	  as	  a	  “third	  tier	  of	  actors	  beyond	  states	  and	  international	  organizations”	  (p.	  6-­‐7).	  	   Increasing	  numbers	  of	  relevant	  conflicts	  and	  more	  NGOs	  tackling	  conflict	  resolution	  beg	  the	  question	  how	  the	  individual	  organizations	  decide	  where	  to	  become	  active.	  Many	  track-­‐two	  organizations	  depend	  on	  donations	  for	  funding;	  this	  may	  make	  them	  more	  interested	  in	  conflicts	  that	  are	  attractive	  to	  potential	  donors.	  Individual	  contributions	  may	  be	  more	  forthcoming	  if	  supporters	  have	  heard	  of	  the	  conflict	  before.	  Rich	  individual	  donors	  may	  have	  an	  interest	  or	  attachment	  to	  a	  specific	  country	  or	  region.	  However,	  the	  opposite	  could	  be	  true,	  too:	  track-­‐two	  activity	  could	  be	  more	  likely	  in	  lesser-­‐known	  conflicts,	  those	  that	  do	  not	  attract	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  from	  states.	  	  The	  third	  set	  of	  reasons	  why	  conflict	  parties	  opt	  for	  weak	  mediators	  falls	  into	  the	  demand	  category.	  Sometimes	  conflict	  parties	  may	  prefer	  the	  services	  of	  a	  mediator	  with	  little	  power.	  This	  preference	  can	  be	  based	  on	  “devious	  objectives”	  when	  a	  party	  uses	  negotiations	  as	  a	  stalling	  tactic	  to	  improve	  its	  currently	  weak	  chances	  on	  the	  battlefield	  (Richmond	  1998).	  Or,	  more	  constructively,	  mediators	  are	  expected	  to	  fill	  less	  power-­‐bound	  functions	  like	  acting	  merely	  as	  messengers	  between	  opponents,	  organizing	  meetings	  or	  acting	  as	  witnesses	  (Burton	  1969,	  Fisher	  1972,	  Kelman	  1992).	  They	  can	  make	  proposals	  or	  encourage	  the	  parties	  to	  see	  the	  issues	  from	  new	  perspectives,	  thus	  opening	  their	  minds	  to	  new	  avenues	  of	  problem	  solving	  (Burton	  1969,	  Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1985,	  Kelman	  1992).	  Little	  leverage	  to	  push	  parties	  towards	  a	  solution	  can	  be	  an	  asset	  if	  parties	  are	  reluctant	  to	  participate	  in	  talks	  that	  may	  commit	  them	  to	  something	  they	  are	  not	  ready	  for.	  Further,	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conflict	  parties	  may	  not	  see	  non-­‐political,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  as	  a	  threat	  (Maundi	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Dunn	  and	  Kriesberg	  (2002)	  explore	  the	  special	  contributions	  international	  NGOs	  may	  bring	  to	  the	  table:	  some	  organizations	  have	  a	  long-­‐term	  presence	  in	  conflict	  zones,	  for	  example	  to	  provide	  humanitarian	  or	  development	  aid.	  Thus,	  they	  develop	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  culture	  and	  place,	  and	  trust	  can	  grow	  between	  the	  organization	  and	  conflict	  parties	  who	  may	  be	  wary	  of	  outside	  intervention.	  	  Most	  interactive	  conflict	  resolution	  (ICR)	  activities	  target	  the	  most	  intractable	  conflicts	  (Fisher	  2007).	  Rothman	  and	  Olson	  (2001,	  289)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  conflicts	  are	  often	  identity-­‐based	  and	  “resistant	  to	  traditional	  interest-­‐based	  conflict	  resolution	  methods.”	  The	  authors	  advocate	  for	  interactive	  conflict	  resolution	  approaches	  instead.	  Austerre	  (2010)	  explains	  that	  today’s	  civil	  wars	  are	  often	  rooted	  in	  local,	  micro-­‐level	  motivations	  (see	  also	  Kalyvas	  2009),	  but	  are	  addressed	  by	  international	  actors	  on	  the	  macro	  (national	  or	  regional)	  level	  alone.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  might	  be	  more	  agile	  in	  adopting	  the	  low-­‐level	  approach	  proposed	  by	  Austerre,	  potentially	  making	  NGOs	  more	  common	  peacemakers	  on	  that	  level.	  Non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  more	  flexible	  in	  their	  approaches	  and	  not	  bound	  to	  traditional	  diplomatic	  protocol	  (Bercovitch	  and	  Schneider	  2000).	  Transnational	  non-­‐state	  organizations,	  can	  “afford	  to	  be	  more	  creative	  and	  less	  inhibited	  in	  the	  policy	  positions	  they	  advocate”	  (p.	  148).	  	  Deep	  knowledge	  of	  people	  and	  place	  also	  increases	  credibility,	  another	  significant	  mediator	  characteristic	  (Maoz	  and	  Terris	  2006).	  Mediation	  scholars	  underline	  the	  importance	  of	  trust	  and	  legitimacy	  for	  successful	  mediation	  processes	  (Lederach	  1995,	  Bercovitch	  and	  Kadayifci-­‐Orellana	  2009),	  but	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  differs,	  e.g.	  in	  some	  cases	  a	  cultural	  insider	  is	  preferable,	  in	  another	  an	  outsider	  embodying	  a	  moral	  principle	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(Bercovitch	  and	  Kadayifci-­‐Orellana	  2009).15	  	  Wehr	  and	  Lederach	  (1991)	  develop	  the	  concept	  of	  insider-­‐partial	  mediator,	  contrasting	  it	  with	  the	  outsider-­‐neutral	  model	  of	  mediation.	  Insiders	  bring	  “connectedness	  and	  trusted	  relationships”	  (p.	  87)	  to	  the	  mediation	  process,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  will	  not	  leave	  the	  conflict	  zone	  after	  the	  successful	  or	  failed	  process	  gives	  them	  credibility.	  Such	  mediation	  is	  not	  an	  invention	  from	  the	  outside,	  but	  a	  shared	  experience	  in	  which	  all	  involved	  have	  a	  stake.16	  The	  authors	  find	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Esquipulas	  process	  in	  Nicaragua	  an	  insider-­‐partial	  mediation	  led	  to	  a	  tentative	  agreement,	  which	  then	  was	  solidified	  by	  an	  outsider-­‐neutral	  mediator.	  Non-­‐state	  actors,	  however,	  are	  not	  entirely	  beyond	  reproach.	  Ron	  and	  Cooley	  (2002)	  point	  out	  the	  institutional	  pressures	  and	  competition	  over	  resources	  can	  subvert	  NGOs’	  good	  intentions,	  for	  example	  leading	  to	  redundancies	  in	  some	  issue	  areas.	  They	  are	  highly	  dependent	  on	  donors	  –	  often	  governments	  or	  large	  foundations	  -­‐	  who	  in	  turn	  may	  exert	  tremendous	  influence	  on	  the	  NGOs	  agenda	  or	  project	  implementation	  (Helms	  2003).	  NGOs	  have	  furthermore	  been	  criticized	  for	  their	  lack	  of	  accountability	  (e.g.	  Jordan	  and	  van	  Tujil	  2000),	  although	  in	  the	  area	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  non-­‐governmental	  mediators	  should	  be	  accountable	  to	  the	  mediation	  parties.	  	  
Mediation	  success	  	  As	  important	  as	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  mediator	  is,	  the	  question	  is	  relevant	  primarily	  in	  the	  context	  of	  mediation	  success.	  Factors	  found	  to	  influence	  the	  outcome	  of	  mediation	  efforts	  include	  third-­‐party	  resources	  (Bercovitch	  and	  Gartner	  2006,	  Richmond	  1998),	  mediator	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Bercovitch	  and	  Kadayifci-­‐Orellana	  (2009)	  point	  out	  that	  religious	  leaders	  often	  combine	  the	  positions	  of	  cultural	  insider	  and	  moral	  guide,	  making	  them	  attractive	  mediators.	  16	  See	  Svensson	  (2013)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  potential	  policy	  implications.	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rank	  (Bercovitch	  and	  Houston	  1996),	  and	  timing	  of	  the	  initiative	  (Regan	  and	  Stam	  2000,	  Zartman	  1985	  and	  2000).	  Interestingly,	  though	  non-­‐state	  actors	  are	  uncommon	  mediators,	  their	  success	  rate	  is	  comparable	  for	  nation-­‐states	  and	  NGOs,	  39%	  and	  34%	  respectively	  in	  the	  Bercovitch	  and	  Schneider	  (2000)	  sample.	  How	  do	  authors	  define	  mediation	  success?	  Based	  on	  a	  popular	  dataset	  often	  employed	  for	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  mediation	  events,	  the	  International	  Conflict	  Management	  Project	  (Bercovitch	  1999),	  they	  usually	  place	  mediation	  outcome	  in	  four	  categories:	  	  unsuccessful,	  ceasefire,	  partly	  successful,	  and	  fully	  successful	  (e.g.	  Bercovitch	  and	  Schneider	  2000,	  Berber	  2010,	  Boehmelt	  2010).	  Beardsley	  (2012)	  warns	  against	  a	  short	  time	  horizon:	  he	  finds	  that	  while	  almost	  half	  of	  mediated	  conflicts	  end	  in	  some	  negotiated	  agreement,	  half	  of	  mediated	  crises	  relapse	  into	  conflict	  (the	  same	  number	  as	  unmediated	  crises).	  Mediators,	  particularly	  those	  with	  power	  and	  resources,	  may	  provide	  artificial	  incentives	  for	  participation	  in	  a	  peace	  process	  to	  the	  parties.	  Thus,	  the	  author	  finds	  significant	  variation	  in	  long-­‐term	  success	  for	  heavy-­‐handed	  mediation	  vs.	  lighter	  forms	  of	  conflict	  management.	  	  A	  clear	  definition	  of	  mediation	  success	  is	  not	  only	  academically	  rigorous,	  but	  it	  will	  influence	  conclusions	  and	  policy	  prescriptions.	  One	  goal	  is	  to	  assess	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  actors.	  Crocker	  et	  al.	  (1999,	  8-­‐9)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  mediating	  actors	  depends	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  mediation,	  too:	  	  “if	   the	   definition	   of	   mediation	   includes	   a	   broad	   array	   of	   actions	   to	   build	   a	  constituency	  for	  peace,	  then	  many	  organizations,	  including	  nonofficial	  actors,	  are	  important	  to	  the	  mediation	  effort	  at	  every	  phase	  of	  the	  conflict	  cycle.	   If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  definition	  includes	  an	  ability	  to	  mobilize	  international	  resources	   and	   political	   will	   and	   to	   offer	   incentives	   and	   threats	   to	   warring	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parties	  to	  change	  their	  behavior,	  the	  state	  actors	  will	  be	  the	  principal	  players	  with	  nonofficial	  organization	  operating	  at	  the	  margins.”17	  The	  expectations	  and	  assessments	  of	  success	  are	  thus	  different	  for	  government	  mediators	  –	  who	  might	  hope	  to	  end	  their	  effort	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  an	  official	  peace	  agreement,	  while	  “weak”	  mediators	  could	  be	  satisfied	  when	  their	  initiative	  leads	  to	  a	  schedule	  for	  further	  talks.	  In	  fact,	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  and	  other	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  often	  explicitly	  see	  their	  role	  in	  this	  supporting	  role	  (Fisher	  1997).	  Methodologically,	  a	  preference	  for	  one	  track	  or	  another	  should	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  statistical	  models.18	  	  Boehmelt	  (2010)	  presents	  the	  first	  large-­‐N	  study	  examining	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  tracks	  of	  diplomacy.	  His	  theoretical	  framework	  distinguishes	  between	  track	  one	  (official	  diplomacy),	  track	  1.5	  (public	  or	  private	  interaction	  between	  official	  representatives	  of	  conflict	  parties	  mediated	  by	  a	  non-­‐governmental	  actor),	  and	  track	  two	  (unofficial,	  informal	  interaction	  between	  members	  of	  conflict	  groups).19	  He	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  timing	  of	  efforts,	  but	  simply	  tests	  whether	  track	  one,	  track	  two,	  or	  combined	  efforts	  are	  most	  successful	  in	  ending	  the	  conflict.	  Boehmelt	  finds	  that	  both	  are	  effective	  tools	  of	  conflict	  resolution,	  although	  track	  one	  more	  so,	  and	  that	  combined	  efforts	  are	  best.	  Boehmelt’s	  study	  looks	  only	  at	  high-­‐level	  negotiation,	  leaving	  out	  interactive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  statement	  reflects	  a	  debate	  about	  competing	  paradigms	  in	  mediation.	  The	  structuralist	  approach	  sees	  conflicts	  as	  a	  rational	  cost-­‐benefit	  process	  that	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  outsiders	  with	  incentives	  and	  threats.	  A	  key	  concept	  is	  Zartman’s	  “hurting	  stalemate”:	  when	  neither	  side	  believes	  it	  can	  win,	  they	  will	  be	  open	  to	  negotiations.	  The	  social-­‐psychological	  approach	  emphasizes	  communication	  and	  dialogue	  between	  the	  conflict	  parties	  with	  the	  goal	  to	  change	  perceptions	  and	  attitudes.	  Interactive	  conflict	  resolution	  is	  anchored	  in	  the	  latter	  approach.	  18	  The	  only	  quantitative	  study	  of	  track-­‐two	  effectiveness	  (Boehmelt	  2010)	  employs	  a	  selection	  model	  to	  account	  for	  the	  selection	  bias	  whether	  mediation	  happens	  at	  all	  or	  not,	  but	  does	  not	  distinguish	  whether	  track	  one	  or	  track	  two	  are	  more	  likely	  in	  certain	  cases.	  19	  His	  empirical	  study,	  however,	  combines	  track	  two	  and	  track	  1.5,	  which	  diminishes	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  research.	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conflict	  resolution,	  training	  and	  other	  track-­‐two	  efforts.	  Effectiveness	  is	  measured	  according	  to	  the	  Bercovitch	  mediation	  dataset.	  	  But	  considering	  the	  lack	  of	  resources	  and	  leverage	  NGOs	  bring	  to	  their	  peace-­‐making	  efforts,	  and	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  track-­‐two	  projects	  target	  parties	  in	  particularly	  antagonistic	  settings,	  measuring	  “success”	  by	  noting	  whether	  a	  track-­‐two	  initiative	  leads	  to	  an	  end	  of	  a	  war	  might	  be	  misleading.	  	  Rouhana	  (2001)	  insists	  that	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  track-­‐two	  effectiveness	  we	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  track	  two	  has	  different	  goals	  than	  official	  diplomacy.	  The	  successful	  cases	  collected	  by	  Fisher	  (1997)	  include	  those	  that	  contributed	  to	  “policy	  formation,”	  those	  that	  “increased	  understanding”	  or	  “improved	  attitudes”	  and	  those	  that	  led	  to	  a	  “framework	  for	  settlement”	  (pp.	  189-­‐191).	  Conflict	  management	  by	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  is	  often	  an	  inter-­‐mediate	  step	  from	  conflict	  to	  peace.	  	  
Multiparty	  mediation	  Simultaneous	  or	  sequential	  efforts	  at	  official	  and	  unofficial	  peace	  making	  are	  common,	  though	  the	  superiority	  of	  several	  mediators	  over	  a	  single	  one	  is	  not	  unchallenged.	  Some	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  caution	  against	  a	  proliferation	  of	  conflict	  management	  initiatives.	  They	  argue	  that	  too	  many	  cooks	  may	  indeed	  spoil	  the	  meal.	  The	  literature	  on	  multi-­‐party	  mediation	  has	  considered	  the	  effect	  of	  several	  mediators	  in	  a	  conflict,	  but	  primarily	  for	  state-­‐led	  interventions	  (Boehmelt	  2010,	  Beber	  2010b).	  	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  why	  mediations	  may	  be	  more	  successful	  when	  there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  third	  party.	  Hampson	  (1996,	  233)	  points	  out	  that	  “third	  parties	  need	  other	  third	  parties”	  to	  move	  mediation	  forward.	  Usually,	  and	  particularly	  in	  protracted,	  complicated	  conflicts,	  parties	  need	  help	  in	  all	  three	  areas	  of	  negotiation	  -­‐	  communication,	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formulation	  and	  manipulation	  (Touval	  and	  Zartman	  1985),	  but	  few	  outsiders	  can	  provide	  all-­‐around	  assistance.	  Multi-­‐party	  peacemaking	  can	  be	  a	  way	  of	  burden	  sharing,	  both	  monetary	  and	  reputational.	  Especially	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  sustained	  diplomatic	  efforts	  can	  be	  expensive;	  sharing	  these	  costs	  with	  other	  peacemakers	  can	  be	  beneficial.	  There	  is	  always	  the	  risk	  that	  a	  peace	  effort	  fails,	  and	  even	  the	  potential	  that	  the	  mediator	  is	  blamed	  for	  the	  failure.	  The	  blame	  will	  be	  diminished	  if	  there	  is	  a	  group	  of	  mediators	  instead	  of	  just	  one.	  	   More	  is	  not	  always	  better,	  though.	  Kriesberg	  (1996)	  outlines	  several	  ways	  in	  which	  multiplicity	  of	  peace	  initiatives	  can	  hamper	  effectiveness	  of	  all	  of	  them.	  Conflict	  parties,	  in	  particular	  those	  that	  have	  limited	  capacities,	  may	  try	  and	  fail	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  all	  ongoing	  mediation	  efforts,	  draining	  their	  resources	  in	  the	  process.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  mediators	  have	  their	  own	  preferences	  and	  priorities.	  Thus,	  several	  simultaneous	  efforts	  can	  send	  mixed	  messages.	  They	  might	  also	  encourage	  “forum	  shopping”	  (Lefler	  2012).	  Additionally,	  different	  efforts	  involving	  different	  people	  may	  produce	  contradictory	  results	  that	  can	  confuse	  official	  negotiators	  when	  they	  are	  passed	  along.	  Also,	  intermediaries	  compete	  for	  resources	  in	  their	  home	  constituencies.	  Mediators	  may	  resist	  cooperation	  with	  each	  other	  because	  they	  are	  not	  willing	  to	  share	  any	  possible	  credit	  for	  the	  potential	  successful	  peace	  settlement.	  	  While	  initial	  tests	  find	  that	  the	  larger	  the	  group	  of	  mediators	  the	  more	  effective	  they	  are	  in	  ending	  war,	  the	  strong	  positive	  statistical	  relationship	  disappears	  when	  Beber	  (2010b)	  takes	  into	  account	  a	  potential	  endogenous	  relationship	  (because	  mediators	  may	  jump	  onto	  the	  bandwagon	  when	  an	  agreement	  is	  in	  sight).	  Boehmelt	  (2011)	  theorizes	  an	  inverted	  U-­‐shaped	  relationship	  between	  the	  number	  of	  interveners	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	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mediation	  efforts.	  His	  analysis	  of	  mediation	  interventions	  in	  inter-­‐state	  wars	  finds	  that	  “both	  very	  small	  and	  very	  large	  groups	  of	  interveners	  perform	  worst	  in	  settling	  disputes	  peacefully”	  (p.	  877).	  	  	  There	  is	  more	  to	  multi-­‐party	  mediation	  than	  how	  many	  actors	  are	  involved.	  The	  interplay	  of	  different	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  is	  much	  more	  dynamic.	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  developed	  by	  Crocker	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  asserts	  that	  depending	  on	  the	  conflict	  cycle	  –	  measured	  by	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  –	  track-­‐one	  and	  track-­‐two	  initiatives	  should	  have	  varying	  levels	  of	  success	  in	  gaining	  access	  to	  conflict	  parties	  and	  in	  resolving	  the	  conflict.	  In	  particular,	  at	  times	  of	  rising	  tensions	  and	  casualty	  levels	  parties	  may	  resist	  entry	  of	  major	  powers	  because	  it	  might	  commit	  them	  to	  a	  formal	  process	  of	  negotiations.	  Meanwhile	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  could	  establish	  some	  direct	  communication	  between	  parties	  without	  these	  unwanted	  pressures.	  Crocker	  et	  al.	  also	  hypothesize	  about	  the	  most	  effective	  sequence	  of	  multi-­‐party	  mediation.	  When	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  is	  on	  the	  rise	  and	  track-­‐two	  initiatives	  may	  have	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  in	  gaining	  access,	  they	  can	  prepare	  conflict	  parties	  for	  high-­‐level	  negotiations.	  Therefore,	  Crocker	  et	  al.	  propose	  simultaneous	  track	  activities	  during	  low	  levels	  at	  the	  lower	  ends	  of	  the	  escalation	  curve	  and	  sequenced	  efforts	  during	  the	  times	  of	  heightened	  conflict.	  Other	  scholars	  concur	  that	  a	  sequence	  of	  track	  two	  followed	  by	  track	  one	  is	  most	  promising	  for	  conflict	  resolution	  (Montville	  1991,	  McDonald	  1991,	  Kriesberg	  1996).	  For	  ongoing	  wars	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  at	  what	  stage	  of	  the	  conflict	  cycle	  the	  parties	  find	  themselves,	  making	  prescriptions	  often	  very	  difficult.	  But	  a	  systematic	  study	  of	  the	  occurrence	  and	  sequencing	  of	  past	  conflict	  management	  efforts	  by	  multiple	  actors	  is	  an	  important	  step	  in	  determining	  which	  conflict	  resolution	  mechanisms	  are	  most	  promising.	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Outsiders	  can	  alleviate	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  being	  played	  out	  against	  each	  other	  if	  they	  agree	  on	  a	  joint	  course	  of	  action	  (Kriesberg	  1996).	  Case	  studies	  of	  conflict	  management	  efforts	  that	  were	  coordinated	  (Congo	  and	  Macedonia,	  Lund	  1996;	  Tajikistan,	  Iij	  2001)	  and	  those	  that	  were	  not	  (Rwanda,	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Zaire,	  Lund	  1996;	  Nagorno	  Karabakh,	  Betts	  1999)	  indicate	  that	  the	  former	  are	  more	  successful	  in	  bringing	  the	  conflict	  to	  a	  close.	  	  
Selection	  effects	  	  Important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  mediation,	  in	  general,	  and	  non-­‐state	  intervention,	  in	  particular,	  are	  considerations	  regarding	  selection	  bias.	  When	  assessing	  the	  success	  of	  initiatives,	  one	  has	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  mediation	  efforts	  are	  not	  random.	  The	  issues	  at	  the	  center	  of	  many	  of	  the	  internal	  conflicts	  in	  this	  inquiry	  are	  intractable	  and	  hardly	  open	  to	  compromise	  (Olson	  and	  Pearson	  2002).	  Melin	  and	  Svensson	  (2009)	  find	  that	  in	  contrast	  to	  inter-­‐state	  wars,	  belligerents	  in	  civil	  wars	  accept	  mediation	  only	  “in	  the	  most	  difficult	  circumstances”	  (p.	  264,	  see	  also	  Greig	  and	  Regan	  2008).	  Disputants	  handing	  mediation	  authority	  to	  an	  outsider	  could	  signal	  weakness	  (Beardsley	  at	  al	  2006),	  and	  they	  resist	  losing	  control	  over	  the	  process.	  Thus,	  they	  only	  do	  so	  when	  their	  own	  previous	  efforts	  have	  failed.	  When	  rebels	  face	  a	  government,	  significant	  power	  disparities	  –	  in	  military	  might,	  international	  recognition	  and	  potential	  support	  –	  will	  make	  it	  unlikely	  that	  the	  nominally	  stronger	  side	  will	  agree	  to	  mediation,	  especially	  if	  doing	  so	  might	  bestow	  legitimacy	  on	  the	  opponent.	  For	  the	  same	  reason,	  fewer	  governments	  will	  offer	  to	  act	  as	  mediator.	  Non-­‐state	  armed	  groups	  feel	  less	  restrained	  by	  international	  norms	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  break	  agreements	  (Gartner	  and	  Bercovitch	  2006).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  longer	  a	  conflict	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endures	  –	  the	  more	  violent	  it	  is	  or	  the	  more	  protracted	  –	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  will	  attract	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  mediation	  attempts	  (Regan	  and	  Stam	  2000).	  Other	  selection	  variables	  depend	  on	  the	  intervener:	  a	  state	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  intervene	  in	  a	  neighboring	  country,	  fearing	  spill-­‐over	  or	  contamination	  (Regan	  2000,	  Saleyhan	  and	  Gleditsch	  2006).	  Major	  powers	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  intervene	  in	  conflicts	  where	  they	  see	  their	  national	  interest	  threatened.	  Studies	  of	  mediation	  events	  that	  suffer	  from	  selection	  bias	  may	  find	  no	  significant	  conflict	  resolution	  effect	  for	  mediation	  (or	  even	  a	  negative	  effect)	  –	  creating	  the	  puzzle	  why	  mediation	  has	  become	  such	  a	  common	  conflict	  management	  tool	  (Gartner	  2011,	  2013).	  To	  counter	  this	  bias,	  some	  studies	  include	  all	  disputes,	  whether	  they	  experienced	  mediation	  or	  not	  (e.g.	  Regan	  and	  Stam	  2000),	  or	  use	  methods	  taking	  into	  account	  a	  selection	  and	  outcome	  stage	  (Beardsley	  2008,	  Beber	  2010a,	  Boehmelt	  2010,	  Gartner	  2011).	  
Conclusion	  This	  chapter	  has	  provided	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  distinct	  yet	  interconnected	  research	  programs	  of	  civil	  conflict	  and	  mediation.	  Internal	  wars	  are	  hardly	  ever	  fought	  without	  any	  outside	  influence,	  from	  military	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  one	  side	  to	  attempts	  at	  peacemaking	  between	  the	  opponents.	  The	  scientific	  study	  of	  civil	  conflicts	  has	  acknowledged	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  into	  account	  and	  the	  mediation	  literature	  explores	  the	  many	  facets	  of	  non-­‐violent	  interventions.	  	  The	  subset	  of	  non-­‐state	  diplomatic	  interventions	  has,	  until	  now,	  received	  little	  attention	  in	  quantitative	  studies	  of	  conflict	  processes,	  for	  lack	  of	  relevant	  data	  as	  well	  as	  neglect	  to	  include	  non-­‐state	  actors	  into	  theoretical	  models.	  As	  summarized	  above,	  individual	  and	  comparative	  case	  studies	  of	  multi-­‐party	  mediation	  indicate	  that	  non-­‐state	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conflict	  management	  can	  be	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  conflict	  resolution,	  especially	  when	  used	  in	  coordination	  with	  high-­‐level	  negotiations.	  Track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  has	  distinct	  advantages	  over	  mediation	  led	  by	  governments	  and	  is	  available	  to	  belligerents	  under	  different	  circumstances.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  increasingly	  common	  in	  internal	  conflicts,	  but	  its	  effectiveness	  has	  not	  been	  studied	  systematically	  or	  in	  a	  way	  comparable	  to	  other	  third-­‐party	  interventions.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  following	  chapters	  I	  will	  develop	  and	  test	  hypotheses	  that	  help	  analyze	  the	  effects	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  has	  on	  civil	  wars	  and	  how	  these	  initiatives	  relate	  to	  other	  peacemaking	  efforts.	  	  I	  set	  out	  to	  measure	  track-­‐two/NGO	  conflict	  management	  success	  both	  as	  a	  direct	  contributor	  to	  “ending	  a	  conflict”	  and	  its	  indirect	  effects,	  including	  the	  potentially	  stronger	  durability	  of	  peace	  agreements.	  I	  believe	  that	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  is	  common	  enough	  and	  its	  approaches	  promising	  enough	  that	  it	  should	  be	  included	  in	  models	  of	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  in	  civil	  wars.	  	  	   Chapter	  3	  focuses	  on	  the	  role	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  can	  play	  in	  bringing	  about	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  The	  theoretical	  model	  I	  develop	  here	  draws	  from	  the	  mediation	  literature	  as	  well	  as	  accounts	  of	  NGO	  diplomacy	  that	  study	  how	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  further	  the	  goal	  of	  peace.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Direct	  impacts	  of	  T2+:	  Onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  
Introduction	  This	  and	  the	  following	  two	  chapters	  quantitatively	  explore	  the	  direct	  impacts	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  has	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  ongoing	  civil	  conflicts	  in	  Africa.	  In	  this	  first	  empirical	  chapter	  I	  consider	  the	  relationship	  of	  non-­‐official	  mediation	  and	  official	  diplomacy.	  I	  test	  my	  hypothesis,	  introduced	  below,	  that	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  is	  more	  likely	  in	  conflicts	  that	  also	  see	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  current	  episode	  of	  the	  Ugandan	  civil	  war	  the	  only	  official	  mediation	  round	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  (the	  2006-­‐2008	  Juba	  talks)	  was	  co-­‐facilitated	  by	  South	  Sudan	  and	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio.	  In	  the	  five	  years	  preceding	  the	  Juba	  talks	  a	  number	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  worked	  hard	  to	  get	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  table,	  e.g.	  the	  Acholi	  Religious	  Leaders	  Peace	  Initiative	  fostered	  contacts	  to	  the	  LRA	  (Ochala	  2004),	  and	  the	  Centre	  for	  Humanitarian	  Dialogue	  acted	  as	  messenger	  (HD	  2004).	  My	  theoretical	  framework	  proposes	  that	  efforts	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  nudge	  parties	  towards	  a	  negotiation	  process	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  more	  often	  than	  random	  chance	  would	  predict.	  	   The	  theoretical	  model	  developed	  in	  this	  chapter	  explains	  how	  and	  in	  which	  cases	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  related	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  It	  addresses	  both	  the	  possibility	  that	  conflicts	  that	  attract	  one	  form	  of	  conflict	  management	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  experience	  the	  other,	  too;	  and	  the	  option	  that	  track-­‐one	  and	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  are	  sequential,	  with	  non-­‐state	  engagement	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  third-­‐party	  state	  interventions.	  The	  latter	  dynamics	  should	  be	  particularly	  pronounced	  if	  NGOs	  are	  involved	  in	  mediation	  training	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  for	  rebel	  party	  leaders.	  Some	  non-­‐
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state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  are	  implemented	  with	  the	  explicit	  goal	  of	  preparing	  one	  or	  both	  sides	  for	  negotiations,	  e.g.	  International	  Alert’s	  1995	  pre-­‐negotiation	  work	  with	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  Sierra	  Leone	  civil	  war	  that	  included	  compiling	  existing	  peace	  accords	  and	  other	  material	  related	  to	  peace-­‐building	  (CEWS	  1999).	  My	  empirical	  models	  will	  test	  whether	  such	  training	  and	  preparation	  initiatives	  systematically	  lead	  to	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  in	  African	  civil	  conflict	  dyads	  for	  the	  time	  period	  1990-­‐2009.	  I	  then	  explore	  how	  the	  type	  of	  organization	  may	  affect	  the	  occurrence	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  A	  number	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  NGOs	  are	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state,	  e.g.	  The	  Carter	  Center	  by	  former	  US	  president	  Jimmy	  Carter,	  Conflict	  Management	  Initiative	  by	  former	  Finnish	  President	  Maarti	  Ahtisaari,	  and	  the	  Nyerere	  Centre	  by	  former	  Tanzanian	  president	  Julius	  Nyerere.	  Considering	  the	  existing	  links	  between	  these	  individuals	  and	  the	  governments	  of	  their	  own	  and	  other	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  I	  expect	  initiatives	  by	  these	  NGOs	  to	  be	  particularly	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  subsequent	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy.	  20	  I	  find	  support	  for	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  is	  a	  predictor	  for	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  by	  third-­‐party	  states	  or	  intergovernmental	  organizations.	  A	  specific	  form	  of	  NGO	  conflict	  management	  –	  training	  for	  conflict	  resolution	  –	  is	  found	  to	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  or	  foreign	  governments	  will	  start	  a	  mediation	  process.	  I	  cannot,	  however,	  confirm	  that	  NGOs	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  have	  a	  particularly	  strong	  effect	  on	  the	  chance	  that	  high	  diplomacy	  will	  happen.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  results	  indicate	  that	  this	  subset	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  These	  former	  government	  officials	  using	  unofficial	  diplomatic	  tools	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “Track	  1.5”	  diplomats	  (Boehmelt	  2010).	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non-­‐state	  conflict	  managers	  may	  act	  instead	  of,	  and	  not	  complementary	  to	  other	  third-­‐party	  mediators.	  The	  chapter	  is	  divided	  into	  six	  sections.	  After	  this	  introduction	  I	  lay	  out	  my	  argument	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  government-­‐led	  mediation	  and	  draws	  hypotheses	  from	  the	  theory.	  Then	  I	  introduce	  the	  data	  for	  this	  chapter.	  After	  I	  define	  my	  unit	  of	  analysis	  and	  my	  dependent	  variable	  I	  give	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  control	  variables	  included	  in	  my	  statistical	  analysis.	  The	  fourth	  section	  lays	  out	  the	  methodology	  I	  apply	  in	  order	  to	  test	  my	  hypotheses.	  I	  then	  test	  my	  hypotheses	  and	  present	  the	  results	  in	  the	  fifth	  section	  of	  the	  chapter.	  The	  conclusion	  section	  addresses	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  implications	  of	  the	  findings	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
Argument	  
Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  advantages:	  track	  two	  instead	  of	  track	  one	  	  	  Mediators	  play	  a	  number	  of	  roles,	  often	  subsumed	  under	  the	  terms	  facilitation,	  formulation	  and	  manipulation	  (Touval	  and	  Zartman	  1985).	  First,	  they	  may	  entice	  belligerents	  to	  start	  a	  negotiation	  process,	  help	  them	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  and	  provide	  a	  neutral	  space	  to	  get	  together.	  Second,	  they	  can	  help	  the	  parties	  find	  common	  ground	  and	  solutions.	  They	  may	  propose	  settlement	  terms,	  or	  create	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  parties	  to	  develop	  their	  own.	  And	  third,	  mediators	  may	  use	  leverage	  to	  pressure	  one	  or	  both	  sides	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  or	  to	  guarantee	  its	  implementation.	  Leverage	  is	  a	  function	  of	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  mediator,	  his	  or	  her	  capability,	  and	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  relationship	  between	  the	  conflict	  parties	  and	  the	  mediator	  (Melin	  2013).	  	  States	  are	  usually	  the	  only	  third	  parties	  that	  have	  the	  leverage	  to	  guarantee	  a	  mediation	  outcome	  (Walter	  2002,	  Beardsley	  2013).	  But	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  be	  vital	  in	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facilitation	  and	  formulation.	  Backchannel	  and	  other	  communication	  between	  conflict	  parties	  facilitate	  dialogue.	  Problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and	  dialogue	  sessions	  straddle	  the	  facilitation	  and	  formulation	  phase,	  aiming	  to	  build	  trust,	  but	  potentially	  also	  leading	  to	  agreements.	  Negotiation	  training	  and	  other	  support	  activities	  similarly	  prepare	  the	  way	  for	  a	  settlement	  without	  having	  it	  as	  an	  explicit	  goal.	  	  Direct	  mediation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  occurs	  only	  in	  the	  formulation	  stage	  and	  its	  success	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  whether	  it	  leads	  to	  an	  end	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  Because	  reliable	  information	  about	  the	  other	  side	  is	  important	  during	  any	  bargaining	  process,	  some	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  a	  distinct	  advantage.	  Svensson	  (2013)	  points	  out	  that	  local	  actors	  like	  religious	  or	  civil	  society	  leaders	  know	  much	  more	  about	  the	  conflict	  situation	  and	  the	  people	  involved	  than	  any	  outsiders.	  He	  adds	  that	  these	  insider	  mediators	  have	  little	  incentive	  to	  misrepresent	  available	  information	  or	  to	  bluff,	  because	  they	  will	  have	  to	  continue	  to	  live	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  conflict	  parties,	  no	  matter	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  peace	  process.	  	  Despite	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  leverage,	  sometimes	  conflict	  parties	  prefer	  the	  services	  of	  a	  “weak	  mediator”	  (Beardsley	  2009).	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  often	  grows	  out	  of	  long-­‐standing	  relations	  in	  the	  country	  at	  war.	  For	  example,	  the	  parties	  in	  Mozambique,	  deeply	  distrustful	  of	  each	  other,	  could	  agree	  on	  the	  intermediary	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio,	  which	  had	  been	  engaged	  in	  humanitarian	  work	  in	  the	  country	  for	  many	  years	  (Gianturco	  2010).	  The	  facilitation	  phase	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  need	  to	  build	  trust.	  Thus,	  a	  weak,	  neutral	  mediator	  might	  be	  more	  desirable	  than	  a	  strong	  one	  who	  enters	  the	  process	  with	  her	  own	  agenda.	  In	  intractable	  conflicts,	  coaxing	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  negotiation	  table	  is	  difficult.	  Especially	  when	  they	  are	  reluctant	  to	  commit	  to	  a	  formal	  process,	  a	  low-­‐key,	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informal	  non-­‐state	  initiative	  can	  be	  preferable	  to	  arm-­‐twisting	  by	  a	  major	  power.	  Agreements	  arrived	  at	  without	  external	  pressure	  can	  prove	  to	  be	  more	  sustainable	  in	  the	  long	  run	  (Beardsley	  2011).	  And	  even	  if	  the	  meeting	  ends	  without	  an	  outcome	  document,	  it	  will	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  clarification	  of	  positions,	  the	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  other	  side’s	  red	  lines,	  and	  possibly	  to	  some	  human	  interaction	  with	  the	  opponent	  that	  can	  make	  future	  interactions	  easier.	  	  
Not	  mutually	  exclusive:	  track	  two	  and	  track	  one	  When	  governments	  give	  up	  on	  difficult	  negotiations	  or	  when	  the	  parties	  lose	  trust	  in	  the	  current	  mediator	  or	  the	  process,	  they	  may	  turn	  to	  another	  mediator,	  state	  or	  non-­‐state.	  The	  civil	  war	  in	  Burundi	  for	  example	  saw	  direct	  mediation	  efforts	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  African	  Union	  in	  1998-­‐1999	  followed	  by	  a	  lengthy	  mediation	  process	  spear-­‐headed	  by	  former	  presidents	  Nyerere	  and	  Mandela	  in	  1999-­‐2000	  (Melander	  and	  von	  Uexküll	  2011).	  	  T2+	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  T1.	  Choosing	  non-­‐state	  mediation	  at	  one	  point	  in	  the	  conflict	  cycle	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  official	  mediation	  will	  not	  be	  an	  option	  in	  the	  future.	  Governmental	  mediators	  who	  were	  reluctant	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  a	  particular	  conflict	  may	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  parties	  after	  T2+	  has	  paved	  the	  way.	  When	  belligerents	  consider	  their	  options	  of	  conflict	  management,	  and	  more	  specifically	  the	  identity	  of	  an	  outside	  mediator,	  they	  may	  choose	  a	  NGO	  mediator	  over	  a	  third-­‐party	  state	  for	  the	  NGO’s	  advantages	  outlined	  above	  or	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  another	  choice.	  Conflict	  resolution	  by	  foreign	  governments	  is	  not	  always	  available	  –	  particularly	  in	  intractable,	  long-­‐lasting	  conflicts	  in	  countries	  of	  little	  strategic	  importance	  few	  outside	  governments	  feel	  compelled	  to	  get	  involved	  (Regan	  2000).	  However,	  actions	  by	  the	  T2+	  actor	  can	  change	  the	  equation	  by	  affecting	  the	  opponents’	  attitudes	  –	  making	  them	  more	  willing	  to	  give	  negotiations	  a	  try	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–	  and	  by	  bolstering	  the	  parties’	  abilities	  –	  leveling	  the	  playing	  filed	  and	  making	  successful	  negotiations	  more	  likely.	  T2+	  initiatives	  can	  target	  one	  side	  or	  all	  sides	  of	  a	  conflict.	  NGO	  initiatives	  targeting	  sides	  separately	  prepare	  individuals	  and	  groups	  for	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  by	  giving	  them	  the	  tools	  they	  need	  to	  engage	  constructively	  in	  the	  peace	  process.	  This	  preparation	  work	  can	  generate	  innovative	  ideas	  how	  to	  address	  the	  underlying	  incompatibilities	  (Zartman	  and	  Touval	  1985,	  Kelman	  1992).	  It	  can	  also	  give	  participants	  the	  confidence	  to	  enter	  into	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  with	  their	  opponents,	  diminishing	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  stronger	  party	  will	  manipulate	  the	  process	  to	  their	  advantage.	  In	  the	  conflict	  between	  Khartoum	  and	  South	  Sudan,	  for	  example,	  a	  number	  of	  organizations	  implemented	  projects	  that	  had	  the	  goal	  of	  preparing	  the	  rebel	  groups	  for	  high-­‐level	  negotiations:	  In	  2002,	  The	  Carter	  Center	  trained	  government	  officials	  and	  rebel	  leaders	  in	  negotiation	  techniques;	  in	  2004	  and	  2005	  the	  Centre	  for	  Humanitarian	  Dialogue	  engaged	  several	  rebel	  groups	  in	  negotiation	  preparation;	  in	  2005,	  the	  Centre	  for	  Conflict	  Resolution	  in	  South	  Africa	  conducted	  a	  workshop	  for	  SPLM	  and	  SPLA	  representatives	  trying	  to	  bridge	  differences	  and	  develop	  a	  joint	  platform	  for	  the	  rebel	  groups.	  These	  efforts	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  direct	  talks	  between	  the	  belligerents.	  Informal	  dialogue	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  involving	  more	  than	  one	  conflict	  party	  give	  opponents	  space	  for	  non-­‐threatening	  personal	  interaction	  in	  which	  to	  improve	  belligerents’	  attitudes	  towards	  each	  other	  and	  the	  conflict,	  and	  to	  change	  a	  zero-­‐sum-­‐mindset	  into	  a	  more	  collaborative	  and	  constructive	  approach.	  Reduced	  tensions	  can	  express	  themselves	  in	  new	  openings	  for	  negotiations.	  These	  were	  the	  ideas	  behind	  the	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workshops	  held	  by	  the	  George	  Mason	  University	  Sudan	  Task	  Force	  for	  representatives	  of	  six	  different	  Darfur	  rebel	  factions.	  	  Examples	  of	  parallel	  mediation	  by	  different	  tracks	  include	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  Ivory	  Coast,	  where	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  participated	  in	  the	  peace	  talks	  on	  the	  request	  of	  the	  host	  nation	  Burkina	  Faso	  (Giro	  2013)	  and	  Burundi	  where	  the	  same	  non-­‐state	  actor	  held	  secret	  negotiations	  with	  the	  parties	  when	  the	  official	  talks	  in	  Arusha	  stalled	  (Hara	  1999).	  	  Considering	  the	  multitude	  of	  ways	  that	  T2+	  can	  benefit	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  I	  expect	  official	  diplomacy	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  when	  T2+	  occurs	  in	  a	  conflict:	  	  
H1a:	  	   High-­‐level	  negotiations	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  take	  place	  in	  those	  conflicts	  that	  
experience	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  than	  in	  those	  conflicts	  that	  do	  not,	  
all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  “All	  else	  being	  equal”	  refers	  to	  the	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  affect	  the	  dynamics	  of	  civil	  war	  explored	  in	  this	  research,	  in	  this	  section	  the	  chances	  that	  a	  war	  experiences	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  an	  end.	  	  I	  control	  for	  these	  factors	  by	  adding	  them	  as	  independent	  variables	  to	  my	  statistical	  models.	  More	  and	  more	  frequently,	  T2+	  is	  an	  explicit	  precursor	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  I	  expect	  one	  type	  of	  T2+	  intervention	  –	  capacity-­‐building	  –	  to	  be	  more	  closely	  linked	  to	  mediation	  by	  state	  actors	  than	  others.	  These	  efforts	  should	  precede	  high	  diplomacy.	  For	  a	  number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives,	  the	  possibility	  of	  subsequent	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  is	  a	  positive	  side	  factor,	  but	  not	  their	  explicit	  goal.	  But	  pre-­‐negotiation	  support	  and	  mediation	  training	  are	  meant	  to	  prepare	  groups	  for	  subsequent	  peace	  talks.	  For	  example,	  the	  Mediation	  Support	  Project	  (MSP)	  describes	  its	  work	  as	  follows:	  “The	  Mediation	  Support	  Project	  (MSP)	  offers	  tailor-­‐made	  trainings	  for	  NGOs,	  states,	  international	  organisations,	  and	  negotiating	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parties”	  (http://peacemediation.ch/tailor-­‐made-­‐trainings).	  Therefore,	  these	  initiatives	  should	  be	  related	  strongly	  to	  the	  subsequent	  onset	  of	  governmental	  mediation	  efforts.	  
H1b:	  	   NGOs	  training	  initiatives	  will	  be	  more	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  
high-­‐level	  mediation	  than	  other	  T2+	  efforts	  (direct	  mediation,	  mediation	  
support	  or	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops),	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  individual’s	  or	  organization’s	  connections	  to	  and	  relationship	  with	  the	  realm	  of	  high	  diplomacy,	  T2+	  can	  also	  have	  an	  advocacy	  effect,	  bringing	  a	  forgotten	  conflict	  into	  third	  states’	  consciousness.	  Groups	  led	  by	  a	  former	  head	  of	  state	  will	  be	  particularly	  good	  at	  generating	  government	  will	  and	  resources.	  There	  are	  several	  of	  those	  groups	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	  conflict	  management	  and	  related	  area,	  including	  two	  organizations	  –	  Club	  de	  Madrid	  and	  The	  Elders	  –	  comprised	  of	  several	  former	  dignitaries.	  	  	  An	  example	  of	  the	  impact	  former	  presidents	  can	  have	  is	  the	  Tunis	  Summit	  of	  1996:	  The	  1996-­‐2001	  violent	  crisis	  in	  Zaire	  saw	  an	  early	  intervention	  by	  The	  Carter	  Center	  in	  March	  1996	  when	  the	  conflict	  was	  one	  among	  several	  discussed	  during	  the	  Tunis	  Summit	  (INN	  1996).	  A	  number	  of	  talks	  with	  foreign	  dignitaries	  and	  negotiations	  between	  the	  conflict	  parties	  under	  mediation	  of	  South	  Africa	  followed	  in	  1997.	  Because	  of	  their	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  personal	  connections	  to	  current	  world	  leaders,	  I	  expect	  T2+	  activities	  by	  organizations	  around	  former	  presidents	  to	  lead	  more	  often	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  than	  initiatives	  by	  other	  organizations.	  
H1c:	  	   Onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  if	  NGOs	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  
of	  state	  conduct	  T2+	  than	  if	  religious	  T2+	  organizations	  (or	  none)	  are	  active,	  
all	  else	  being	  equal.	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Data	  	  
Sample	  of	  cases	  	   Datasets	  compiled	  and	  made	  available	  by	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  (UCDP)	  build	  the	  basis	  of	  my	  own	  data	  collection.	  From	  armed	  conflicts	  that	  appear	  in	  the	  
UCDP/PRIO	  Armed	  Conflict	  Dataset	  v.4-­‐2011,	  1946	  –	  2010	  (Gleditsch	  et	  al.	  2002,	  Themnér	  and	  Wallensteen	  2011)	  I	  include	  those	  conflicts	  that	  take	  place	  in	  Africa	  during	  the	  time	  period	  1990-­‐2010	  and	  that	  are	  coded	  as	  internal	  conflicts	  (Type	  3	  or	  4	  according	  to	  the	  codebook,	  UCDP	  2011).	  	  A	  research	  focus	  on	  African	  civil	  conflicts	  in	  the	  time	  period	  1990-­‐2010	  makes	  sense	  practically	  as	  well	  as	  theoretically.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  technological	  globalization	  saw	  an	  explosion	  of	  the	  number	  of	  international	  NGOs,	  including	  in	  the	  field	  of	  conflict	  resolution.	  This	  evolution	  coincided	  with	  a	  declining	  interest	  of	  the	  remaining	  super-­‐power	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  previously	  propped-­‐up	  allies	  and	  the	  eruption	  or	  exacerbation	  of	  a	  number	  of	  civil	  wars,	  particularly	  in	  Africa.	  Limiting	  the	  time	  under	  observation	  to	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era	  allows	  me	  to	  hold	  these	  systematic	  variables	  constant.	  My	  geographical	  focus	  on	  Africa	  also	  has	  the	  practical	  advantage	  of	  keeping	  a	  number	  of	  regional	  factors	  of	  importance,	  like	  membership	  in	  regional	  organizations,	  constant.	  Furthermore,	  the	  continent	  has	  experienced	  many	  violent	  wars	  in	  the	  last	  25	  years,	  and	  still	  does.	  A	  thorough	  study	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  in	  the	  region	  might	  lead	  to	  helpful	  insights	  for	  future	  policy.	  Although	  this	  dissertation	  is	  limited	  to	  one	  region	  and	  a	  relatively	  short	  time	  period,	  it	  has	  larger	  implications:	  the	  NGO	  peace-­‐making	  field	  has	  grown	  exponentially	  in	  the	  last	  25	  years	  and	  it	  is	  time	  to	  move	  beyond	  case	  studies	  in	  analyzing	  its	  effectiveness.	  There	  are	  few	  quantitative	  studies	  of	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  (see	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Boehmelt	  2010	  for	  an	  exception,	  who	  compares	  the	  effectiveness	  in	  mediation	  outcome	  of	  different	  tracks	  of	  diplomacy),21	  and	  none	  to	  my	  knowledge	  that	  addresses	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  (Chapter	  3),	  conflict	  duration	  (Chapter	  4)	  -­‐	  a	  common	  test	  for	  other	  types	  of	  interventions	  -­‐	  or	  conflict	  severity	  (Chapter	  5).	  	  UCDP’s	  definition	  of	  conflict	  is	  based	  on	  these	  requirements:	  the	  use	  of	  armed	  force,	  a	  minimum	  of	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  per	  year	  per	  dyad,	  the	  participation	  of	  at	  least	  one	  government	  of	  a	  state	  as	  a	  primary	  party,	  and	  a	  stated	  incompatibility	  (parties	  fight	  over	  either	  territory	  or	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  current	  government).	  UCDP	  codes	  a	  conflict	  episode	  as	  ended	  when	  the	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths	  does	  not	  reach	  25	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  However,	  should	  the	  same	  incompatibility	  lead	  to	  renewed	  fighting,	  UCDP	  codes	  a	  new	  episode	  with	  the	  same	  conflict	  ID.	  My	  sample	  thus	  includes	  75	  conflict	  episodes	  for	  37	  conflicts	  in	  27	  countries.	  This	  produces	  262	  observations.	  Eight	  episodes	  started	  before	  January	  1,	  1990;	  10	  were	  still	  ongoing	  by	  December	  31,	  2010.	  See	  the	  appendix	  for	  a	  list	  of	  all	  included	  conflict	  episodes	  and	  the	  participants.	  
Unit	  of	  analysis	  This	  chapter	  uses	  the	  conflict	  dyad	  year	  as	  its	  unit	  of	  observation.22	  Dyads	  warrant	  consideration	  because	  14	  conflicts	  in	  my	  sample	  involve	  more	  than	  one	  rebel	  group	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  active	  fighting	  phase.	  The	  same	  country	  can	  face	  several	  distinct	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  study	  differs	  in	  three	  important	  ways	  from	  my	  own:	  the	  author’s	  definition	  of	  track	  two	  diplomacy	  only	  includes	  mediation	  events,	  the	  information	  about	  mediation	  events	  is	  collected	  using	  only	  news	  media	  sources,	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  mediation	  is	  measured	  by	  whether	  parties	  reach	  a	  stable	  peace	  settlement.	  22	  When	  considering	  the	  exact	  timing	  of	  T2+	  in	  relation	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  a	  monthly	  unit	  of	  analysis	  would	  be	  preferable	  to	  the	  annual	  count.	  However,	  for	  many	  of	  the	  NGO	  initiatives	  in	  my	  sample,	  in	  particular	  those	  efforts	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  exact	  dates	  when	  the	  initiatives	  began	  are	  not	  available.	  Organizational	  reports,	  one	  of	  my	  main	  sources,	  often	  just	  list	  the	  NGO’s	  initiatives	  by	  year.	  In	  such	  a	  small	  sample,	  losing	  many	  observations	  due	  to	  missing	  information	  about	  the	  main	  variable	  of	  interest	  would	  make	  further	  statistical	  analysis	  impossible.	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insurgencies	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  which	  are	  coded	  as	  separate	  conflicts	  by	  UCDP	  (e.g.	  there	  are	  currently	  two	  active	  rebel	  movements	  in	  Ethiopia).	  But	  even	  conflicts	  about	  the	  same	  incompatibility	  (territory	  or	  government-­‐control)	  can	  be	  fought	  by	  a	  number	  of	  rebel	  groups,	  either	  over	  time	  (Niger’s	  government	  faced	  challenges	  from	  three	  different	  rebel	  movements	  in	  the	  1990s)	  or	  simultaneously	  (e.g.	  Sudan’s	  conflict	  in	  the	  Darfur	  region	  has	  the	  same	  UCDP	  ID	  as	  the	  conflict	  over	  South	  Sudan’s	  independence).	  Mediation	  might	  attempt	  to	  end	  a	  conflict	  that	  is	  fought	  by	  a	  number	  of	  groups,	  but	  more	  often	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  talks	  will	  bring	  together	  one	  band	  of	  rebels	  with	  the	  government,	  excluding	  other	  opposition	  organizations.	  Information	  about	  conflict	  dyads	  comes	  from	  UCDP’s	  dyadic	  dataset	  (Harbom	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  -­‐	  Date	  of	  retrieval:	  2014/02/15	  -­‐	  UCDP	  Database:	  www.ucdp.uu.se/database,	  Uppsala	  University).	  	  The	  yearly	  unit	  of	  analysis	  has	  limitations,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  1998-­‐1999	  crisis	  in	  Guinea-­‐Bissau:	  Both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  intervened	  to	  end	  the	  violence	  in	  this	  confrontation	  between	  the	  government	  and	  a	  military	  junta.	  Fighting	  erupted	  on	  June	  7,	  1998.	  Mediation	  offers	  by	  third-­‐party	  governments	  were	  initially	  not	  accepted	  (Massey	  2004:	  85),	  but	  already	  in	  June	  1998	  the	  bishop	  of	  Bissau,	  Settimio	  Arturo	  Ferrazzetta,	  began	  to	  talk	  to	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  conflict.	  Official	  mediation	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Portuguese	  Speaking	  Countries	  and	  later	  also	  the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  followed	  in	  July.	  While	  this	  brief	  glimpse	  into	  the	  conflict	  suggests	  that	  the	  non-­‐state	  mediator	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  my	  data	  cannot	  pick	  up	  the	  T2+-­‐T1	  sequence.	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Dependent	  variable:	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  The	  dependent	  variable	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  I	  use	  the	  UCDP	  Managing	  Interstate	  Conflict	  in	  Africa	  Dataset,	  MIC	  (Melander	  and	  von	  Uexküll	  2011),	  and	  include	  those	  instances	  of	  conflict	  management	  in	  my	  data	  that	  a)	  are	  conducted	  by	  representatives	  of	  governments	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  and	  b)	  are	  coded	  as	  direct,	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  talks	  of	  the	  conflict	  parties.	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  shuttle	  diplomacy,	  bilateral	  talks	  between	  one	  party	  and	  a	  foreign	  government/organization	  or	  unilateral	  calls	  for	  peace	  by	  outsiders.	  The	  MIC	  data	  end	  in	  2007.	  I	  complement	  my	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  data	  for	  the	  years	  2008-­‐2010	  with	  information	  from	  the	  Civil	  War	  Mediation	  (CWM)	  dataset	  (DeRouen	  et	  al	  2011,	  version	  April	  2013).	  
Descriptive	  data	  My	  sample	  consists	  of	  100	  conflict	  dyads	  and	  133	  dyad	  episodes.	  This	  results	  in	  354	  dyad	  years.	  According	  to	  the	  information	  from	  MIC	  and	  CWM	  data,	  there	  were	  72	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  events	  for	  43	  dyad	  episodes	  in	  my	  sample.	  As	  Figure	  8	  shows,	  22	  of	  these	  instances	  are	  government-­‐led	  mediation;	  15	  are	  in	  the	  hand	  of	  intergovernmental	  organizations;	  35	  times	  governments	  and	  IGOs	  work	  simultaneously.	  23	  dyads	  see	  more	  than	  one	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  mediation	  by	  governments	  or	  intergovernmental	  organizations;	  79	  see	  none	  at	  all.23	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Small	  inconsistencies	  in	  the	  summing	  up	  of	  dyad	  years	  are	  the	  result	  of	  incomplete	  data	  on	  official	  mediation	  for	  a	  few	  conflict	  dyads.	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Figure	  8:	  High-­‐level	  mediations	  (track	  one)	  by	  mediator	  
	  
	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  present	  in	  38	  dyad	  episodes	  (see	  Figure	  9).	  22	  of	  those	  also	  see	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy.	  In	  31	  dyad	  years	  T2+	  and	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy	  occurs	  in	  the	  same	  year;	  26	  dyad	  years	  experience	  T1	  after	  T2+	  happened	  the	  year	  before.	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Controls	  	  My	  hypotheses	  posit	  that	  T2+	  will	  be	  positively	  related	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  Other	  conditions	  affecting	  the	  likelihood	  of	  T1	  efforts	  depend	  on	  both	  circumstances	  within	  the	  country	  at	  war	  and	  on	  the	  strategic	  interests	  of	  potential	  mediators.	  Factors	  can	  have	  contradictory	  effects	  at	  times,	  for	  example	  conflict	  duration:	  Once	  a	  conflict	  has	  been	  ongoing	  for	  a	  long	  time	  and	  positions	  are	  entrenched,	  mediators	  are	  reluctant	  to	  get	  involved	  (Touval	  and	  Zartman	  1985,	  Bercovitch	  and	  Langley	  1993).	  Finding	  a	  solution	  to	  an	  intractable	  conflict	  enhances	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  mediator	  –	  but	  the	  more	  intractable,	  the	  more	  likely	  becomes	  failure,	  which	  is	  detrimental	  to	  the	  mediator’s	  prestige.	  Thus,	  long-­‐lasting	  wars	  will	  attract	  fewer	  official	  mediation	  attempts.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Greig	  and	  Regan	  (2008)	  find	  that	  in	  civil	  wars	  conflict	  parties	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  give	  negotiations	  a	  chance	  when	  the	  conflict	  has	  lasted	  a	  long	  time.24	  I	  include	  the	  logged	  number	  of	  months	  the	  conflict	  dyad	  episode	  has	  lasted	  to	  measure	  conflict	  
duration	  and	  expect	  longer-­‐lasting	  civil	  war	  dyads	  to	  be	  more	  amenable	  to	  mediation.	  	  High	  levels	  of	  intensity	  may	  urge	  powerful	  outsiders	  to	  try	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  ongoing	  violence	  (Quinn	  et	  al.	  2006).	  Previous	  literature	  finds	  that	  in	  interstate	  wars	  mediation	  efforts	  are	  more	  common	  (Beardsley	  2010)	  and	  more	  often	  accepted	  (Greig	  2005)	  if	  the	  fighting	  results	  in	  high	  casualty	  numbers.	  However,	  a	  high	  death	  rate	  also	  signals	  intractability,	  which	  makes	  third	  parties	  cautious.	  I	  control	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  conflict	  intensity	  by	  including	  the	  UCDP	  variable	  for	  conflict	  intensity	  (minor	  war,	  if	  the	  battle-­‐death	  rate	  is	  between	  25	  and	  999	  for	  the	  dyad	  year;	  war	  if	  it	  is	  at	  least	  1,000).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  A	  demand	  for	  a	  mediator	  and	  a	  simultaneous	  reluctance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  powerful	  states	  opens	  opportunities	  for	  non-­‐state	  mediation.	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Considering	  earlier	  findings	  that	  identity	  conflicts	  should	  be	  harder	  to	  end,	  outside	  mediators	  should	  be	  reluctant	  to	  become	  active	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  societies.	  I	  include	  a	  measure	  of	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  (from	  Alesina	  et	  al.	  2002),	  expecting	  a	  lower	  probability	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  mediation	  under	  official	  auspices	  for	  higher	  values	  of	  ethnic	  fractionalization.	  
Separatist	  conflicts	  are	  often	  less	  open	  to	  compromise	  than	  those	  centered	  on	  grievances	  about	  the	  central	  government.	  Groups	  that	  have	  the	  goal	  to	  divide	  the	  country	  will	  have	  few	  incentives	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  government	  will	  be	  particularly	  concerned	  about	  bestowing	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  separatists,	  thus	  avoiding	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  (Melin	  and	  Svensson	  2009).	  I	  recode	  UCDP’s	  incompatibility	  variable	  into	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  for	  territorial	  issues	  and	  hypothesize	  that	  those	  conflicts	  about	  territory	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  see	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  Comparative	  strength	  of	  the	  opponent	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  civil	  war	  duration	  (Cunningham	  et	  al.	  2013).	  Similarly,	  it	  will	  influence	  leaders’	  willingness	  to	  look	  for	  alternatives	  to	  the	  battlefield.	  If	  one	  side	  is	  much	  stronger	  than	  the	  other,	  the	  weaker	  party	  will	  be	  more	  open	  to	  negotiations.	  And	  while	  the	  stronger	  party	  could	  bank	  on	  a	  military	  victory,	  it	  probably	  prefers	  a	  negotiation,	  especially	  while	  it	  has	  the	  military	  leverage	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  bargaining	  process.	  My	  models	  include	  Cunningham	  et	  al.’s	  (2013)	  measures	  of	  
rebel	  strength	  parity	  (rebel	  forces	  equal	  in	  strength	  to	  the	  government’s	  forces)	  and	  rebel	  
superiority.	  I	  expect	  the	  former	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  occurs;	  and	  the	  latter	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  effect.	  The	  government’s	  calculus	  will	  furthermore	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  diversity	  of	  threats	  it	  faces.	  If	  the	  government	  negotiates	  with	  one	  challenger,	  rewards	  given	  to	  this	  group	  may	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lead	  other	  rebels	  to	  increase	  their	  demands	  (Cunnigham	  2006,	  Clayton	  and	  Gleditsch	  2014).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  state	  that	  has	  to	  respond	  to	  more	  than	  one	  rebel	  group	  at	  the	  same	  time	  might	  be	  more	  open	  to	  negotiation	  with	  at	  least	  one	  rebel	  actor	  in	  order	  to	  concentrate	  military	  assets	  where	  it	  thinks	  them	  most	  effective.	  I	  add	  the	  number	  of	  ongoing	  dyads	  in	  a	  country	  year	  to	  my	  model.	  
Military	  interventions	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  conflict	  affect	  the	  just	  discussed	  balance	  of	  power	  and	  leverage.	  They	  can	  give	  an	  impetus	  to	  the	  other	  side	  to	  press	  for	  negotiations.	  I	  code	  an	  overt	  third-­‐party	  military	  intervention	  in	  the	  cases	  where	  the	  UCDP	  conflict	  data	  note	  a	  second	  state-­‐participant	  on	  either	  side.	  I	  expect	  mediation	  by	  third	  states	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  if	  military	  interventions	  occur.	  	  
Democracy	  within	  a	  country	  is	  often	  correlated	  with	  stronger	  ties	  within	  the	  international	  community.	  Thus,	  more	  democratic	  governments	  may	  be	  more	  open	  to	  offers	  of	  (or	  pressures	  towards)	  mediation	  by	  third	  parties.	  Higher	  Polity	  scores	  should	  thus	  indicate	  more	  frequent	  occurrences	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  	  To	  account	  for	  the	  strategic	  considerations	  of	  potential	  mediators	  I	  include	  three	  measures.	  First,	  I	  code	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  that	  is	  1	  if	  the	  country	  in	  conflict	  I	  a	  former	  
colony	  of	  either	  Great	  Britain	  or	  France.	  I	  limit	  colonial	  ties	  to	  these	  two	  countries	  because	  almost	  all	  African	  countries	  were	  colonies	  of	  European	  powers,	  but	  only	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  France	  have	  shown	  both	  the	  power	  and	  the	  interest	  in	  continuing	  influence	  in	  their	  former	  colonies	  (see	  for	  example	  France’s	  ongoing	  engagement	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic).	  Second,	  I	  include	  the	  logged	  population	  (data	  from	  the	  World	  Development	  Indicators)	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  country	  size.	  Larger	  countries	  are	  more	  interesting	  strategically,	  not	  last	  because	  they	  are	  a	  larger	  possible	  market	  for	  imported	  goods	  from	  the	  potential	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intervener.	  And	  third,	  Lujula’s	  (2009)	  variable	  for	  gemstone	  and	  hydrocarbon	  production	  indicates	  whether	  a	  country	  is	  producing	  natural	  resources	  of	  interest	  to	  other	  countries.	  For	  all	  three	  indicators	  I	  expect	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  for	  larger	  values.	  Lastly,	  my	  models	  also	  include	  two	  variables	  relating	  to	  earlier	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy:	  one	  regressor	  measures	  the	  time	  since	  the	  last	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  attempt,	  the	  other	  is	  a	  variable	  counting	  the	  number	  of	  previous	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  dyad	  episode.	  It	  will	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  if	  governments	  or	  IGOs	  made	  an	  effort	  to	  end	  an	  internal	  conflict	  before.	  The	  more	  outsiders	  have	  tried	  to	  bring	  a	  conflict	  to	  an	  end,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  will	  either	  continue	  or	  someone	  else	  (like	  an	  intergovernmental	  organization)	  will	  take	  over.	  But	  the	  longer	  it	  has	  been	  since	  an	  earlier	  attempt	  at	  conflict	  resolution,	  the	  more	  reluctant	  outsiders	  will	  be	  to	  get	  involved.	  The	  time	  since	  the	  last	  mediation	  should	  be	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  operationalization	  and	  sources	  of	  all	  variables,	  refer	  to	  the	  codebook	  (appendix	  5)	  and	  the	  summary	  table	  (appendix	  6).	  
Methodology	  
Logistic	  regression	  	  	   When	  testing	  whether	  official	  mediation	  events	  are	  correlated	  with	  non-­‐official	  diplomacy,	  my	  dependent	  variable	  –	  onset	  of	  governmental	  mediation	  –	  is	  binary.	  I	  therefore	  employ	  logistic	  regression	  models	  (Greig	  2005	  uses	  probit	  estimator;	  Boehmelt	  2009	  uses	  logit).	  Because	  of	  the	  temporal	  correlation	  of	  observations	  in	  the	  same	  conflict	  (e.g.	  ethnic	  composition	  of	  a	  state	  remains	  unchanged	  from	  one	  year	  to	  the	  next;	  level	  of	  violence	  in	  one	  year	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  death	  rate	  in	  the	  preceding	  year	  etc.)	  I	  cluster	  the	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standard	  errors	  on	  conflict	  dyad.25	  I	  test	  both	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  one	  conflict	  episode	  is	  associated	  with	  governmental	  conflict	  management	  in	  the	  same	  episode,	  and	  whether	  T2+	  and	  T1	  occur	  in	  the	  same	  year	  more	  often	  than	  randomly	  expected.	  Then	  I	  use	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variable	  to	  analyze	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  one	  year	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  official	  mediation	  in	  the	  following	  years.26	  	   As	  I	  elaborate	  above,	  official	  mediation	  can	  also	  lead	  to	  T2+,	  for	  example	  earlier	  failed	  attempts	  of	  third-­‐party	  governmental	  mediation	  may	  discourage	  further	  official	  mediation,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  open	  opportunities	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  I	  consider	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  with	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  regression,	  but	  do	  not	  find	  evidence	  of	  endogeneity.	  The	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  appendix.	  Previous	  literature	  has	  argued	  that	  chances	  for	  mediation	  change	  over	  time.	  In	  particular,	  third-­‐party	  governments	  will	  become	  less	  inclined	  to	  intervene	  diplomatically	  in	  civil	  wars	  the	  longer	  the	  conflict	  has	  already	  lasted.	  To	  account	  for	  a	  possible	  time-­‐dependency,	  I	  include	  the	  time	  (in	  years)	  until	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  happens,	  as	  well	  as	  cubic	  splines	  (Beck,	  Katz	  and	  Tucker	  1998).27	  Logistic	  regression	  also	  determines	  whether	  particular	  types	  of	  T2+	  approaches	  (capacity-­‐building	  versus	  direct	  mediation)	  and	  organizations	  (those	  led	  by	  former	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  As	  robustness	  checks,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  multiple	  simultaneous	  dyads	  I	  also	  run	  the	  models	  with	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  and	  on	  conflict	  episode.	  Coefficients	  and	  p-­‐values	  are	  comparable	  to	  those	  reported	  here.	  26	  Aside	  from	  a	  couple	  of	  exceptions	  mentioned	  below	  I	  lag	  the	  T2+	  variables	  by	  one	  year	  for	  two	  reasons:	  First,	  while	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and	  other	  dialog	  sessions	  have	  long-­‐term	  goals	  that	  may	  not	  fit	  into	  this	  time	  frame,	  mediation	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  should	  show	  effect	  within	  one	  or	  two	  years.	  Second,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  sample	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  information	  resulting	  from	  repeated	  lags	  makes	  any	  findings	  unreliable.	  27	  A	  likelihood	  ratio	  test	  comparing	  the	  model	  including	  splines	  and	  a	  count	  variable	  and	  one	  model	  without	  time	  variables	  shows	  that	  the	  variables	  accounting	  for	  time	  are	  not	  jointly	  significant.	  I	  continue	  to	  include	  them	  because	  I	  consider	  a	  measure	  of	  time	  theoretically	  important	  and	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  non-­‐linear	  effect	  of	  time.	  Results	  do	  not	  change	  significantly	  without	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  models.	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presidents)	  are	  correlated	  with	  higher	  probabilities	  of	  official	  mediation.	  The	  next	  section	  uses	  the	  proposed	  methodology	  to	  test	  the	  earlier	  developed	  hypotheses.	  
Testing	  and	  discussion	  	  
Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  	   Table	  1	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  the	  logistic	  regressions.	  	  
Table	  1:	  High-­‐level	  mediation,	  results	  of	  logistic	  regression	  	   (1)	  Logistic	  regression:	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  episode	   (2)	  Logistic	  regression:	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  
T2+	  (in	  dyad	  episode)	   2.06***	  
(0.61)	  
	  
T2+	  (previous	  dyad	  year)	   	   0.98***	  
(0.35)	  Previous	   official	   mediation	   in	  episode	   	   1.16***	  (0.27)	  Separatist	  conflict	   -­‐3.05**	  (1.42)	   -­‐1.80**	  (0.76)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   1.88	  (1.36)	   0.81	  (0.73)	  Conflict	  intensity	   -­‐0.13	  (0.48)	   -­‐0.62	  (0.48)	  Conflict	   duration	   in	   months,	  logged	   0.43***	  (0.15)	   0.07	  (0.13)	  Rebel	  parity	   -­‐2.01**	  (0.93)	   0.31	  (0.61)	  Rebel	   stronger	   than	  government	   0.18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1.70)	   1.47**	  (0.73)	  Veto	  players	   0.06	  (0.23)	   0.16	  (0.19)	  Military	   intervention	   same	  year	   1.27**	  (0.57)	   0.73	  (0.57)	  Polity	  score	   0.09	  (0.08)	   0.13***	  (0.05)	  Population,	  logged	   -­‐0.27	  	  	  	  (0.30)	   0.06	  (0.18)	  Former	  colony	  of	  UK	  or	  France	   -­‐1.04	  (0.95)	   -­‐0.36	  (0.18)	  Gems	  or	  carbon	  production	   0.94	  (0.69)	   0.63	  (0.43)	  Time	   since	   last	   high-­‐level	  mediation	   -­‐0.26	  (0.30)	   0.39	  (0.48)	  Constant	  	   2.08	  (4.49)	   -­‐3.02	  (2.78)	  
N	  Frequency	  of	  T2+	   322	  (96	  clusters)	  148	   322	  (96)	  59	  Wald	  chi2	   51.80***	   91.73***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐145.03	   -­‐127.15	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  conflict	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported	  	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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The	  Wald	  chi2	  statistics	  is	  significant	  in	  all	  models.	  I	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  variables’	  effects	  are	  jointly	  indistinguishable	  from	  zero.	  In	  Model	  1,	  the	  main	  variable	  of	  interest,	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  Those	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  T2+	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  ongoing	  violence	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  also	  see	  official	  mediation	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  same	  conflict	  episode.	  The	  results	  lend	  support	  to	  hypothesis	  1a,	  postulating	  that	  official	  and	  unofficial	  diplomacy	  occurs	  in	  the	  same	  conflict	  episodes.	  If	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  a	  dyad	  year	  and	  the	  regressor	  is	  determined	  as	  T2+	  in	  the	  same	  dyad	  year,	  the	  coefficient	  for	  T2+	  remains	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  	  A	  dyad	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  in	  a	  given	  year	  is	  likely	  to	  also	  see	  T1	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  When	  I	  use	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variable	  in	  the	  model,	  the	  variable	  of	  interest	  is	  positive,	  and	  the	  coefficient	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  (Model	  2).	  I	  confirm	  that	  T2+	  is	  a	  precursor	  to	  official	  mediation,	  as	  well	  as	  occurring	  simultaneously	  with	  governmental	  and	  intergovernmental	  mediation.	  Subsequent	  models	  will	  shed	  more	  light	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  T1-­‐T2+	  relationship.	  But	  first	  I	  consider	  the	  results	  for	  the	  control	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  models	  so	  far.	  	  	   The	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  is	  less	  likely	  for	  separatist	  conflicts	  than	  for	  conflicts	  about	  governmental	  control.	  The	  coefficient	  for	  separatist	  conflicts	  is	  negative	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  finding	  confirms	  earlier	  literature	  on	  the	  subject.	  The	  measure	  of	  ethnic	  fractionalization,	  however,	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  any	  of	  the	  models.	  Conflict	  intensity	  and	  dyad	  episode	  duration	  do	  not	  display	  statistical	  significance,	  either.	  The	  relation	  of	  these	  conflict	  dynamics	  and	  possible	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  is	  not	  straightforward	  –	  as	  conflicting	  findings	  in	  earlier	  research	  suggests.	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The	  hypothesized	  relationship	  between	  rebel	  superiority	  and	  mediation	  onset	  is	  also	  confirmed:	  in	  those	  conflicts	  where	  rebel	  groups	  are	  much	  stronger	  than	  government	  troops,	  outside	  governments	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  offer	  mediation	  services,	  or	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  mediators.	  I	  had	  proposed	  that	  in	  those	  dyads	  where	  rebel	  forces	  are	  of	  comparable	  strength	  to	  the	  government	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  mediation	  by	  third	  parties	  should	  be	  less	  likely.	  This	  proposition	  finds	  support	  in	  the	  statistically	  significant	  coefficient	  for	  rebel	  parity	  in	  Model	  1,	  but	  the	  variable	  is	  no	  longer	  significant	  in	  Model	  2.	  Military	  intervention	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  from	  the	  outside	  is	  positive	  but	  not	  significant.	  	  As	  expected,	  higher	  democracy	  scores	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  probability	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  My	  measures	  of	  strategic	  importance	  of	  the	  country	  at	  war	  do	  not	  return	  statistically	  significant	  coefficients.	  	  The	  more	  official	  mediation	  attempts	  dyads	  see	  during	  a	  conflict	  episode,	  the	  more	  likely	  they	  are	  to	  see	  another	  attempt	  at	  high-­‐level	  conflict	  management	  in	  the	  same	  episode.	  The	  variables	  meant	  to	  capture	  effects	  of	  time	  are	  mostly	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  the	  constant,	  which	  represents	  the	  baseline	  probability	  that	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  occurs,	  is	  positive	  in	  one	  and	  negative	  in	  the	  other	  model,	  and	  not	  significant	  in	  either.	  It	  remains	  unclear	  whether	  governments	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  become	  less	  or	  more	  willing	  to	  mediate	  internal	  conflicts	  given	  that	  they	  have	  not	  mediated	  until	  now.	  Similarly,	  the	  coefficient	  for	  time	  since	  the	  last	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  is	  inconsistent	  and	  none	  of	  the	  time	  variables	  is	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  simultaneous	  equation	  model	  (see	  appendix	  8)	  are	  comparable	  to	  the	  logistic	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regression	  and	  also	  show	  a	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  relationship	  between	  T2+	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  Because	  the	  results	  of	  logistic	  regressions	  are	  not	  easily	  interpretable	  I	  present	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  my	  main	  variable	  of	  interest	  and	  some	  the	  covariates	  that	  show	  statistical	  significance,	  based	  on	  Model	  2:	  Table	  2	  compares	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  a	  dyad	  year	  given	  that	  T2+	  occurs	  in	  the	  same	  dyad	  year.	  
Table	  2:	  Predicted	  probabilities	  for	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  -­‐	  Dichotomous	  variables	  set	  to	  mode	  value,	  others	  to	  mean	  -­‐	  
Variable	  of	  interest	   no/minimum	  value	   yes/maximum	  value	   Magnitude	  of	  change	  
in	  baseline	  
probability	  T2+	   in	   preceding	   dyad	  year	   0.16	   0.34	   +112%	  Separatist	  conflict	   0.16	   0.03	   -­‐81%	  Rebel	   forces	   stronger	  than	  government	   0.16	   0.46	   +188%	  Democracy	  score	   0.08	   0.43	   +438%	  Table	  2	  is	  based	  on	  coefficients	  from	  Model	  2	  	  For	  those	  conflicts	  that	  see	  T2+	  the	  probability	  of	  experiencing	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  rises	  from	  16%	  to	  34%,	  more	  than	  doubling	  their	  chances	  for	  (inter)governmental	  peace	  intervention.	  The	  table	  also	  includes	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  a	  change	  in	  democracy	  level,	  rebel	  strength,	  and	  type	  of	  conflict	  (separatist	  or	  not).	  The	  chances	  of	  seeing	  official	  mediation	  decline	  by	  81%,	  from	  16%	  to	  3%,	  for	  conflicts	  where	  the	  rebels’	  goal	  is	  secession	  compared	  to	  conflicts	  with	  other	  incompatibilities.	  If	  the	  rebel	  forces	  have	  a	  military	  advantage	  over	  the	  government,	  the	  probability	  of	  high-­‐level	  diplomacy	  almost	  triples,	  from	  16%	  if	  rebels	  are	  weaker	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  government’s	  forces	  to	  46%.	  As	  hypothesized,	  the	  government	  will	  consent	  to	  talks	  much	  more	  willingly	  if	  it	  faces	  a	  strong	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opponent.	  Lastly,	  more	  democratic	  countries	  are	  much	  more	  open	  to	  external	  diplomatic	  intervention.	  As	  the	  Polity	  score	  changes	  from	  the	  minimum	  level	  (-­‐8)	  to	  the	  maximum	  (8,	  the	  full	  Polity	  Scale	  goes	  from	  -­‐10,	  hereditary	  monarchy,	  to	  +10,	  consolidated	  democracy),	  the	  likelihood	  a	  conflict	  dyad	  will	  see	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  increases	  fivefold,	  from	  8%	  to	  43%.	  	  
Collaborators	  I	  now	  consider	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  coincide	  with	  intergovernmental	  mediation	  efforts	  or	  third-­‐state	  government	  intervention.	  To	  do	  so	  I	  create	  two	  dummy	  variables	  –	  one	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  conducted	  by	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  and	  one	  for	  mediation	  by	  outside	  governments.28	  I	  use	  specifications	  as	  in	  Model	  2,	  because	  I	  most	  interested	  in	  finding	  out	  whether	  T2+	  is	  followed	  by	  T1,	  but	  replace	  the	  dependent	  variable	  “onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation”	  with	  the	  new	  variables	  in	  turn.	  Interestingly,	  there	  are	  no	  mediation	  initiatives	  by	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  in	  any	  of	  the	  separatist	  conflicts	  in	  my	  sample.	  Because	  the	  variable	  is	  dropped	  in	  the	  regression	  I	  rerun	  the	  models	  without	  accounting	  for	  the	  conflicts’	  incompatibility.	  Table	  3	  present	  the	  results.	  	  Lagged	  T2+	  is	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  for	  IGO	  mediation,	  at	  the	  0.1	  level	  for	  third-­‐states	  governmental	  conflict	  management.	  Predicted	  probabilities	  based	  on	  the	  separate	  models	  show	  that	  high-­‐level	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  multilateral	  setting	  is	  three	  times	  as	  likely	  when	  T2+	  precedes	  it	  (6%	  and	  24%	  likelihood),	  while	  the	  probability	  that	  governmental	  third-­‐party	  mediation	  begins	  is	  15%	  and	  27%	  respectively	  depending	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  A	  multinomial	  logit	  would	  be	  a	  more	  efficient	  approach;	  however,	  observations	  can	  take	  on	  both	  values	  (intergovernmental	  and	  governmental	  mediation)	  in	  the	  same	  dyad	  year.	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on	  whether	  T2+	  occurs.	  	  	  These	  findings	  indicate	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  T2+	  on	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  onset	  differ	  by	  type	  of	  official	  mediator.	  NGOs	  seem	  to	  path	  the	  way	  for	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  but	  less	  so	  for	  conflict	  management	  by	  third-­‐party	  governments.	  	  
Table	  3:	  Onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  by	  mediator	  identity	  	   (3)	  Logistic	  regression:	  intergovernmental	  
mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   (4)	  Logistic	  regression:	  third-­‐state	  governmental	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  
T2+	  (previous	  dyad	  year)	   1.60***	  
(0.39)	  
0.75*	  
(0.42)	  Previous	   official	   mediation	  in	  episode	   0.80***	  (0.24)	   0.54***	  (0.14)	  Separatist	  conflict	   	   -­‐1.27*	  (0.73)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.06	  (0.88)	   0.23	  (0.70)	  Conflict	  intensity	   -­‐0.12	  	  	  (0.47)	   -­‐0.61	  (0.49)	  Conflict	   duration	   in	  months,	  logged	   0.19	  (0.46)	   0.09	  (0.14)	  Rebel	  parity	   1.23*	  (0.65)	   0.37	  (0.72)	  Rebel	   stronger	   than	  government	   2.60***	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.91)	   1.13	  (0.81)	  Veto	  players	   0.26	  (0.25)	   0.16	  (0.19)	  Military	   intervention	   same	  year	   0.52	  (0.71)	   0.26	  (0.47)	  Polity	  score	   0.09*	  (0.05)	   0.11**	  (0.05)	  Population,	  logged	   0.28	  	  	  	  (0.24)	   -­‐0.01	  (0.97)	  Former	   colony	   of	   UK	   or	  France	   -­‐0.63	  (0.59)	   -­‐0.26	  (0.42)	  Gems	  or	  carbon	  production	   1.40***	  (0.44)	   0.70*	  (0.41)	  Time	   since	   last	   high-­‐level	  mediation	   -­‐0.19	  (0.46)	   0.12	  (0.48)	  Constant	  	   -­‐8.31**	  (4.11)	   -­‐1.80	  (2.86)	  
N	  Frequency	  of	  T2+	   321	  (95	  clusters)	  59	   321	  (95)	  59	  Wald	  chi2	   115.04***	   87.56***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐94.29	   -­‐125.91	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  conflict	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported	  	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  The	  control	  variables	  for	  the	  most	  part	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  previous	  models.	  However,	  discrepancies	  between	  Model	  3	  and	  Model	  4	  point	  to	  interesting	  differences	  
	  	   81	  
among	  the	  two	  options	  of	  international	  mediation.	  Variables	  accounting	  for	  rebel	  strength	  are	  statistically	  significant	  in	  the	  expected	  directions	  for	  intergovernmental	  mediation,	  but	  not	  significant	  for	  governmental	  mediation.	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  multilateral	  organizations	  stand	  ready	  to	  mediate	  when	  belligerents	  (or	  the	  international	  community)	  want	  them	  to	  do	  so.	  That	  rebel	  capability	  has	  no	  influence	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  governmental	  mediation	  by	  outside	  governments	  could	  be	  a	  sign	  that	  in	  these	  cases	  considerations	  on	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  mediation	  are	  more	  important	  (however,	  among	  variables	  measuring	  general	  strategic	  importance	  only	  gemstone	  and	  petroleum	  production	  is	  significant	  in	  both	  models).	  	  	  	  
Capacity-­‐building	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  I	  now	  analyze	  how	  different	  NGO	  approaches	  and	  organizational	  types	  affect	  the	  probability	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  negotiations	  mediated	  by	  IGOs	  and	  governments.	  	  27	  dyad	  years	  in	  13	  conflict	  episodes	  had	  NGO-­‐led	  capacity-­‐building	  exercises	  for	  conflict	  parties.	  Using	  logistic	  regression	  I	  explore	  whether	  NGO	  training	  is	  significantly	  related	  with	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  I	  add	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  for	  NGO	  training	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  it	  to	  other	  NGO	  activities,	  also	  dummy	  variables	  for	  direct	  mediation	  by	  NGOs,	  mediation	  support,	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops.29	  The	  T2+	  variables	  are	  lagged	  one	  year	  in	  order	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  temporal	  relation	  of	  official	  mediation	  and	  capacity-­‐building.	  The	  lagged	  training	  variable	  is	  significant.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Reference	  category:	  no	  T2+.	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Table	  4:	  T2	  +	  approaches	  and	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  	   (5)	  Logistic	  regression:	  any	  high-­‐level	  
mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   (6)	  Logistic	  regression:	  third-­‐state	  intergovernmental	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   (7)	  Logistic	  regression:	  third-­‐state	  governmental	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  
T2+	  training,	  	  lagged	  one	  year	  	   1.64*	  (0.87)	   3.37***	  (1.05)	   0.73	  (0.87)	  
T2+	  mediation,	  	  lagged	  one	  year	   0.87	  (0.64)	   1.57*	  (0.92)	   1.44**	  (0.57)	  
T2+	   mediation	  
support,	  	  lagged	  one	  year	   0.49	  (0.75)	   0.37	  (0.87)	   -­‐0.99	  (0.69)	  
T2+	  dialog,	  	  lagged	  one	  year	   -­‐0.99*	  (0.53)	   -­‐0.59	  (0.60)	   -­‐0.67	  (0.87)	  Previous	   official	  mediation	  in	  episode	   1.48***	  (0.30)	   1.20***	  (0.43)	   0.52***	  (0.18)	  Separatist	  conflict	   -­‐2.10	  (1.69)	   	   -­‐1.82	  (1.56)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   0.14	  (1.01)	   -­‐0.10	  (1.03)	   -­‐0.19	  (1.00)	  Conflict	  intensity	   -­‐0.62	  (0.65)	   0.43	  (0.67)	   -­‐0.41	  (0.51)	  Conflict	   duration	   in	  months,	  logged	   0.06	  (0.22)	   -­‐0.17	  (0.26)	   0.11	  (0.20)	  Rebel	  parity	   0.90	  (0.93)	   1.95**	  (0.94)	   0.13	  (0.80)	  Rebel	   stronger	   than	  government	   2.69***	  (0.70)	   3.69***	  (1.18)	   1.08	  (1.33)	  Veto	  players	   0.45	  (0.28)	   0.57	  (0.49)	   0.28	  (0.22)	  Military	   intervention	  same	  year	   0.87	  (0.83)	   0.22	  (0.08)	   0.28	  (0.82)	  Polity	  score	   0.15	  (0.09)	   0.07	  (0.08)	   0.13	  (0.09)	  Population,	  logged	   -­‐0.05	  (0.16)	   0.60	  (0.37)	   -­‐0.20	  (0.26)	  Former	   colony	   of	   UK	  or	  France	   -­‐0.53	  (0.59)	   -­‐1.17**	  (0.59)	   -­‐0.68	  (0.58)	  Gems	   or	   carbon	  production	   1.16**	  (0.48)	   1.52***	  (0.59)	   1.40***	  (0.50)	  Time	   since	   last	   high-­‐level	  mediation	   0.85	  (0.61)	   0.15	  (0.53)	   -­‐0.18	  (0.63)	  Constant	  	   -­‐2.16	  (3.98)	   -­‐14.12**	  (7.07)	   1.27	  (4.18)	  
N	  T2+	  training	  T2+mediation	  T2+mediation	  support	  T2+	  dialog	  
197	  (59	  clusters)	  17	  35	  17	  21	  
197	  (59	  clusters)	   197	  (59	  clusters)	  
Wald	  chi2	   147.58***	   154.08***	   77.16***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐77.97	   -­‐55.13	   -­‐80.57	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  conflict	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported.	  	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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As	  hypothesized,	  NGO	  training	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  The	  coefficient	  for	  T2+	  mediation	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  Mediation	  support	  is	  no	  longer	  significant	  either,	  probably	  because	  these	  activities	  happen	  by	  definition	  in	  the	  same	  year	  than	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  The	  variable	  accounting	  for	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  is	  significant	  and	  negative.	  I	  expect	  such	  initiatives	  to	  have	  a	  longer	  time	  horizon	  and	  build	  towards	  negotiations	  much	  slower	  than	  the	  other	  types	  of	  T2+.	  Thus,	  a	  one-­‐year	  lag	  may	  not	  be	  enough	  to	  measure	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  particular	  category.30	  	  I	  once	  more	  consider	  the	  probabilities	  that	  a	  dyad	  experiences	  IGO	  intervention	  or	  intervention	  by	  third-­‐party	  governments	  I	  see	  that	  T2+	  training	  in	  one	  year	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  IGO-­‐led	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  the	  following	  year	  (Model	  6).	  It	  is	  highly	  significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level.	  The	  results	  are	  somewhat	  different	  if	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  onset	  of	  governmental	  mediation	  (Model	  7).	  Specifically,	  capacity-­‐building	  is	  no	  longer	  statistically	  significant	  –	  but	  direct	  mediation	  is.	  It	  seems	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy	  by	  states	  happens	  more	  often	  parallel	  or	  consecutive	  to	  T2+	  mediation,	  and	  less	  often	  building	  on	  NGO	  preparation.	  Another	  interesting	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  models	  is	  that	  the	  dummy	  variable	  for	  former	  French	  or	  British	  colonies	  is	  positive	  and	  significant	  in	  the	  model	  for	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  model	  for	  governmental	  mediation.	  While	  Britain	  and	  France	  are	  only	  two	  of	  many	  different	  mediators	  included	  in	  the	  second	  model,	  they	  both	  hold	  a	  permanent	  seat	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  (a	  major	  intergovernmental	  mediator)	  and	  may	  use	  their	  influence	  there	  to	  push	  for	  diplomatic	  interventions	  in	  their	  former	  colonies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  When	  lagged	  by	  two	  years,	  the	  coefficient	  of	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  variable	  is	  positive	  (though	  not	  significant),	  and	  the	  number	  of	  observation	  drops	  to	  129.	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Former	  presidents	  In	  hypothesis	  H1c	  I	  propose	  that	  NGO	  efforts	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  should	  be	  particularly	  effective	  in	  leading	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  But	  when	  I	  replace	  my	  T2+	  variable	  with	  one	  variable	  accounting	  for	  non-­‐state	  mediation	  by	  former	  presidents,	  one	  variable	  for	  efforts	  by	  religious	  groups,	  and	  one	  for	  other	  organizations/individuals/networks	  (no	  T2+	  in	  the	  dyad	  year	  is	  the	  reference	  category),	  the	  coefficient	  for	  former	  presidents	  is	  not	  significant.31	  The	  one	  for	  religious	  organizations,	  however,	  displays	  positive	  statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  (Model	  8).	  When	  parsing	  my	  sample	  into	  mediation	  attempts	  by	  outside	  government	  (Model	  9)	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  (Model	  10)32	  respectively,	  religious	  organizations	  remain	  statistically	  significant	  and	  positive	  in	  both.	  Former	  presidents	  are	  only	  significant	  in	  the	  model	  for	  intergovernmental	  mediation	  –	  but	  the	  coefficient	  is	  negative.	  Table	  5	  shows	  the	  results.	  This	  puzzling	  finding	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  conflict	  management	  approaches	  taken	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state:	  overwhelmingly,	  they	  mediate	  directly	  between	  the	  conflict	  parties	  –	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  Track	  1.5	  initiatives	  accounted	  for	  in	  this	  study	  are	  direct	  mediation.	  Because	  of	  the	  high	  profile	  former	  presidents	  still	  enjoy,	  their	  mediation	  rounds	  usually	  take	  place	  instead	  of	  and	  not	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  other	  mediation	  (particularly	  multilateral	  organizations,	  which	  often	  coordinate	  their	  efforts	  with	  high-­‐profile	  NGOs).	  Religious	  organizations,	  while	  also	  conducting	  much	  direct	  mediation,	  have	  a	  more	  eclectic	  portfolio:	  many	  combine	  mediation	  with	  training	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Because	  the	  main	  approach	  of	  T2+	  organizations	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  is	  direct	  mediation,	  I	  do	  not	  lag	  the	  T2+	  variables.	  32	  “Separatist	  conflict”	  is	  dropped	  in	  this	  model	  because	  none	  of	  the	  observations	  of	  separatist	  conflicts	  see	  any	  governmental	  mediation.	  
	  	   85	  
accompany	  ongoing	  mediation	  processes.	  These	  activities	  can	  happen	  simultaneously	  with	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  	  
Table	  5	  	  T2+	  by	  former	  presidents	  and	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  	   (8)	  Logistic	  regression:	  
high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   (9)	  Logistic	  regression:	  third-­‐state	  governmental	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   (10)	  Logistic	  regression:	  intergovernmental	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  







(0.60)	  T2+	   by	   religious	  organizations	   1.41***	  (0.41)	   1.31***	  (0.47)	   2.46***	  (0.52)	  T2+	  by	  others	   -­‐0.72	  (0.50)	   -­‐0.02	  (0.48)	   0.13	  (0.60)	  Previous	   official	  mediation	  in	  episode	   1.29***	  (0.30)	   0.55***	  (0.16)	   0.99***	  (0.28)	  Separatist	  conflict	   -­‐1.82**	  (0.71)	   -­‐1.23*	  (0.72)	   	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   0.42	  (0.77)	   -­‐0.13	  (0.79)	   -­‐1.20	  (0.99)	  Conflict	  intensity	   -­‐0.61	  (0.45)	   -­‐0.61	  (0.48)	   -­‐0.16	  (0.49)	  Conflict	   duration	   in	  months,	  logged	   0.16	  (0.15)	   0.16	  (0.15)	   0.25	  (0.19)	  Rebel	  parity	   0.09	  (0.61)	   0.22	  (0.74)	   1.01	  (0.70)	  Rebel	   stronger	   than	  government	   0.56	  (0.82)	   0.33	  (0.91)	   1.27	  (0.99)	  Veto	  players	   0.15	  (0.20)	   0.12	  (0.20)	   0.09	  (0.28)	  Military	   intervention	  same	  year	   0.85	  (0.62)	   0.37	  (0.49)	   0.63	  (0.74)	  Polity	  score	   0.16***	  (0.06)	   0.11**	  (0.01)	   0.10	  (0.06)	  Population,	  logged	   -­‐0.10	  (0.18)	   -­‐0.13	  (0.18)	   0.14	  (0.23)	  Former	   colony	   of	   UK	   or	  France	   -­‐0.27	  (0.47)	   -­‐0.21	  (0.45)	   -­‐0.78	  (0.53)	  Gems	   or	   carbon	  production	   0.67	  (0.49)	   0.83*	  (0.47)	   2.08***	  (0.60)	  Time	   since	   last	   high-­‐level	  mediation	   0.33	  (0.48)	   -­‐0.05	  (0.49)	   -­‐0.17	  (0.53)	  Constant	  	   -­‐0.52	  (2.85)	   0.21	  (2.97)	   -­‐5.76	  (3.92)	  
N	  T2+	  by	  frm.	  presidents	  T2+	  by	  religious	  groups	  T2+	  by	  others	  
322	  20	  46	  24	  
321	   321	  
Wald	  chi2	   144.91***	   106.61***	   104.04***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐123.84	   -­‐123.35	   -­‐86.27	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  conflict	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported	  	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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Conclusion	  This	  chapter	  begins	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  direct	  effects	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  can	  have	  on	  civil	  conflicts.	  I	  test	  hypotheses	  related	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  and	  how	  T2+	  may	  lead	  to	  diplomatic	  interventions	  by	  intergovernmental	  and	  governmental	  actors.	  I	  confirm	  a	  strong	  association	  between	  unofficial	  and	  official	  diplomacy,	  as	  dyads	  that	  experience	  T2+	  are	  112%	  more	  likely	  to	  also	  see	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  I	  corroborate	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  capacity-­‐building	  initiatives	  occur	  in	  conflicts	  that	  also	  see	  an	  onset	  of	  mediation	  more	  often	  than	  randomly	  expected.	  Any	  discrepancies	  between	  IGO	  and	  governmental	  diplomacy	  may	  point	  to	  a	  discrepancy	  of	  purpose	  for	  conflict	  management	  offered	  by	  IGOs	  vs.	  governments:	  Governments	  that	  consider	  diplomatic	  intervention	  in	  another	  country	  will	  consider	  first	  and	  foremost	  their	  own	  strategic	  interests,	  while	  intergovernmental	  organizations	  are	  often	  tasked	  with	  conflict	  management	  as	  part	  of	  their	  collective	  security	  mandate.	  As	  professional	  conflict	  manager,	  they	  are	  in	  more	  regular	  contact	  with	  NGOs	  (often	  because	  the	  NGOs	  seek	  contact	  and	  information)	  than	  states	  are,	  more	  familiar	  with	  the	  current	  efforts	  and	  more	  open	  to	  collaboration,	  e.g.	  by	  tasking	  NGOs	  to	  prepare	  conflict	  parties	  for	  IGO	  negotiations.	  They	  will	  thus	  be	  attuned	  to	  new	  openings	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  because	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  may	  inform	  the	  IGO	  (or	  one	  of	  the	  many	  members).	  	  My	  results	  may	  miss	  additional	  cases	  where	  NGO	  mediation	  is	  a	  precursor	  to	  official	  mediation	  –	  if	  the	  timing	  of	  initiatives	  is	  sequential,	  but	  T2+	  happens	  early	  one	  year	  and	  T1	  later	  the	  same	  year,	  my	  data	  cannot	  capture	  the	  order.	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Defying	  my	  expectation,	  T2+	  initiatives	  that	  are	  spearheaded	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  are	  not	  more	  likely	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  This	  finding	  underlines	  the	  separate	  status	  of	  these	  actors	  in	  conflict	  resolution:	  even	  though	  officially	  actions	  by	  non-­‐governmental	  actors,	  it	  seems	  that	  mediation	  by	  former	  presidents	  is	  more	  often	  a	  substitution	  for	  governmental	  action	  then	  a	  precursor	  for	  it.	  	  	   My	  research	  has	  some	  limitations.	  My	  definition	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  ignores	  many	  NGO	  activities	  that	  could	  have	  important	  effects	  on	  conflict	  dynamics,	  from	  grassroots	  peace-­‐building	  to	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks.	  However,	  the	  sheer	  number	  of	  NGO	  conflict	  resolution	  efforts	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  account	  them	  all	  for	  all	  conflicts	  in	  the	  sample.	  Another	  concern	  is	  that	  my	  T2+	  dataset	  is	  potentially	  biased	  because	  I	  might	  miss	  some	  initiatives,	  for	  example	  when	  NGOs	  have	  not	  replied	  to	  my	  inquiries,	  or	  if	  the	  project	  is	  still	  ongoing	  and	  confidential.	  However,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  data	  section,	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  am	  working	  with	  a	  representative	  sample.	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  use	  the	  collected	  T2+	  data	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  civil	  war	  termination	  and	  the	  effect	  non-­‐state	  interventions	  may	  have	  on	  it.	  The	  literature	  has	  considered	  many	  factors	  that	  influence	  how	  long	  a	  violent	  conflict	  may	  last,	  including	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  and	  mediation	  effectiveness.	  I	  expand	  on	  earlier	  theories	  to	  include	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  as	  a	  potentially	  powerful	  mechanism	  to	  bring	  civil	  conflict	  to	  an	  end.	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Chapter	  4	  –	  T2+	  and	  Conflict	  termination	  and	  Outcome	  
Introduction	  	  	   The	  literature	  on	  civil	  war	  has	  given	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  factors	  that	  may	  affect	  the	  duration	  of	  conflicts	  (Brandt	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Length	  of	  a	  war	  is	  often	  understood	  as	  a	  proxy	  of	  destructiveness.	  Longer	  wars,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  fought	  at	  a	  low	  intensity	  level,	  tend	  to	  impact	  a	  country	  deeper	  than	  short	  bursts	  of	  violence.	  As	  battle	  deaths	  accumulate,	  infrastructure	  is	  destroyed	  and	  economy	  activity,	  from	  subsistence	  farming	  to	  foreign	  direct	  investment,	  grinds	  to	  a	  halt.	  Conflict	  duration	  can	  also	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  intractability	  of	  the	  issues	  underlying	  the	  ongoing	  fighting:	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  parties	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  ceasefire	  or	  settlement	  framework	  can	  represent	  the	  depth	  of	  division	  in	  the	  society.	  A	  long	  list	  of	  variables	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  conflict	  termination	  or	  continuation,	  including	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  (see	  Dixon	  2009a	  for	  an	  overview).	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  besides	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  interventions	  by	  outside	  governments,	  non-­‐state	  diplomatic	  interventions	  can	  also	  affect	  whether	  and	  when	  conflicts	  end.33	  	  Non-­‐state	  actors	  mediate	  between	  parties	  in	  civil	  wars,	  e.g.	  the	  Nyerere	  Center	  in	  the	  Arusha	  process	  in	  the	  Burundian	  civil	  conflict	  (Hara	  1999)	  or	  the	  International	  Committee	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  /	  International	  Alert	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  where	  they	  negotiated	  the	  release	  of	  hostages	  (Sorbe	  et	  al.	  1997);	  they	  provide	  support	  to	  ongoing	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  e.g.	  Initiatives	  of	  Change	  supported	  the	  Inter-­‐Congolese	  dialog	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,34	  or	  they	  use	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  to	  change	  belligerents’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  The	  effects	  of	   financial	  or	  military	  contributions	   from	  non-­‐governmental	   sources	  –	  may	   it	  be	  an	   influx	  of	  foreign	   fighters	   (Malet	   2013)	   into	   a	   civil	   conflict	   or	  money	   collected	   by	   the	   diaspora	   (Byman	   et	   al.	   2001,	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  2004)	  to	  support	  insurgencies	  -­‐	  warrant	  their	  own	  research	  project.	  	  	  34	  http://www.iofc.org/great-­‐lakes-­‐project-­‐activities,	  accessed	  April	  9,	  2014.	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attitudes	  towards	  each	  other,	  e.g.	  ACCORD’s	  session	  with	  “representatives	  of	  the	  RCD	  rebels,	  unarmed	  political	  parties,	  ministers	  from	  the	  Mobutu	  government,	  the	  Archbishop	  of	  Kisangani	  and	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  civil	  society	  groups”	  (Naidoo	  2000:	  99),	  also	  addressing	  the	  DRC	  conflict.	  These	  initiatives	  have	  in	  common	  a	  hope	  to	  contribute	  to	  an	  end	  of	  a	  conflict,	  and	  organizers	  claim	  that	  the	  conflict	  will	  terminate	  sooner	  because	  of	  them.	  Anecdotal	  evidence	  cannot	  determine	  whether	  NGO	  conflict	  resolution	  –	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  mediation	  -­‐	  is	  the	  decisive	  factor	  that	  ends	  the	  war.	  Maybe	  the	  conflict	  simply	  was	  “ripe”	  to	  be	  resolved	  (Zartman	  1985,	  Regan	  and	  Stam	  2000)	  when	  the	  non-­‐state	  actors	  became	  engaged.	  But	  statistical	  models	  that	  include	  controls	  for	  those	  variables	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  make	  up	  ripeness	  along	  with	  measures	  for	  T2+	  can	  help	  assess	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management’s	  contribution	  to	  conflict	  resolution.	  	  	  I	  find	  that	  once	  selection	  effects	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  resolution	  are	  taken	  into	  account,	  NGO	  initiatives	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  conflict	  termination.	  In	  the	  sample	  of	  cases	  under	  observation	  in	  this	  study,	  initiatives	  by	  religiously	  affiliated	  organizations	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  end	  of	  civil	  wars,	  while	  other	  organizations	  display	  no	  statistical	  significance.	  There	  are	  indications	  that	  religious	  institutions	  and	  professional	  NGOs	  may	  be	  more	  effective	  at	  different	  times	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  Intimately	  linked	  to	  the	  end	  of	  a	  conflict	  is	  the	  type	  of	  termination:	  how	  a	  conflict	  ends	  is	  as	  important	  as	  if	  and	  when	  (Brandt	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Previous	  literature	  posits	  that	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  conflict	  and	  certain	  characteristic	  of	  the	  parties	  involved	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  conflict	  (DeRouen	  and	  Sobek	  2004,	  Cunningham	  et	  al.	  2009).	  I	  test	  whether	  the	  presence	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  will	  make	  a	  negotiated	  outcome	  more	  likely.	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An	  example	  case	  where	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  contributed	  to	  an	  eventual	  peace	  agreement	  is	  Liberia:	  The	  civil	  war	  in	  Liberia	  proceeded	  in	  two	  phases,	  1989-­‐1995	  and	  2000-­‐2003.	  Based	  on	  the	  annual	  severity	  threshold	  of	  at	  least	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  (UCDP),	  the	  conflict	  is	  coded	  in	  two	  episodes,	  1989-­‐1990	  and	  2000-­‐2003,	  both	  of	  which	  ended	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement.	  The	  opponent	  to	  the	  government	  in	  the	  first	  phase	  was	  the	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (NPFL)	  under	  Charles	  Taylor;	  in	  the	  second	  episode	  the	  Taylor	  government	  faced	  off	  with	  Liberians	  United	  for	  Reconciliation	  and	  Democracy	  (LURD)	  and	  the	  Movement	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Liberia	  (MODEL).	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1990,	  the	  Liberian	  Inter	  Faith	  Mediation	  Council	  (IFMC)	  held	  consultations	  with	  both	  the	  current	  government	  and	  the	  NPFL,	  searching	  for	  a	  peaceful	  solution.	  According	  to	  outside	  observers,	  the	  IFMC’s	  “proposals	  were	  adopted	  and	  articulated	  as	  the	  Economic	  Community	  of	  West	  African	  States	  (ECOWAS)	  peace	  plan	  for	  Liberia”	  (Toure	  2002).	  In	  the	  second	  violent	  phase	  of	  the	  conflict,	  official	  mediators	  from	  ECOWAS	  sought	  the	  help	  of	  outsiders	  with	  good	  contacts	  to	  the	  rebels,	  namely	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio,	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  the	  rebels	  continuing	  cooperation	  in	  the	  negation	  process,	  which	  the	  organization	  delivered	  (Scelzo	  2010).	  	  I	  find	  partial	  statistical	  support	  for	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  T2+	  generally	  makes	  future	  peace	  agreements	  more	  likely	  for	  the	  subcategory	  of	  NGO	  training.	  I	  also	  confirm	  that	  conflicts	  ending	  in	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  will	  be	  shorter	  if	  they	  experience	  T2+	  during	  the	  conflict.	  	   The	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows:	  in	  the	  next	  section	  I	  present	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  linking	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  to	  civil	  war	  termination	  and	  introduce	  my	  hypotheses.	  This	  part	  also	  considers	  the	  importance	  of	  accounting	  for	  potential	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selection	  effects.	  Section	  three	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  data	  used	  in	  the	  empirical	  tests.	  Then	  I	  explain	  the	  methodology	  used	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  the	  fifth	  section	  I	  test	  the	  hypotheses	  and	  analyze	  the	  results.	  Lastly,	  I	  draw	  conclusions	  from	  my	  research	  and	  point	  to	  implications	  for	  theory	  and	  practice.	  	  
Argument	  
Direct	  effects	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management:	  conflict	  termination	  	   Third-­‐party	  interventions	  affect	  civil	  war	  duration.	  Previous	  quantitative	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  while	  military	  involvement	  prolongs	  violent	  conflict	  (e.g.	  Balch-­‐Lindsay	  and	  Enterline	  2000,	  Elbadawi	  and	  Sambanis	  2000,	  Cunningham	  2010),35	  diplomatic	  intercessions	  can	  shorten	  them	  (Regan	  and	  Aydin	  2006).	  But	  studies	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  conflict	  duration	  and	  interventions	  have	  focused	  primarily	  on	  state	  interventions.	  I	  test	  whether	  the	  finding	  regarding	  non-­‐violent	  outside	  intervention	  holds	  true	  if	  the	  intervener	  is	  not	  a	  state	  but	  a	  non-­‐state	  actor.	  I	  argue	  that	  organizations	  or	  programs	  designed	  to	  “resolve	  conflict”	  should	  make	  measurably	  increase	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  civil	  conflict	  ends.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  determine	  that	  a	  conflict	  has	  indeed	  ended	  for	  good	  makes	  testing	  the	  theoretical	  argument	  difficult.	  Sometimes	  violence	  flares	  up	  surrounding	  the	  same	  issue	  after	  many	  years	  of	  peaceful	  coexistence.	  The	  definition	  of	  conflict	  episodes	  is	  more	  straightforward:	  if	  the	  conflict	  is	  inactive	  in	  a	  year,	  meaning	  that	  there	  were	  less	  than	  25	  battle	  related	  deaths,	  the	  episode	  has	  ended.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  it	  is	  unsatisfactory	  for	  conflict	  parties	  and	  mediators	  alike	  if	  a	  conflict	  flares	  up	  after	  a	  period	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  However,	  Collier,	  Hoeffler	  &	  Soderborn	  (2004)	  find	  that	  military	  support	  for	  rebel	  movements	  shortens	  the	  duration	  of	  civil	  wars.	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calm,	  but	  even	  a	  break	  in	  the	  fighting	  should	  be	  counted	  as	  some	  success	  for	  peacemaking	  efforts	  (Bercovitch	  and	  Gartner	  2006).	  	   I	  expect	  T2+	  initiatives	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  termination	  of	  civil	  conflicts	  in	  at	  least	  three	  ways:	  First,	  direct	  mediation	  between	  the	  conflict	  parties	  leads	  to	  a	  negotiated	  agreement.	  Mediation	  conducted	  by	  an	  NGO	  or	  individual	  between	  warring	  parties	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  ceasefire	  or	  peace	  agreement,	  ending	  a	  conflict,	  like	  the	  1992	  Rome	  peace	  agreement	  mediated	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  which	  ended	  the	  15	  year	  civil	  war	  in	  Mozambique.	  As	  explored	  in	  preceding	  chapters,	  non-­‐state	  mediators	  can	  have	  distinct	  advantages	  over	  governmental	  actors.	  Their	  long-­‐standing	  relationship	  with	  the	  country	  at	  war	  can	  inspire	  trust	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  battle-­‐line.	  Similarly,	  professed	  neutrality	  and	  small	  personal	  stakes	  in	  the	  mediation	  outcome	  (besides	  a	  potential	  loss	  in	  credibility)	  make	  them	  prime	  choices	  for	  those	  looking	  for	  un-­‐biased	  mediators.	  	  Two,	  negotiation	  training	  prepares	  sides	  for	  direct	  talks.	  For	  example,	  the	  Swisspeace/Mediation	  Support	  Project	  holds	  workshops	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  negotiation	  knowhow	  in	  the	  Central	  African	  Republic.	  This	  work	  supports	  the	  ongoing	  internal	  political	  dialogue.	  The	  rationale	  is	  that	  if	  all	  sides	  accept	  the	  process	  as	  legitimate	  and	  fair	  and	  know	  how	  to	  formulate	  their	  needs,	  expectations	  and	  red	  lines,	  then	  an	  eventual	  outcome	  should	  be	  acceptable	  to	  everyone.	  Three,	  programs	  designed	  to	  bring	  opponents	  together	  in	  unofficial	  settings	  can	  help	  reduce	  the	  psychological	  barriers	  to	  conflict	  resolution	  that	  hinder	  sincere	  negotiations	  particularly	  in	  protracted	  conflicts	  (Kelman	  1992).	  Even	  if	  T2+	  projects	  do	  not	  include	  active	  negotiation	  or	  preparation	  for	  high-­‐level	  conflict	  resolution	  processes,	  their	  conveners	  hope	  to	  end	  wars	  by	  affecting	  the	  belligerents’	  attributes	  towards	  or	  interactions	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with	  the	  other	  side	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  will	  then	  be	  possible	  and	  an	  agreement	  can	  be	  reached.	  Informal	  dialogue	  contributes	  to	  humanization	  of	  the	  opponent	  (Davidson	  and	  Montville	  1981).	  For	  example,	  a	  1999	  problem-­‐solving	  workshop	  by	  the	  South	  African	  NGO	  ACCORD	  brought	  together	  rebels	  and	  government	  representative	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo.	  It	  “produced	  a	  consensus	  on	  many	  crucial	  issues	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  exposed	  the	  divergent	  perceptions	  and	  positions	  held	  by	  the	  various	  participants”	  (Naidoo	  2000:	  99).	  The	  same	  year	  the	  conflict	  parties	  signed	  an	  accord	  brokered	  by	  the	  president	  of	  Zambia	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  (however,	  the	  agreement	  fell	  apart	  shortly	  after).	  
H2a:	   	  A	  civil	  conflict	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  diplomacy	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  
year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  does	  not,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  	  “All	  else	  being	  equal”	  refers	  to	  the	  factors	  that	  have	  been	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  affect	  the	  dynamics	  of	  civil	  war	  explored	  in	  this	  research,	  in	  this	  section	  the	  chances	  that	  a	  war	  comes	  to	  an	  end.	  The	  factors	  will	  be	  controlled	  for	  by	  adding	  them	  as	  independent	  variables	  to	  my	  statistical	  model,	  see	  below.	  	  	  The	  range	  of	  NGO	  conflict	  resolution	  approaches	  and	  practitioners	  is	  wide,	  and	  some	  types	  and	  approaches	  are	  probably	  more	  effective	  towards	  the	  goal	  of	  conflict	  termination	  than	  others.	  The	  approaches	  included	  in	  my	  analysis	  range	  from	  direct	  mediation	  to	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and	  negotiation	  training.	  When	  assessing	  the	  T2+	  effect	  on	  conflict	  duration,	  direct	  mediation	  is	  of	  particular	  importance.	  Informal	  dialogue	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  exercises	  do	  not	  have	  the	  same	  short-­‐term	  goals	  as	  actual	  mediation	  rounds.	  Instead,	  these	  activities	  are	  meant	  to	  prepare	  the	  groundwork	  for	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  reconciliation	  in	  later	  stages	  of	  the	  confrontation.	  Mediation,	  like	  former	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South	  African	  president	  Nelson	  Mandela’s	  efforts	  in	  the	  Burundi	  civil	  war,	  or	  the	  negotiations	  by	  the	  local	  NGO	  Reunir	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  surrender	  of	  almost	  300	  rebels	  in	  the	  Congo	  (Pan	  African	  News	  1999),	  have	  immediate	  objectives,	  usually	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict.	  In	  that,	  T2+	  mediation	  is	  more	  easily	  compared	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  with	  its	  short	  time	  horizons.	  Like	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy,	  I	  expect	  NGO	  mediation	  to	  	  	  measurably	  affect	  conflict	  duration.	  	  
H2b:	   Conflicts	  that	  experience	  direct	  mediation	  by	  T2+	  organizations	  will	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  year	  than	  conflicts	  that	  do	  not	  experience	  T2+	  
mediation,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  In	  regards	  to	  NGO	  type	  I	  expect	  religious	  organizations	  to	  command	  a	  particular	  respect	  as	  they	  call	  upon	  shared	  values	  and	  beliefs	  in	  countries	  with	  one	  dominant	  religion,	  or	  when	  the	  peace	  initiative	  brings	  together	  people	  from	  different	  religions.	  Local	  religious	  initiatives	  include	  the	  Acholi	  Religious	  Leaders	  Peace	  Initiative	  (ARLPI)	  in	  Uganda,	  an	  organization	  bringing	  together	  Anglican,	  Catholic	  and	  Muslim	  religious	  personas.	  Their	  professed	  impartiality	  and	  integrity,	  stemming	  from	  their	  religious	  roles,	  made	  ARLPI	  members	  acceptable	  as	  go-­‐between	  for	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  and	  the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  (Otim	  2009).	  Alternatively,	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  religion	  connected	  to	  the	  organization	  is	  a	  minority	  religion	  and	  has	  no	  strong	  ties	  to	  the	  government,	  it	  will	  have	  an	  especially	  strong	  claim	  to	  neutrality.	  This	  should	  allow	  the	  organization	  to	  act	  as	  a	  credible	  mediator.	  The	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio,	  a	  Catholic	  lay	  organization,	  had	  strong	  ties	  with	  the	  local	  Catholic	  community	  in	  Algeria,	  but	  in	  a	  country	  that	  is	  99%	  Muslim,	  that	  does	  not	  translate	  to	  political	  influence	  (Impagliazzo	  2010,	  CIA	  World	  Factbook	  2014).	  Sant’Egidio	  organized	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a	  dialogue	  among	  most	  opposition	  forces	  that	  led	  the	  signing	  of	  a	  “Platform	  for	  a	  peaceful	  political	  solution	  to	  the	  crisis	  in	  Algeria.”	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Swedish	  Life	  and	  Peace	  Institute	  supported	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  Somalia	  that	  led	  to	  regional	  institution	  building	  (van	  Beurden	  1999).	  	  	  
H2c:	   A	  conflict	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  led	  by	  religious	  organizations	  will	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  given	  year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  sees	  T2+	  led	  by	  professional	  
NGOs,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  A	  particular	  subset	  of	  non-­‐religious	  NGOs	  could	  confound	  my	  expectations	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  organizational	  type	  and	  conflict:	  A	  number	  of	  organizations	  are	  run	  by	  individuals	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  ties	  to	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy	  (e.g.	  former	  heads	  of	  states	  or	  diplomats,	  examples	  include	  The	  Carter	  Center,	  Conflict	  Management	  Initiative,	  Nyerere	  Centre).	  Their	  connections	  to	  governmental	  and	  intergovernmental	  actors	  can	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  incentives	  to	  conflict	  parties.	  These	  mediators	  combine	  the	  advantages	  of	  NGOs	  and	  some	  of	  the	  leverage	  of	  third-­‐party	  states,	  which	  could	  make	  them	  particularly	  effective	  in	  bringing	  about	  an	  end	  to	  hostilities.	  	  
H2d:	   A	  conflict	  that	  sees	  T2+	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  
a	  given	  year	  than	  a	  conflict	  that	  sees	  T2+	  led	  by	  religious	  NGOs,	  all	  else	  being	  
equal.	  
Civil	  conflict	  outcomes	  	   A	  conflict	  can	  end	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  one	  party	  may	  win	  militarily,	  the	  belligerents	  may	  agree	  to	  a	  ceasefire	  or	  a	  peace	  deal,	  or	  the	  conflict	  may	  fizzle	  out.	  Unless	  military	  preponderance	  by	  challengers	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  obvious	  early	  in	  the	  conflict,	  the	  eventual	  outcome	  is	  unknown	  to	  participants	  and	  outsiders.	  Given	  the	  T2+	  focus	  on	  non-­‐
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violent	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  for	  negotiations,	  more	  conflicts	  should	  end	  in	  a	  negotiated	  compromise	  if	  T2+	  takes	  place.	  This	  argument	  dovetails	  with	  propositions	  in	  earlier	  research:	  Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  hypothesize	  that	  conflicts	  more	  likely	  will	  end	  in	  negotiated	  settlements	  if	  the	  rebels	  have	  access	  to	  nonviolent	  means.	  The	  authors	  argue	  that	  “nonviolent	  means”	  are	  present	  when	  the	  rebel	  movement	  has	  a	  legal	  political	  wing	  that	  may	  represent	  them	  in	  discussion	  with	  the	  government.	  However,	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  societies	  where	  such	  legal	  representation	  exists,	  conflict	  should	  be	  less	  common.	  If	  violence	  breaks	  out	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  legal	  political	  wing	  exists,	  this	  conflict	  is	  probably	  more	  intractable.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  that	  arises	  in	  response	  to	  ongoing	  fighting,	  however,	  can	  create	  new	  alternatives	  to	  violence	  and	  may	  change	  the	  rebels’	  calculations.	  
H3a:	   	  A	  negotiated	  settlement	  of	  a	  civil	  conflict	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  if	  the	  conflict	  
episode	  sees	  T2+	  diplomacy	  than	  if	  the	  conflict	  does	  not	  experience	  T2+.	  Counterfactuals,	  as	  so	  often,	  are	  very	  difficult	  to	  construct:	  we	  do	  not	  know	  if	  a	  conflict	  would	  have	  ended	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement	  without	  the	  T2+	  organization’s	  efforts.	  There	  might	  be	  something	  special	  about	  conflicts	  that	  eventually	  end	  in	  a	  compromise.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  unobserved	  factors	  that	  make	  a	  conflict	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  compromise	  solutions	  will	  be	  the	  same	  as	  those	  circumstances	  that	  open	  it	  up	  to	  non-­‐violent	  conflict	  management.	  I	  therefore	  also	  test	  whether	  the	  time	  to	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  may	  be	  shorter	  if	  NGO	  diplomacy	  takes	  place.	  
H3b:	   	  Among	  conflicts	  that	  end	  in	  a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  those	  that	  experience	  T2+	  
will	  be	  shorter	  than	  those	  that	  do	  not,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	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Selection	  effects	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  mediation	  attempts	  in	  civil	  conflicts	  are	  not	  random	  events.	  They	  often	  occur	  in	  the	  most	  difficult-­‐to-­‐solve	  cases	  (Melin	  and	  Svensson	  2009).	  Selection	  effects	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  efforts	  in	  these	  situations	  are	  determined	  by	  supply	  and,	  though	  less	  so,	  demand.	  First,	  many	  NGOs	  and	  other	  potential	  non-­‐state	  mediators	  may	  self-­‐select	  the	  hardest	  cases.	  They	  spring	  into	  action	  alarmed	  by	  the	  human	  suffering	  caused	  by	  long	  years	  of	  war,	  extreme	  violence	  or	  atrocities.	  They	  are	  founded	  to	  fill	  a	  need	  (or	  have	  to	  find	  one	  in	  order	  to	  survive),	  so	  they	  go	  where	  others,	  like	  governments	  or	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  do	  not.	  They	  attempt	  to	  solve	  those	  conflicts	  that	  are	  “forgotten”	  by	  powerful	  states.	  Previous	  literature	  has	  found	  that	  third-­‐party	  governments	  become	  less	  willing	  to	  tackle	  intractable	  conflicts	  the	  longer	  they	  have	  been	  ongoing	  (Touval	  and	  Zartman	  1985,	  Bercovitch	  and	  Langley	  1993).	  This	  provides	  openings	  for	  non-­‐state	  peacemakers.	  	  
Another	  reason	  why	  T2+	  could	  be	  associated	  with	  longer	  conflicts	  is	  practical:	  NGO	  activities	  might	  just	  be	  longer	  in	  the	  making.	  A	  characteristic	  of	  most	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  is	  that	  the	  decision	  process	  whether	  an	  organization	  will	  approach	  conflict	  parties	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  initiating	  any	  project	  involves	  internal	  vetting	  –	  is	  the	  situation	  deemed	  fit	  for	  the	  organization’s	  mission	  or	  approach,	  will	  the	  board	  agree,	  will	  funding	  be	  forthcoming?	  –	  and	  often	  several	  project	  management	  steps,	  like	  writing	  and	  securing	  grants,	  before	  an	  initiative	  can	  begin.36	  This	  process	  precludes	  NGO	  mediation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  High-­‐level	  mediation	   often	  needs	   preparatory	  work,	   too.	   For	   example,	   a	  United	  Nations	   effort	   to	   solve	   a	  crisis	  will	  have	  to	  be	  preceded	  by	  Security	  Council	  decision	  that	  give	  the	  organization	  the	  necessary	  mandate.	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in	  those	  conflict	  episodes	  that	  are	  short-­‐lived,	  e.g.	  military	  coups	  that	  are	  followed	  by	  a	  period	  of	  stability.	  Second,	  as	  laid	  out	  earlier,	  conflict	  parties	  will	  only	  agree	  to	  mediation	  if	  bilateral	  efforts	  have	  failed,	  for	  fear	  of	  losing	  control	  over	  the	  process	  and	  of	  bestowing	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  opponent.	  However,	  these	  selection	  effects	  on	  the	  demand	  side	  will	  be	  weaker	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors	  than	  for	  governments.	  The	  advantage	  of	  NGOs	  is	  that	  their	  activities	  do	  not	  recognize	  an	  armed	  non-­‐state	  group	  in	  the	  international	  community	  and	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  enforceable	  agreements	  (at	  least	  not	  enforceable	  by	  the	  NGO).	  In	  order	  to	  account	  for	  the	  selection	  effects	  and	  divorce	  them	  from	  the	  process	  effects,	  the	  methods	  applied	  in	  this	  chapter	  will	  account	  for	  a	  selection	  stage	  that	  explores	  which	  conflicts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attract	  T2+	  and	  an	  outcome	  stage	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  T2+	  on	  conflict	  duration.	  Alternatively,	  some	  of	  the	  models	  introduced	  below	  limit	  the	  sample	  to	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  T2+.	  	  
Data	  
Unit	  of	  Analysis	  and	  main	  explanatory	  variable	  	   The	  unit	  of	  analysis	  in	  this	  chapter,	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  one,	  is	  the	  conflict	  dyad	  episode	  year.	  The	  universe	  of	  cases	  consists	  of	  African	  conflicts	  for	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2010	  based	  on	  the	  UCDP/PRIO	  Armed	  Conflict	  Dataset	  (Gleditsch	  et	  al.	  2002,	  Themnér	  and	  Wallensteen	  2011).	  Information	  about	  conflict	  dyads	  comes	  from	  UCDP’s	  dyadic	  dataset	  (Harbom	  et	  al.	  2008,	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program	  -­‐	  Date	  of	  retrieval:	  2014/02/15	  -­‐	  UCDP	  Database:	  www.ucdp.uu.se/database,	  Uppsala	  University).	  The	  main	  explanatory	  variable	  is	  T2+,	  defined	  and	  coded	  as	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  However,	  generally	  government	  and	  intergovernmental	  efforts	  can	  begin	  on	  much	  shorter	  notice	  than	  non-­‐governmental	  initiatives,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  political	  will	  is	  there.	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Descriptive	  data	  The	  133	  conflict	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  make	  up	  the	  sample	  range	  in	  duration	  from	  one	  month	  to	  20.5	  years.	  15	  episodes	  were	  still	  ongoing	  on	  31	  December	  2009.37	  The	  average	  duration	  of	  the	  terminated	  episodes	  is	  27.8	  months,	  and	  the	  median	  is	  12.	  The	  longest	  continuous	  dyad	  was	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  government	  in	  Khartoum	  and	  the	  Sudan	  People's	  Liberation	  Movement/Army	  (SPLM/A)	  in	  Sudan,	  for	  which	  UCDP/PRIO	  codes	  a	  minimum	  of	  25	  battle	  deaths	  for	  each	  year	  between	  May	  1983	  and	  December	  2004.	  Other	  very	  long	  dyad	  episodes	  include	  the	  war	  between	  the	  government	  of	  Mozambique	  and	  Renamo	  (1977-­‐1992),	  the	  twenty-­‐year	  civil	  war	  in	  Angola	  against	  UNITA	  (1974-­‐1995;	  a	  new	  episode	  of	  fighting	  erupted	  in	  1998)	  and	  the	  Eritrean	  independence	  movement	  (1975-­‐1991).	  Examples	  of	  short	  episodes	  are	  brief	  but	  intense	  bouts	  of	  fighting	  in	  Nigeria	  against	  Ahlul	  Sunnah	  Jamaa	  and	  also	  NDPVF	  in	  2004,	  or	  a	  conflict	  in	  Mali	  that	  lasted	  from	  1990-­‐2009,	  but	  that	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  separate	  episodes	  (1990,	  1994,	  2007-­‐2009)	  against	  three	  different	  rebel	  groups.	  Figure	  10	  and	  11	  show	  the	  distribution	  of	  episode	  durations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  frequency	  of	  T2+.	  	  T2+	  happens	  in	  conflicts	  of	  all	  durations,	  though	  less	  frequently	  in	  those	  lasting	  a	  year	  or	  less,	  compared	  to	  NGO	  engagement	  in	  long-­‐lasting	  dyads.	  12	  out	  of	  the	  56	  shortest	  conflict	  episodes	  experience	  T2+	  during	  the	  year	  of	  active	  conflict.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Conflicts	  that	  began	  before	  1990	  are	  included	  and	  variables	  accounting	  for	  conflict	  duration	  measure	  the	  total	  time	  the	  conflict	  lasted,	  including	  the	  months	  before	  1990.	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Figure	  10:	  Conflict	  episode	  duration	  by	  T2+,	  frequency	  	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Conflict	  episode	  duration	  by	  T2+,	  percentages	  





no	  T2+	  T2+	  
0%	  10%	  20%	  
30%	  40%	  50%	  
60%	  70%	  80%	  
90%	  100%	  
up	  to	  1	  year	   1-­‐3	  years	  3-­‐5	  years	   5-­‐15	  years	   over1	  5	  years	  
no	  T2+	  T2+	  
	  	   101	  
agreement	  (8	  cases),	  or	  victory	  of	  one	  side	  (in	  six	  cases	  the	  government	  was	  declared	  the	  victor,	  in	  nine	  the	  rebels).	  	  17	  of	  those	  conflicts	  that	  end	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement	  (46%)	  experience	  T2+	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  ongoing	  conflict.	  Seven	  conflicts	  that	  end	  in	  victory	  see	  T2+	  (47%),	  three	  that	  ends	  with	  a	  ceasefire	  (38%),	  and	  11	  of	  those	  that	  peter	  out	  (22%).	  Figure	  12	  illustrates	  the	  relationship	  of	  conflict	  outcome	  and	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  	  
Figure	  12:	  Conflict	  outcomes	  by	  T2+	  
	  
Controls	  	   As	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  other	  variables	  explaining	  civil	  conflict	  duration	  are	  rebel	  motivation,	  ethnic	  composition	  of	  the	  state,	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths,	  comparative	  rebel-­‐government	  strength,	  lootable	  resources,	  mountainous	  terrain,	  GDP,	  inequality,	  regime	  type,	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  interventions.	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making	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  low-­‐level	  violence	  drags	  on	  for	  years.	  I	  expect	  those	  countries	  that	  have	  higher	  measures	  of	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  to	  experience	  longer	  conflicts,	  because	  ethnicity	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  group	  identity,	  potentially	  making	  rapprochement	  with	  “the	  other”	  less	  likely.	  I	  use	  the	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  fractionalization	  index	  (ELF)	  developed	  by	  Alessina	  et	  al	  (2002).	  Similarly,	  I	  also	  include	  a	  measure	  for	  religious	  fractionalization,	  another	  deep-­‐rooted	  identity	  characteristic	  (Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003).	  The	  total	  number	  of	  
battle	  deaths	  comes	  from	  UCDP.	  I	  divide	  the	  number	  by	  total	  population	  (information	  from	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  World	  Development	  Indicators)	  and	  log	  the	  result.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  conflicts	  experiencing	  much	  violence	  will	  in	  fact	  be	  harder	  to	  end	  and	  thus	  last	  longer,	  because	  of	  the	  hardening	  of	  positions	  and	  thirst	  for	  revenge	  for	  past	  deaths.38	  	  While	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  countries	  with	  “lootable”	  natural	  resources,	  those	  that	  rebels	  may	  appropriate	  and	  use	  to	  fill	  their	  war	  coffers,	  experience	  longer	  civil	  wars,	  empirical	  tests	  often	  include	  variables	  for	  natural	  resources	  that	  are	  in	  fact	  not	  easy	  to	  exploit	  without	  industrial	  mining	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  2004,	  for	  example,	  rely	  on	  the	  ratio	  of	  primary	  commodity	  exports	  to	  GDP).	  The	  presence	  of	  secondary	  diamonds,	  those	  that	  usually	  are	  mined	  with	  artisanal	  tools,	  are	  a	  better	  proxy	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  potential	  rebel	  loot	  (Gilmore	  et	  al.	  2005).	  I	  expect	  conflicts	  to	  be	  longer	  if	  
secondary	  diamonds	  are	  present	  in	  the	  conflict	  country.	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  (2003)	  use	  the	  proportion	  of	  a	  terrain	  that	  is	  mountainous	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  rough	  (accommodating	  to	  rebels)	  terrain.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  countries	  that	  have	  more	  rough	  terrain	  for	  rebels	  to	  hide	  will	  have	  longer-­‐lasting	  internal	  conflicts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  An	  alternative	  explanation	  is	  that	  parties	  tire	  faster	  of	  war	  if	  it	  is	  very	  bloody.	  In	  this	  case,	  higher	  casualty	  rates	  should	  lead	  to	  shorter	  wars.	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Belligerents’	  relative	  military	  capability	  influence	  both	  how	  long	  the	  parties	  can	  physically	  fight,	  and	  how	  soon	  they	  prefer	  to	  negotiate.	  Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  provide	  measures	  of	  the	  rebel	  strength	  compared	  to	  the	  government’s	  capability.	  I	  expect	  conflicts	  to	  be	  shorter	  if	  the	  challenger	  is	  clearly	  superior	  to	  the	  government,	  but	  longer	  if	  they	  are	  close	  to	  power	  parity	  and	  battlefield	  outcomes	  are	  less	  certain.	  Collier,	  Hoeffler	  and	  Soderborn	  (2004)	  find	  that	  conflicts	  are	  shorter	  in	  richer	  countries.	  I	  use	  the	  average	  annual	  per-­‐capita	  GDP	  (in	  2000	  US-­‐$,	  logged,	  WDI	  2013)	  as	  my	  proxy.39	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  most	  important	  element	  of	  a	  government’s	  regime	  categorization	  is	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  political	  process:	  if	  government	  opponents	  have	  access	  to	  legitimate	  political	  competition,	  violent	  civil	  conflicts,	  if	  they	  are	  a	  last	  resort,	  should	  be	  less	  common,	  and	  if	  they	  break	  out	  anyway,	  might	  not	  last	  as	  long.	  I	  use	  the	  country’s	  Polity	  IV	  score	  (Marshall	  and	  Jaggers	  2011)	  as	  my	  proxy	  and	  expect	  countries	  to	  have	  shorter	  wars	  if	  their	  score	  is	  higher.	  	  	  	  Following	  Cunningham	  (2010)	  I	  code	  a	  conflict	  as	  experiencing	  a	  military	  intervention	  when	  the	  UCDP	  dataset	  lists	  external	  states	  as	  having	  a	  military	  presence	  in	  the	  conflict	  episode.	  In	  accordance	  with	  earlier	  literature,	  I	  expect	  military	  interventions	  to	  prolong	  the	  duration	  of	  civil	  wars.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  open	  battle	  support	  to	  one	  side	  can	  influence	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  on	  the	  battlefield	  substantially,	  possibly	  precipitating	  a	  military	  victory	  by	  the	  aid	  recipient.	  This	  would	  shorten	  the	  conflict.	  According	  to	  Regan	  and	  Aydin	  (2006),	  
diplomatic	  interventions	  should	  contribute	  to	  shorter	  than	  expected	  wars.	  I	  use	  the	  UCDP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  authors	  also	  find	  that	  wars	  last	  longer	  in	  unequal	  societies.	  Inequality	  is	  usually	  measured	  with	  the	  Gini	  coefficient;	  however,	  there	  are	  only	  very	  few	  data	  points	  available	  for	  the	  countries	  in	  my	  sample.	  As	  a	  proxy	  I	  try	  to	  introduce	  a	  variable	  that	  measures	  the	  level	  of	  corruption,	  because	  previous	  literature	  has	  established	  a	  correlation	  between	  income	  inequality	  and	  corruption	  (Gupta	  et	  al.2002	  find	  that	  high	  corruption	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	   in	   income	   inequality;	   You	   and	   Khagram	   2004	   argue	   that	   high	   income	   inequality	   contributes	   to	  higher	  levels	  of	  corruption).	  However,	  data	  are	  still	  only	  available	  for	  the	  time	  period	  1996-­‐2010.	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Managing	  Intrastate	  Conflict	  (MIC)	  Dataset	  (Melander	  &	  von	  Uexküll,	  2011)	  to	  construct	  a	  variable	  that	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  1	  if	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  occurs	  during	  the	  conflict	  year.40	  	  	  
Methodology	  
Conflict	  termination	  and	  duration:	  Duration	  models	  	  	   Initially,	  I	  use	  a	  hazard	  model	  (also	  called	  event	  history	  or	  duration	  model)	  to	  estimate	  the	  length	  of	  violent	  internal	  conflicts.	  Hazard	  models	  estimate	  the	  risk	  of	  failure	  (a	  conflict	  ending,	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  negotiations)	  at	  a	  certain	  time,	  given	  the	  conditions	  specified,	  and	  are	  common	  in	  the	  civil	  war	  duration	  literature.	  The	  failure	  variable	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  end	  of	  the	  dyad	  episode,	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  conflict.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  definition	  of	  conflict	  termination	  can	  be	  controversial	  (has	  the	  war	  ended	  for	  good	  or	  will	  it	  start	  again	  in	  a	  month,	  a	  year	  or	  a	  decade?).	  This	  research	  uses	  the	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Program’s	  definition	  of	  conflict	  episode	  termination	  –	  a	  dyad	  episode	  is	  coded	  as	  having	  ended	  if	  less	  than	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  are	  counted	  in	  one	  year	  (should	  the	  threshold	  be	  reached	  again	  the	  following	  year,	  a	  new	  episode	  is	  coded).	  	  	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  different	  duration	  models.	  Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  apply	  a	  Cox	  proportional	  hazards	  model;	  Regan	  and	  Aydin	  (2006)	  use	  a	  Weibull	  parameterization.	  Choosing	  a	  parametric	  model	  necessitates	  an	  assumption	  about	  the	  baseline	  hazard,	  for	  example	  that	  the	  “risk”	  of	  a	  conflict	  ending	  is	  the	  same	  at	  all	  times	  (in	  which	  case	  I	  would	  use	  an	  exponential	  model),	  or	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  changes	  monotonically	  (monotonically	  increases,	  decreases,	  or	  stays	  flat	  over	  time:	  Weibull).	  Unlike	  these	  parametric	  models,	  the	  semi-­‐parametric	  Cox	  (1972)	  proportional	  hazards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Missing	  data	  for	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2010	  is	  filled	  in	  with	  information	  from	  DeRouen	  et	  al.’s	  (2011)	  Civil	  War	  
Mediation	  (CWM)	  dataset,	  version	  April	  2013.	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model	  does	  not	  require	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  particular	  shape	  of	  the	  baseline	  hazard.	  The	  Cox	  model	  gives	  the	  hazard	  rate	  for	  an	  observation	  i	  at	  time	  t	  as	  hi(t)	  =	  h0	  (t)-­‐	  exp	  (xi’	  b),	  where	  h0	  (t)	  is	  the	  baseline	  hazard	  and	  exp	  denotes	  the	  function	  of	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  model.	  I	  use	  robust	  standard	  errors,	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  ID,	  to	  account	  for	  time-­‐dependencies	  within	  the	  individual	  dyads.	  As	  a	  robustness	  check	  I	  also	  cluster	  on	  country,	  in	  case	  each	  conflict	  dyad	  has	  specific	  dynamics	  not	  necessarily	  dependent	  on	  the	  location.	  Coefficients	  and	  significance	  levels	  do	  not	  change.41	  When	  testing	  the	  proportional	  hazard	  assumption	  of	  the	  Cox	  model	  I	  find	  that	  the	  rho	  value	  of	  the	  global	  test	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  0,	  indicating	  that	  the	  proportional	  hazard	  assumption	  underlying	  the	  Cox	  model	  is	  violated.	  Individual	  variables	  showing	  significant	  correlation	  of	  residuals	  and	  survival	  time	  are	  T2+,	  battle	  deaths	  and	  GDP.	  I	  interact	  these	  variables	  with	  a	  lagged	  time	  measure.	  Alternatively	  to	  hazard	  models	  temporal	  effects	  can	  also	  be	  captured	  in	  logistic	  models,	  as	  long	  as	  time	  is	  included	  in	  the	  regression.	  Beck,	  Katz	  and	  Tucker	  (1998)	  suggest	  splines,	  a	  smooth	  function	  of	  time	  point	  dummies,	  as	  well	  a	  count	  of	  conflict	  years.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  1	  if	  a	  conflict	  ends	  in	  a	  dyad	  year.	  	  I	  report	  the	  results	  of	  this	  model	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  results	  to	  the	  simultaneous	  equation	  model	  explained	  below.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  Cox	  model	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  appendix.	  	  
Seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  As	  discussed	  above	  and	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  independent	  variable	  T2+	  is	  not	  randomly	  assigned;	  rather	  the	  error	  terms	  of	  the	  calculations	  when	  T2+	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  and	  whether	  a	  conflict	  ends	  in	  a	  year	  are	  correlated.	  If	  not	  addressed,	  selection	  effects	  will	  bias	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  When	  results	  are	  not	  clustered	  at	  all,	  results	  remain	  comparable.	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any	  results	  of	  statistical	  models.	  The	  strong	  link	  of	  mediation	  with	  intractable	  conflicts	  will	  show	  a	  correlation	  between	  T2+	  and	  longer	  wars.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  selection	  effects,	  I	  employ	  a	  simultaneous	  equations	  approach	  that	  models	  the	  independent	  variable	  selection	  and	  the	  outcome	  equations	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  approach	  available	  for	  duration	  models,	  but	  as	  Beck	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  have	  shown,	  logistic	  regression	  models	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  take	  time-­‐dependencies	  into	  account.	  Thus,	  I	  use	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  model	  (Greene	  2003,	  Kimball	  2006)	  that	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  adequately	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  selection	  effects	  of	  mediation	  (Beardsley	  2008,	  Gartner	  2011)	  and	  include	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  to	  control	  for	  time	  effects.42	  The	  first	  equation	  determines	  the	  probabilities	  that	  a	  conflict	  dyad	  experiences	  T2+.	  Based	  on	  the	  theoretical	  consideration	  that	  more	  intractable	  conflicts	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  intervention	  –	  because	  official	  mediation	  is	  less	  likely	  if	  success	  is	  elusive,	  because	  NGOs	  will	  choose	  hard-­‐to-­‐solve	  conflicts,	  and	  because	  opponents	  in	  entrenched	  conflict	  will	  be	  more	  open	  to	  low-­‐key	  peacemaking	  efforts	  –	  the	  variables	  included	  in	  the	  selection	  stage	  are	  rebel	  motivation,	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  fractionalization,	  conflict	  duration	  and	  conflict	  severity.	  I	  expect	  all	  covariates	  to	  be	  positively	  related	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  I	  also	  include	  a	  count	  of	  conflict	  dyads	  simultaneously	  ongoing	  in	  the	  same	  country.	  I	  expect	  T2+	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  in	  a	  dyad	  if	  several	  conflicts	  are	  ongoing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  because	  there	  are	  more	  opportunities	  for	  NGOs	  to	  become	  involved.	  This	  “veto	  player”	  measure	  is	  an	  instrumental	  variable:	  the	  simultaneous	  equation	  model	  requires	  at	  least	  one	  regressor	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  that	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  The	  model	  is	  recursive,	  because	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  the	  first	  equation	  is	  an	  independent	  variable	  in	  the	   second	   equation.	   The	   error	   terms	   in	   the	   two	   equations	   can	   be	   correlated;	   thus	   they	   are	   described	   as	  “seemingly	  unrelated.”	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exogenous	  to	  the	  second	  stage.	  I	  do	  not	  expect	  the	  number	  of	  additional	  conflict	  dyads	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  conflict	  termination	  in	  a	  particular	  dyad.	  A	  second	  instrument	  is	  a	  decade	  dummy:	  NGO	  activities	  have	  generally	  become	  more	  frequent	  over	  time.	  I	  would	  therefore	  expect	  conflicts	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  experience	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  the	  2000s	  than	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Conflict	  duration,	  however,	  should	  not	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  decade	  the	  dyad	  fights	  in.	  Because	  I	  found	  in	  chapter	  3	  that	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  and	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  are	  correlated,	  I	  also	  include	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  official	  mediation	  (at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  conflict	  episode).	  The	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  model	  then	  models	  the	  factors	  increasing	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  conflict	  ending	  (see	  section	  on	  control	  variables),	  while	  controlling	  for	  factors	  that	  increase	  the	  probability	  that	  T2+	  occurs.	  A	  number	  of	  variables	  are	  included	  in	  this	  equation	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  selection	  stage,	  for	  example	  geographical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  country.	  Because	  many	  NGO	  initiatives	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  prepare	  conflict	  parties	  for	  high-­‐level	  negotiations,	  which	  later	  lead	  to	  a	  ceasefire	  or	  peace	  agreement,	  I	  include	  the	  lag	  of	  my	  main	  explanatory	  variable	  to	  account	  for	  a	  delay	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.43	  I	  include	  a	  logged	  count	  of	  the	  months	  a	  dyad	  has	  lasted	  until	  the	  year	  under	  observation	  as	  well	  as	  three	  cubic	  splines	  in	  the	  outcome	  stage	  equation	  in	  order	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  time	  dependence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  The	  dependent	  variable	  of	   the	  selection	  stage	  has	   to	  be	   included	  as	   independent	  variable	   in	   the	  outcome	  stage.	  When	   I	   try	   to	   use	   the	   lagged	   T2+	   variable	   in	   the	   selection	   stage	   instead	   of	   the	   non-­‐lagged	   one,	  my	  model	  does	  not	  converge.	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Conflict	  outcome:	  Probit	  and	  duration	  model	  with	  selection	  Whether	  conflict	  ends	  in	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  or	  not	  is	  a	  binary	  outcome	  variable,	  calling	  for	  a	  probit	  regression	  model.	  I	  include	  a	  measure	  for	  time	  to	  account	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  conflict	  duration.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  in	  those	  conflict	  dyads	  that	  end	  in	  negotiated	  agreement	  T2+	  initiatives	  accelerate	  the	  time	  until	  an	  agreement	  is	  reached,	  I	  then	  develop	  a	  selection	  model.	  While	  the	  bivariate	  probit	  described	  above	  addresses	  the	  issue	  of	  endogeneity	  in	  the	  independent	  variable,	  a	  selection	  model	  is	  appropriate	  if	  the	  sample	  might	  be	  non-­‐randomly	  restricted.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  here:	  only	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  negotiations	  will	  be	  able	  to	  end	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  this	  selection	  effect,	  I	  employ	  a	  full	  information	  maximum	  likelihood	  method	  that	  simultaneously	  estimates	  the	  selection	  and	  duration	  processes	  developed	  by	  Frederick	  Boehmke,	  Daniel	  Morey	  and	  Megan	  Shannon	  (Boehmke	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  The	  selection	  stage	  determines	  the	  probabilities	  that	  a	  conflict	  will	  end	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement	  (this	  is	  the	  binary	  censoring	  variable);	  the	  duration	  model	  then	  corrects	  for	  selection	  bias	  by	  calculating	  probabilities	  of	  both	  uncensored	  and	  censored	  observations.44	  The	  model	  allows	  for	  duration	  dependence	  by	  using	  a	  Weibull	  distribution.	  I	  use	  variables	  found	  in	  the	  initial	  probit	  model	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  likelihood	  that	  a	  peace	  agreement	  or	  ceasefire	  agreement	  is	  signed	  in	  the	  selection	  stage	  of	  the	  Weibull	  duration	  model	  with	  selection.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Stata	   utility	   “dursel”	   acquired	   at	   http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods.html,	   accessed	   September	  6,	  2013	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Testing	  and	  discussion	  
Conflict	  termination	  and	  T2+	  	   The	  Kaplan-­‐Meier	  curve,	  Figure	  13,	  depicts	  the	  survival	  estimates	  (the	  probability	  that	  a	  conflict	  continues,	  given	  that	  it	  has	  lasted	  until	  now).	  	  
Figure	  13:	  Kaplan-­‐Meier	  survival	  estimates	  (probability	  that	  conflict	  continues)	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taken	   into	   account.	   The	   graph	   furthermore	   shows	   that	   the	   survival	   rate	   declines	   in	   the	  early	  months	  and	  years,	  but	  once	  conflicts	  have	   lasted	  about	  4.5	  years,	   the	  probability	  of	  conflict	  termination	  levels	  out	  for	  a	  while,	  then	  drops	  a	  bit	  and	  levels	  out	  again.	  Overall,	  the	  chances	  a	  conflict	  will	  end	  do	  not	  improve	  much	  after	  the	  first	  five	  years	  of	  war.	  	  	  	   Table	  6	  (next	  page)	  shows	  the	  regression	  results	  for	  the	  regular	  probit	  model	  (1)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  (2).45	  In	  the	  initial	  probit	  model	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variable	  is	  positive,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  While	  this	  result	  does	  not	  confirm	  my	  hypothesis,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising,	  if	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  as	  expected	  more	  common	  in	  the	  most	  intractable	  conflicts.	  The	  findings	  are	  clarified	  when	  selection	  is	  taken	  into	  account	  (see	  below).	  	  Variables	  significant	  and	  negative	  –	  indicating	  a	  smaller	  probability	  for	  conflict	  termination	  -­‐	  in	  model	  1	  are	  incompatibility,	  ethnic	  fractionalization,	  mountainous	  terrain	  and	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths.	  As	  expected,	  separatist	  wars	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  end	  than	  those	  about	  government	  control.	  Ethnically	  diverse	  countries	  experience	  longer	  conflicts,	  and	  deadlier	  conflicts	  end	  later.	  Dyads	  located	  in	  countries	  with	  more	  difficult	  terrain	  tend	  to	  fight	  for	  longer	  periods	  than	  those	  in	  states	  without	  mountains.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  religious	  fractionalization	  is	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  result	  is	  surprising	  and	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  result	  for	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  (ethnic	  and	  religious	  fractionalizations	  are	  correlated	  at	  0.51).	  	  Clearly,	  the	  dynamics	  in	  ethnically	  divided	  societies	  is	  different	  than	  those	  in	  religiously	  divided	  countries,	  at	  least	  for	  this	  sample.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  I	  report	  the	  models	  that	  use	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variables	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  potential	  delay	  between	  peace	  efforts	  and	   the	  end	  of	   the	  violence.	  When	   I	   run	   the	  models	  with	   the	  original	  T2+	  variable,	   the	  variable	  of	   interest	  displays	  the	  same	  direction	  and	  significance.	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Table	  6:	  Termination	  of	  conflicts	  	   (1)	  Probit	  model	   (2)	  Seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  	  
Selection:	  T2+	  in	  dyad	  year	   	   	  Rebel	  motivation	   	   -­‐0.20	  (0.28)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   	   -­‐0.44	  (0.30)	  Religious	  fractionalization	  	   	   0.93*	  (0.53)	  Battle	  deaths,	  per	  capita	   	   0.08	  (0.06)	  Length	  of	  conflict	  episode,	  logged	   	   -­‐0.0003	  (0.07)	  Veto	  players	   	   -­‐0.16*	  (0.09)	  2000s	   	   0.01	  (0.14)	  T2+	  in	  previous	  year	   	   1.55***	  (0.28)	  Official	  mediation	  in	  conflict	  dyad	  episode	   	   0.91***	  (0.17)	  Constant	   	   -­‐0.17	  (1.01)	  
Outcome:	  conflict	  termination	  in	  dyad	  year	   	   	  




Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  dyad	  year,	  lagged	  one	  year	   0.29	  (0.24)	   1.05***	  (0.24)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐0.79***	  (0.30)	   -­‐0.67**	  (0.26)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐1.69**	  (0.72)	   -­‐1.53***	  (0.56)	  Religious	  fractionalization	  	   1.72**	  (0.69)	   2.00***	  (0.58)	  Lootables	   -­‐0.14	  (0.19)	   -­‐0.07	  (0.13)	  Mountains	   -­‐0.02***	  (0.01)	   -­‐0.02***	  (0.01)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.11	  (0.12)	   0.10	  (0.10)	  Democracy	   0.03	  (0.02)	   0.03	  (0.02)	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	  	   0.34	  (0.23)	   0.23	  (0.16)	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   0.47	  (0.38)	   0.39**	  (0.18)	  Battle	  deaths,	  by	  population,	  logged	   -­‐0.09*	  (0.06)	   -­‐0.02	  (0.05)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐0.27	  (0.24)	   -­‐0.13	  (0.13)	  Official	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   0.66***	  (0.18)	   0.67***	  (0.14)	  Dyad	  duration,	  logged	   -­‐0.08	  (0.06)	   -­‐0.07	  (0.07)	  Constant	   0.26	  (1.15)	   0.73	  (0.97)	  
N	  
	  Frequency	  of	  T2+	  Lagged	  T2+	  
323	  (97	  clusters	  /	  dyadid)	  83	  58	  
323	  
Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐183.01	   -­‐297.14	  Wald	  Chi2	   	  54.05***	   	  
Rho	  (error	  correlation)	   	   1***	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported.	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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   Official	  mediation	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  conflict	  termination,	  as	  expected.	  The	  remaining	  variables	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  simultaneous	  equation	  model	  differ	  from	  the	  ordinary	  probit	  model.	  In	  particular,	  the	  lagged	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  variable	  is	  now	  statistically	  significant,	  indicating	  that	  those	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  a	  non-­‐state	  diplomatic	  intervention	  as	  defined	  here	  during	  one	  year,	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  the	  next	  year,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  This	  confirms	  my	  hypothesis	  (H2a).	  The	  NGO	  initiatives	  included	  in	  my	  sample	  are	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  a	  higher	  probability	  of	  conflict	  termination.	  All	  independent	  variables	  have	  retained	  their	  original	  directionality,	  but	  superior	  rebel	  strength	  is	  now	  statistically	  significant	  and	  associated	  with	  higher	  chances	  of	  a	  war	  ending.46	  	  	  The	  selection	  stage	  yields	  interesting	  insights,	  too.	  The	  measure	  of	  religious	  fractionalization	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  T2+.	  This	  could	  be	  a	  function	  of	  organizations	  included	  in	  my	  research,	  many	  of	  whom	  have	  a	  religious	  component.	  The	  number	  of	  simultaneously	  ongoing	  dyads	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  but	  negative	  indicating	  that	  more	  actors	  in	  a	  conflict	  will	  make	  it	  less	  likely	  that	  one	  of	  them	  will	  work	  with	  NGOs,	  possibly	  because	  the	  NGOs	  have	  choices	  and	  only	  will	  work	  with	  one	  of	  the	  groups	  at	  a	  time.	  The	  strongest	  predictor	  for	  T2+	  in	  one	  year	  is	  T2+	  in	  the	  previous	  year.	  Also	  strongly	  related	  to	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  the	  occurrence	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  conflict	  episode.	  The	  dummy	  variable	  assigned	  to	  conflict	  dyads	  active	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Selection	  models	  are	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  specification.	  Leaving	  out	  random	  controls	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  results	  significantly.	  When	  using	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variable	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  selection	  stage,	  the	  modle	  no	  longer	  converges.	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the	  2000s	  is	  not	  significant	  and	  neither	  are	  the	  coefficients	  for	  incompatibility,	  ethnic	  fractionalization,	  conflict	  duration	  and	  battle	  deaths.	  The	  correlation	  of	  the	  errors	  between	  the	  selection	  and	  outcome	  stages,	  rho,	  is	  positive.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Wald	  test	  for	  rho	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.01	  level	  supports	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  model.	  The	  direction	  indicates	  that	  the	  unobserved	  factors	  leading	  to	  NGO	  interventions	  in	  civil	  conflicts	  have	  the	  same	  effects	  on	  the	  termination	  of	  civil	  wars	  (Thyne	  2008).	  For	  example,	  unmeasured	  or	  unmeasurable	  factors	  like	  parties’	  resolve	  to	  fight	  until	  victory	  might	  make	  it	  less	  likely	  that	  NGOs	  initiate	  conflict	  resolution	  projects,	  because	  groups	  embroiled	  in	  the	  conflict	  will	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  agree	  to	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  under	  these	  circumstances.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  determination	  to	  continue	  the	  fight	  has	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  conflict	  termination	  –	  the	  war	  will	  go	  on.	  	  
Direct	  mediation	  and	  other	  T2+	  approaches	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  which	  conflict	  management	  approach	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  is	  associated	  with	  conflict	  termination,	  I	  restrict	  my	  observations	  to	  those	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  see	  some	  T2+	  during	  the	  ongoing	  episode.	  I	  then	  dissect	  the	  T2+	  variable	  into	  the	  approaches	  coded	  –	  direct	  mediation,	  mediation	  support,	  training	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  –	  and	  run	  probit	  regressions	  with	  the	  end	  of	  a	  dyad	  episode	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  I	  do	  not	  lag	  the	  variables,	  because	  mediations	  have	  a	  short	  time-­‐horizon.	  If	  they	  are	  successful,	  they	  end	  the	  fighting	  immediately,	  or	  at	  least	  within	  the	  ongoing	  year.	  Problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  are	  omitted	  as	  reference	  category.	  Table	  7	  reports	  the	  results.	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Table	  7:	  Conflict	  termination	  and	  T2+	  approaches	  	   (3)	  Probit	  	  (only	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  see	  T2+)	  
	   	  
T2+	  direct	  mediation	  	   0.03	  
(0.26)	  
T2+	  mediation	  support	   -­‐0.07	  
(0.43)	  
T2+	  training	  	   -­‐0.22	  (0.40)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   0.10	  (0.74)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.26	  (1.34)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   1.26	  (1.33)	  Lootables	   0.12	  (0.27)	  Mountains	   -­‐0.01	  (0.02)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.61***	  (0.21)	  Democracy	   0.17***	  (0.04)	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	   0.32	  (0.27)	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   0.92**	  (0.46)	  Battle	  deaths,	  by	  population,	  logged	   0.03	  (0.10)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐0.04	  (0.39)	  Official	  mediation	   0.62**	  (0.25)	  Dyad	  duration,	  logged	   0.16	  (0.13)	  Constant	   -­‐4.83**	  (2.02)	  
N	  Frequency	  of	  T2+	  mediation	  T2+	  training	  T2+	  mediation	  support	  
159	  50	  23	  23	  
χ2(19)	   64.49***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐71.58	  	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported.	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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Direct	  mediation	  displays	  a	  positive	  coefficient,	  but	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  coefficients	  for	  the	  other	  categories	  do	  not	  reach	  significance	  either.47	  While	  the	  sum	  of	  T2+	  projects	  has	  a	  measurable	  effect	  on	  conflict	  termination,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  I	  cannot	  determine	  which	  approach	  is	  driving	  the	  finding	  (although	  the	  directionality	  of	  the	  results	  hints	  at	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  hypothesized	  positive	  effect	  of	  direct	  T2+	  mediation).	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  religious	  organizations	  are	  generally	  more	  effective	  than	  other	  T2+	  providers.	  	  
Religious	  organizations	  and	  former	  presidents	  	   I	  introduce	  dummy	  variables	  for	  the	  organizational	  type	  –	  religious	  organization,	  professional	  organization,	  individuals/networks	  –	  into	  the	  restricted	  model.	  They	  take	  the	  value	  1	  if	  any	  initiative	  led	  by	  a	  religiously	  affiliated,	  a	  professional	  T2+	  organization,	  or	  an	  individual/network	  ,	  respectively,	  occurs	  in	  the	  conflict	  episode	  year.	  I	  lag	  the	  variables	  because	  any	  NGO	  effort	  may	  show	  its	  effectiveness	  only	  with	  a	  time	  delay.	  Table	  8	  shows	  the	  regression	  results	  (individual	  efforts	  are	  omitted	  as	  reference	  category).	  	   Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  provided	  by	  a	  religiously	  affiliated	  organization	  is	  significantly	  related	  to	  conflict	  termination.	  This	  supports	  hypothesis	  2c.	  Religious	  groups	  often	  have	  long-­‐standing	  relations	  to	  and	  a	  special	  rapport	  with	  opposing	  civil	  war	  parties	  that	  give	  them	  legitimacy	  as	  mediators.	  	  The	  variable	  accounting	  for	  professional	  organizations	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  Positive	  effects	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  seem	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  positive	  effect	  religious	  groups	  have.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Capacity-­‐building	  measures	  have	  a	  negative	  coefficient.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  longer-­‐term	  goals	  of	  training	  and	  fits	  my	  theory	  that	  sees	  such	  efforts	  as	  being	  less	  directly	  correlated	  with	  conflict	  termination	  than	  mediation.	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Table	  8:	  Termination	  and	  organization	  type	  	   (4)	  Probit	  	  (only	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  see	  T2+)	  reference	  category	  =	  T2+	  by	  individuals	  
(5)	  Probit	  (only	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  see	  T2+),	  reference	  category	  =	  T2+	  by	  professional	  groups	  
T2+	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	   n/a	   -­‐0.30	  
(0.57)	  
T2+	  individuals	   	   dropped	  
T2+	  by	  professional	  
organization,	  lagged	  one	  year	   -­‐0.12	  (0.45)	   	  
T2+	  by	  religious	  organization,	  lagged	  one	  year	   1.29***	  (0.48)	   1.18**	  (0.45)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐0.15	  (1.04)	   -­‐0.36	  (1.07)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.55	  (1.57)	   -­‐0.48	  (1.56)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   2.28	  (1.59)	   2.05	  (1.59)	  Lootables	   -­‐0.22	  (0.34)	   -­‐0.38	  (0.39)	  Mountains	   -­‐0.01	  (0.01)	   -­‐0.01	  (0.01)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.45	  (0.28)	   0.45*	  (0.26)	  Democracy	   0.09*	  (0.05)	   0.09	  (0.05)	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	   0.72	  (0.50)	   0.66	  (0.49)	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   -­‐0.02	  (0.59)	   -­‐0.12	  (0.57)	  Battle	  deaths,	  by	  population,	  logged	   -­‐0.08	  (0.12)	   -­‐0.07	  (0.12)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐0.48	  (0.63)	   -­‐0.51	  (0.51)	  Official	  mediation	   0.48*	  (0.28)	   0.44	  (0.29)	  Dyad	  duration,	  logged	   -­‐0.48	  (0.32)	   -­‐0.57	  (0.37)	  Constant	   -­‐3.08	  (2.70)	   -­‐2.03	  (3.09)	  
N	  T2+	  by	  religious	  organization	  (lagged)	  T2+	  by	  prof	  org	  (lagged)	  T2+	  by	  former	  presidents	  T2+	  by	  individuals	  
116	  24	  31	   116	  	  	  20	  4	  
χ2(18)	   160.15***	   120.38***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐50.85	   -­‐50.59	  	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported.	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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Figure	  14	  shows	  the	  Kaplan	  Meier	  survival	  estimates	  grouped	  by	  T2+	  organizational	  types.	  I	  compare	  conflicts	  that	  see	  only	  T2+	  by	  religious	  organizations	  with	  those	  that	  experience	  only	  T2+	  by	  professional	  organizations.	  	  
Figure	  14:	  Conflict	  duration	  and	  types	  of	  organizations	  (survival	  rates)	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is	  associated	  with	  higher	  chances	  that	  the	  conflict	  will	  be	  resolved.	  For	  very	  long	  wars,	  the	  relationship	  reverses	  itself	  again	  and	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  interventions	  by	  religious	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  	  When	  I	  isolate	  those	  efforts	  that	  are	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  from	  the	  individual-­‐led	  T2+	  initiatives	  (model	  5),48	  the	  coefficient	  for	  former	  presidents	  is	  negative	  and	  not	  significant.	  This	  subset	  of	  T2+	  does	  not	  independently	  bring	  about	  conflict	  termination	  -­‐	  I	  cannot	  confirm	  hypothesis	  2d.	  	  
Outcomes	  I	  use	  a	  probit	  model	  to	  test	  my	  hypothesis	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  the	  likelihood	  that	  conflict	  ends	  in	  a	  negotiated	  settlement.	  A	  negotiated	  settlement	  is	  identified	  when	  the	  UCDP	  Conflict	  Termination	  data	  codes	  a	  peace	  agreement	  of	  ceasefire	  agreement	  for	  the	  conflict	  year.	  The	  model	  includes	  control	  variables	  that	  have	  been	  found	  to	  affect	  the	  likelihood	  that	  an	  agreement	  will	  be	  signed	  (Cunningham	  et	  al.	  2009):	  length	  of	  the	  conflict,	  ethnic	  composition	  of	  the	  country	  at	  war,	  the	  number	  of	  conflict	  dyads,	  level	  of	  democracy,	  wealth	  of	  the	  country,	  comparative	  strength	  of	  the	  rebel	  movement,	  and	  whether	  the	  rebels	  have	  legal	  political	  representation.	  I	  add	  three	  variables	  to	  account	  for	  third-­‐party	  interventions:	  military	  interventions,	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  and	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  (lagged).	  Table	  9	  shows	  the	  results.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Dummy	   variables	   for	   efforts	   by	   a)	   former	   presidents,	   b)	   other	   individuals,	   c)	   religious	   organizations;	  reference	  category	  is	  “T2+	  by	  professional	  organizations”	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Table	  9:	  Conflict	  outcomes	  
Negotiated	  agreement	   (6)	  Probit	  	   (7)	  Probit	  	  
Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  	  lagged	  one	  year	   0.13	  (0.24)	   	  
T2+	  direct	  mediation	  	  	   	   0.31	  (0.29)	  
T2+	  mediation	  support	   	   -­‐0.78	  
(0.48)	  
T2+	  training	  	  	   	   0.81*	  (0.42)	  
T2+	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  	   	   -­‐0.66	  
(0.49)	  Conflict	  duration,	  logged	   -­‐0.05	  (0.07)	   -­‐0.04	  (0.07)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   0.65	  (0.46)	   0.77	  (0.46)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   0.06	  (0.71)	   -­‐0.16	  (0.71)	  Democracy	   0.09***	  (0.04)	   0.09***	  (0.04)	  Per-­‐capita	  GDP,	  logged	   0.33*	  (0.18)	   0.28	  (0.18)	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	  	   0.33	  (0.34)	   0.37	  (0.34)	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   0.57	  (0.71)	   0.63	  (0.67)	  Rebel	  political	  wing	   -­‐0.000	  (0.000)	   -­‐0.000	  (0.0001)	  Battle	  deaths,	  by	  population,	  logged	   -­‐0.01	  (0.05)	   -­‐0.01	  (0.05)	  Military	  interventions	   0.005	  (0.28)	   0.18	  (0.28)	  Official	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   0.86***	  (0.20)	   0.92***	  (0.20)	  Veto	  Players	  	   0.19	  (0.12)	   0.24*	  (0.12)	  Constant	   -­‐3.72***	  (1.30)	   -­‐3.83***	  (1.41)	  
N	  
	  Frequency	  of	  lagged	  T2+	  T2+	  mediation	  T2+	  mediation	  support	  T2+	  dialog	  T2+	  training	  
327	  	  (97	  clusters)	  58	  	  	  	  
327	  	  (97	  clusters)	  	  23	  50	  23	  29	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐105.91	   -­‐103.16	  
χ2	   45.52***	   59.66***	  	  Reference	  category	  for	  Model	  6	  =	  no	  T2+	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported.	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  	   My	  lagged	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  variable	  is	  positive,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  model	  6.	  Parsing	  out	  the	  T2+	  variable	  into	  the	  different	  approaches	  (model	  7),	  the	  coefficient	  for	  training	  is	  significant.	  It	  indicates	  that	  preparation	  for	  negotiations	  can	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indeed	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  the	  successful	  conclusion	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement.	  My	  assumption	  that	  negotiated	  outcomes	  are	  more	  likely	  in	  conflict	  dyads	  that	  see	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  finds	  support	  for	  the	  subcategory	  encompassing	  capacity-­‐building.	  Other	  variables	  that	  are	  significantly	  correlated	  with	  an	  agreement	  are	  democracy,	  GDP	  level,	  the	  number	  of	  simultaneous	  conflict	  dyads,	  and	  (surprisingly)	  ethnic	  fractionalization.	  As	  a	  final	  step,	  I	  then	  use	  a	  Weibull	  model	  with	  selection	  to	  test	  whether	  conflicts	  that	  are	  overall	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  will	  see	  this	  outcome	  sooner	  if	  they	  experience	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  (see	  Table	  10,	  next	  page).	  The	  selection	  stage	  of	  the	  model	  calculates	  coefficients	  for	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  conflict	  ends	  with	  a	  ceasefire	  or	  peace	  agreement.	  I	  include	  the	  variables	  found	  significant	  in	  the	  preceding	  probit	  model	  in	  this	  stage.	  The	  selection	  stage	  confirms	  the	  results	  of	  earlier	  models	  that	  higher	  democracy	  levels	  and	  wealth	  as	  well	  as	  high	  diplomacy	  significantly	  increase	  the	  chances	  for	  a	  peace	  agreement	  in	  a	  civil	  conflict.	  The	  outcome	  stage	  then	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  selection	  effects	  when	  calculating	  the	  coefficients	  for	  the	  variables	  predicted	  conflict	  duration.	  In	  this	  stage,	  larger	  coefficients	  mean	  greater	  hazards	  (the	  probability	  of	  a	  conflict	  ending)	  and	  therefore	  shorter	  conflict	  durations.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  positive	  and	  significant.	  As	  hypothesized,	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  NGO	  conflict	  management	  end	  earlier	  than	  those	  that	  do	  not,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  This	  finding	  holds	  for	  the	  subset	  of	  cases	  that	  is	  generally	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  a	  negotiated	  end	  to	  a	  conflict.	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Table	  10:	  Duration	  of	  conflicts	  ending	  in	  agreement	  	  	   (8)	  Weibull	  model	  with	  selection	  
Selection	  stage:	  negotiated	  agreement	   	  Democracy	   0.06***	  (0.02)	  Official	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   0.74***	  (0.15)	  Per-­‐capita	  GDP,	  logged	   0.20*	  (0.12)	  Constant	   -­‐1.95***	  (0.66)	  	   	  
Duration	   	  
Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management,	  lagged	   1.03**	  
(0.47)	  Incompatibility	   0.70	  (0.81)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	  	   -­‐0.07	  (1.91)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   -­‐2.73***	  (1.02)	  Lootables	   -­‐0.34	  (0.62)	  Mountains	   0.01	  (0.02)	  GDP,	  per	  capita,	  logged	   -­‐0.68**	  (0.32)	  Democracy	   -­‐0.14**	  (0.07)	  Rebel	  parity	   -­‐0.38	  (0.48)	  Rebel	  superiority	   -­‐0.77	  (0.81)	  Battle	  deaths,	  by	  population,	  logged	   -­‐0.002	  (0.10)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐0.33	  (0.63)	  Official	  mediation	   0.43	  (0.42)	  Constant	   6.74*	  (3.59)	  
N	   323	  (97	  clusters)	  Uncensored	  observations	   43	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐286.31	  p	   1.11***	  
Rho	   0.03	  
χ2	   32.12***	  The	  model	  was	  estimated	  in	  Stata	  12,	  using	  DURSEL	  	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  
***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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Conclusion	  I	  find	  support	  for	  my	  proposition	  that	  T2+	  during	  a	  conflict	  episode	  year	  increases	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  conflict	  ends	  the	  next	  year.	  I	  also	  find	  that	  conflicts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  if	  they	  see	  non-­‐state	  capacity-­‐building	  efforts,	  and	  that	  among	  conflicts	  ending	  in	  negotiated	  agreements	  those	  that	  experience	  T2+	  will	  terminate	  earlier	  than	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  My	  results	  point	  to	  the	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  NGO	  peace-­‐making	  efforts.	  	  This	  research	  does	  not	  answer	  more	  nuanced	  questions	  of	  what	  it	  is	  about	  T2+	  that	  contributes	  to	  war	  termination,	  although	  it	  discovers	  some	  interesting	  details.	  I	  cannot	  confirm	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  NGO	  mediation	  is	  particularly	  apt	  at	  ending	  war.	  The	  coefficient	  for	  direct	  T2+	  mediation	  is	  positive,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  relatively	  small	  N	  of	  the	  sample	  makes	  results	  for	  the	  sub-­‐hypotheses	  not	  generalizable.	  The	  same	  limitation	  affects	  the	  findings	  regarding	  different	  types	  of	  organizations.	  For	  the	  cases	  in	  the	  sample,	  initiatives	  led	  by	  religiously	  oriented	  organizations	  have	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  termination,	  but	  the	  survival	  curves	  indicate	  that	  professional	  organizations	  may	  be	  more	  effective	  earlier	  in	  a	  conflict	  cycle,	  while	  religious	  organizations	  are	  associated	  with	  higher	  rates	  of	  conflict	  termination	  once	  a	  conflict	  has	  continued	  for	  many	  years.	  Efforts	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state,	  a	  noteworthy	  category	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  are	  not	  to	  be	  found	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  separate	  effect	  on	  conflict	  duration.	  	  The	  finding	  that	  conflicts	  experiencing	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  indeed	  have	  a	  significantly	  higher	  probability	  of	  ending	  in	  a	  given	  year	  bolsters	  NGOs’	  claims	  that	  they	  can	  be	  valuable	  in	  conflict	  resolution.	  Conflict	  parties	  and	  interested	  third	  parties	  should	  take	  note	  that	  non-­‐state	  diplomacy	  can	  bring	  about	  negotiated	  agreements	  sooner.	  The	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results	  also	  should	  encourage	  more	  academic	  research	  on	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  as	  mediators	  and	  conflict	  managers	  during	  civil	  wars.	  	  The	  field	  of	  conflict	  management	  has	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  seen	  a	  shift	  towards	  capacity-­‐building	  initiatives.	  My	  research	  finds	  that	  conflicts	  in	  which	  such	  training	  occurs	  will	  more	  likely	  end	  with	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  than	  those	  wars	  that	  see	  no	  T2+	  at	  all.	  This	  chapter	  shows	  potential	  for	  synergy	  between	  different	  non-­‐state	  mediators.	  At	  least	  for	  the	  present	  universe	  of	  cases,	  religious	  organizations	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  slight	  edge	  over	  other	  organizations	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  ending	  conflicts,	  but	  not	  at	  all	  times.	  For	  long	  wars	  survival	  rates	  are	  smaller	  when	  professional	  T2+	  NGOs	  are	  active.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  consider	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  also	  decreases	  the	  level	  of	  ongoing	  violence	  in	  a	  conflict.	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CHAPTER	  5	  -­‐	  Direct	  impacts	  of	  T2+:	  Conflict	  Severity	  	   	  
Introduction	  In	   1995,	   the	   former	   U.S.	   president	   Jimmy	   Carter	   brokered	   a	   temporary	   ceasefire	  between	   the	   government	   of	   Sudan	   and	   the	   Sudan	   People’s	   Liberation	   Movement/Army	  (SPLM/A).	  The	  interruption	  of	  the	  fighting	  enabled	  the	  implementation	  of	  health	  initiatives.	  Despite	   efforts	   to	   extend	   the	   ceasefire,	   fighting	   soon	   resumed	   and	   the	  war	   between	   the	  government	   in	   Khartoum	   and	   the	   South	   Sudanese	   rebels	   continued	   for	   ten	  more	   years.	  Algeria’s	  civil	  conflict	  continues	  even	  today,	  despite	  the	  1995	  Platform	  of	  Rome	  developed	  under	  the	  auspice	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  and	  signed	  by	  the	  most	  representative	  Algerian	  political	  parties,	  including	  the	  Islamic	  FIS.	  	  When	  narrowly	  defining	  conflict	  management	  success	  as	  bringing	  about	  an	  end	  to	  a	  conflict	  or	  shortening	   its	  duration	   in	  any	  of	   the	  ways	  discussed	   in	   the	  preceding	  chapter,	  the	   examples	   given	   here	   will	   be	   logged	   as	   failures.	   Sudan’s	   civil	   war	   did	   not	   end,	   and	  neither	  did	  the	  conflict	  in	  Algeria.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  annual	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths	  never	  fell	  under	  25,	  which	  means	  that	  under	  the	  coding	  scheme	  for	  this	  dissertation,	   the	  Sudan	  ceasefire	  and	  the	  Algerian	  peace	  proposal	  do	  not	  register	  as	  interruptions	  of	  the	  fighting	  at	  all.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   non-­‐state	   actors	  who	   designed	   the	   conflict	  management	   initiatives	  clearly	  believe	   that	   their	  efforts	  were	   important	  contributions	   to	  conflict	  resolution	  –	   the	  Carter	   Center,	   for	   example,	   mentions	   the	   1995	   ceasefire	   in	   numerous	   publications	   as	   a	  success	   for	   their	   conflict	   resolution	   program.	   Cynics	   might	   contend	   that	   NGOs	   need	   to	  present	  success	  stories	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  legitimate	  and	  to	  continue	  to	  receive	  funding.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  temporary	  humanitarian	  relief	  is	  a	  success	  in	  itself.	  Getting	  medical	  supplies	  and	   food	   to	  victims	  of	  war,	  providing	   shelter	   to	  displaced	  populations	  or	   safe	  passage	   to	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civilians	   that	  otherwise	  would	  die	   in	   the	  war	  zone	  are	  very	   important	  ways	  how	  outside	  organizations	   can	  help	   those	   suffering	  most.	   I	   argue	   that	   even	   those	  projects	   that	   aim	   to	  find	  a	  political	  way	  out	  of	  the	  crisis,	  but	  do	  not	  achieve	  the	  stated	  goal	  of	  ending	  the	  war,	  still	   have	   real	   and	  measurable	   impacts.	  Maybe	   there	   is	   a	  way	   to	   quantitatively	  measure	  how	  NGO	  mediation	  efforts	  that	  do	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  end	  of	  a	  war	  affect	  conflict	  dynamics.	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	  draw	  on	   the	   literature	  on	  conflict	   severity	  and	   test	  whether	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  a	  war’s	  death	  rate.	  While	  more	  academic	  knowledge	  has	  been	  accumulated	  about	  civil	  war	  onset	  and	  duration	  than	  conflict	  intensity,	  authors	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  length	  of	  a	  conflict	  is	  not	  the	  only	  measure	  of	  its	  seriousness.	  Many	   long-­‐lasting	   conflicts	   are	   relatively	   low	   in	   intensity,	   experiencing	   occasional	  skirmishes	  and	  guerrilla	  attacks,	  but	  no	  battles	  –	  the	  long-­‐standing	  rebellions	  in	  Ethiopia’s	  Ogaden	   and	   Angola’s	   Cabinda	   regions	   are	   example	   of	   conflicts	   in	   my	   sample	   that	   most	  years	   count	   about	   25	   battle-­‐related	   deaths.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   some	   short	   wars	   are	  extremely	   deadly.	   For	   example,	   the	   1997-­‐1999	   conflict	   episode	   in	   the	   Republic	   of	   the	  Congo	  cost	  4,652	  lives	  for	  each	  year.49	  The	  intensity	  of	  a	  conflict	   is	  therefore	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  conflict	  that	  is	  interesting	  both	  for	  the	  groups	  involved	  in	  the	  fighting	  and	  those	  who	  try	  to	  end	  the	  war.	  A	  common	  measure	  for	  violence	  is	  the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  (e.g.	  Lacina	  2006,	  Heger	  and	  Saleyan	  2007,	  Lujala	  2009).	  Battle-­‐related	  deaths,	  as	  coded	  by	  the	  Uppsala	   Conflict	   Data	   Programme,	   include	   civilian	   casualties,	   though	   not	   indirect	   war	  deaths	  that	  are	  the	  result	  of	  disease,	  starvation	  or	  attacks	  that	  target	  civilians	  deliberately	  (UCDP	  2011c:	  6).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  These	  numbers	  are	  from	  the	  UCDP	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  dataset.	  For	  more	  information	  about	  the	  data	  see	  the	  data	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  and	  the	  UCDP	  codebook	  (UCDP	  2011c)	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In	  this	  chapter	  I	  test	  whether	  the	  presence	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  annual	  battle	  deaths	  in	  a	  given	  government-­‐rebel	  group	  dyad.	  My	  argument	  posits	   that	   non-­‐state	   interventions	   can	   lead	   to	   temporary	   interruptions	   of	   the	   fighting,	  lowering	   the	   average	   casualty	   rate	   for	   the	   year	   in	   which	   the	   project	   was	   implemented.	  Alternatively,	  they	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  gradual	  decline	  in	  violence,	  as	  unofficial	  diplomacy	  brings	  leaders	  of	  the	  opposing	  sides	  together	  and	  makes	  them	  more	  familiar	  with	  each	  other.	  	  Research	  on	  conflict	  severity	  lags	  behind	  the	  study	  of	  civil	  war	  onset	  and	  duration,	  and	   this	   dissertation	   chapter	   contributes	   to	   the	   developing	   field.	   Corroborating	   results	  would	   have	   important	   implications	   for	   the	   study	   of	   civil	   conflict	   and	   the	   for	   conflict	  resolution	  efforts.	  If	  I	  show	  that	  T2+	  is	  a	  statistically	  significant	  factor	  in	  slowing	  down	  the	  rate	  of	  violence,	  future	  research	  should	  include	  a	  measure	  for	  non-­‐violent	  interventions	  in	  models	   of	   conflict	   severity.	   Practically,	   confirmation	   of	   my	   hypothesis	   encourages	  continuing	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  even	  if	  the	  explicit	  goal	  of	  conflict	  termination	  is	  not	  met	  –	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths,	  lives	  spared	  in	  the	  war,	  is	  an	  important	  success	  for	  NGOs.50	  My	  analysis	   lends	  support	  to	  the	  hypothesized	  negative	  relationship	  between	  NGO	  mediation	  and	  civil	  conflict	  severity.	  T2+	  training	  has	  no	  statistically	  significant	  short-­‐term	  effect	  on	  war	  intensity.	  The	  statistical	  models	  do	  not	  confirm	  my	  theory	  that	  long-­‐term	  NGO	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  whether	  apparently	  beneficial	  attempts	  at	  peacemaking	  can	  have	  detrimental	  effects	  if	  they	  come	  at	  the	  wrong	  time.	  Zartman’s	  concept	  of	  conflict	  ripeness	  demands	  that	  opponents	  have	  to	  find	  themselves	   in	   a	   hurting	   stalemate	   before	   they	   will	   seriously	   consider	   alternatives	   to	   war	   (1985,	   2000).	  Lowering	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  postponement	  of	  the	  necessary	  war	  fatigue,	  leading	  to	  lower	   intensity,	   but	   longer	   conflict.	   Beardsley	   (2012)	   finds	   that	   mediation	   that	   is	   deemed	   successful	   in	  bringing	  about	  an	  end	  to	  a	  conflict	  episode	  often	  has	  no	   long-­‐term	  pacifying	  effect	  as	  belligerents	  return	  to	  war	  (see	  Chapter	  6	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion).	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efforts	  that	  last	  more	  than	  one	  year	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  noticeable	  decrease	  in	  the	  yearly	  battle	  death	  rate.	  	  The	   chapter	   is	   divided	   in	   six	   sections.	   Following	   the	   introduction,	   I	   lay	   out	   my	  argument	   and	   develop	   hypotheses	   to	   test	   my	   theoretical	   model.	   The	   third	   section	  introduces	   the	  data,	   and	   the	   fourth	   section	   the	  methodology	  used	   to	   empirically	   test	  my	  propositions.	  In	  the	  fifth	  section	  I	  report	  the	  tests	  and	  results	  of	  my	  statistical	  models,	  and	  use	   brief	   cases	   to	   illustrate	   the	   casual	   mechanisms.	   In	   the	   conclusion	   I	   summarize	   the	  outcomes	  of	  my	  analysis	  and	  consider	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  implications.	  	  	  
Argument	  
How	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  decreases	  conflict	  severity	  	   The	  ability	  to	  shorten	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  conflict	  is	  one	  measure	  of	  success	  for	  conflict	  management.	  It	  sets	  the	  bar	  pretty	  high.	  A	  more	  sophisticated	  evaluation	  needs	  to	  look	  at	  additional	   ways	   non-­‐state	   conflict	   management	   influences	   a	   conflict’s	   dynamics.	   I	   am	  interested	   here	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   non-­‐state	   conflict	   management	   and	   conflict	  severity,	  as	  measured	  in	  the	  annual	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths.	  	  	  Previous	   research	   has	   drawn	   parallels	   between	   circumstances	   influencing	   the	  chances	   a	   conflict	   experiences	   civil	   conflict	   in	   the	   first	   place	   (as	   well	   as	   the	   conflict’s	  duration,	   see	   below)	   and	   the	   aspects	   that	   determine	   the	   conflict’s	   intensity.	   Whether	   a	  country	  experiences	  civil	  war	  onset	  depends	  both	  on	  the	  grievances	  potential	  rebels	   feel,	  and	  on	  the	  opportunity	   for	  organized	  violence	  (Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003,	  Sambanis	  2004).	  Similarly,	  the	  intensity	  of	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  depends	  on	  motivation	  and	  opportunity	  of	  the	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conflict	   parties	   (Lacina	   2006).51	  Conflicts	   that	   arise	   out	   of	   deep	   social	   cleavages	   or	   are	  grounded	   in	   particularly	   hurtful	   grievances	   could	   lead	   to	  more	   ubiquitous	   killings.	   Such	  situations	   include	   long-­‐standing	   ethnic	   divisions	   in	   the	   political	   and	   social	   sphere,	   for	  example	   where	   colonial	   powers	   favored	   one	   group	   and	   encouraged	   discrimination	   of	  another.	   Escalating	   identity	   conflicts	   often	   express	   themselves	   in	   dehumanization	   of	   the	  other	   side	   that	   encourages	   eradication	   of	   entire	   groups,	   as	   when	   the	   Rwandan	   Hutu	  propaganda	  referred	  to	  the	  Tutsi	  population	  as	  “cockroaches.”	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  conflicts	  about	   resources	   or	   specific	   governmental	   policies	   may	   see	   more	   targeted	   and	   confined	  violence	   (towards	   government	   representatives	   instead	   of	   whole	   population	   groups,	   or	  towards	  the	  geographical	  region	  where	  the	  resources	  in	  question	  are	  located).	  	  Besides	  the	  level	  of	  grievances,	  the	  opportunity	  for	  armed	  conflict	  –	  expressed	  in	  the	  level	   of	  militarization	   –	  will	   determine	   a	   conflict’s	   severity.	   Better-­‐armed	   rebels	   can	   kill	  more	   soldiers.	   Better-­‐equipped	   soldiers	   kill	  more	   rebels.	   Third-­‐party	   support	   (on	   either	  side)	   can	   increase	   the	   level	   of	  militarization,	   as	   does	   financing	   through	   lootable	   natural	  resources.	  Conflict	  diamonds,	  outside	  military	  aid,	  resolve	  –	  these	  variables	  associated	  with	  conflict	  severity	  recall	  the	  determinants	  for	  conflict	  duration.	  In	  fact,	  the	  proposed	  reasons	  for	   variation	   in	   conflict	   severity	   are	   similar	   to	   those	   associated	   with	   conflict	   duration:	  Conflict	  characteristics	  like	  military	  capacity,	  identity	  conflict	  and	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  influence	  how	  long	  a	  conflict	  lasts,	  and	  also	  how	  deadly	  it	  will	  be.	  I	  propose	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	   management	   is	   a	   (non-­‐violent)	   third-­‐party	   intervention.	   Therefore	   I	   am	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Lacina	   (2006:	   280)	   points	   out	   that	   some	   factors	   related	   to	   the	   deadliness	   of	   war	   may	   be	   significantly	  different	   from	   those	   that	   lead	   to	   war	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   She	   uses	   the	   example	   of	   poverty:	   if	   countries	  experiencing	  civil	  conflict	  are	  generally	  poorer	  than	  countries	  that	  do	  not,	  low	  income	  will	  not	  account	  for	  any	  variation	  in	  conflict	  intensity.	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particularly	   interested	   in	   the	   findings	   regarding	   other	   interventions.	   Previous	   literature	  has	   established	   that	   military	   third-­‐party	   interventions	   in	   civil	   wars	   can	   intensify	   the	  conflict	  and	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  (Lacina	  2006,	  Heger	  and	  Saleyhan	  2007).	   If	  military	   interventions	  have	   a	   similar	   effect	   on	   conflict	   severity	   as	   they	  have	  on	  conflict	  duration,	  maybe	  non-­‐violent	  interventions	  that	  are	  shown	  to	  shorten	  the	  duration	  of	  conflicts	  (see	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  also	  Regan	  and	  Aydin	  2006)	  can	  also	  dampen	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  fighting.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  can	  influence	  the	  conflict	  dynamics	  linked	  to	   severity	   on	   both	   the	   opportunity	   and,	  more	   relevant	   for	   this	   research,	   the	  motivation	  side.	  Whether	   NGOs	   can	   affect	   the	   opportunities	   to	   fight	   depends	   on	   their	   influence	   on	  third	  parties	   that	  supply	  arms	  or	  money	   to	   the	  belligerents.	  Advocacy	  groups	  may	   target	  individual	   governments	   that	   support	   one	   of	   the	   parties,	   or	   they	   attempt	   to	   convince	  international	   organizations	   like	   the	  United	  Nations	   to	   implement	   sanctions	   or	   embargos.	  These	  measures,	  when	  successful,	   can	  undermine	   the	  military	  strength	  of	   the	  opponents,	  potentially	   leading	   to	   a	   decrease	   in	   conflict	   intensity.	   Alternatively,	   they	   can	   upset	   the	  power	  balance	  enough	  that	  belligerents	  will	  be	  more	  open	  to	  peace	  talks	  as	  their	  military	  power	  wanes.	   	  Advocacy	  efforts,	   important	  and	   interesting	  as	   they	  are,	   fall	  outside	  of	   the	  scope	   of	   this	   dissertation.	   But	   non-­‐state	   conflict	  management	   as	   defined	   throughout	   this	  dissertation	  project	  can	  change	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  conflict	  parties	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  and	  thus	  impact	  conflict	  severity.	  	  First,	   some	   initiatives	   may	   directly	   interrupt	   ongoing	   fighting,	   putting	   a	   hold	   –	  however	   temporary	   –	   on	   the	   killing.	   Conferences	   and	   rounds	   of	   negotiations	   are	   often	  accompanied	  by	  temporary	  ceasefires	  or	  goodwill	  gestures	   like	  withdrawals	   from	  certain	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areas	  or	  release	  of	  prisoners.	  For	  example,	  in	  August	  2003,	  Sekou	  Conneh,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Liberian	   LURD	   rebels,	   withdrew	   his	   troops	   from	   Monrovia	   and	   committed	   them	   to	   a	  unilateral	   ceasefire	  when	  he	  decided	   to	   join	   ongoing	  peace	   talks	   in	  Accra,	   Ghana	   (Scelzo	  2010).52	  	  Second,	  T2+	  can	  be	  an	  alternative	  to	  violence,	  allowing	  for	  different	  ways	  of	  conflict	  resolution.	   Violence	   is	   costly	   in	   equipment	   and	   lives.	   Even	   with	  military	  means	   at	   their	  disposal,	   most	   groups	   will	   consider	   less	   costly	   alternatives,	   unless	   they	   are	   certain	   of	  battlefield	   victory.	   Talks	   and	   mediation	   efforts	   even	   in	   unofficial	   settings	   may	   warrant	  gestures	   of	   goodwill	   like	   ceasefires,	   or	   a	   new	   level	   of	   restraint	   not	   to	   jeopardize	   a	   new,	  fragile	  trust	  between	  the	  parties.	  While	  peace	  initiatives	  are	  ongoing,	  conflict	  parties	  may	  feel	   compelled	   to	   show	   some	   degree	   of	   good	   faith	   by	   conducting	   fewer	   attacks.	   For	  example,	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   IGAD	   (Inter-­‐Governmental	   Authority	   on	   Development)	   peace	  committee	  mediation	  effort	  in	  Sudan	  in	  1994	  indeed	  corresponded	  with	  a	  lower	  death	  toll	  compared	   to	   years	   before	   (943	   battle	   deaths	   in	   1993	   compared	   to	   337	   in	   1994,	  UCDP/PRIO).53	  And	   third,	   initiatives	   that	   bring	   together	   the	   different	   sides	   in	   problem-­‐solving	  workshops	   and	   similar	   direct,	   unofficial	   dialogue	   sessions	   might	   over	   time	   change	  opponents’	  perceptions	  of	  each	  other,	  softening	  hardline	  approaches	  and	  lessen	  genocidal	  tendencies.	   Many	   track-­‐two	   diplomacy	   approaches	   focus	   on	   humanizing	   the	   other	   side,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Not	  all	  mediation	  efforts	  are	  accompanied	  by	  ceasefires.	  In	  most	  cases,	  ceasefires	  are	  the	  intended	  outcome	  of	  mediation,	  not	  the	  starting	  point.	  	  53	  There	  is	  a	  valid	  argument	  that	  pauses	   in	  the	  fighting	  can	  be	  used	  by	  the	  opponents	  to	  regroup,	  organize,	  and	  take	  up	  the	  fighting	  after	  the	  interruption	  with	  new	  energy	  and	  deadliness.	  But	  the	  proclaimed	  goal	  is	  to	  stop	   or	   slow	   down	   the	   bloodshed	   and	   end	   it	   permanently.	   And	   even	   temporary	   dips	   in	   severity	   could	  decrease	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths	  counted.	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trying	   to	   move	   the	   conflict	   from	   the	   identity	   level	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   interests.	   These	  programs	  –	  more	  often	  on	  the	  grassroots	  than	  the	  leadership	  level	  –	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  gradual	  decline	   in	   killings	   as	   adversaries	   get	   to	   know	   each	   other	   better	   and	   learn	   to	   accept	   the	  other	  side’s	  right	  to	  exist.	  Examples	  include	  Muslim-­‐Christian	  organizations	  in	  Nigeria	  like	  the	   Interfaith	   Mediation	   Centre	   in	   Kaduna	   which	   “opens	   channels	   of	   communication	  between	   Christian	   and	   Muslim	   leaders,	   reorients	   militant	   youths	   toward	   dialogue	   and	  forgiveness,	   facilitates	  peace	  agreements	  between	  warring	  groups,	   and	  utilizes	   radio	  and	  television	  as	  platforms	  for	  advocating	  dialogue	  and	  reconciliation”	  (Ojo	  and	  Lateju	  2010).	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  consultative	  dialogue	  organized	  by	  Interpeace	  in	  Rwanda	  which	  in	  the	   years	   2001-­‐2003	   brought	   together	   Rwandans	   from	   all	   sectors	   and	   regions	   of	   the	  country.54	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  if	  the	  examples	  mentioned	  above	  are	  exceptions	  or	  part	  of	  a	  measurable	  pattern.	  The	   initiatives	   subsumed	  under	  my	  definition	  of	  non-­‐state	   conflict	  management	   (T2+)	  may	   display	   short-­‐term	   or	   longer-­‐lasting	   effects	   on	   conflict	   severity.	  First,	  goodwill	  gestures	  ahead	  of	  or	  during	  mediation	  rounds	  could	   temporarily	  decrease	  the	   level	   of	   ongoing	   violence.	   While	   the	   opponents	   may	   use	   the	   outside	   peacemaking	  efforts	  to	  regroup	  and	  plan	  future	  military	  campaigns,	  the	  conflict	  intensity	  should	  be	  lower	  as	   long	   as	   talks	   of	   any	   kind	   are	   continuing.	   Thus,	   the	   number	   of	   battle-­‐related	   deaths	  should	  be	  smaller	  in	  dyad	  years	  that	  see	  NGO	  mediation	  than	  in	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  
H4a:	  	   A	   dyad	   year	   in	  which	   non-­‐state	  mediation	   happens	  will	   be	   lower	   in	   intensity	  
(number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths)	  than	  dyad	  years	  that	  do	  not	  see	  T2+,	  all	  else	  
being	  equal.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  http://www.interpeace.org/programmes/rwanda/strategy,	  accessed	  May	  21,	  2014.	  
	  	   132	  
As	   rebel	   groups	   receive	   training	   in	   non-­‐violent	   conflict	   management	   skills,	   they	  should	  be	  more	  open	  to	  alternatives	  to	  the	  battlefield.	  And	  as	  enemies	  get	  the	  chance	  to	  talk	  with	  each	  other	  in	  a	  neutral	  space,	  the	  hope	  is	  that	  they	  learn	  to	  accept	  the	  other	  side	  as	  a	  negotiation	  partner.	  These	  developments	   should	   reduce	   the	  overall	   level	   of	   violence	  of	   a	  conflict	  following	  the	  T2+	  program	  implementation,	  even	  if	  the	  war	  does	  not	  end	  outright.	  	  
H4b:	  	   A	  civil	  conflict	  dyad	  that	  experiences	  T2+	  training	  in	  one	  year	  will	  subsequently	  
decrease	  in	  intensity	  (number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths).	  	  I	   argue	   that	   the	   longer	   T2+	   initiatives	   last,	   the	   higher	   their	   impact	   on	   conflict	  severity.	   If	  T2+	  efforts	   coincide	  with	  ceasefires	  –	  whether	  as	  precondition	  or	  as	  goodwill	  gesture	  –	  then	  they	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  lower	  casualty	  rates	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  program;	  thus	  longer-­‐lasting	  initiatives	  should	  mean	  fewer	  deaths	  overall.	  Programs	  aimed	  to	   improve	   interpersonal	   relationships	   of	   leaders	   usually	   take	   place	   over	   several	  weeks,	  months	  or	  years.	  The	   longer	   they	   last,	   the	   fewer	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	   the	  conflict	   should	  incur.	  First,	  upticks	  in	  violence	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  talks,	  thus	  leaders	  will	  attempt	   to	  reign	   in	   their	  subordinates.	  And	  second,	  even	   if	   the	  conflict	  does	  not	  end,	  the	   continuing	   violence	  may	  be	   on	   a	   lower	   level	   as	   the	   lessons	   of	   the	  T2+	   sessions	   bear	  fruit.	  
H4c:	  	   	  The	   duration	   of	   conflict	   management	   initiatives	   and	   the	   conflict’s	   intensity	  
level	  will	  be	  negatively	  correlated.	  	  
Data	  
Unit	  of	  Analysis	  The	  universe	  of	   cases	   for	  my	   analysis	   remains	   all	   internal	   conflicts	   in	  Africa	   from	  1990-­‐2010;	   the	   unit	   of	   analysis	   is	   the	   dyad	   episode	   year.	   Dyadic	   observations	   take	   into	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consideration	   the	   variety	   in	   intensity	   that	   conflicts	  with	   several	   active	   rebel	   groups	  may	  experience.	   It	   also	   helps	  me	   to	   compare	   the	   effect	   of	   non-­‐state	   conflict	   management	   on	  conflict	  intensity	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  one	  government-­‐rebel	  dyad	  uses	  T2+	  and	  the	  other	  does	  not.	  	  	  Information	   about	   the	   conflicts	   comes	   from	   the	   Uppsala	   Conflict	   Data	   Program	  (UCDP	  2011a).	  In	  order	  to	  be	  included	  in	  my	  models,	  a	  conflict	  dyad	  suffers	  a	  minimum	  of	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  per	  year.	  	  My	   354	   observations	   consist	   of	   100	   conflict	   dyads	   (133	   dyad	   episodes)	   in	   37	  conflicts	   (75	  conflict	  episodes).	  Twelve	  dyad	  episodes	  started	  before	   January	  1,	  1990;	  22	  were	  still	  ongoing	  by	  December	  31,	  2010.	  See	   the	  appendix	   for	  a	   list	  of	   conflict	   episodes	  and	  rebel	  groups	  involved.	  
Dependent	  variable	  The	  dependent	  variable	  –	   the	  measure	  of	   severity	  of	   a	   conflict	   –	   is	   the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  casualties	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  conflict	  episode	  year.	  The	  numbers	  come	  from	  the	  UCDP	  “Battle-­‐related	  deaths	  dataset	  v5-­‐2011,	  1989-­‐2010.”	  The	  dataset	  compiles	  “deaths	  caused	  by	  the	  warring	  parties	  that	  that	  can	  be	  directly	  related	  to	  combat	  over	  the	  contested	  incompatibility”	  (UCDP	  2011c).	  Besides	  fighting	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  UCDP	  includes	  guerilla	  activities	  and	  urban	  warfare,	  military	  and	  civilian	  fatalities.	  Gathering	  information	  on	   battle-­‐related	   deaths	   in	   an	   ongoing	   conflict	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   and	   potentially	  unreliable.55	  In	   striving	   for	   accuracy,	   the	   Uppsala	   Conflict	   Data	   Program	   uses	   several	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  see	  Balcells	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  for	  a	  recent	  discussion	  of	  the	  difficulties	  to	  count	  war	  deaths	   in	  the	  Washington	  Post’s	   Monkey	   Cage	   blog:	   “How	   should	   we	   count	   the	   war	   dead	   in	   Syria?”	   May	   1,	   2014.	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-­‐cage/wp/2014/05/01/how-­‐should-­‐we-­‐count-­‐the-­‐war-­‐dead-­‐in-­‐syria/	  accessed	  May	  13,	  2014.	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independent	  publicly-­‐available	  sources	  for	  each	  yearly	  count	  and	  gives	  three	  estimates	  in	  its	  UCDP	  Battle-­‐related	  Deaths	  Dataset	  (Sundberg	  2008):	  high,	  low	  and	  best.	  The	  codebook	  points	  out	  that	  “Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  available	  information,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  there	  are	  more	  fatalities	   than	  the	  UCDP	  high	  estimate,	  but	   it	   is	  very	  unlikely	   that	   there	   is	   fewer	   than	  the	  UCDP	  best	  estimate.”	  This	  research	  uses	  the	  UCDP’s	  best	  estimate.	  For	  more	   information,	  please	  consult	  the	  UCDP	  Battle-­‐Related	  Deaths	  Dataset	  Codebook	  (UCDP	  2011c).	  
Main	  variable	  of	  interest:	  T2+	  I	   question	   whether	   the	   occurrence	   of	   non-­‐state	   conflict	   management	   during	   an	  ongoing	  conflict	  dampens	  the	  conflict’s	  severity.	  Chapter	  1	  elaborates	  on	  my	  definition	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  (T2+)	  as	  well	  as	   the	  data	  collection	  process,	  and	  provides	  descriptive	  data	  on	  T2+.	  Because	  I	  am	  interested	  not	  only	  in	  finding	  out	  whether	  T2+	  has	  the	  hypothesized	  effect	  but	  also	  in	  the	  causal	  mechanism,	  I	  use	  different	  variables	  for	  the	  tests	   of	   sub-­‐hypotheses	   4a	   and	   4b:	   When	   assessing	   whether	   NGO	   mediation	   is	  accompanied	  by	  ceasefires	  and	  other	  goodwill	  gestures	  depressing	  the	  casualty	  rate,	  I	  use	  a	  dichotomous	   variable	   that	   stipulates	   whether	   direct	   T2+	   mediation	   and/or	   mediation	  support	  occurred	   in	  the	  conflict	  episode	  year.	  When	  testing	  whether	  T2+	   leads	  to	  a	   long-­‐term	  decrease	  in	  the	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths,	  I	  create	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  is	  one	  if	  the	  episode	   year	   experiences	   T2+	   training,	   a	   problem-­‐solving	   workshop	   or	   similar	   dialogue	  exercises.	   Because	   effects	   of	   training	   and	   dialogue	   will	   not	   be	   as	   immediate	   as	   lulls	   in	  violence	  caused	  by	  ongoing	  talks,	  I	  lag	  this	  variable	  by	  one	  year	  (and	  for	  robustness	  checks	  two).	  	  	  Finding	   good,	   comparable	  measures	   for	  NGO	   commitment	   is	   a	   challenge.	   I	   collect	  information	   on	   the	   duration	   of	   individual	   efforts,	   similar	   to	   Melander	   and	   von	   Uexküll	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(2011).	  I	  code	  a	  categorical	  variable	  where	  “1”	  stands	  for	  a	  one-­‐time	  effort	  (one	  workshop,	  or	   one	   negotiation	   conference),	   “2”	   for	   an	   initiative	   that	   encompasses	   several	   rounds	   of	  negotiation	  or	  several	  meetings	  over	  one	  year,	  and	  “3”	  for	  multi-­‐year	  sustained	  projects.	  Of	  the	  76	  T2+	  efforts	  in	  my	  sample,	  32	  are	  one-­‐time	  efforts,	  16	  see	  several	  meetings	  over	  one	  year,	  and	  28	  last	  longer	  than	  a	  year.	  
Descriptive	  data	  	  	   The	   annual	   death	   rate	   for	   conflict	   dyad	   episode	   years	   varies	   greatly	   from	  25	   (the	  minimum	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  UCDP	  data)	  to	  30,633.	  The	  latter	  observation	  is	  the	  conflict	  between	  Ethiopian	  government	  and	  Eritrean	  separatists	  in	  1990.	  The	  mean	  annual	  casualty	  rate	  is	  724,	  and	  the	  median	  is	  200	  (time	  period	  1990-­‐2010;	  for	  conflicts	  that	  started	  before	  1990,	   only	   years	  1990	   and	   after	   are	   included).	   51	  of	   the	  354	   yearly	   observations	   (14%)	  count	   25	   battle-­‐related	   deaths.	   62	   dyad	   years	   see	   1,000	   deaths	   or	   more;	   four	   years	  experience	  10,000	  deaths	  or	  more	  –	  Ethiopia	  1990,	  both	   in	   the	  conflict	  with	   the	  Eritrean	  People’s	   Liberation	   Front	   about	   the	   latter’s	   secession,	   and	   the	   Ethiopian	   People's	  Revolutionary	   Democratic	   Front’s	   struggle	   with	   the	   Mengistu	   regime,	   Angola	   1993,	   and	  Congo	  (Brazzaville)	  1997.	  The	  deadliest	  conflict	  episode	  is	  the	  war	  in	  Sudan,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  longest	  uninterrupted	  war	  included	  in	  my	  sample.	  Only	  five	  of	  the	  28	  conflicts	  that	  last	  up	  to	  12	  months	  see	  a	  death	  rate	  higher	  than	  100	  casualties.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  longer	  wars	  are	   associated	  with	   higher	   average	   death	   tolls,	   contradicting	   the	   proposition	   that	  maybe	  short	  wars	  are	  particularly	  violent.	  See	  Figures	  15,	  16	  and	  17	  for	  visual	  representation.	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Figure	  15:	  Annual	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths	  by	  conflict	  duration	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Figure	  17:	  Observations	  by	  severity	  (Annual	  battle-­‐related	  deaths)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   T2+	  occurs	  on	  all	  levels	  of	  severity.	  Noteworthy	  is	  that	  all	  six	  conflicts	  that	  at	  some	  point	   experience	   a	   year	   in	   which	   more	   than	   5,000	   people	   die	   see	   non-­‐state	   conflict	  management	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  same	  episode,	  as	  do	  all	  except	  two	  of	  those	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  at	  least	  one	  year	  of	  more	  than	  1,000	  battle-­‐related	  deaths.	  	  	   I	   calculate	   the	   change	   of	   severity	   from	   one	   year	   to	   the	   next.	   In	   110	   of	   221	   cases	  (50%),	   a	   dyad	   episode	   year	   is	   less	   violent	   than	   the	   preceding	   year.56	  Of	   those	   66	   dyad	  episodes	  that	  experience	  T2+,	  35	  (53%)	  are	  correlated	  with	  a	  decline	  in	  severity	  from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  number	  of	  observations	  is	  now	  221	  (from	  354)	  because	  the	  first	  year	  of	  each	  dyad	  is	  dropped.	  
15	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previous	   year.	   Of	   those	   58	   dyad	   episodes	   that	   saw	  T2+	   in	   the	   preceding	   year	   32	   (55%)	  experience	  a	  subsequent	  decline	   in	  the	  annual	  battle-­‐death	  rate.	  Whether	  the	  decrease	   in	  severity	   is	  a	   function	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	   is	   the	  subject	  of	   this	  chapter.	  The	  next	  section	  will	  consider	  which	  control	  variables	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  
Controls	  Studies	   on	   the	   deadliness	   of	   conflicts	   have	   identified	   a	   number	   of	   explanatory	  variables	  that	  I	  will	  include	  in	  my	  models	  as	  control	  variables.	  Identity	  conflicts	  could	  be	  more	  violent	  as	  combatants	  see	  the	  other	  side	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  own	  identity	  group’s	  existence,	  thus	  becoming	  more	  likely	  to	  strive	  for	  eradication	  of	   the	  other	   side.	   I	   expect	   countries	  with	  a	  high	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  or	  high	  religious	  
fractionalization	  (data	  from	  Alesina	  et	  al.	  2002,	  and	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  2003,	  respectively)	  to	  experience	  more	  deaths	  per	  capita	  during	  conflict.	  	  The	   type	  of	   incompatibility	  at	   the	  center	  of	   the	  conflict,	   the	  motivation	  of	   the	  rebels,	  should	  be	  a	  determining	  factor	  of	  the	  level	  of	  violence.	  Secessionist	  wars	  often	  last	  longer	  than	  other	   types	  of	  conflicts	   (Fearon	  2004).	  Groups	  attempting	   to	  break	  away	   from	  their	  current	  state	  will	  feel	  less	  restraint	  in	  using	  force	  against	  their	  enemies	  and	  civilians	  than	  those	  groups	  that	  hope	  to	  govern	  the	  population	  and	  military	  once	  the	  war	  is	  won.	  At	  the	  same	   time,	   separatist	   conflicts	   often	   are	   waged	   in	   the	   periphery	   of	   a	   country,	   limiting	  violence	   to	   a	   region.	   	   I	   include	   the	   UCDP/PRIO	   incompatibility	   variable	   which	   codes	  whether	  a	  conflict	  is	  about	  territory	  or	  government	  control	  and	  expect	  territorial	  conflicts	  to	  be	  more	  severe	  as	  measured	  in	  battle	  deaths.57	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  In	  large	  countries,	  secessionist	  wars	  are	  often	  fought	  on	  the	  periphery	  and	  express	  themselves	  as	  wars	  of	  attrition,	  with	  steady	  but	  low	  numbers	  of	  casualties.	  Fighting	  about	  control	  of	  the	  central	  government,	  on	  the	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A	   more	   democratic	   government	   may	   be	   more	   restrained	   in	   its	   response	   to	   regime	  opposition.	   Heger	   and	   Saleyhan	   (2007)	   find	   that	   the	   larger	   coalition	   sizes	   and	   more	  stringent	  government	  constraints	  in	  democratic	  states	  lead	  to	  more	  restrained	  use	  of	  force	  in	  conflict.	  Thus,	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  democracy,	  measured	  by	  a	  country’s	  Polity	  score,	  should	  be	  correlated	  with	  lower	  casualty	  rates.	  Rebels	  that	  are	  militarily	  capable	  will	  see	  opportunities	  on	  the	  battlefield	  and	  attempt	  to	  use	   them	   (Lacina	  2006).	  One	  expression	  of	   this	   relationship	   is	   that	  wars	   in	  which	   the	  opponents	  have	  relatively	  equal	  military	  capacities	  last	  longer	  (Cunningham	  et	  al.	  2009)	  –	  if	  one	  side	   is	  much	  stronger,	   the	  other	  will	  acquiesce	   to	  negotiations	  more	  quickly.	  We	  can	  expect	   these	   wars	   between	   equal	   powers	   to	   be	   more	   severe,	   too.	   My	   models	   include	  dummy	   variables	   for	   rebels	   at	   parity	   to	   the	   government,	   and	   rebels	   stronger	   than	   the	  government,	  taken	  from	  Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2013).	  Violence	  begets	  violence.	  If	  one	  side	  is	  particularly	  brutal	  at	  one	  time,	   the	  other	  side	  may	   look	   for	  revenge.	  Escalation	   is	   likely.	   I	  expect	   the	  measure	   of	   severity	   in	   one	   year	   to	   be	   positively	   correlated	   with	   the	   level	   of	  
violence	   in	   the	   preceding	   year	   (higher	   numbers	   of	   battle-­‐related	   deaths	   in	   one	   year	   will	  correspond	  to	  high	  numbers	  in	  the	  next	  year)	  and	  therefore	  include	  the	  lagged	  dependent	  variable	   into	  my	  model.	   Further,	   violence	  may	  not	   only	   be	   correlated	  over	   time	  but	   also	  across	   space.	   If	   there	   is	   an	   ongoing	   conflict	   in	  a	  neighboring	   country,	   this	  may	   affect	   the	  severity	  of	  the	  conflict	  (Lujala	  2009).	  I	  include	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  simultaneous	  conflict	  in	  a	  contiguous	  country.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  other	  hand,	  might	  be	  shorter,	  but	  more	  intense.	  In	  this	  case,	  my	  expectations	  should	  be	  reversed,	  and	  severity	  higher	  for	  conflicts	  about	  government	  control	  than	  about	  territory.	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Lujala	  (2009)	  finds	  that	  longer-­‐lasting	  conflicts	  have	  a	  lower	  average	  annual	  casualty	  rate	  and	   that	   the	  most	   intense	  wars	  are	  relatively	  short	  episodes	  of	  extreme	  violence.	  As	  my	  descriptive	  section	  shows,	  cases	  that	  make	  up	  my	  sample	  display	  the	  opposite	  dynamic:	  longer	   wars	   are	   also	   more	   deadly	   on	   average.	   To	   account	   for	   any	   temporal	   dynamic,	   I	  include	  the	  length	  of	  the	  dyad	  conflict	  episode	  (in	  months,	  logged)	  as	  a	  control	  variable.	  Lujala	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  natural	  resources	  are	  key	  determinants	  of	  the	  number	  of	  casualties	   in	  a	  conflict.	  Lootable	  resources	  and	  the	  money	  made	  off	  them	  can	  increase	  the	  military	   power	   of	   rebels.	   They	   can	   also	   contribute	   to	   infighting	   among	   the	   rebels	   as	   the	  desire	  for	  personal	  enrichment	  trumps	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  war	  (Weinstein	  2007).	  In	  the	  long	  term,	   the	   presence	   of	   natural	   resources	  might	  motivate	   rebels	   to	   fight	   particularly	   hard,	  because	  they	  fear	  any	  compromise	  solution	  will	  jeopardize	  their	  access	  to	  the	  riches	  –	  only	  victory	   assures	   control	   over	   the	   resources.	   Lujala	   finds	   that	   diamonds,	   oil	   and	   gas	  production	  in	  the	  conflict	  zone	  increases	  conflict	  intensity.	  I	  include	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  that	   is	   “1”	   if	   the	   country	   at	   war	   has	   hydrocarbon	   (oil	   and	   natural	   gas)	   or	   gemstone	  production.	  I	  expect	  those	  conflicts	  to	  be	  more	  severe.	  	  Because	   of	   my	   over-­‐all	   focus	   on	   interventions	   in	   civil	   conflicts,	   I	   also	   include	  variables	   that	  account	   for	  military	  interventions	   (coded	  when	  a	  country	   is	   included	   in	   the	  UCDP	   dataset	   as	   engaging	   in	   the	   active	   fighting)	   and	   high-­‐level	   negotiations	   (from	   the	  UCDP	  Managing	   Intrastate	   Conflict	   Dataset,	  Melander	   and	   von	   Uexküll	   2011,	   until	   2007,	  and	   the	   Civil	   War	   Mediation	   dataset,	   DeRouen	   et	   al	   2011,	   for	   2008-­‐2010)	   and	   I	   expect	  outside	  military	  intervention	  to	  increase	  the	  casualty	  rate,	  because	  they	  will	  encourage	  the	  supported	  side	  to	  exploit	   their	  potential	  new	  military	  advantage,	  while	  diplomatic	  efforts	  should	   decrease	   the	   level	   of	   violence	   as	   alternatives	   to	   the	   battlefield	   become	   relevant.	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Please	  see	  the	  codebook	  in	  the	  appendix	  for	  information	  about	  the	  sources	  for	  all	  variables	  and	  for	  a	  summary	  table.	  	  
Methodology	  
Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  	  	   For	  the	  test	  of	  hypothesis	  4a,	  the	  effect	  T2+	  may	  have	  on	  conflict	  severity,	  I	  initially	  use	  multivariate	   OLS	   regressions	  with	   robust	   standard	   errors	   adjusted	   for	   clustering	   on	  conflicts.	   The	   clustering	   controls	   for	   auto-­‐correlation	   effects	   within	   observations	   of	   the	  same	  conflict.	  The	  dependent	  variable,	  yearly	  battle	  deaths,	   is	   log-­‐transformed	  because	  of	  the	   large	   range	  of	   values	   from	  25	   to	  over	  30,000.	  My	  expectation	   is	   that	  T2+	  efforts	  will	  lead	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  war	  casualties.	  I	  first	  test	  for	  immediate	  effects	  of	  NGO	  mediation	  by	  including	  my	  “direct	  mediation	  T2+”	  variable	   (model	  1).	  The	  pacifying	  effect	  of	  problem-­‐solving	   workshops,	   teaching	   of	   non-­‐violent	   conflict	   resolution	   techniques	   and	   high-­‐level	  confidence	  building	  will	  not	  be	  immediate,	  but	  rather	  need	  some	  time	  to	  evolve.	  I	  therefore	  stipulate	  the	  expectation	  that,	  if	  a	  conflict	  experiences	  a	  T2+-­‐event	  in	  one	  year,	  the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  will	  decline	  in	  the	  following	  year	  (I	  also	  test	  with	  a	  two-­‐year	  lag).	  	   As	   I	  have	  pointed	  out	   in	   the	  preceding	  chapters,	  conflicts	   that	  experience	  T2+	  will	  not	  be	  representative	  of	   the	  all	   civil	  wars.	  Those	  cases	   that	  are	   interesting	   for	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	  open	  to	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  practitioners	  are	  a	  particular	  subset	  of	  all	  conflicts.	  They	  are	  potentially	  longer	  and	  possibly	  harder	  to	  solve	  than	  other	  civil	  wars.	  They	  also	  could	  be	  more	  severe,	  as	  NGOs	  often	  have	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  trying	  to	  pacify	  those	  groups	  that	  inflict	  the	  most	  damage	  and	  hurt	  the	  most	  people.	  For	  more	  background	  on	   the	   selection	   effects	   at	   play	   in	   the	   research	   on	   mediation	   in	   general	   and	   T2+	   in	  particular,	  please	  refer	  to	  Chapter	  2	  and	  4.	  Because	  selection	  effects	  will	  introduce	  biased	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results,	  I	  rerun	  the	  OLS	  regressions	  while	  limiting	  my	  sample	  to	  those	  conflicts	  that	  at	  some	  point	  experience	  T2+.58	  	  
Testing	  and	  discussion	  
Non-­‐state	  Conflict	  Management	  and	  Conflict	  Severity	  Table	  11	  (next	  page)	  compiles	  the	  results	  of	  the	  models	  reported	  here.	  Model	  1	  uses	  OLS	  regression	  to	  determine	  whether	  T2+	  has	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  logged	  number	  of	  annual	  battle	  deaths.	  The	  measure	  of	  T2+	  is	  not	  significant.	  The	  positve	  sign	  of	  the	  T2+	  coefficient	  indicates	  that	  in	  the	  full	  sample	  of	  all	  African	  civil	  conflict	  dyads	  under	  observation,	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  coincide	  with	  higher	  battle-­‐death	  rates.	  The	  only	  significant	  regressors	  are	  rebel	  motivation	  and	  the	  lagged	  dependent	  variable.	  The	  model	  finds	  conflicts	  about	  government	  control	  will	  cost	  more	  lives	  in	  a	  year	  than	  separatist	  conflicts.	  Separatist	  conflicts	  often	  happen	  at	  the	  periphery	  of	  a	  country	  and	  do	   involve	  small	  segments	  of	   the	  population,	  while	  rebellions	  with	   the	  goal	   to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  will	  engulf	  whole	  nations.	  	  	  If	   a	   conflict	  experienced	  a	  high	  casualty	   rate	   in	  one	  year,	   it	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   see	  a	  high	   casualty	   rate	   in	   the	   following	   year.	   The	   other	   covariates	   are	   not	   statistically	  significant.	   Significance	   levels	   and	   direction	   of	   the	   coefficients	   remain	   unchanged	   for	   all	  variables	  when	  I	  use	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  I	   consider	   simultaneous	   equation	   models,	   specifically	   two	   stages	   probit	   least	   squares,	   2SPLS	   (Maddala	  1983,	  Keshk	  2003)	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  endogeneity	  between	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  conflict	  severity.	   In	   the	   first	   stage	  of	  2SPLS,	   the	  dependent	  variables	  are	   regressed	  on	  all	   exogenous	  variables.	  The	  second	   stage	   uses	   the	   predicted	   values	   for	   battle	   deaths	   and	   T2+	   as	   regressors	   in	   separate	   tests	   for	  occurrence	  of	  T2+	  and	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  respectively.	  Postestimation	  tests	  find	  that	  variables	  may	  not	  be	  endogenous.	  I	  therefore	  relegate	  this	  model	  to	  the	  appendix	  (appendix	  8).	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Table	  11:	  Severity	  of	  conflicts,	  measured	  by	  battle	  deaths	  in	  year,	  logged	  	   (1)	  OLS:	  all	  T2+	   (2)	  OLS,	  T2+:	  approaches	  (reference:	  no	  T2+)	   (3)	   OLS,	   conflicts	  with	  T2+:	  all	  T2+	  	   (4)	  OLS,	  conflicts	  with	  T2+:	  approaches	   (5)	  OLS,	  conflicts	  with	  T2+:	  longest	  efforts,	  lagged	  
any	  T2+	  in	  dyad	  year	   0.11	  
(0.19)	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.21	  
(0.23)	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  






-­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.43*	  
(0.22)	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
T2+	  Training	  	  lagged	  one	  year	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.09	  (0.47)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.37	  (0.40)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
T2+	  Problem-­‐solving	  lagged	  one	  year	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   0.01	  (0.34)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   reference	  category	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Long-­‐term	   T2+,	   lagged	  one	  year	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.25	  (0.23)	  
Medium-­‐term	  T2+,	  lagged	  one	  year	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐-­‐-­‐	   -­‐0.14	  (0.52)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.47	  (0.46)	   -­‐0.49	  (0.50)	   -­‐0.11	  (0.26)	   -­‐0.03	  (0.28)	   -­‐0.19	  (0.29)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   0.36	  (0.54)	   0.46	  (0.52)	   2.08***	  (0.42)	   2.07***	  (0.47)	   2.09***	  (0.45)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   0.80*	  (0.30)	   0.84**	  (0.32)	   1.45*	  (0.57)	   1.56***	  (0.56)	   1.44**	  (0.54)	  Rebel	  parity	   0.57	  (0.38)	   0.56	  (0.40)	   0.87*	  (0.48)	   0.81**	  (0.39)	   0.90*	  (0.48)	  Rebel	  stronger	   -­‐0.08	  (0.25)	   -­‐0.003	  (0.26)	   -­‐0.16	  (0.33)	   -­‐0.11	  (0.31)	   -­‐0.19	  (0.37)	  Democracy	   -­‐0.01	  (0.03)	   -­‐0.01	  (0.03)	   -­‐0.02	  (0.04)	   -­‐0.02	  (0.03)	   -­‐0.02	  (0.03)	  Gems	  and	  carbon	   0.33	  (0.32)	   0.31	  (0.33)	   0.25	  (0.22)	   0.16	  (0.25)	   0.26	  (0.26)	  War	  in	  neighboring	  country	   0.19	  (0.26)	   0.18	  (0.26)	   0.09	  (0.23)	   0.10	  (0.20)	   0.11	  (0.24)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐0.13	  (0.34)	   -­‐0.10	  (0.33)	   -­‐0.64	  (0.48)	   -­‐0.50	  (0.41)	   -­‐0.64	  (0.47)	  Official	  mediation	   -­‐0.18	  (0.20)	   -­‐0.16	  (0.21)	   0.04	  (0.24)	   0.06	  (0.18)	   0.04	  (0.24)	  Length	  of	  dyad	  episode,	  logged	   0.03	  (0.13)	   0.04	  (0.14)	   0.06	  (0.17)	   0.06	  (0.18)	   0.07	  (0.17)	  Battle	  deaths,	  lagged	   0.48***	  (0.07)	   0.48***	  (0.07)	   0.34***	  (0.11)	   0.32***	  (0.10)	   0.35***	  (0.11)	  Constant	   1.06	  (0.85)	   0.98	  (0.95)	   -­‐0.29	  (1.15)	   -­‐0.36	  (1.30)	   -­‐0.35	  (1.10)	  
N	  	  	  Frequency	  of	  T2+	  T2+	  mediation/support	  T2+	  training	  T2+dialog	  Long-­‐term	  T2+	  Medium-­‐term	  T2+	  
197	  (59	  clusters	  on	  dyads)	  63	  
201	  (60	  clusters)	  	  	  41	  14	  18	  
116	  (29	  clusters)	   116	  (29	  clusters)	   116	  29	  clusters	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  9	  R2	   0.41	   0.41	   0.46	   0.47	   0.46	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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Model	   2	   dissects	   the	   T2+	   variable	   into	   the	   different	   approaches	   taken	   by	   NGOs,	  namely	   direct	   mediation	   and	   mediation	   support, 59 	  training,	   and	   problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  (the	  last	  two	  variables	  are	  lagged	  one	  year;	  the	  reference	  category	  is	  dyad	  years	  without	  any	  T2+).	  Both	  the	  variable	  accounting	  for	  mediation	  and	  mediation	  support	  and	  the	  variable	  accounting	  for	  previous	  T2+	  capacity-­‐building	  are	  now	  negative,	  although	  they	  remain	  not	  significant.	  The	  lagged	  problem-­‐solving	  variable	  is	  positive.	  I	  would	  expect	  any	  positive	   impact	   of	   dialogue	   and	   problem	   solving	   workshops	   to	   be	   more	   difficult	   to	  determine	   statistically	   as	   socialization	   effects	   will	   take	   root	   slowly	   and	   will	   express	  themselves	   in	   different	   ways	   in	   individual	   conflicts.	   When	   I	   lag	   the	   problem-­‐solving	  variable	   two	   years,	   it	   is	   statistically	   significant	   and	   negative,	   showing	   that	   certain	   T2+	  efforts	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  casualty	  rates	  in	  later	  years.	  The	  control	  variables	  remain	  unchanged.	  Models	   3	   and	   4	   repeats	   the	   regressions	   performed	   in	   Model	   1	   and	   2,	   but	   use	   a	  sample	   that	   is	   limited	   to	   those	   conflict	   dyads	   that	   experience	   non-­‐state	   conflict	  management	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  ongoing	  episode.	  	  In	  Model	  3,	  the	  variable	  of	  interest,	  the	  general	  dichotomous	  variable	  for	  T2+	  in	  a	  given	  dyad	  year,	  is	  now	  negative,	  but	  still	  not	  statistically	  significant.60	  A	  number	  of	  control	  variables	  reach	  acceptable	  significance	  levels,	  namely	  religious	  fractionalization,	  rebel	  motivation,	  rebel	  strength	  parity	  and	  lagged	  battle	  deaths.	  Religious	  fractionalization	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  higher	  conflict	  severity,	  indicating	  that	  conflicts	  in	  countries	  divided	  by	  religion	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  violent.	  When	  the	  rebel	  group	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  I	  combine	  the	  measures	  of	  direct	  mediation	  and	  mediation	  support	  because	  they	  both	  describe	  roles	  T2+	  organizations	   play	   in	   the	   direct	   interaction	   of	   conflict	   parties,	  with	   expected	   immediate	   effects	   on	   conflict	  severity.	  This	   juxtaposes	  with	   the	   longer-­‐term	  expectations	  mediation	   training/capacity	  building	   and	   long-­‐term	  goals	  of	  dialogue.	  60	  Again	  nothing	  changes	  when	  the	  lagged	  T2+	  variable	  is	  used.	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is	  equal	   in	  strength	   to	   the	  government,	   the	  dyad	  will	  be	  more	  violent.	  This	   is	  a	  matter	  of	  military	   capacity	   (rebels	   can	  kill	  more	  people	   so	   they	  will),	   but	   also	  of	  uncertainty:	   if	   no	  side	   is	   clearly	  dominant,	  both	  sides	  will	   try	   to	  win	  on	   the	  battlefield.	   Incompatibility	  and	  lagged	  battle	  deaths	  remain	  positive	  and	  significant	  in	  these	  models.	  	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	  is	  not	  only	  not	  significant,	  but	  its	  coefficient	  is	  unexpectedly	  negative.	  Lacina	  (2006)	  finds	  a	  negative	  effect	   for	  ethnic	  polarization	  on	  conflict	  severity.	  Maybe	   extreme	   violence	   related	   to	   identity	   issues	   happens	   at	   certain	   points	   of	   the	  fractionalization	  index,	  possibly	  in	  very	  divided	  societies	  and	  in	  those	  countries	  where	  only	  one	  minority	   ethnic	   group	   faces	   off	   with	   the	  majority.	   I	   consider	   a	   curvilinear	   effect	   by	  including	  the	  squared	  ethnic	  polarization	  index,	  but	  the	  variable	  remains	  not	  significant.	  	  The	  signs	  for	  rebel	  superiority,	  gems	  and	  carbon	  production,	  democracy	  and	  war	  in	  a	  neighboring	  country	  are	  as	  hypothesized	  -­‐	  positive	  for	  natural	  resources	  and	  neighboring	  war,	   negative	   for	   dominant	   rebel	   strength	   and	   democracy	   –	   but	   not	   significant.	   Military	  interventions	  and	  official	  mediation	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  either,	  and	  the	  signs	  for	  the	   coefficients	   are	   opposite	   of	   what	   I	   had	   expected.	   The	   theoretical	   expectations	   that	  third-­‐party	   military	   support	   will	   exacerbate	   violence,	   but	   diplomatic	   interventions	   will	  abate	  it	  need	  clarification.	  If	  military	  interventions	  are	  changing	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  a	  conflict	   they	  may	  give	   incentives	  to	  the	  suddenly	  weaker	  party	  to	   look	  for	  alternatives	  to	  military	  confrontation.	  Official	  mediation	  by	  governments	  or	  international	  organizations	  is	  often	  prompted	  by	  escalation	  of	  conflict,	  creating	  endogeneity	  for	  my	  model.	  	  	   Among	  all	  dyads	  that	  see	  T2+	  at	  some	  point	  during	  an	  ongoing	  episode,	  I	  compare	  in	  Model	  4	  whether	  those	  dyad	  years	  that	  see	  T2+	  mediation/mediation	  support,	  or	  saw	  T2+	  training	  in	  the	  previous	  year,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  lower	  casualty	  rates	  than	  those	  years	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that	  do	  not.	  Both	  coefficients	  are	  negative,	  but	  only	   the	  mediation	  variable	   is	   statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level.61	  NGO	  mediation	  is	  indeed	  related	  to	  a	  lower	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  –	  years	  in	  which	  NGOs	  are	  active	  as	  mediators	  or	  supporting	  mediation	  see	  fewer	  deaths	  than	  those	  years	  that	  do	  not	  experience	  T2+	  mediation.	  	  Taken	   together,	   Models	   1-­‐4	   show	   some	   support	   for	   hypothesis	   4a,	   but	   little	   for	  hypothesis	  4b:	  The	   restricted	  OLS	  models	   find	   statistical	   significance	   for	  NGO	  mediation,	  confirming	  my	  proposition	   that	  years	   that	   see	  direct	  mediation	  organized	  and	  supported	  by	  T2+	  actors	  will	  experience	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths.	  Capacity-­‐building	  for	  belligerents	  has	  no	  immediate	  effect	  on	  conflict	  severity.	  The	  coefficient	  for	  T2+	  training	  is	  only	  significant	  when	  lagged	  two	  years,	  indicating	  a	  potential	  delayed	  effect	  –	  however	  the	  temporal	  and	  cross-­‐sectional	   limitations	  of	  my	  sample	  are	  too	  severe	  to	  draw	  meaningful	  conclusions	  from	  this	  particular	  model.	  	  
	  Duration	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  and	  conflict	  severity	  I	  now	  single	  out	  one	  characteristic	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  that	  I	  expect	  to	  have	  a	  particularly	  strong	   effect	   on	   conflict	   severity.	  My	   theoretical	   expectation	   is	   that	   NGOs	   that	   display	   a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  resolving	  a	  conflict	  will	  be	  most	  effective	   in	  building	  the	  trust	  and	  willingness	   to	   compromise	   necessary	   to	   depress	   the	   level	   of	   violence.	   Examples	   of	   such	  long-­‐term	  strategies	  include	  the	  continuing	  support	  of	  the	  Acholi	  Religious	  Leaders	  Peace	  Initiative	   in	  Uganda,	  which	  has	  acted	  as	  a	  go-­‐between	   for	   the	  government	  and	  the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	   Army	   since	   2002,	   Interpeace’	   consultation	   exercise	   in	   Rwanda	   (2001-­‐2003)	  cumulating	  in	  a	  mediation	  forum	  on	  the	  national	  level,	  and	  the	  Collaborative	  Peace	  Building	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  The	   reference	   category	   in	   Model	   4	   is	   “problem-­‐solving.”	   T2+	   training	   is	   negative	   and	   significant	   when	  lagged	  two	  years.	  However,	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  in	  that	  model	  is	  only	  86	  (with	  20	  individual	  dyads).	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Program	   of	   the	   West	   Africa	   Peace	   Network,	   which	   from	   1998	   through	   the	   end	   of	   the	  conflict	   in	   Sierra	   Leone	   led	   dialogue	   among	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   actors	   in	   that	   country’s	  society.	   Figure	   18	   shows	   two	   scatter	   plots	   of	   conflict	   severity	   as	   a	   function	   of	   conflict	  duration,	  one	  for	  dyad	  episode	  years	  that	  experience	  long-­‐lasting	  T2+	  efforts,	  the	  other	  for	  those	  episode	  years	  without	  sustained	  commitment.	  
Figure	  18:	  Duration	  of	  current	  dyad	  episode	  (months)	  





0 100 200 300 0 100 200 300
A B
annual battle deaths, logged Fitted values
B:  at least one T2+ effort in the preceding year was a multi-year effort
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In	  Model	  5,	   I	   replace	   the	  T2+	  variable	   in	   the	   restricted	  OLS	  model	  with	   a	  dummy	  variable	   that	   is	   “1”	   if	   the	  most	   sustained	   T2+	   effort	   in	   preceding	   dyad	   episode	   year	   is	   a	  long-­‐term	   initiative	   rather	   than	   a	   single	  workshop	   or	  mediation	   round.	  Using	   the	   lagged	  variable	  is	  important,	  because	  otherwise	  I	  include	  in	  my	  count	  of	  long-­‐term	  efforts	  the	  first	  year	  of	  such	  a	  project.	  Only	  a	  continuing	  activity	  past	  the	  first	  year,	  however,	  will	  prove	  to	  the	   conflict	  parties,	   that	   the	  organization	   is	   serious	   about	   their	   long-­‐term	  commitment.	   I	  also	  include	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  medium-­‐length	  NGO	  initiatives	  (more	  than	  one-­‐off	  effort,	  but	  not	  longer	  than	  one	  year),	  which	  leaves	  those	  one-­‐time	  mediation	  rounds	  as	  reference	  category.	  The	  main	  explanatory	  variable	  is	  negative,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  Neither	  is	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  shorter	  T2+	  initiatives.	  Similarly,	  when	  I	  use	  a	  variable	  counting	  the	  T2+	   efforts	   in	   a	   given	   dyad	   year,	   or	   the	   cumulative	   number	   of	   NGO	   efforts	   in	   a	   dyad	  episode,	  the	  coefficients	  are	  consistently	  negative	  and	  consistently	  not	  significant.	  I	  cannot	  reject	  the	  null-­‐hypothesis	  that	  long-­‐term	  T2+	  efforts	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  conflict	  severity.	  The	  control	  variables	  perform	  as	  in	  earlier	  models.	  	  My	  statistical	  models	  do	  not	  adequately	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  endogeneity.	  Maybe	  instead	  of	  T2+	  bringing	  about	  a	  decrease	  in	  severity,	  a	  decrease	  in	  severity	  opens	  the	  door	  to	   T2+	   activities.	   The	   lack	   of	   reliable	   instrumental	   variables	   prohibits	   me	   from	   using	  instrumental	   variable	   regression	   to	   address	   the	   matter.	   In	   the	   following	   pages	   I	   give	  examples	  of	  T2+	  in	  ongoing	  conflicts	  that	  had	  the	  hypothesized	  impact	  on	  conflict	  severity.	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Illustration	  –	  the	  cases	  of	  Somalia,	  Chad,	  Algeria	  and	  Uganda	  	  
Somalia	  and	  Chad	  	   In	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  T2+,	  I	  initially	  present	  two	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  experience	  any	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  during	  the	  time	  under	  observation.	  	  First,	  the	  conflict	  between	  the	  Transitional	  Federal	  Government	  of	  Somalia	  and	  Al-­‐Shabab	  is	  coded	  by	  UCDP	  as	  active	  since	  2008	  and	  has	  not	  ended	  in	  2013.	  Second,	  the	  government	  of	  Chad	  has	  faced	  many	  insurgent	  groups	  over	  the	  years.	  I	  focus	  here	  on	  the	  years	  1992-­‐1994,	  when	  four	  different	  groups	  challenged	  the	  government.	  	  Because	  both	  the	  Somali	  and	  Chadian	  conflicts	  did	  not	  experience	  any	  T2+	  in	  the	  time	  under	  observation,	  I	  use	  them	  as	  a	  baseline	  for	  the	  subsequent	  examples	  of	  conflicts	  that	  see	  T2+.	  
Table	  12:	  Annual	  Battle	  deaths	  in	  Al-­‐Shabab	  –	  Somalia	  government	  dyad	  (2008-­‐2012)	  
Year	  	   Annual	  Battle	  Deaths	  
2008	   1292	  
2009	   1403	  
2010	   2069	  
2011	   1938	  
2012	   2622	  	  
Table	  13:	  Annual	  Battle	  deaths	  in	  Chad	  (1992-­‐1994)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  year	  group	   1992	   1993	   1994	  
CNR	   115	   25	   25	  
CSNPD	   33	   30	   105	  
FNT	   25	   25	   31	  
MDD	   726	   40	   	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	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The	  Somali	  case	  shows	  that,	  as	  described	  above	  in	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  section,	  conflict	  severity	  as	  measured	  by	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  tends	  to	  increase	  over	  time.	  The	  Chadian	  conflict	  illustrates	  how	  low-­‐level	  violence	  often	  continues	  over	  several	  years,	  with	  occasional	  spikes	  in	  the	  death	  rate.	  I	  expect	  the	  pattern	  to	  be	  different	  if	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  occurs.	  The	  following	  two	  examples	  show	  how	  T2+	  can	  correlate	  with	  decreases	  in	  conflict	  severity.	  	  
Algeria	  	  The	  first	  multiparty	  elections	  in	  Algeria	  were	  held	  in	  December	  1991.	  The	  Islamist	  Salvation	  Front	  (Front	  Islamique	  du	  Salut/FIS)	  won	  a	  majority	  of	  votes	  and	  was	  poised	  to	  win	   the	   elections	   in	   the	   next	   round	   when	   the	   army	   cancelled	   the	   electoral	   process,	  effectively	   took	   over	   government	   control,	   and	   banned	   the	   FIS.	   Insurgency	   ensued.	   A	  number	   of	   Islamist	   groups	   joined	   forces	   in	   their	   fight	   against	   the	   regime,	   including	   the	  Armed	   Islamic	  Movement	   (Mouvement	   Islamique	  Armée/MIA)	   and	  Takfir	  wa'l	  Hijra.	   FIS	  formed	  its	  own	  militant	  wing,	  the	  Islamic	  Salvation	  Army	  (Armée	  Islamique	  du	  Salut/AIS).	  Another	   militant	   collaborative	   that	   developed	   in	   1992	   was	   the	   Armed	   Islamic	   Group	  (Groupe	  islamique	  armée/GIA),	  a	  group	  that	  rejected	  democracy	  outright.	  	  Table	   14	   shows	   the	   number	   of	   annual	   battle-­‐deaths	   for	   the	   years	   1992-­‐1998	   by	  insurgent	  group.	  The	  most	  deadly	  year	  overall	   is	  1995,	  when	  3,978	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  occurred.	  The	  conflict	   severity	  escalates	  steadily	   in	   the	  years	  1992-­‐1995,	  and	   then	  drops	  notably	   in	   1996	   before	   climbing	   again,	  more	   than	   doubling	   from	   1997	   to	   1998.	   For	   AIS	  separately,	   the	   death	   rate	   increases	   from	   228	   in	   1992	   to	   1341	   in	   1994,	   then	   decreases	  slightly	   in	   1995	   and	  most	   dramatically	   in	   1996.	  While	   the	   conflict	   dyad	   is	   still	   coded	   as	  active	  in	  1996	  and	  1997,	  it	  is	  at	  the	  low	  end	  of	  the	  intensity	  scale.	  GIA’s	  severity	  curve	  sees	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several	  spikes	  of	  casualty	  numbers	   in	  1995,	  1998	  and	  (though	  much	   lower)	   in	  2001.	  The	  GIA-­‐government	  dyad	  is	  overall	  more	  deadly.	  
Table	  14:	  Annual	  Battle-­‐Deaths	  in	  Algeria	  (1992-­‐1998)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  year	  	  group	   1992	   1993	   1994	   1995	   –	  Platform	  for	  Algeria	   1996	   1997	   1998	  
AIS	   228	   775	   1341	   1000	   25	   40	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
GIA	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	   25	   1000	   2978	   1059	   1284	   3024	  
Total	   228	   800	   2341	   3978	   1084	   1324	   3024	  	   One	   explanation	   for	   the	   dyad-­‐level	   variation	   in	   severity	   is	   that	   the	   FIS-­‐allied	   AIS	  understood	   violence	   as	   a	   last	   resort	   and	   reacted	   with	   armed	   struggle	   against	   the	  government	   after	   the	   democratic	   path	   to	   power	   was	   blocked,	   while	   GIA	   saw	   the	   entire	  Algerian	  society	  as	   its	  enemy.	  Starting	   in	  1993,	  GIA	  began	  deliberately	  targeting	  civilians.	  The	  army	  responded	  with	  increasingly	  brutal	  counterattacks.	  	  While	   the	  groups	  disagreed	  about	  the	  use	  of	  violence,	   they	  still	  shared	  some	  goals	  and	  did	  not	  fight	  each	  other.	  But	  GIA	  refused	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  government,	  while	  FIS	  (and	  later	  AIS	   directly)	   favored	   a	   negotiated	   settlement.	   No	   agreements	   were	   signed	   with	   either	  group,	  however	   the	  efforts	   towards	  a	  peaceful	  end	  to	   the	  conflict	  will	  have	   influenced	   its	  deadliness.	   An	   important	   initiative	   was	   the	   Platform	   for	   Algeria	   mediated	   by	   the	  Community	   of	   Sant’Egidio	   in	   Rome,	   21-­‐22	   November	   1994	   (Impagliazzo	   2010)	   that	  brought	  together	  political	  parties	  including	  the	  FIS	  in	  a	  forum.	  The	  goal	  was	  trust-­‐building	  between	  Algerian	   interlocutors,	   and	   to	  devise	  a	   framework	   for	  a	  peaceful	  way	  out	  of	   the	  crisis.	  The	  Platform	  for	  Algeria	  was	  signed	  January	  13,	  1995,	  among	  others	  by	  the	  FIS.	  The	  T2+	  effort	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  peace	  deal,	  or	  even	  an	  official	  ceasefire.	  Rupesinghe	  (1998:	  180)	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calls	  it	  a	  “lost	  opportunity.”	  Indeed,	  AIS	  fought	  for	  another	  three	  years.	  But	  after	  the	  Rome	  document	   was	   signed,	   the	   number	   of	   deaths	   in	   the	   AIS-­‐government	   dyad	   declined	  dramatically,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  group’s	  preference	   for	  non-­‐violence	  was	   supported	  and	  encouraged.	  Thus,	  I	  argue,	  the	  non-­‐state	  intervention	  made	  a	  measurable	  impact	  on	  conflict	  severity.	  	  	  
Uganda	  The	  conflict	  between	   the	  Uganda	  government	  and	   the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  has	  been	  active	  since	  1988,	  with	  very	  brief	  interruptions	  in	  1993,	  1999	  and	  2007.	  The	  average	  annual	  death	  toll	  for	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2013	  as	  counted	  by	  UCDP	  is	  331.	  Table	  15	  shows	  the	  yearly	   battle	   deaths	   for	   the	   LRA-­‐government	   dyad	   (2000-­‐2008)	   and	   notes	   the	   years	   in	  which	  conflict	  management	  took	  place.	  
Table	  15:	  Annual	  Battle	  deaths	  in	  LRA	  –	  Uganda	  government	  dyad	  (2000-­‐2008)	  
Year	  	   Annual	  Battle	  Deaths	   Official	  mediation	   T2+	  
2000	   164	   	   	  
2001	   110	   	   	  
2002	   1010	   	   X	  (ARLPI)	  	  
2003	   644	   	   X	  (ARLPI)	  
2004	   1610	   	   X	   (Bigombe,	  HD,	  Okumu)	  
2005	   695	   	   X	  (ARLPI,	  Bigombe)	  
2006	   221	   X	   X	  (ARLPI,	  Sant’Egidio)	  
2007	   <25	   X	  	   X	  (Pax	  Christi,	  Sant’Egidio)	  
2008	   53	   X	   X	  	  An	   official	   peace	   process	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   South	   Sudan’s	   vice-­‐president	  occurred	   from	   2006-­‐2008.	   Unofficial	   diplomacy	   both	   preceded	   and	   accompanied	   these	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high-­‐level	  talks.	  A	  local	  effort	  of	  traditional	  religious	  leaders,	  the	  Acholi	  Religious	  Leaders’	  Peace	  Initiative	  (ARLPI)	  formed	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  The	  group	  focuses	  on	  building	  a	  public	  consensus	   for	   peace	   and	   national	   advocacy,	   and	   also	   has	   played	   a	   role	   as	   intermediary	  between	  the	  Ugandan	  government	  and	  the	  LRA	  leadership	  (Lacey	  2002;	  Rodrigues	  2002).	  2004	  was	  a	  particularly	  active	  year	  for	  T2+	  in	  Uganda:	  Betty	  Bigombe,	  a	  former	  Ugandan	  government	  official	  who	  had	  been	  in	  charge	  of	  talks	  with	  the	  LRA	  in	  the	  1990s,	  started	  her	  own	  personal	  peace	  initiative	  (McLaughlin	  2005).	  Her	  mediation,	  though	  it	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  an	  agreement,	  is	  credited	  with	  preparing	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  subsequent	  Juba	  talks.62	  Concurrently	  with	  Bigombe’s	   effort,	   the	  Geneva-­‐based	   Centre	   for	  Humanitarian	  Dialogue	  acted	   as	   intermediary	   (HD	   2004),	   as	   did	   Washington	   Okumu,	   a	   Kenyan	   professor	  (Mucunguzi	  2004).	  The	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  accompanied	  the	  Juba	  Talks	  2006-­‐2008	  as	  observers	  and	  advisers	  (survey	  response).	  	  The	  LRA	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  using	  the	  official	  peace	  process	  to	  buy	  time.	  They	  are	  still	  active,	  spread	  across	  a	  vast	  region	  and	  the	  conflict	  is	  coded	  as	  ongoing.	  But	  one	  change	  in	  conflict	  dynamics	   is	  obvious:	   the	  average	  number	  of	  annual	  battle-­‐deaths	  has	  declined	  significantly	  since	   the	  combined	  efforts	  of	  official	  and	  unofficial	  mediation	   in	  2006-­‐2008:	  from	  1990-­‐2005	   the	   average	   conflict	   severity	   is	   455;	   since	   2006,	   the	   number	   is	   84.	   The	  decreasing	   death	   toll	   can	   partially	   be	   attributed	   to	   intense	   military	   pressure	   by	   the	  Ugandan	  government	  that	  dispersed	  the	  rebels	  (although	   it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  major	  offensive	  in	  2002	  was	  not	  accompanied	  by	  a	  sustained	  drop	  in	  violence).	  But	  the	  attempts	  at	   peaceful	   conflict	   resolution	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   lower	   intensity.	   A	   number	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Bigombe’s	  profile	  as	  a	  Tanenbaum’s	  Peacemakers	  in	  Action	  https://tanenbaum.org/peacemakers-­‐in-­‐action-­‐network/meet-­‐the-­‐peacemakers/betty-­‐oyella-­‐bigombe/,	  accessed	  May	  14,	  2014	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ceasefires	   accompanied	   the	   talks,	   e.g.	   in	   September	  2004,	   and	   in	  Augsut	  2006	   (Nyakairu	  2004;	   UCDP	   Conflict	   Encyclopedia).	   And	   the	   T2+	   activities	   in	   the	   2000s,	   especially	  Bigombe’s	   2004	   renewed	   mediation	   efforts	   that	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   the	   Juba	   talks,	  contributed	  to	  the	  official	  process	  that	  lowered	  the	  death	  toll.	  	  
Conclusion	  My	  proposition	  that	  T2+	  initiatives	  generally	  contribute	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  a	  conflict’s	  casualty	   rate	   cannot	  be	   confirmed;	   I	   find	  no	   statistically	   significant	   relationship	  between	  the	  combined	  measure	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  and	  annual	  battle-­‐related	  deaths.	  However,	  when	   I	   look	   at	   T2+	   categories	   separately,	  my	   analysis	   shows	   that	   certain	  NGO	  efforts	   at	   certain	   times	   can	   have	   an	   effect	   on	   conflict	   severity.	   Specifically,	   mediation-­‐related	   activities	   (direct	  mediation	   and	   support	   for	   direct	  mediation)	   have	   a	   statistically	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  annual	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths.	  The	  measure	  for	  T2+	  capacity-­‐building	  and	  training	  is	  only	  significant	  when	  lagged	  two	  years	  –	  this	  makes	  sense	  because	   such	   initiatives	   have	   longer-­‐term	  goals	   of	   preparing	   groups	   for	  mediation	  and	  peace;	  however,	  the	  sample	  is	  too	  small	  at	  this	  point	  of	  the	  analysis	  to	  be	  confident	  in	  the	   findings.	   I	   cannot	   confirm	  my	   hypothesis	   that	   sustained	   commitment	   to	   resolving	   a	  conflict,	  measured	  by	  either	  duration	  of	  individual	  T2+	  initiatives	  or	  the	  number	  of	  efforts,	  have	  a	  dampening	  effect	  on	  the	  yearly	  battle	  death	  count.	  	  Cross-­‐sectional	   and	   cross-­‐temporal	   limitations	   of	   my	   data	   make	   any	   findings	  tentative.	   It	   is	   also	   difficult	   to	   entangle	   the	   possible	   endogeneity	   between	   third-­‐party	  interventions	  and	  conflict	  severity	  –	  are	  conflicts	  less	  bloody	  because	  of	  peace	  initiatives,	  or	  can	   peace	   initiatives	   only	   take	   place	  when	   violence	   is	   declining?	   Or	  maybe	   a	   previously	  unmeasured	   third	   factor	   is	   in	   fact	   responsible	   for	   both	   phenomena:	   both	   a	   decrease	   in	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intensity	   of	   fighting	   and	   the	   acquiescence	   to	   mediation	   could	   be	   driven	   by	   a	   change	   in	  attitude	  in	  the	  belligerents.	  A	  group	  that	  truly	  wants	  to	  end	  a	  war	  may	  both	  agree	  to	  T2+	  and	  stop	  killing	  so	  many	  enemies.	  If	  statistical	  models	  really	  get	  at	  the	  matter	  of	  interest	  is	  always	   a	   nagging	   question.	   Including	   control	   variables	   that	   have	   been	   found	   in	   the	  literature	  important	  to	  conflict	  severity	  helps	  minimize	  potential	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	  But	  “will	   for	   peace”	   is	   unmeasurable.	   I	   cannot	   conclude	   with	   certainty	   that	   there	   is	   not	   an	  unobserved	   factor	  missing	   from	  my	   analysis.	   I	   argue,	   and	   find	   support	   in	  my	   illustrative	  cases,	  that	  even	  if	  the	  endogenous	  relationship	  remains	  problematic,	  at	  the	  least	  non-­‐state	  conflict	   management	   can	   support	   and	   hopefully	   expand	   existing	   	   will	   for	   an	   end	   to	   the	  violence.	  	  	  	  The	   results	   of	  my	   study	   are	   interesting	   for	   T2+	   organizations.	   They	   indicate	   that	  non-­‐state	   conflict	   management	   can	   have	   effects	   on	   conflict	   dynamics	   beyond	   preparing	  groundwork	   for	  official	  negotiations	  or	  ending	  conflicts.	   Initiatives	   that	  may	   look	  on	   first	  sight	  as	  doing	  little	  to	  end	  a	  war,	  may	  nevertheless	  contribute	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  intensity	  of	  the	   war.	   This	   finding	   underlines	   the	   humanitarian	   impact	   non-­‐violent	   third-­‐party	  intervention	  can	  have.	  	  	  This	   dissertation	   chapter	   contributes	   to	   the	   literature	   on	   conflict	   severity.	   While	  research	  on	  civil	  war	  duration	  has	  taken	  note	  of	   the	  negative	  and	  positive	  effects	  outside	  intervention	   can	   have,	   increasingly	   including	   third-­‐party	   interventions	   beyond	   military	  support	   to	   one	   or	   both	   sides,	   little	   has	   been	   said	   about	   foreign	   contributions	   to	   conflict	  severity	  (Lacina	  2006),63	  and	  nothing,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  about	  non-­‐violent	  interventions.	  I	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  is	  correlated	  across	  borders	  in	  previous	  research	  (Lujula	  2009)	  points	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	  studying	  “internal”	  war	  in	  a	  vacuum	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  outside	  influences.	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do	   not	   only	   expand	   previous	  models	   to	   accommodate	   my	   primary	   interest	   of	   non-­‐state	  conflict	   management,	   but	   I	   show	   that	   diplomatic	   third-­‐party	   interventions	   have	   a	  dampening	  effect	  on	  ongoing	  violence.	  	  	  	  The	  question	  I	  turn	  to	  next	  is	  how	  sustainable	  any	  T2+	  successes	  (or	  peace-­‐making	  efforts	  in	  general)	  are.	  Preceding	  chapters	  have	  defined	  T2+	  success	  as	  contributing	  to	  an	  end	  of	   a	   conflict	   episode.	  But	  many	   conflicts	   in	  my	   sample	   see	   lulls	   in	   violence	   and	  may	  even	  have	  an	  end	  to	  the	  conflict	  episode	  coded,	  only	  then	  to	  re-­‐enter	  the	  sample.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	   explore	   how	   non-­‐state	   conflict	  management	  may	   affect	   the	   sustainability	   of	  peace	  and	  whether	  T2+	  initiatives	  in	  one	  conflict	  episode	  make	  it	  less	  likely	  that	  a	  country	  lapses	  back	  into	  civil	  conflict	  after	  some	  truce	  was	  found.	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CHAPTER	  6	  –	  T2+	  and	  the	  durability	  of	  peace	  	  
Introduction	  	   Chapter	  3	  through	  5	  have	  explored	  the	  direct	  impact	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  has	  on	  specific	  conflict	  dynamics.	  This	  chapter	  will	  now	  consider	  whether	  T2+	  during	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  can	  affect	  developments	  beyond	  the	  official	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  Implemented	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  ending	  a	  violent	  conflict,	  do	  the	  effects	  of	  T2+	  linger	  and	  make	  sustainable	  peace	  between	  government	  and	  rebels	  more	  likely?	  The	  work	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  in	  Mozambique	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  a	  sustainable	  peace	  agreement	  mediated	  by	  a	  non-­‐state	  actor.	  Negotiated	  from	  1990	  –	  1992,	  the	  General	  Peace	  Agreement	  was	  honored	  by	  all	  parties	  until	  at	  least	  October	  2013.64	  The	  Rome	  process	  was	  the	  last	  of	  many	  attempts	  to	  end	  the	  war	  that	  began	  in	  1975.	  South	  Africa	  mediated	  earlier	  negotiations	  in	  the	  early	  1980s;	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Kenya	  were	  joint	  mediators	  in	  1989-­‐1990	  (Msabaha	  1995).	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  reasons	  why	  the	  Sant’Egidio	  initiative	  succeeded	  where	  more	  powerful	  actors	  failed,	  including	  a	  changing	  world	  and	  regional	  order.	  But	  characteristics	  of	  the	  NGO	  mediator	  and	  the	  process	  are	  credited,	  too:	  the	  Community	  had	  a	  long-­‐standing	  relationship	  with	  Mozambique,	  growing	  out	  of	  humanitarian	  relief	  work	  (Gianturco	  2010:	  33).	  The	  respect	  all	  sides	  felt	  for	  the	  Catholic	  lay	  organization	  and	  its	  undoubted	  neutrality	  made	  it	  acceptable	  as	  a	  go-­‐between	  and	  mediator.	  Msabaha’s	  (1995:	  227)	  assessment	  of	  Sant’Egidio’s	  role	  stresses	  advantages	  that	  only	  NGOs	  can	  bring	  to	  the	  table:	  	  “The	  community’s	  evenhanded	  goodwill,	  its	  concern	  for	  the	  affective	  and	   technical	  dimensions	  of	  asymmetry,	   its	   long-­‐standing	  efforts	   to	  build	   relationships,	   and	   its	   honest	   search	   for	   solutions	   made	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  The	  rebel	  group	  RENAMO	  staged	  some	  ambushes	  in	  October	  2013	  when	  its	  headquarters	  were	  attacked	  by	  government	  security	  forces,	  but	  no	  general	  breakdown	  of	  the	  peace	  was	  determined	  as	  of	  January	  2014	  (Felimao	  2014).	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invaluable	  to	  the	  negotiations.	  The	  community	  was	  present	  before	  it	  was	   needed,	   and	   possessed	   a	   patience	   that	   outlasted	   the	   parties’	  proclivity	  for	  delays.	  	  The	  long	  duration	  of	  the	  negotiations	  have	  been	  criticized	  (Posthumus	  1999a),	  but	  not	  rushing	  the	  process	  was	  key	  for	  the	  building	  of	  trust	  and	  interpersonal	  relationships,	  central	  to	  Sant’Egidio’s	  conflict	  resolution	  strategy	  (Bartoli	  1999).	  These	  relationships	  continue	  after	  peace	  agreements	  are	  signed,	  making	  returns	  to	  violence	  a	  little	  less	  likely.	  	  Even	  if	  NGO	  efforts	  at	  conflict	  resolution	  do	  not	  result	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement,	  T2+	  initiatives	  during	  the	  war	  can	  prepare	  conflict	  parties	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  collaboration:	  The	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  International	  Center’s	  Burundi	  Leadership	  Training	  Program	  was	  implemented	  from	  2002	  to	  2008.	  Workshops	  trained	  key	  Burundian	  leaders	  in	  problem-­‐solving	  and	  negotiation,	  among	  other	  skills.	  One	  of	  the	  developers	  of	  the	  program,	  Howard	  Wolpe,	  formulates	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  initiative:	  "We	   hope	   and	   expect	   that	   BLTP	   participants,	   for	   years	   to	   come,	   will	  collaborate	  with	  one	  another	   in	  stabilizing	   the	  Burundian	  transition	  and	   in	  guiding	   the	   country's	   post-­‐war	   economic,	   social	   and	   political	  reconstruction."	  65	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  research	  for	  this	  dissertation	  chapter	  aims	  to	  determine	  whether	  T2+	  projects	  like	  the	  Burundi	  Leadership	  Training	  contribute	  systematically	  to	  the	  sustainability	  of	  peace,	  making	  relapse	  into	  violence	  less	  probable.	  Generally,	  T2+	  during	  the	  war	  does	  not	  show	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  reoccurrence	  of	  armed	  conflict,	  but	  when	  the	  different	  approaches	  of	  T2+	  organizations	  are	  considered	  separately,	  I	  find	  that	  while	  mediation	  support	  (work	  in	  conjuncture	  with	  official	  diplomacy)	  is	  significantly	  and	  positively	  related	  to	  renewal	  of	  violence,	  direct	  mediation	  by	  T2+	  actors	  has	  a	  negative	  sign.	  I	  furthermore	  find	  that	  both	  the	  number	  of	  NGO	  initiatives	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  http://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-­‐burundi-­‐leadership-­‐training-­‐program.	  The	  conflict	  in	  Burundi	  is	  coded	  as	  terminated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2008	  (UCDP).	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commitment,	  measured	  with	  the	  duration	  of	  individual	  programs,	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  durability	  of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  peace.	  	  	   The	  chapter	  proceeds	  in	  six	  section.	  Following	  this	  introduction	  I	  develop	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  research	  question.	  In	  section	  three	  I	  present	  the	  data	  used	  to	  test	  my	  propositions,	  beginning	  with	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  how	  peace	  can	  be	  defined;	  section	  four	  describes	  the	  methodologies	  applied.	  The	  fifth	  section	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  my	  statistical	  analysis.	  In	  the	  last	  section	  I	  point	  to	  potential	  weaknesses	  in	  my	  design	  and	  tests,	  consider	  rival	  explanations	  and	  summarize	  the	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  implications	  of	  the	  research.	  	  
Argument	  	  
How	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  during	  ongoing	  civil	  wars	  improves	  the	  
chances	  for	  stable	  peace	  Previous	  literature	  has	  pointed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  will	  determine	  whether	  a	  conflict	  ends	  for	  good	  –	  after	  victory	  of	  one	  side,	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  or	  disintegration	  of	  the	  rebellion	  –	  or	  whether	  violence	  will	  restart	  after	  an	  interlude	  of	  inactivity.	  The	  determinants	  fall	  into	  three	  categories:	  characteristics	  of	  the	  preceding	  conflict,	  including	  the	  issue	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  conflict	  (identity	  wars	  tend	  to	  reemerge,	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000)	  and	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  fighting	  (Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000,	  Fortna	  2004);	  the	  type	  of	  conflict	  termination,	  with	  decisive	  victories	  contributing	  to	  more	  stability	  (Licklider	  1995,	  Fortna	  2004a);	  and	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  climate.	  Certain	  institutions,	  like	  power-­‐sharing	  mechanisms,	  have	  been	  found	  to	  make	  peace	  more	  sustainable	  (Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  2007,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010).	  Furthermore,	  third	  parties	  are	  often	  crucial	  for	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  peace	  agreements	  (Walter	  2002).	  In	  fact,	  outsiders,	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐
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state,	  can	  help	  create	  an	  environment	  conducive	  to	  durable	  agreements	  in	  the	  negotiation,	  the	  bargaining	  and	  the	  implementation	  stages	  of	  a	  peace	  process.	  Third	  parties	  may	  act	  as	  go-­‐between	  for	  the	  parties,	  preparing	  them	  for	  negotiations	  (Burton	  1969,	  Kelman	  1992).	  As	  mediators	  during	  peace	  talks,	  third	  parties	  can	  overcome	  mistrust	  and	  help	  craft	  a	  fair	  agreement	  that	  addresses	  the	  underlying	  issues	  and	  considers	  institutions	  that	  will	  incorporate	  all	  conflict	  parties	  (Dunn	  and	  Kriesberg	  2002).66	  Once	  a	  treaty	  is	  signed,	  third	  parties	  can	  continue	  to	  act	  as	  intermediary	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  information	  asymmetries,	  oversee	  and	  guarantee	  its	  implementation,	  and,	  if	  they	  have	  the	  resources,	  even	  enforce	  it	  (Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000,	  Fortna	  2008,	  Gilligan	  and	  Sergenti	  2008,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010,	  Walter	  2002).	  While	  enforcement	  is	  generally	  reserved	  for	  states	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  this	  stage,	  too,	  e.g.	  as	  experts	  (for	  example	  assisting	  the	  demobilization	  process),	  trusted	  advisers	  and	  public	  watchdogs	  who	  might	  shame	  conflict	  parties	  who	  do	  not	  fulfill	  their	  obligations.	  	  	   This	  study	  does	  not	  deal	  with	  NGO	  actions	  in	  the	  implementation	  stage	  per	  se.	  The	  contributions	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  stability	  and	  peace	  building	  by	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  are	  manifold	  and	  impressive	  (see	  Barnes	  2006,	  Zaum	  2009	  for	  examples)	  but	  they	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  Here,	  I	  argue	  that	  initiatives	  that	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  during	  the	  conflict	  and	  before	  a	  peace	  agreement	  was	  reached	  (or	  the	  war	  ended	  in	  victory	  of	  one	  side	  or	  in	  a	  stalemate)	  can	  have	  effects	  that	  being	  felt	  beyond	  the	  end	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Mediation	  has	  been	  touted	  as	  a	  successful	  tool	  to	  find	  non-­‐violent	  solutions	  to	  conflicts,	  but	  recently	  the	  long-­‐term	  benefits	  of	  mediation	  have	  been	  questioned:	  Beardsley	  (2012)	  points	  out	  that	  although	  half	  of	  all	  interstate	  crises	  in	  his	  sample	  that	  experience	  mediation	  end	  in	  an	  agreement	  (three	  times	  as	  many	  as	  when	  the	  crises	  is	  unmediated),	  half	  of	  mediated	  conflicts	  reemerge	  (and	  50%	  of	  non-­‐mediated	  crises).	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There	  are	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  during	  the	  ongoing	  conflict	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  sustainable	  peace.	  One,	  actions	  taken	  by	  organizations	  can	  create	  or	  reinforce	  the	  circumstances	  necessary	  for	  a	  successful	  peace	  agreement.	  Two,	  the	  unique	  relationship	  NGO	  mediators	  have	  with	  conflict	  parties	  can	  develop	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  trust	  among	  all	  sides	  that	  make	  an	  immediate	  revocation	  of	  terms	  of	  agreement	  less	  likely.	  Three,	  conflict	  resolution	  initiatives	  during	  the	  conflict	  may	  have	  beneficial	  side	  effects	  that	  make	  a	  breakdown	  after	  the	  end	  of	  fighting	  less	  likely.	  	  The	  first	  category	  includes	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  for	  NGOs	  to	  contribute	  to	  durable	  peace.	  As	  other	  mediators,	  conflict	  management	  organizations	  can	  act	  as	  go-­‐between	  for	  the	  parties	  and	  thus	  help	  prepare	  the	  groundwork	  for	  negotiations.	  They	  may	  even	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  bringing	  reluctant	  parties	  to	  the	  table	  as	  they	  often	  have	  long-­‐standing	  contacts,	  making	  them	  sometimes	  more	  trusted	  than	  others.	  For	  example,	  in	  1994/1995,	  International	  Alert	  facilitated	  contacts	  between	  RUF	  rebels	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  the	  international	  community	  (Sorbe	  and	  Wohlgemut	  1997;	  see	  also	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  in	  Mozambique	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  chapter).	  Especially	  when	  earlier	  interactions	  were	  non-­‐political,	  instead	  related	  to	  aid	  and	  assistance,	  all	  conflict	  parties	  will	  more	  readily	  accept	  the	  good	  intentions	  of	  the	  NGO	  than	  claims	  of	  neutrality	  by	  a	  neighboring	  state.	  	  T2+	  work	  with	  individual	  groups	  in	  conflicts	  where	  several	  opposition	  groups	  operate	  may	  nudge	  parties	  towards	  compromise.	  Some	  NGOs	  execute	  training	  programs	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  negotiation	  techniques	  to	  rebels	  (e.g.	  Mediation	  Support	  Project)	  or	  use	  other	  means	  to	  level	  the	  diplomatic	  playing	  field	  (e.g.	  Independent	  Diplomat	  helps	  those	  with	  little	  understanding	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  to	  navigate	  the	  places	  and	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protocol	  of	  high	  diplomacy).	  Once	  groups	  feel	  more	  empowered	  and	  less	  disadvantaged,	  they	  are	  more	  willing	  to	  consider	  negotiations.	  In	  cases	  of	  splintered	  rebellions,	  initiatives	  can	  lead	  to	  unification	  of	  opposition	  groups	  and	  consolidation	  of	  their	  positions,	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  government	  (e.g.	  in	  1993	  the	  Carter	  Center	  discussed	  with	  Sudanese	  rebels	  groups	  SPLA	  and	  SPLA-­‐U	  the	  possibility	  of	  reconciliation).	  	  NGOs	  can	  also	  help	  draft	  agreements	  that	  solve	  the	  underlying	  issues	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  include	  provisions	  that	  help	  to	  avoid	  a	  return	  to	  war.	  Certain	  non-­‐state	  mediators	  or	  advisers	  are	  particularly	  qualified	  to	  help	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  agreements	  as	  the	  organizations	  often	  have	  legal	  and	  diplomatic	  expertise	  or	  a	  strong	  background	  in	  research	  across	  cases	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  apply	  lessons	  learned.	  For	  example,	  the	  United	  States	  institute	  of	  Peace	  (USIP)	  is	  active	  in	  mediation	  and	  facilitation,	  but	  also	  conducts	  extensive	  research	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction,	  among	  others,	  and	  provides	  training	  in	  these	  areas.	  	  In	  the	  second	  category	  fall	  both	  personal	  characteristics	  of	  the	  mediator	  and	  particularities	  of	  the	  track-­‐two	  process.	  Again,	  NGOs	  local	  knowledge	  and	  connections	  are	  an	  advantage:	  knowing	  the	  opponents’	  red	  lines	  and	  their	  possible	  limitations	  in	  their	  negotiation	  mandate	  better	  than	  other	  outsiders,	  they	  can	  help	  avoid	  pressuring	  groups	  to	  sign	  agreements	  that	  are	  non-­‐implementable.	  Because	  most	  NGO	  work	  happens	  away	  from	  the	  media	  spotlight,	  both	  conflict	  parties	  and	  mediators	  may	  feel	  less	  pressured	  for	  immediate	  results,	  which	  can	  draw	  out	  the	  negotiation	  process,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  lead	  to	  more	  thought-­‐out	  and	  thus	  sustainable	  agreements.	  For	  example,	  during	  the	  long	  Burundi	  peace-­‐process,	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  then	  South	  Africa’s	  president,	  oversaw	  a	  mediation	  round	  that	  ended	  with	  a	  signed	  peace	  agreement,	  but	  other	  mediators	  criticized	  that	  groups	  did	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not	  have	  enough	  time	  to	  air	  grievances	  and	  discuss	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  agreement	  (Van	  Eck	  2007).	  The	  accord	  was	  subsequently	  violated.67	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio’s	  Rome	  Process	  in	  the	  Mozambique	  civil	  war	  was	  criticized	  for	  taking	  too	  long,	  but	  the	  resulting	  agreement	  has	  lasted.68	  The	  NGOs’	  non-­‐political	  nature	  and	  professed	  neutrality	  can	  further	  help	  overcome	  reluctance	  to	  accept	  certain	  provisions	  that	  seem	  preferential	  to	  the	  opponent	  –	  the	  unofficial	  mediator	  should	  have	  no	  interest	  in	  taking	  advantage	  of	  one	  side.	  The	  third	  category	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  effects	  on	  the	  chance	  for	  lasting	  peace	  is	  less	  straightforward.	  One	  goal	  of	  track-­‐two	  initiatives	  is	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  collaborative	  spirit	  among	  participants	  and	  the	  preparation	  for	  coexistence.	  Conflict	  management	  like	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  makes	  conflict	  parties	  more	  familiar	  with	  each	  other	  and	  changes	  the	  perceptions	  opponents	  have	  of	  each	  other.	  Those	  representatives	  of	  government	  and	  rebels	  who	  participate	  in	  the	  initiatives	  included	  in	  this	  study	  are	  leaders	  themselves,	  as	  well	  as	  negotiators	  or	  advisors.	  People	  on	  this	  level	  within	  their	  organization’s	  hierarchy	  are	  likely	  to	  play	  important	  roles	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  setting.	  Most	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  projects	  bring	  them	  in	  personal	  contact	  with	  representatives	  of	  the	  other	  side.	  This	  socialization	  will	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  individuals	  to	  enter	  into	  power-­‐sharing	  arrangements	  in	  unity	  governments,	  a	  possible	  outcome	  of	  a	  peace	  agreement.	  Mediation	  training	  and	  preparation	  for	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  transfers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Another	  example:	  in	  2012	  the	  Karen	  rebels	  of	  Myanmar/Burma	  denied	  having	  signed	  a	  ceasefire	  with	  their	  government	  after	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  members	  protested	  the	  agreement;	  they	  also	  claimed	  to	  have	  been	  pressured	  to	  sign	  a	  document,	  Fuller	  2012.	  68	  Mario	  Giro,	  a	  Sant’Egidio	  mediator,	  points	  out	  in	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  peace	  process	  in	  Cote	  d’Ivoire	  that	  “International	  negotiations	  often	  fail	  because	  rivalry	  between	  mediators	  is	  compounded	  by	  haste	  and	  an	  overriding	  need	  to	  succeed,	  unwittingly	  fueled	  by	  public	  opinion.	  Those	  who	  should	  be	  facilitating	  the	  dialogue	  become	  hostages	  to	  their	  own	  impatience	  for	  success”	  (Giro	  2010:276).	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skills	  to	  them	  that	  will	  help	  them	  to	  deal	  peacefully	  with	  inevitable	  conflicts	  in	  a	  post-­‐war	  society.	  From	  these	  theoretical	  considerations	  I	  draw	  my	  first	  testable	  hypothesis:	  
H5a:	  	   Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  measures	  during	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  will	  make	  
post-­‐conflict	  peace	  more	  durable,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  My	  theoretical	  framework	  points	  to	  several	  potential	  causal	  pathways	  how	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  may	  relate	  to	  peace	  durability.	  The	  driving	  factors	  of	  successful	  NGO	  mediation	  could	  be	  the	  character	  of	  the	  organization	  (expertise,	  local	  knowledge,	  neutrality)	  or	  the	  character	  of	  the	  interaction	  (confidential,	  low-­‐pressure).	  If	  the	  NGOs’	  influence	  is	  primarily	  on	  the	  personal	  relationships	  of	  leaders	  of	  opposing	  groups	  and	  if	  increased	  personal	  interaction	  between	  leaders	  prepares	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  more	  peaceful	  post-­‐agreement	  political	  environment,	  then	  the	  content	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  is	  less	  important	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  happen	  at	  all,	  and	  preferably	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  more	  opportunities	  for	  socialization	  between	  the	  groups	  there	  are,	  the	  stronger	  the	  impact	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  on	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  environment	  should	  be.	  	  	  
H5b:	  	   Number	  and	  duration	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  initiatives	  will	  be	  
negatively	  correlated	  with	  renewed	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  after	  the	  conflict	  
officially	  ends.	  
Data	  
Definition	  of	  peace	  	   When	  can	  we	  declare	  a	  peace	  agreement	  to	  be	  successful,	  a	  conflict	  truly	  ended?	  After	  the	  signing	  ceremony?	  After	  a	  year	  without	  fighting?	  After	  five	  years	  or	  ten?	  The	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Uppsala	  Conflict	  Research	  Database	  includes	  many	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  more	  than	  one	  episode,	  meaning	  that	  the	  number	  of	  annual	  battle	  deaths	  fell	  below	  25	  for	  one	  year	  or	  longer,	  but	  at	  some	  point	  rose	  again	  to	  over	  25.	  Some	  of	  these	  conflicts	  may	  continue	  through	  the	  years	  on	  a	  very	  low	  intensity	  level	  below	  25	  annual	  battle	  deaths,	  e.g.	  the	  government	  of	  Chad	  against	  various	  rebel	  groups	  1989-­‐1994,	  then	  again	  1997-­‐2002.	  Some	  end	  with	  a	  negotiated	  agreement,	  e.g.	  the	  peace	  agreement	  between	  the	  Malian	  government	  and	  Azawad	  rebels	  in	  1992	  –	  the	  conflict	  resumed	  1994.	  And	  others	  end	  in	  victory	  of	  one	  side	  only	  to	  start	  again	  at	  a	  later	  point,	  e.g.	  Rwanda	  1994.	  If	  the	  definition	  of	  peace	  insists	  that	  a	  conflict	  may	  never	  reemerge,	  studies	  of	  peace	  durability	  become	  impossible	  –	  that	  fighting	  has	  ceased	  until	  today	  does	  not	  preclude	  it	  from	  restarting	  tomorrow.	  The	  literature	  has	  used	  varying	  measures.	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  (2000)	  declare	  peace	  building	  successful	  if	  the	  peace	  holds	  at	  two	  years	  after	  the	  agreement	  (they	  use	  5	  and	  10	  year	  peace	  stability	  as	  robustness	  checks).	  DeRouen	  and	  Chowdry’s	  (2013)	  study	  defines	  peace	  as	  stable	  if	  it	  lasts	  at	  least	  five	  years.	  Fortna	  (2004b)	  points	  out	  that	  these	  cut-­‐off	  points	  are	  arbitrary.	  She	  argues	  that	  a	  continuous	  measure	  for	  duration	  (in	  her	  models	  she	  uses	  months	  since	  the	  agreement	  was	  signed)	  is	  less	  random	  and	  allows	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  cases	  without	  judging	  the	  quality	  of	  a	  peace.	  Other	  authors	  also	  using	  the	  time	  since	  an	  agreement	  was	  signed	  as	  their	  measure	  of	  comparative	  success	  include	  Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  (2003)	  and	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  (2010).	  I	  concur	  with	  the	  reasoning	  that	  underlies	  the	  use	  of	  duration	  models	  and	  consider	  them;	  however,	  the	  necessity	  to	  employ	  a	  simultaneous	  equation	  approach	  forces	  me	  to	  primarily	  use	  logistic	  models	  with	  a	  fixed	  definition	  of	  peace	  agreement	  success	  –	  peace	  is	  judged	  to	  be	  stable	  if	  it	  prevails	  at	  least	  two	  (five)	  years.	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Unit	  of	  analysis	  The	  universe	  of	  cases	  includes	  all	  civil	  conflicts	  in	  Africa	  for	  the	  time	  period	  January	  1,	  1990	  until	  December	  31,	  2009.	  The	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  episode	  dyad	  year.	  Dyadic	  observations	  are	  preferable	  to	  conflict	  episodes	  because	  in	  a	  number	  of	  conflicts	  the	  government	  faces	  more	  than	  one	  adversary	  and	  sometimes	  agrees	  a	  ceasefire	  with	  one	  but	  not	  another	  rebel	  group.	  Peace	  agreed	  between	  two	  actors	  can	  also	  cease	  at	  distinct	  times	  within	  the	  ongoing	  conflict.	  The	  data	  come	  from	  the	  UCDP	  Conflict	  Termination	  dataset	  (Kreutz	  2010).69	  The	  analysis	  includes	  all	  terminated	  conflict	  dyads	  as	  observations.	  Previous	  literature	  often	  distinguishes	  between	  different	  outcome	  categories,	  limiting	  cases	  to	  those	  civil	  wars	  that	  ended	  in	  peace	  agreements	  (Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  2003,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010,	  Hultman	  et	  al	  2013).	  This	  makes	  sense	  if	  the	  research	  question	  addresses	  the	  details	  of	  a	  negotiated	  agreement,	  e.g.	  whether	  power-­‐sharing	  provisions	  are	  an	  effective	  way	  to	  stabilize	  a	  truce.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  effects	  of	  T2+	  that	  happens	  before	  the	  conflict	  terminates,	  during	  the	  ongoing	  fighting.	  I	  therefore	  include	  all	  conflict	  outcomes.	  Once	  a	  dyad	  ends	  hostilities	  –	  due	  to	  a	  negotiated	  settlement,	  victory	  of	  one	  side	  or	  low	  activity	  –	  I	  code	  my	  dependent	  variable	  “peace	  spell”	  in	  yearly	  observations	  until	  the	  conflict	  reemerges	  or	  the	  dyad	  is	  right-­‐censored	  in	  December	  2009.	  Several	  authors	  prefer	  monthly	  post-­‐conflict	  observations	  to	  yearly	  counts	  (Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  2003,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010,	  Hultman	  et	  al.	  2013).	  While	  counting	  peace	  from	  the	  month	  it	  starts	  to	  the	  month	  it	  breaks	  down	  is	  more	  precise	  than	  counting	  years,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  monthly	  observations	  add	  information	  beyond	  that	  to	  my	  model	  as	  I	  have	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Because	  the	  data	  set	  codes	  a	  new	  dyad	  even	  when	  rebels	  rename	  their	  group	  the	  data	  may	  underestimate	  the	  reoccurrence	  of	  conflict	  in	  some	  dyads.	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explanatory	  variables	  that	  vary	  by	  month.	  I	  therefore	  rely	  on	  yearly	  post-­‐conflict	  observations.70	  
Descriptive	  data	  	   The	  sample	  includes	  102	  conflict	  dyads	  and	  134	  dyad	  episodes.	  17	  government-­‐rebel	  group	  pairings	  see	  more	  than	  one	  episode	  of	  activity	  during	  the	  time	  under	  observation:	  ten	  fight	  two	  rounds,	  two	  fight	  three,	  three	  dyads	  see	  four	  episodes	  of	  violence,	  and	  two	  fight	  six	  times	  between	  1990	  and	  2009.	  Overall,	  25%	  of	  dyad	  episodes	  (34)	  that	  end	  experience	  an	  eventual	  return	  to	  war.	  14	  dyads	  are	  still	  active	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2009;	  eight	  of	  those	  were	  relapses	  of	  earlier	  dyads.	  	  	   The	  average	  duration	  of	  conflict	  activity	  in	  a	  terminated	  dyad	  episode	  is	  2.3	  years	  (median	  =	  1).71	  Those	  dyads	  that	  return	  to	  war	  do	  so	  on	  average	  after	  4	  years	  of	  peace.	  45	  cases	  end	  in	  a	  negotiated	  settlement	  (ceasefire	  or	  peace	  agreement).	  Three	  of	  these	  45	  cases	  relapse	  into	  war,	  while	  one	  of	  those	  15	  that	  end	  in	  outright	  victory	  returns	  to	  war	  (Ugandan	  government	  vs.	  ADF).	  75%	  of	  those	  dyads	  that	  experience	  a	  relapse	  into	  violence	  were	  coded	  as	  terminated	  because	  of	  low	  activity.	  	   Eight	  of	  the	  34	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  experience	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  the	  active	  dyad	  return	  to	  war	  (see	  Figure	  19	  and	  20).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The	  appendix	  includes	  histograms	  at	  the	  monthly	  unit	  of	  analysis.	  It	  shows	  very	  clearly	  that	  peace	  agreements	  tend	  to	  fall	  apart	  early	  –	  most	  between	  12	  and	  24	  months,	  none	  later	  than	  six	  years	  after	  the	  initial	  episode	  ends	  (appendix	  7).	  	  71	  The	  mean	  number	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	  years	  until	  31	  December	  2009	  for	  the	  conflict	  dyads	  included	  in	  my	  models	  is	  8.1	  (median	  =	  7).	  Average	  duration	  of	  peace	  spells	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  describe	  comparable	  data	  sets.	  However,	  it	  is	  less	  helpful	  here:	  this	  sample	  is	  limited	  to	  dyads	  active	  in	  the	  years	  1990-­‐2009.	  The	  time	  frame	  is	  too	  short	  to	  talk	  about	  average	  peace	  duration.	  71	  of	  the	  118	  episodes	  that	  ended	  before	  2009	  ended	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  (2000-­‐2008),	  17	  ended	  only	  after	  2005.	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Figure	  19:	  Number	  of	  dyad	  episodes	  returning	  to	  war	  by	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  20:	  Percent	  of	  dyad	  episodes	  returning	  to	  war	  by	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Just	  looking	  at	  the	  descriptive	  data,	  conflicts	  that	  experience	  some	  form	  of	  T2+	  during	  the	  ongoing	  conflict	  are	  slightly,	  though	  noticeably	  less	  likely	  to	  relapse	  into	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significant	  fighting	  after	  a	  conflict	  episode	  has	  ended.	  But	  other	  factors	  besides	  NGO	  conflict	  management	  will	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  sustainable	  peace.	  	  	  	  
Controls	  	   For	  a	  definition	  and	  description	  of	  my	  main	  variable	  of	  interest	  –	  track-­‐two	  plus	  	  -­‐	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  data	  collection	  process,	  please	  see	  chapter	  1.	  My	  models	  further	  include	  the	  following	  control	  variables	  that	  have	  been	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  affect	  the	  durability	  of	  peace	  agreements	  (see	  also	  the	  appendix	  for	  information	  about	  the	  variables	  and	  summary	  statistics):	  Just	  like	  some	  conflicts	  are	  harder	  to	  end,	  certain	  characteristics	  can	  make	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	  more	  or	  less	  durable.	  Identity	  conflicts	  may	  turn	  violent	  more	  often	  than	  those	  about	  interests,	  they	  might	  last	  longer	  –	  and	  they	  could	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  resume	  (Licklider	  1995,	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000).	  Therefore	  I	  include	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin’s	  (2003)	  measure	  of	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  into	  my	  models,	  expecting	  higher	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  shorter	  post-­‐conflict	  periods.	  Conflicts	  about	  territory	  are	  often	  more	  intractable	  than	  those	  about	  government	  control.	  They	  are	  inherently	  zero-­‐sum,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  can	  continue	  over	  many	  years	  without	  necessarily	  to	  threaten	  the	  central	  government.	  I	  add	  UCDP’s	  incompatibility	  measure	  that	  is	  coded	  1	  if	  the	  conflict	  issue	  is	  territory,	  2	  if	  it	  relates	  to	  government.	  The	  former	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  more	  frequent	  breakdowns	  of	  peace.	  	  Some	  research	  shows	  that	  deadlier	  wars	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reemerge,	  possibly	  because	  the	  social	  fabric	  has	  been	  damaged	  irreparably	  and	  different	  groups	  in	  a	  society	  cannot	  bear	  to	  live	  with	  those	  who	  killed	  people	  of	  one’s	  kin.	  However,	  a	  more	  costly	  war,	  measured	  by	  battle-­‐related	  deaths,	  might	  also	  increase	  war	  fatigue	  and	  decreasing	  the	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chances	  of	  a	  new	  outbreak	  of	  violence.	  Another	  measure	  of	  cost	  is	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  war.	  Again,	  there	  are	  two	  contradictory	  expectations:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  long	  war	  may	  condition	  the	  population	  to	  a	  life	  under	  the	  gun	  and	  increasing	  the	  probability	  that	  some	  group	  will	  return	  to	  violence	  at	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  conflict.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  people	  will	  be	  weary	  of	  war	  and	  possibly	  disinclined	  to	  join	  new	  rebellions.	  I	  include	  a	  count	  of	  dyad	  episode	  months	  (logged)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  logged	  number	  of	  overall	  battle	  deaths	  per	  dyad	  (from	  UCDP)	  in	  the	  models.	  	  In	  order	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  effects	  of	  non-­‐state	  interventions	  during	  ongoing	  conflict,	  I	  need	  to	  control	  for	  other	  third-­‐party	  interventions.	  I	  include	  one	  dichotomous	  variable	  for	  any	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  the	  previous	  conflict	  episode	  (from	  the	  UCDP	  Managing	  Intrastate	  Conflict	  dataset)	  and	  one	  for	  military	  interventions	  (coded	  1	  if	  UCDP/PRIO	  codes	  outside	  governments	  as	  involved	  in	  an	  ongoing	  civil	  conflict.	  	  	  	  How	  the	  conflict	  ended	  is	  an	  important	  predictor	  of	  how	  successful	  the	  subsequent	  peace	  will	  be.	  A	  variable	  “agreement”	  is	  coded	  1	  if	  the	  episode	  ended	  in	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  for	  a	  ceasefire	  or	  peace	  deal.	  Another,	  “victory”	  is	  1	  if	  the	  fighting	  ended	  in	  a	  decisive	  victory	  (I	  change	  the	  categorical	  UCDP	  Conflict	  Mediation	  Database	  “outcome”	  variable	  into	  dichotomous	  variables	  for	  peace	  agreement	  and	  victory).	  As	  the	  literature	  finds,	  civil	  wars	  that	  end	  with	  a	  settlement	  imposed	  by	  a	  victor	  are	  in	  fact	  more	  stable	  than	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  (Licklider	  1995).	  Power-­‐sharing	  provisions	  have	  been	  found	  positively	  correlated	  with	  longer	  periods	  of	  peace	  (Hartzel	  and	  Hoddie	  2003);	  therefore	  agreements	  ending	  a	  conflict	  episode	  that	  include	  power-­‐sharing	  stipulations	  are	  coded	  1.	  Additional	  variables	  measure	  whether	  the	  parties	  agreed	  any	  “uncertainty	  reducing	  provisions”	  (Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010),	  here	  understood	  as	  stipulation	  of	  a	  joint	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implementation	  mechanism,	  and	  whether	  they	  include	  an	  amnesty	  provision	  in	  their	  peace	  deal	  (DeRouen	  and	  Chowdry	  2013).	  These	  provisions	  should	  make	  a	  peace	  more	  likely	  to	  last.	  Information	  for	  peace	  agreement	  variables	  comes	  from	  Högbladh’s	  (2011)	  UCDP	  Peace	  Agreement	  database.	  	  	   Third-­‐party	  guarantees	  are	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  sustainability	  of	  peace.	  The	  involvement	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  peacekeeping	  operations	  have	  been	  found	  to	  extend	  the	  durability	  of	  peace	  agreements	  (Fortna	  2004b,	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2006),	  thus	  my	  models	  include	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  that	  reads	  1	  if	  a	  UN	  mission	  (observer	  or	  full	  peacekeeping)	  is	  present.	  Information	  from	  the	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  website,	  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/.	  I	  expect	  post-­‐conflict	  stability	  to	  last	  longer	  if	  the	  UN	  has	  a	  peacekeeping	  presence.72	  	   If	  the	  country	  that	  emerges	  from	  a	  civil	  conflict	  can	  limit	  the	  development	  of	  new	  grievances,	  the	  risk	  of	  reemergence	  of	  fighting	  should	  be	  smaller.	  Economic	  development	  will	  increase	  rebels’	  opportunity	  costs	  (Walter	  2004),	  making	  it	  less	  likely	  that	  people	  will	  (re)join	  the	  fighters.	  Measures	  for	  development	  in	  my	  models	  are	  yearly	  per	  capita	  gross	  
domestic	  product	  and	  life	  expectancy.	  Better	  development	  indicators	  should	  be	  correlated	  with	  fewer	  relapses	  into	  violence.	  The	  information	  comes	  from	  the	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  The	  presence	  of	  lootable	  natural	  resources	  also	  influences	  the	  calculus	  of	  past	  and	  future	  rebels.	  I	  use	  Gilmore	  et	  al.’s	  (2005)	  information	  on	  secondary	  (artisanal,	  thus	  easy	  to	  mine)	  diamonds	  and	  hypothesize	  that	  those	  countries	  in	  which	  lootlable	  natural	  
resources	  are	  present	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  a	  return	  to	  war.	  Previous	  research	  finds	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Recent	  research	  on	  UN	  peacekeeping	  points	  out	  that	  UN	  mission	  vary	  tremendously	  in	  their	  mandate	  and	  commitment	  level.	  Kathman	  (2013),	  for	  example,	  introduces	  a	  measure	  of	  UN	  troop	  numbers	  and	  distinguishes	  military	  personnel	  from	  police	  and	  observer	  missions.	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correlation	  between	  the	  level	  of	  democracy	  in	  a	  country	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  peace	  (Hartzell	  et	  al.	  2001,	  Walter	  2004).	  Concurrently,	  I	  propose	  that	  more	  democratic	  countries,	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  Polity	  IV	  indicator	  (Marshall	  et	  al.	  2010),	  should	  be	  at	  a	  lesser	  risk	  of	  new	  war.	  
Methodology	  	   Previous	  literature	  suggests	  two	  methodological	  approaches	  to	  determine	  the	  factors	  that	  increase	  the	  probabilities	  of	  a	  sustainable	  peace.	  When	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  dichotomous,	  stating	  whether	  a	  peace	  is	  stable	  at	  a	  certain	  time,	  researchers	  have	  used	  logit	  regression	  (e.g.	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  2000,	  DeRouen	  and	  Chowdry	  2013).	  Most	  recent	  research	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  peacebuilding	  employs	  duration	  models,	  both	  parametric	  Weibull	  (Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  2003)	  and	  Cox	  proportional	  hazard	  models	  (Fortna	  2004b,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  2010,	  Gurses	  and	  Rost	  2013).	  	  	  
Duration	  models	  	   Event	  history	  models	  have	  the	  advantage	  that	  I	  do	  not	  have	  to	  determine	  an	  arbitrary	  point	  in	  time	  at	  which	  peace	  is	  deemed	  sustainable,	  as	  I	  have	  to	  do	  for	  logistic	  regressions.	  Instead,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  end	  of	  a	  peace	  spell,	  if	  and	  whenever	  it	  occurs,	  and	  the	  model	  determines	  which	  factors	  contribute	  to	  an	  earlier	  or	  later	  failure.	  The	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  this	  method	  is	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  dyad	  year	  (dyad	  information	  from	  UCDP	  Dyadic	  Conflict	  Termination	  Dataset	  Version	  1-­‐2010)	  and	  a	  failure	  is	  noted	  for	  the	  year	  in	  which	  the	  count	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  exceeds	  25	  again.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  duration	  models	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  assess	  peace	  durability,	  particularly	  the	  Weibull	  parametric	  model	  and	  the	  Cox	  proportional	  hazard	  model.	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   Parametric	  duration	  models	  require	  an	  assumption	  regarding	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  baseline	  hazard	  rate;	  the	  Weibull	  model	  assumes	  that	  the	  hazard	  rate	  is	  monotonically	  changing	  over	  time.	  Hartzell	  and	  Hoddie	  (2003)	  point	  out	  that	  the	  failure	  event	  for	  peace	  agreements	  is	  indeed	  time-­‐dependent:	  the	  longer	  a	  peace	  has	  lasted,	  the	  less	  likely	  should	  be	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  agreement,	  all	  else	  being	  equal.	  Weibull	  models	  can	  be	  more	  efficient	  for	  smaller	  samples	  (Fortna	  2004b).	  Contrary,	  Mattes	  and	  Savun	  (2010)	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  no	  strong	  theoretical	  expectation	  about	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  hazard	  rate,	  thus	  one	  should	  prefer	  the	  Cox	  semi-­‐parametric	  model	  (Box-­‐Steffensmeier	  and	  Jones	  2004).	  Most	  control	  variables	  are	  static	  because	  they	  refer	  to	  events	  during	  the	  previous	  conflict	  episode	  (e.g.	  the	  cumulative	  number	  of	  deaths	  for	  the	  episode,	  or	  whether	  T2+	  took	  place),	  but	  some	  explanatory	  variables	  can	  vary	  over	  the	  time,	  including	  Polity	  score,	  GDP	  per	  capita	  or	  the	  presence	  of	  United	  Nations	  peacekeepers.	  Gurses	  and	  Rost	  (2013)	  point	  out	  that	  parametric	  models	  can	  deal	  better	  with	  these	  time-­‐varying	  covariates.	  	  I	  run	  a	  Cox	  proportional	  hazard	  model	  and	  then	  test	  the	  proportional	  hazard	  assumption.	  The	  global	  test	  of	  all	  covariates	  shows	  that	  rho	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  0,	  suggesting	  serious	  time	  correlation.	  Ten	  of	  fifteen	  independent	  variables	  have	  significant	  
rho	  values,	  too.	  Because	  the	  proportional	  hazard	  assumption	  is	  violated	  I	  will	  continue	  with	  a	  parametric	  Weibull	  model	  instead.	  
	  Logistic	  regression	  and	  bivariate	  probit	  	  	   For	  the	  logistic	  regression	  models	  I	  create	  three	  dummy	  variables:	  the	  first	  one	  measures	  a	  return	  to	  war	  at	  any	  point	  until	  2009;	  the	  second	  one	  is	  positive	  if	  the	  dyad	  sees	  new	  violence	  within	  2	  years	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  preceding	  episode;	  the	  last	  is	  coded	  1	  if	  a	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conflict	  reemerges	  within	  five	  years	  of	  peace.	  73	  Because	  I	  expect	  the	  probability	  of	  renewed	  conflict	  to	  change	  over	  time	  –	  the	  longer	  peace	  lasted,	  the	  less	  likely	  should	  renewed	  violence	  become	  –	  I	  include	  the	  peace	  year	  count	  as	  a	  time	  variable	  into	  the	  model.	  Including	  cubic	  splines	  and	  a	  count	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  years	  leads	  to	  comparable	  results	  –	  the	  same	  variables	  are	  statistically	  significant	  that	  are	  significant	  in	  the	  logistic	  or	  Cox	  models.	  I	  specify	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  conflict	  dyad	  to	  account	  for	  autocorrelation	  across	  multiple	  pairings	  of	  the	  same	  opponents.	  As	  I	  have	  shown	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  non-­‐state	  interventions	  is	  more	  common	  in	  certain	  conflicts	  and	  using	  duration	  models	  that	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  selection	  effects	  at	  play	  might	  underestimate	  the	  importance	  of	  T2+.	  Because	  there	  are	  no	  simultaneous	  equation	  models	  specifically	  for	  event	  history	  data,	  I	  return	  to	  the	  logistic	  approach.	  I	  run	  a	  logistic	  regression	  that	  includes	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  meant	  to	  capture	  time	  effects	  –	  a	  count	  of	  peace	  years	  and	  cubic	  splines	  (Beck	  et	  al.	  1998).	  The	  dependent	  variable,	  as	  in	  the	  duration	  models,	  is	  the	  end	  of	  a	  peace	  spell	  when	  and	  if	  it	  occurs.	  The	  results	  should	  mirror	  the	  results	  of	  the	  hazard	  model.	  	  Then,	  as	  in	  earlier	  models	  (see	  Chapter	  4)	  I	  develop	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  model	  to	  account	  for	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	  instances	  of	  T2+	  during	  violent	  conflict	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	  durability.	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  I	  include	  variables	  measuring	  the	  intractability	  of	  the	  conflict:	  conflict	  duration,	  number	  of	  battle	  deaths,	  ethnic	  fractionalization	  and	  maximum	  number	  of	  conflict	  parties	  during	  the	  conflict	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  The	  time	  frame	  for	  my	  sample	  is	  too	  small	  to	  use	  a	  robustness	  check	  of	  10-­‐year	  peace	  spells;	  none	  of	  the	  44	  dyads	  that	  live	  peaceful	  for	  10	  years	  or	  longer	  experience	  a	  return	  to	  war.	  The	  longest	  peace	  that	  ultimately	  fails	  lasts	  seven	  years.	  Doyle	  and	  Sambanis	  (2000)	  code	  civil	  war	  as	  recurring	  if	  at	  least	  1,000	  people	  have	  died	  in	  new	  violence.	  My	  sample	  includes	  only	  four	  cases	  of	  renewed	  conflict	  that	  rise	  to	  the	  level	  of	  major	  war	  (1,000	  battle-­‐related	  deaths),	  and	  only	  one	  case	  where	  1,000	  casualties	  occur	  in	  one	  year.	  
	  	   175	  
episode.	  As	  discussed,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  NGO	  intervention	  should	  be	  higher	  for	  more	  intractable	  cases.	  I	  expect	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  to	  be	  more	  frequent	  the	  longer	  a	  conflict,	  the	  higher	  the	  country’s	  ethnic	  fractionalization,	  and	  the	  more	  rebel	  groups	  exist.	  The	  number	  of	  veto	  players	  is	  the	  instrumental	  variable	  for	  this	  model:	  as	  more	  groups	  enter	  the	  fray,	  chances	  that	  one	  particular	  rebel	  group	  will	  match	  with	  a	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  manager	  will	  decline,	  as	  results	  in	  earlier	  chapters	  have	  shown.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  more	  simultaneous	  dyads	  in	  the	  past	  should	  not	  affect	  present	  peace	  sustainability	  within	  a	  specific	  dyad.	  I	  also	  include	  official	  mediation	  in	  the	  first	  equation	  as	  track-­‐one	  and	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  are	  often	  correlated.	  The	  second	  equation	  of	  this	  regression	  models	  the	  factors	  increasing	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  peace	  ending,	  while	  controlling	  for	  factors	  that	  may	  have	  affected	  the	  probability	  that	  T2+	  occurred	  during	  the	  active	  conflict.	  
Testing	  and	  discussion	  	  
	  T2+	  contributes	  to	  longer	  peace	  spells	  
Duration	  models	  I	  graph	  the	  cumulative	  hazard	  (Figure	  21)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  survivor	  function	  (Figure	  22)	  by	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management,	  presenting	  the	  probability	  a	  peace	  endures	  given	  that	  it	  has	  lasted	  until	  a	  given	  time	  and	  whether	  the	  conflict	  dyad	  experienced	  T2+.74	  Figure	  21	  shows	  a	  small	  advantage	  for	  those	  dyads	  that	  previously	  saw	  NGO	  intervention:	  dyads	  with	  T2+	  have	  a	  slightly	  higher	  chance	  of	  survival	  at	  any	  point,	  once	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Looking	  at	  the	  Kaplan-­‐Meier	  curve	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  no	  peace	  fails	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years	  after	  conflict	  termination	  (the	  survival	  function	  is	  1).	  However,	  25	  of	  312	  dyad	  peace	  spells	  (8%)	  fail	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years.	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two-­‐year	  mark	  has	  passed.	  The	  hazard	  rate	  climbs	  in	  the	  first	  seven	  years	  after	  the	  end	  of	  a	  conflict	  from	  0	  to	  0.048,	  and	  then	  remains	  steady.75	  
Figure	  21:	  Nelson-­‐Aalen	  cumulative	  hazard	  estimate	  for	  peace	  ending	  
	  
Figure	  22:	  Kaplan-­‐Meier	  survival	  estimates	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	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   The	  fact	  that	  a	  return	  to	  violent	  conflict	  becomes	  more	  likely	  over	  time,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  first	  seven	  years	  –	  the	  probability	  of	  peace	  failing	  is	  close	  to	  2%	  at	  two	  years	  and	  about	  3.8%	  at	  five	  years	  –	  is	  slightly	  counterintuitive,	  but	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  this	  dynamic:	  after	  a	  conflict	  ends,	  both	  sides	  take	  a	  wait-­‐and-­‐see	  approach	  for	  a	  year	  or	  two,	  refraining	  from	  returning	  to	  violence,	  but	  then	  they	  will	  display	  increasing	  impatience	  if	  the	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  conflict	  are	  not	  addressed,	  or	  agreements	  not	  implemented	  as	  envisioned.	  After	  about	  seven	  years	  the	  hazard	  rate	  stabilizes.	  The	  result	  for	  the	  p	  parameter	  in	  the	  Weibull	  regression	  is	  larger	  than	  1,	  indicating	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  hazard	  rate	  over	  time.	  This	  finding	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  literature	  –	  we	  would	  expect	  peace	  to	  become	  more	  stable	  over	  time	  –	  but	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  the	  limited	  time	  frame	  of	  the	  sample.	  Table	  19	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Weibull	  regression.	  	   The	  variable	  accounting	  for	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  the	  preceding	  dyad	  episode	  has	  a	  positive	  coefficient	  (a	  hazard	  rate	  larger	  than	  1),	  indicating	  that	  conflict	  dyads	  that	  have	  seen	  T2+	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  return	  to	  violent	  conflict.76	  The	  measure	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  In	  fact,	  only	  three	  variables	  are	  statistically	  significant:	  the	  incompatibility	  measure,	  outcome	  in	  victory	  by	  one	  side	  and	  the	  Polity	  score.	  All	  three	  perform	  as	  expected:	  conflicts	  that	  are	  about	  government	  control	  are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  see	  a	  relapse	  into	  war	  than	  separatist	  conflicts.	  Resounding	  victories	  lead	  to	  more	  stable	  peace.	  And	  as	  democracy	  levels	  rise,	  a	  return	  to	  violence	  becomes	  less	  probable.	  The	  other	  controls	  do	  not	  show	  any	  statistical	  significance.	  Notably,	  like	  T2+,	  official	  mediation	  displays	  a	  positive	  coefficient.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  The	  result	  contradicts	  the	  hazard	  rates	  depicted	  in	  figure	  2.	  The	  Kaplan	  Meier	  function	  does	  not	  take	  the	  covariates	  into	  account.	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Table	  16:	  Duration	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  peace	  spell	  	   (1)	  Hazard	  model	  (Weibull)	  
Duration	   Coefficient	  
T2+	  in	  dyad	  episode	   0.62	  
(1.12)	  Official	  mediation	   0.64	  (0.82)	  Military	  intervention	  	   1.74	  (1.52)	  Dyad	  duration,	  log	   0.60	  (0.43)	  Battle	  deaths,	  logged	   0.11	  (0.41)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐4.19***	  (1.48)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐1.52	  (1.83)	  Negotiated	  settlement	  	   -­‐0.25	  (0.93)	  Victory	  	   -­‐5.89*	  (3.20)	  Power-­‐sharing	  provisions	   1.00	  (4.46)	  Amnesty	  provision	   -­‐0.27	  (1.89)	  Joint	  implementation	  oversight	   -­‐2.39	  (2.39)	  UN	  mission	  	   -­‐2.33	  (4.88)	  Lootables	   -­‐1.03	  (1.64)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.36	  (0.93)	  Life	  expectancy	   -­‐0.05	  (0.06)	  Democracy	  score	   -­‐0.30*	  (0.16)	  Constant	   0.68	  (5.36)	  
N	   841	  (85	  clusters:	  dyads)	  	   Failures:	  34	  Wald	  Chi2	   81.50***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐118.09	  
p	   1.46	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  *Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	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  Logistic	  regression	  	   The	  results	  of	  the	  main	  logit	  regression	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  15.	  
	   Table	  17:	  Likelihood	  of	  conflict	  recurrence	  	  Logistic	  regression	   (2)	  Return	  to	  violence	  at	  some	  point	   (3)	  Return	  to	  violence	  within	  2	  years	   (4)	  Return	  to	  violence	  within	  5	  years	  





(0.67)	  Official	  mediation	   0.71	  (0.64)	   2.22**	  (1.04)	   1.40**	  (0.58)	  Military	  intervention	  	   0.35	  (0.81)	   -­‐0.41	  (0.87)	   0.23	  (0.73)	  Dyad	  duration,	  log	   0.59*	  (0.33)	   0.63	  (0.44)	   0.65***	  (0.24)	  Battle	  deaths,	  logged	   -­‐0.07	  (0.24)	   -­‐0.57**	  (0.28)	   -­‐0.29	  (0.18)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐2.40***	  (0.72)	   -­‐4.05***	  (1.16)	   -­‐2.31***	  (0.58)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   0.13	  (1.44)	   4.20	  (5.05)	   -­‐0.23	  (1.46)	  Negotiated	  settlement	  	   -­‐0.94	  (0.73)	   -­‐0.93*	  (0.56)	   -­‐0.26	  (0.61)	  Victory	  	   -­‐2.41	  (1.56)	   	   	  Power-­‐sharing	  provisions	   0.06	  (1.66)	   0.67	  (1.20)	   -­‐0.85	  (1.15)	  Amnesty	  provision	   -­‐1.57	  (1.03)	   	   -­‐2.00**	  (0.97)	  Joint	  implementation	  oversight	   0.48	  (1.10)	   -­‐2.24**	  (1.00)	   0.70	  (0.93)	  UN	  mission	  	   -­‐2.43	  (1.98)	   	   -­‐1.22	  (1.26)	  Lootables	   -­‐1.07	  (0.74)	   -­‐0.95	  (1.08)	   -­‐0.64	  (0.56)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.44	  (0.36)	   0.10	  (0.38)	   0.40	  (0.28)	  Life	  expectancy	   0.04	  (0.04)	   0.19***	  (0.07)	   0.06*	  (0.03)	  Democracy	  score	   -­‐0.09	  (0.07)	   -­‐0.14***	  (0.05)	   -­‐0.08	  (0.06)	  Constant	   -­‐6.50***	  (2.45)	   -­‐10.08**	  (5.05)	   -­‐3.98*	  (2.05)	  
N	   841	  (85	  clusters)	   841	   841	  (85)	  Wald	  Chi2	   428.74***	   .	   165.57***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐97.51	   -­‐40.31	   -­‐88.96	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  and	  a	  count	  of	  peaceful	  years	  included	  in	  models	  and	  not	  reported.	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Once	  again,	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  but	  displays	  a	  positive	  sign,	  indicating	  that	  dyads	  that	  see	  T2+	  during	  a	  conflict	  episode	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  a	  reemergence	  of	  conflict	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  violence	  than	  those	  dyads	  that	  do	  not	  see	  T2+.	  Model	  2	  tests	  the	  factors	  that	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  breakdown	  of	  peace	  at	  any	  point.	  The	  results	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  reported	  for	  the	  event	  history	  model.	  The	  main	  explanatory	  variables	  retain	  their	  directionality,	  although	  some	  controls	  –	  not	  statistically	  significant	  in	  either	  model	  –	  switch	  their	  sign.	  Significant	  in	  model	  2	  are	  the	  logged	  duration	  of	  the	  conflict	  dyad	  and	  the	  incompatibility	  measure.	  Separatist	  conflicts	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  reemerge	  than	  wars	  about	  government	  control.	  The	  longer	  a	  conflict	  has	  lasted,	  the	  more	  likely	  is	  the	  outbreak	  of	  new	  violence,	  hinting	  at	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  rivalries.	  	  Defying	  expectations,	  peace	  grows	  weaker	  over	  time;	  the	  longer	  a	  peace	  spell	  lasts,	  the	  more	  likely	  is	  a	  new	  dyad	  episode.	  The	  count	  of	  peace	  years	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  and	  positive.	  This	  result	  mirrors	  the	  finding	  of	  larger	  than	  1	  for	  the	  p-­‐value	  in	  the	  Weibull	  duration	  model.	  The	  cubic	  splines	  included	  in	  the	  model	  are	  statistically	  significant,	  confirming	  the	  existence	  of	  time	  effects.	  The	  coefficients	  for	  the	  splines	  reflect	  the	  form	  of	  the	  hazard	  function	  (Figure	  21):	  the	  first	  spline	  has	  a	  positive	  coefficient,	  because	  return	  to	  war	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  early	  years;	  the	  second	  spline	  is	  negative	  as	  peace	  becomes	  more	  stable.	  	  Subsequent	  models	  drop	  the	  variable	  for	  victory	  outcome	  because	  my	  sample	  includes	  no	  cases	  of	  conflicts	  ending	  in	  victory	  that	  see	  new	  conflict	  within	  two	  or	  five	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years	  of	  the	  preceding	  episode.77	  Similarly,	  no	  dyads	  that	  agree	  on	  amnesty	  provisions	  or	  invite	  a	  UN	  peacekeeping	  force	  into	  the	  country	  experience	  new	  war	  in	  the	  first	  two	  years	  after	  the	  war.	  After	  a	  variable	  is	  dropped	  automatically,	  I	  exclude	  it	  from	  the	  model	  and	  run	  the	  regression	  again.	  The	  results	  when	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  new	  conflict	  within	  24	  months	  are	  comparable	  to	  model	  2.	  T2+	  is	  still	  positive,	  although	  now	  statistically	  significant	  (model	  3).	  Again,	  this	  points	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  may	  be	  most	  common	  in	  intractable	  conflicts,	  those,	  that	  are	  quick	  to	  resume	  after	  brief	  intermissions.	  When	  expanding	  the	  time	  horizon	  –	  dependent	  variable	  is	  now	  new	  conflict	  within	  five	  years	  –	  the	  model	  only	  converges	  when	  some	  of	  the	  time	  variables	  are	  taken	  out.	  The	  results	  are	  included	  in	  Table	  2	  (model	  4).	  Additionally	  to	  those	  variables	  found	  significant	  in	  model	  2,	  the	  factors	  that	  are	  significantly	  associated	  with	  lower	  probabilities	  that	  a	  peace	  fails	  within	  five	  years	  are	  amnesty	  provisions	  in	  negotiated	  peace	  agreements	  and	  the	  time	  since	  the	  conflict	  ended.	  T2+	  is	  also	  negative	  in	  this	  model,	  but	  not	  significant.	  	  
Bivariate	  probit	  I	  run	  the	  seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  regression	  and	  find	  the	  results	  less	  changed	  than	  anticipated	  (see	  Table	  16).	  Coefficients	  have	  not	  changed	  direction.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  remains	  positive	  and	  is	  now	  statistically	  significant.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  There	  is	  some	  correlation	  in	  the	  variables	  accounting	  for	  institutional	  provisions	  (powersharing	  and	  joint	  implementation	  is	  correlated	  at	  .30),	  and	  between	  outcomes	  (negotiated	  agreements	  and	  termination	  by	  victory	  are	  correlated	  at	  -­‐.45).	  Agreements	  and	  joint	  implementation	  are	  correlated	  at	  .56.	  If	  I	  delete	  variables	  individually,	  the	  signs	  of	  the	  coefficients	  do	  not	  change.	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Table	  18:	  Likelihood	  of	  conflict	  recurrence:	  Seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit	  Results	  of	  the	  second	  equation	  DV:	  Peace	  failure	   (5)	  Return	  to	  violence	  at	  some	  point	  
T2+	  in	  dyad	  episode	   1.96***	  
(0.31)	  Official	  mediation	   0.31	  (0.30)	  Military	  intervention	  	   -­‐0.31	  (0.39)	  Dyad	  duration,	  log	   0.24*	  (0.12)	  Battle	  deaths,	  logged	   -­‐0.20**	  (0.10)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐0.80**	  (0.36)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   0.68	  (0.72)	  Negotiated	  settlement	  	   -­‐0.50	  (0.32)	  Victory	  	   -­‐0.83	  (0.76)	  Power-­‐sharing	  provisions	  	   0.17	  (0.36)	  Amnesty	  provision	   -­‐0.64*	  (0.33)	  Joint	  implementation	  oversight	   0.50	  (0.37)	  UN	  mission	  	   -­‐0.99	  (0.78)	  Lootables	   -­‐0.32	  (0.40)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.19	  (0.17)	  Life	  expectancy	   0.03*	  (0.09)	  Democracy	  score	   -­‐0.03	  (0.03)	  Peace	  years	   1.21***	  (0.20)	  Constant	   -­‐3.93***	  (1.04)	  
N	   841	  (85	  clusters)	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐443.50	  Rho	   -­‐1***	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  included	  in	  models	  and	  not	  reported.	  	  Official	  mediation,	  too,	  remains	  positively	  (though	  not	  significantly)	  associated	  with	  higher	  probabilities	  of	  peace	  failing.	  Possibly	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  as	  measured	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in	  this	  dissertation	  project	  –	  which	  focuses	  on	  initiatives	  targeting	  the	  leadership	  of	  conflict	  parties	  –	  has	  truly	  similar	  negative	  effects	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  stability	  as	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy	  has	  (Beardsley	  2012).	  But	  I	  am	  very	  aware	  of	  the	  limitations	  of	  my	  data,	  including	  a	  very	  short	  potential	  peace	  period	  and	  little	  variation	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  return	  to	  war.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  T2+	  closer,	  I	  hope	  to	  establish	  whether	  there	  are	  some	  approaches	  that	  may	  still	  be	  beneficial	  to	  long-­‐term	  peace.	  Because	  postestimation	  tests78	  reveal	  that	  the	  instrument	  used	  in	  the	  regression	  is	  weak	  and	  because	  others	  are	  not	  available	  I	  return	  to	  simple	  logistic	  regression.79	  	  Model	  6	  in	  Table	  17	  includes	  dummy	  variables	  for	  the	  individual	  categories	  if	  T2+	  approaches:	  direct	  mediation,	  mediation	  support,	  training	  and	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops.	  The	  reference	  category	  is	  “no	  T2+	  in	  this	  dyad	  episode.”	  The	  only	  statistically	  significant	  T2+	  variable	  is	  the	  dummy	  for	  mediation	  support.	  Its	  coefficient	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  a	  relapse	  into	  war.	  Mediation	  support	  is	  the	  T2+	  activity	  most	  closely	  affiliated	  with	  high-­‐level	  diplomatic	  negotiations.	  Thus,	  this	  finding	  confirms	  research	  that	  sees	  mediation	  as	  effective	  in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  but	  counter-­‐productive	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  T2+	  mediation,	  contrarily,	  is	  negative	  in	  this	  model.	  Its	  significance	  comes	  close	  acceptable	  levels	  (p-­‐value	  of	  0.104).	  While	  in	  my	  research	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  is	  very	  consistently	  related	  to	  higher	  probabilities	  of	  peace	  failure,	  NGO	  mediation,	  when	  it	  happens,	  seems	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  sustainable	  peace.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Endogeneity	  test	  after	  Two	  Stages	  Least	  Squares	  cannot	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  first	  stage	  variables	  are	  exogenous.	  79	  Similarly	  to	  earlier	  chapters,	  I	  attempt	  to	  run	  the	  logit	  regression	  for	  the	  sub-­‐sample	  of	  cases	  that	  experience	  T2+,	  but	  the	  model	  does	  not	  converge,	  even	  after	  dropping	  a	  number	  of	  variables.	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Table	  19:	  T2+	  and	  approaches	  Logistic	  regression	   (6)	  
DV:	  end	  of	  peace	  spell	   Coefficient	  
T2+	  training	  in	  dyad	  episode	   -­‐0.19	  
(1.09)	  
T2+	  mediation	  	   -­‐1.81	  
(1.11)	  
T2+	  mediation	  support	   3.97**	  
(1.73)	  
Problem-­‐solving	  workshops	   0.31	  
(1.00)	  Official	  mediation	   0.42	  (0.90)	  Military	  intervention	  	   -­‐0.86	  (1.44)	  Dyad	  duration,	  log	   0.54	  (0.36)	  Battle	  deaths,	  logged	   -­‐0.05	  (0.27)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐2.43***	  (0.70)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.82	  (1.16)	  Negotiated	  settlement	  	   -­‐0.11	  (0.77)	  Victory	  	   -­‐2.45	  (2.05)	  Power-­‐sharing	  provisions	   -­‐0.84	  (2.38)	  Amnesty	  provision	   -­‐2.73**	  (1.33)	  Joint	  implementation	  oversight	   0.62	  (1.21)	  UN	  mission	  	   -­‐2.39	  (2.56)	  Lootables	   -­‐0.95	  (1.02)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.46	  (0.45)	  Life	  expectancy	   0.03	  (0.04)	  Democracy	  score	   -­‐0.08	  (0.06)	  Peace	  years	   2.87***	  (0.51)	  Constant	   -­‐5.46**	  (1.04)	  
N	   841	  (85	  clusters)	  Wald	  Chi2	   456.09***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐80.96	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  included	  in	  models	  and	  not	  reported.	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Capacity-­‐building	  during	  ongoing	  conflict	  is	  negative,	  but	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  while	  the	  coefficient	  for	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  is	  positive.	  	  
Number	  and	  duration	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  In	  order	  to	  tease	  out	  whether	  the	  number	  and	  duration	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  matter,	  I	  include	  new	  variables	  in	  a	  logit	  regression.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  count	  variable	  for	  the	  number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  preceding	  dyad	  episode.	  The	  variable	  measures	  from	  0	  to	  7.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  longest-­‐lasting	  effort	  in	  the	  preceding	  conflict	  episode	  (0	  =	  no	  T2+,	  1	  =	  one-­‐time	  effort,	  2	  =	  project	  runs	  up	  to	  one	  year,	  3	  =	  multi-­‐year	  effort).	  And	  lastly,	  I	  interact	  the	  two	  variables.	  Table	  18	  shows	  the	  results	  of	  this	  and	  the	  following	  bivariate	  probit	  model.	  	   The	  negative	  coefficients	  for	  the	  duration	  and	  number	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  indicate	  that	  more	  initiatives,	  as	  well	  as	  longer-­‐lasting	  ones,	  are	  more	  beneficial	  for	  sustainable	  peace	  than	  shorter,	  or	  fewer	  T2+	  efforts.	  The	  variables	  are	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  The	  interaction	  term	  of	  them	  is	  significant,	  and	  it	  is	  positive,	  meaning	  that	  as	  more	  and	  longer	  efforts	  combine,	  they	  may	  have	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  desired	  effect	  and	  contribute	  to	  renewed	  violence.	  However,	  this	  model	  does	  not	  the	  address	  the	  endogeneity	  between	  dyads	  that	  are	  inherently	  prone	  to	  repeated	  conflict	  episodes	  and	  the	  intractability	  that	  attracts	  T2+.	  A	  bivariate	  probit	  model	  confirms	  the	  results	  –	  and	  returns	  statistically	  significant	  coefficients	  for	  number	  and	  duration	  of	  efforts	  (model	  8).	  I	  can	  note	  some	  cautious	  support	  for	  hypothesis	  5b.	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Table	  20:	  Number	  and	  duration	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  DV:	  end	  of	  peace	  spell	   (7)	  Logit	  model	   (8)	  Seemingly	  unrelated	  bivariate	  probit;	  second	  stage	  














T2+	  in	  dyad	  episode	   1.59	  
(2.36)	  
2.65***	  
(0.51)	  Official	  mediation	   0.15	  (0.75)	   -­‐0.01	  (0.32)	  Military	  intervention	   0.46	  (0.91)	   -­‐0.17	  (0.25)	  Dyad	  duration,	  log	   0.58	  (0.37)	   0.23*	  (0.14)	  Battle	  deaths,	  log	   -­‐0.03	  (0.23)	   -­‐0.16	  (0.10)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐2.72***	  (0.67)	   -­‐1.06***	  (0.36)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   1.25	  (2.03)	   1.00	  (0.72)	  Negotiated	  settlement	  	   -­‐0.89	  (0.72)	   -­‐0.47*	  (0.25)	  Victory	  	   -­‐2.09	  (1.73)	   -­‐0.95	  (0.88)	  Power-­‐sharing	  provisions	   0.84	  (1.56)	   0.54	  (0.50)	  Amnesty	  provision	   -­‐2.14*	  (1.17)	   -­‐0.86**	  (0.41)	  Joint	  implementation	  oversight	   0.73	  (1.02)	   0.47	  (0.40)	  UN	  mission	  	   -­‐1.71	  (1.57)	   -­‐0.63	  (0.57)	  Lootables	   -­‐1.27	  (0.92)	   -­‐0.56*	  (0.03)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged	   0.53	  (0.41)	   0.31	  (0.20)	  Life	  expectancy	   0.06*	  (0.04)	   0.04**	  (0.02)	  Democracy	  score	   -­‐0.16**	  (0.07)	   -­‐0.08**	  (0.03)	  Peace	  years	   2.82***	  (0.48)	   1.25***	  (0.19)	  Constant	   -­‐8.76***	  (3.24)	   -­‐4.87***	  (1.15)	  
N	   841	  (85	  clusters)	   841	  (85	  clusters)	  Wald	  Chi2	   259.37***	   	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐81.76	   -­‐439.80	  
Rho	  (error	  correlation)	   	   -­‐1***	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  country	  in	  parentheses.	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  included	  in	  models	  and	  not	  reported.	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   The	  interpretation	  of	  coefficients	  for	  interaction	  effects	  is	  not	  straightforward.	  Therefore,	  I	  plot	  the	  interaction	  of	  my	  two	  variables	  of	  interest	  –	  duration	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  and	  number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  in	  a	  dyad	  episode	  (Figure	  23).80	  	  
Figure	   23:	  Marginal	  effects	  of	   the	   interaction	  between	  T2+	  duration	  and	  number	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  (based	  on	  Model	  7)	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peace	  failing,	  while	  those	  that	  saw	  four	  initiatives	  are	  at	  a	  1-­‐2%	  risk.	  The	  duration	  of	  the	  most-­‐sustained	  T2+	  effort	  in	  a	  dyad	  episode	  has	  a	  similarly	  positive	  effect	  on	  peace	  durability.	  For	  example,	  those	  dyad	  episodes	  that	  see	  only	  one-­‐off	  initiatives	  vary	  in	  their	  chance	  of	  conflict	  reoccurrence	  from	  1-­‐11%,	  but	  those	  that	  see	  multi-­‐year	  projects	  have	  a	  1-­‐6%	  risk	  of	  new	  war.	  The	  combined	  effect	  of	  the	  interaction	  is	  small,	  yet	  clear:	  combining	  long-­‐term	  effects	  and	  larger	  number	  of	  projects	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  conflict	  durability.	  For	  example,	  an	  episode	  that	  experiences	  two	  T2+	  one-­‐time	  initiatives	  has	  a	  4%	  chance	  of	  seeing	  a	  new	  conflict,	  but	  when	  in	  an	  episode	  that	  experiences	  two	  initiatives	  at	  least	  one	  of	  project	  runs	  longer	  than	  12	  months,	  the	  risk	  of	  conflict	  decreases	  to	  3%.	  	   I	  end	  with	  a	  few	  interesting	  takeaways	  regarding	  some	  control	  variables:	  the	  most	  consistent	  predictor	  for	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  renewed	  conflict	  is	  the	  incompatibility	  measure.	  Separatist	  conflicts	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  reemergence	  of	  conflict.	  Few	  variables	  measuring	  post-­‐conflict	  institutions	  are	  statistically	  significant	  across	  models.	  The	  regressor	  for	  amnesty	  provisions	  is	  consistently	  related	  to	  longer-­‐lasting	  peace	  spells,	  while	  other	  measures	  seem	  to	  contribute	  less	  reliably	  to	  sustainable	  peace.	  Democracy	  is	  a	  decent	  predictor	  for	  durable	  peace.	  The	  proxies	  for	  quality	  of	  life,	  however,	  perform	  surprisingly.	  When	  they	  are	  significant,	  they	  are	  in	  an	  unexpected	  direction:	  higher	  GDP	  is	  in	  some	  models	  related	  to	  higher	  probabilities	  of	  new	  violence	  after	  a	  conflict	  has	  ended.	  This	  finding	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  less	  economic	  development	  will	  mean	  a	  better	  peace	  –	  it	  could	  be	  an	  indication	  for	  a	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  change	  in	  GDP	  in	  a	  country	  over	  time	  instead	  of	  absolute	  numbers.	  People	  may	  not	  rejoin	  an	  insurgency	  because	  of	  their	  government’s	  low	  economic	  performance;	  but	  if	  a	  country	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  GDP	  scale	  sinks	  even	  deeper	  into	  poverty,	  this	  might	  motivate	  people	  to	  rebel.	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Lastly,	  the	  results	  for	  the	  measures	  for	  time	  are	  quite	  puzzling.	  The	  constant	  term	  is	  negative	  and	  significant,	  indicating	  that	  if	  no	  covariates	  are	  taking	  into	  account,	  over	  time	  peace	  should	  become	  more	  stable.	  But	  the	  count	  of	  peace	  years	  for	  dyads	  has	  a	  positive	  coefficient,	  which	  suggests	  that	  as	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  non-­‐violent	  spell	  gets	  longer	  by	  one	  year,	  the	  probability	  of	  renewed	  conflict	  increases.	  The	  splines	  show	  that	  the	  risk	  of	  new	  conflict	  changes	  over	  time.	  Early	  on	  the	  hazard	  that	  a	  dyad	  returns	  to	  war	  is	  high,	  later	  it	  decreases,	  and	  after	  a	  long	  peaceful	  time	  the	  risk	  for	  war	  increases	  again.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  The	  end	  of	  a	  violent	  conflict	  is	  often	  a	  short-­‐term	  relief.	  Making	  a	  cease-­‐fire	  last	  and	  a	  peace	  deal	  stick	  is	  difficult,	  and	  many	  countries	  relapse	  into	  war	  –	  conflict	  dyad	  episodes	  analyzed	  in	  this	  chapter	  see	  a	  recurrence	  of	  significant	  violence	  in	  29%	  of	  the	  cases.	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  during	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  can	  prepare	  parties	  for	  a	  time	  after	  the	  fighting.	  Problem-­‐solving	  workshops,	  negotiation	  preparation	  and	  other	  training	  is	  positively	  related	  with	  more	  durable	  peace.	  My	  statistical	  models	  do	  not	  allow	  me	  to	  ascertain	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  will	  always	  be	  related	  to	  durable	  peace.	  But	  they	  indicate	  that	  NGO	  mediation,	  in	  particular,	  is	  linked	  to	  sustainable	  post-­‐conflict	  calm.	  When	  T2+	  mediation	  occurs	  in	  an	  ongoing	  conflict,	  the	  following	  peace	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  hold	  than	  if	  it	  does	  not	  occur.	  Contrarily,	  high-­‐level	  official	  mediation	  remains	  positively	  related	  to	  higher	  risks	  of	  conflict	  renewal,	  as	  Beardsley	  (2012)	  finds.	  My	  results	  thus	  hint	  towards	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  the	  mediation	  dilemma	  when	  mediation	  ends	  a	  conflict	  in	  the	  short	  term	  but	  is	  related	  to	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  peace	  that	  follows:	  T2+	  mediation	  may	  help	  to	  resolve	  conflicts	  in	  a	  more	  sustainable	  way	  than	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy.	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Both	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  and	  longer-­‐lasting	  efforts	  are	  associated	  with	  smaller	  risks	  of	  war	  reoccurrence.	  However,	  many	  long	  T2+	  efforts	  are	  a	  symptom	  for	  particularly	  fragile	  dyads	  that	  are	  prone	  to	  renewed	  violence.	  	  My	  theory	  suggests	  that	  the	  content	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  might	  be	  less	  important	  than	  their	  duration,	  and	  some	  results	  of	  my	  statistical	  models,	  while	  not	  conclusive,	  support	  the	  view	  that	  longer-­‐lasting	  efforts	  are	  more	  effective	  than	  shorter	  ones	  (and	  more	  is	  better,	  to	  a	  point)	  indicate	  that	  in	  fact	  substance	  matters.	  But	  even	  though	  only	  direct	  mediation	  and	  T2+	  training	  are	  ever	  statistically	  significant	  that	  these	  approaches	  are	  related	  to	  longer	  peace	  spells	  while	  others	  do	  not	  cautions	  me	  against	  accepting	  the	  notion	  that	  type	  of	  intervention	  does	  not	  matter	  at	  all.	  	  	  Still,	  the	  statistical	  methods	  employed	  do	  not	  allow	  me	  to	  determine	  with	  certainty	  whether	  NGOs	  contribute	  to	  a	  peaceful	  post-­‐conflict	  environment	  through	  their	  help	  to	  forge	  a	  better,	  fairer	  peace,	  or	  whether	  their	  main	  contribution	  is	  the	  socialization	  of	  conflict-­‐party	  leaders.	  Duration	  of	  the	  longest-­‐lasting	  T2+	  initiative	  in	  a	  given	  dyad	  episode	  remains	  a	  crude	  measure	  of	  NGO	  commitment.	  My	  models	  do	  not	  include	  a	  control	  for	  NGO	  initiatives	  that	  happen	  after	  the	  conflict	  has	  ended.	  However,	  I	  do	  include	  a	  variable	  for	  United	  Nations	  mission.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  captures	  both	  official	  and	  non-­‐official	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  efforts	  as	  the	  UN	  often	  works	  in	  tandem	  with	  local	  and	  international	  NGOs.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Peacekeeping	  Operations	  highlights	  on	  its	  website	  that	  “The	  work	  of	  CSOs	  (local	  and	  international)	  can	  often	  complement	  that	  of	  a	  peacekeeping	  operation.81”	  For	  example,	  the	  UN	  Development	  Assistance	  Framework	  2013-­‐2017	  for	  Liberia	  states	  that	  the	  a	  goal	  for	  the	  UN	  is	  “strengthening	  capacity	  of	  people	  of	  Liberia	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  http://www.un-­‐ngls.org/spip.php?page=article_s&id_article=843,	  accessed	  October	  14,	  2014	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through	  CSOs	  to	  engage	  in	  consultation,	  advocacy	  and	  outreach	  activities	  related	  to	  national	  reconciliation.”	  Even	  if	  I	  take	  into	  account	  peace-­‐building	  efforts	  that	  happen	  after	  the	  conflict	  ends	  by	  including	  a	  control	  for	  UN	  peacekeeping,	  the	  variable	  for	  T2+	  remains	  significant.	  	  A	  major	  limitation	  of	  the	  data,	  beyond	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  and	  short	  time	  period	  under	  observation,	  is	  the	  relatively	  short	  duration	  of	  and	  potential	  post-­‐conflict	  period.	  The	  longest	  peace	  spells	  are	  19	  years,	  but	  most	  are	  much	  shorter	  because	  I	  only	  consider	  conflict	  dyads	  that	  ended	  in	  the	  time	  period	  1990-­‐2009.	  There	  are	  only	  few	  cases	  of	  dyads	  relapsing,	  which	  cautions	  against	  generalizing	  from	  this	  sample.	  Lastly,	  the	  appropriate	  methods	  for	  some	  models	  require	  instrumental	  variables	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  identify.	  	  The	  results	  of	  this	  chapter	  have	  implications	  for	  both	  theoretical	  models	  of	  civil	  war	  processes	  and	  practical	  efforts	  to	  end	  conflict.	  I	  find	  evidence	  that	  events	  during	  the	  war	  will	  influence	  the	  chances	  of	  peace.	  Particularly,	  I	  point	  to	  the	  impact	  third-­‐party	  interventions	  can	  have.	  Previous	  literature	  on	  sustainable	  peace	  has	  focused	  on	  third-­‐party	  guarantees	  during	  the	  implementation	  phase	  of	  peace	  agreements,	  but	  less	  so	  on	  the	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  of	  interventions	  during	  the	  conflict.	  I	  have	  analyzed	  how	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  stable	  peace.	  Practically,	  my	  findings	  show	  the	  initiatives	  included	  in	  my	  analysis	  do	  not	  only	  decrease	  the	  duration	  of	  civil	  conflicts,	  but	  that	  they	  also	  potentially	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  sustainable	  peace.	  	  This	  chapter	  concludes	  the	  empirical	  section	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  In	  the	  following	  pages	  I	  will	  revisit	  the	  questions	  posed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  project,	  summarize	  my	  findings	  and	  consider	  the	  larger	  implications	  of	  the	  study.	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Chapter	  7	  –	  Conclusion	  
Revisiting	  the	  research	  questions	  This	  dissertation	  set	  out	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  conflict	  management.	  It	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  question	  how	  actors	  without	  the	  resources	  and	  influence	  available	  to	  governments	  may	  intervene	  successfully	  in	  internal	  conflicts.	  I	  put	  forward	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  based	  on	  the	  literature	  on	  mediation	  by	  weak	  actors	  in	  which	  I	  propose	  that	  the	  advantages	  NGOs	  and	  other	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  managers	  bring	  to	  the	  table	  arise	  from	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  these	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  them.	  Some	  non-­‐state	  actors	  derive	  their	  legitimacy	  from	  long-­‐standing	  relations	  with	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  conflict	  parties.	  Their	  claims	  to	  neutrality	  are	  more	  believable	  than	  those	  of	  powerful	  states	  with	  strong	  national	  interests.	  	  And	  their	  inherent	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  power	  allows	  opponents	  to	  explore	  creative	  solutions	  without	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  forced	  to	  sign	  a	  premature	  agreement.	  Regarding	  the	  activities	  undertaken	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  the	  data	  collected	  for	  the	  dissertation	  project	  distinguish	  between	  mediation	  services,	  capacity-­‐building,	  and	  unofficial	  dialog.	  Non-­‐state	  mediators	  can	  be	  alternatives	  to	  governmental	  actors.	  In	  this	  role	  they	  are	  particularly	  attractive	  if	  third-­‐party	  states	  are	  reluctant	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  dispute	  resolution,	  or	  if	  one	  party	  is	  concerned	  that	  governmental	  mediators	  would	  bestow	  legitimacy	  on	  the	  opponent.	  Negotiation	  training	  and	  other	  capacity-­‐building	  measures,	  as	  well	  as	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and	  similar	  dialog-­‐focused	  interactions	  are	  complementary	  to	  other	  diplomatic	  interventions,	  and	  I	  expect	  them	  to	  enhance	  the	  success	  rate	  of	  official	  conflict	  resolution.	  The	  preceding	  empirical	  chapters	  have	  tested	  hypotheses	  derived	  from	  the	  larger	  theoretical	  context.	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  outcomes	  that	  are	  measurable	  and	  directly	  attributed	  to	  T2+.	  This	  concluding	  chapter	  summarizes	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findings,	  considers	  the	  implications	  for	  theory	  and	  practice,	  and	  points	  to	  future	  research	  avenues.	  
Summary	  of	  findings	  
T2+	  and	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  	   Conflicts	  that	  see	  T2+	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  also	  see	  official	  mediation	  at	  some	  point	  during	  the	  same	  conflict	  episode.	  The	  finding	  that	  T2+	  and	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  frequently	  occur	  in	  the	  same	  conflicts	  indicates	  that	  the	  two	  tracks	  of	  diplomacy	  are	  complementary	  to	  rather	  than	  exclusive	  of	  each	  other.	  It	  also	  indicates	  that	  the	  two	  types	  of	  conflict	  management	  are	  attracted	  to	  (or	  by)	  similar	  circumstances.	  This	  is	  important	  when	  scholars	  consider	  the	  selection	  effects	  of	  mediation	  –	  similarly	  to	  the	  endogeneity	  between	  mediation	  and	  difficult-­‐to-­‐solve	  conflicts	  (Gartner	  2011,	  2013),	  T2+	  is	  more	  common	  in	  intractable	  conflict	  settings.	  Studies	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  non-­‐random	  occurrence	  of	  conflict	  management;	  if	  they	  do	  not,	  findings	  that	  mediation	  correlates	  with	  longer	  conflicts	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  faulty	  conclusion	  that	  mediation	  causes	  longer	  conflict	  duration.	  I	  confirm	  that	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  more	  than	  a	  companion	  to	  (inter)governmental	  mediation;	  it	  is	  a	  precursor:	  The	  probability	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  a	  year	  more	  than	  doubles	  if	  a	  conflict	  dyad	  experiences	  T2+	  in	  the	  preceding	  year.	  This	  result	  shows	  that	  NGO	  conflict	  management	  can	  move	  a	  conflict	  towards	  serious	  negotiations.	  	  When	  considering	  how	  T2+	  may	  fulfill	  this	  task,	  I	  find	  partial	  support	  for	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  capacity-­‐building	  measures	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  While	  the	  proposed	  relationship	  is	  confirmed	  for	  mediation	  led	  by	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  for	  mediation	  by	  third-­‐party	  governments.	  The	  discrepancy	  can	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be	  explained	  with	  the	  different	  modes	  of	  operation	  of	  IGOs	  and	  governments.	  Intergovernmental	  bodies	  are	  by	  definition	  collaborative	  enterprises	  and	  they	  are	  more	  often	  open	  to	  coordinate	  their	  efforts	  with	  other	  groups	  (which	  can	  also	  help	  preserve	  limited	  resources),	  while	  governments,	  should	  they	  decide	  to	  take	  on	  the	  role	  of	  mediators,	  do	  so	  for	  their	  own	  gain	  and	  are	  not	  as	  interested	  in	  cooperation	  with	  others.	  Direct	  mediation	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  is	  also	  a	  significant	  precursor	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  supporting	  my	  proposition	  that	  conflicts	  previously	  ignored	  by	  the	  third	  parties	  become	  more	  interesting	  after	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  brought	  attention	  to	  them.	  Other	  categories	  of	  T2+	  show	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  occurring.	  Potential	  official	  actors	  deciding	  whether	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  a	  conflict	  as	  mediators	  seem	  to	  take	  their	  cue	  primarily	  from	  preceding	  mediation	  attempts	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  consider	  whether	  NGOs	  may	  have	  prepared	  the	  belligerents	  for	  talks	  (by	  the	  time	  a	  government	  considers	  whether	  such	  activities	  may	  have	  happened,	  they	  probably	  already	  have	  decided	  to	  become	  engaged	  in	  the	  process).	  	   I	  expected	  to	  find	  a	  significant	  positive	  relationship	  between	  T2+	  activities	  led	  by	  former	  high-­‐level	  state	  officials	  and	  subsequent	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  However,	  I	  find	  the	  opposite	  effect,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  subset	  of	  third-­‐party	  governmental	  mediation.	  This	  result	  indicates	  that	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  who	  take	  on	  the	  role	  of	  mediator	  do	  so	  in	  place	  of,	  rather	  than	  in	  concert	  with,	  current	  government	  officials,	  while	  religious	  organizations	  more	  commonly	  prepare	  parties	  for	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy.	  	  
T2+	  and	  conflict	  termination	  	   The	  results	  in	  Chapter	  3	  show	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  not	  random	  across	  conflict	  dyads.	  Rather,	  it	  occurs	  more	  frequently	  in	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intractable,	  long-­‐lasting	  conflicts.	  In	  order	  to	  address	  these	  selection	  effects,	  models	  in	  Chapter	  4-­‐6	  model	  endogeneity	  or	  limit	  the	  sample	  to	  conflicts	  that	  at	  some	  point	  experience	  T2+.	  I	  find	  that	  dyads	  that	  experience	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  in	  one	  year	  are	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  end	  in	  the	  following	  year.	  This	  result	  confirms	  an	  important	  proposition	  about	  conflict	  termination:	  T2+	  can	  indeed	  contribute	  to	  the	  resolution	  of	  internal	  conflicts.	  	  None	  of	  the	  T2+	  categories	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  have	  an	  individual	  positive	  effect.	  I	  had	  expected	  direct	  mediation	  to	  make	  a	  unique	  contribution	  towards	  conflict	  termination,	  but	  I	  cannot	  confirm	  the	  hypothesis.	  There	  are	  two	  possible	  explanations	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  findings.	  	  One,	  the	  effects	  of	  T2+	  might	  be	  indirect	  and	  therefore	  difficult	  to	  measure.	  If	  the	  main	  contribution	  of	  T2+	  in	  general,	  and	  T2+	  mediation	  in	  particular	  is	  to	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  (see	  the	  findings	  in	  Chapter	  3),	  then	  models	  including	  individual	  approaches	  lose	  predictive	  power.	  Two,	  the	  effects	  may	  be	  subtle	  and	  accumulate	  over	  time.	  For	  example,	  NGO	  mediation	  may	  be	  preceded	  by	  problem-­‐solving	  workshops	  and/or	  accompanied	  by	  negotiation	  training.	  Even	  in	  the	  categories	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  there	  may	  be	  variation	  that	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  with	  my	  limited	  data.	  The	  type	  of	  organization	  shows	  more	  distinction.	  Religiously	  affiliated	  groups	  have	  a	  statistically	  significant	  effect	  on	  conflict	  termination,	  while	  the	  coefficient	  for	  professional	  groups	  is	  not	  significant.	  Survival	  graphs	  that	  ignore	  other	  covariates	  indicate	  that	  dyads	  that	  see	  T2+	  by	  religious	  organizations	  last	  on	  average	  shorter	  than	  those	  that	  see	  T2+	  by	  professional	  groups,	  but	  once	  dyads	  have	  lasted	  10	  years,	  their	  survival	  rate	  is	  slightly	  lower	  when	  T2+	  is	  provided	  by	  professional	  organizations.	  Contrary	  to	  expectations,	  the	  subset	  of	  T2+	  providers	  led	  by	  former	  heads	  of	  state	  has	  no	  noticeable	  advantage	  when	  the	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dependent	  variable	  is	  conflict	  termination.	  Similarly	  to	  the	  non-­‐findings	  regarding	  NGO	  mediation,	  I	  expect	  a	  mixture	  of	  data	  weaknesses	  (the	  number	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  executed	  by	  this	  specific	  subset	  of	  organizations	  is	  not	  large,	  and	  gets	  smaller	  in	  the	  restricted	  models)	  and	  a	  possibly	  indirect	  causal	  pathway	  (T2+	  !	  T1	  !	  conflict	  termination)	  to	  account	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  results.	  	  Capacity-­‐building	  initiatives	  are	  significantly	  related	  to	  negotiated	  agreements.	  This	  result	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  findings	  regarding	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation:	  T2+	  training	  leads	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  and	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  often	  is	  a	  necessary	  precursor	  to	  peace	  agreements.	  I	  confirm	  my	  expectation	  that	  those	  conflict	  dyads	  that	  eventually	  reach	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  to	  end	  their	  dispute	  will	  do	  so	  sooner	  if	  there	  is	  T2+	  in	  the	  conflict	  episode.	  Overall,	  I	  find	  convincing	  support	  that	  T2+	  can	  contribute	  to	  conflict	  duration	  that	  is	  shorter	  than	  it	  would	  be	  without	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  
T2+	  and	  conflict	  severity	  The	  results	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  T2+	  and	  conflict	  severity	  are	  encouraging,	  too.	  The	  coefficient	  for	  non-­‐state	  mediation	  is	  negative	  and	  significant,	  supporting	  the	  proposition	  that	  during	  ongoing	  mediation	  conflicts	  become	  less	  violent,	  sparing	  lives.	  Dyad	  years	  in	  which	  non-­‐state	  actors	  mediate,	  or	  support	  mediation	  activities,	  see	  a	  significant	  decline	  in	  the	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	  deaths.	  	  I	  do	  not	  find	  such	  a	  relationship	  for	  other	  T2+	  initiatives,	  even	  when	  they	  last	  longer	  than	  a	  year.	  The	  results	  signal	  that	  a	  drop	  in	  the	  battle-­‐death	  rate	  is	  less	  likely	  a	  long-­‐term	  trend	  and	  more	  likely	  a	  temporary	  relief	  caused	  by	  conflict	  parties	  sitting	  down	  to	  negotiations.	  	  T2+	   capacity-­‐building	   is	   significant	   when	   lagged	   two	   years,	   which	   indicates	   the	  possibility	   that	   training	   initiatives	   have	   a	   delayed	   effect	   on	   the	   conflict’s	   intensity.	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However,	   this	   could	   also	   pick	   up	   the	   pathway	   from	   negotiation	   training	   in	   one	   year	   to	  negotiations	  in	  the	  next	  –	  which	  in	  turn	  are	  associated	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  deadly	  violence.	  Because	  the	  two-­‐year	   lag	   leads	  to	  the	   loss	  of	  many	  observations,	   I	  cannot	  be	  confident	   in	  my	   findings.	   With	   a	   more	   complete	   sample	   I	   would	   expect	   a	   significant	   effect	   for	   an	  interaction	  term	  of	  lagged	  training	  and	  non-­‐lagged	  mediation.	  
T2+	  and	  sustainable	  peace	  The	  most	  important,	  though	  still	  tenuous,	  finding	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  prospects	  for	  long-­‐term	  peace	  is	  that	  while	  track-­‐one	  diplomacy	  is	  consistently	  associated	  with	  higher	  risks	  of	  peace	  failure,	  NGO	  mediation	  is	  related	  to	  more	  sustainable	  peace.	  This	  finding	  supports	  the	  proposition	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  certain	  advantages	  over	  state	  actors	  and	  can	  be	  the	  more	  effective	  mediators.	  The	  expertise	  many	  conflict	  resolution	  NGOs	  bring	  to	  the	  table,	  combined	  with	  their	  uncontested	  neutrality,	  will	  help	  the	  parties	  to	  address	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  conflict	  instead	  of	  pushing	  them	  towards	  a	  superficial	  agreement.	  Further,	  confidential	  meetings	  away	  from	  the	  media	  spotlight	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  deliberate,	  less	  time-­‐pressed	  negotiation	  process	  than	  diplomatic	  summits.	  This	  in	  turn	  assures	  that	  any	  agreement	  signed	  will	  be	  thoroughly	  vetted	  by	  both	  sides.	  	  I	  also	  find	  some	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  long-­‐term	  engagement	  by	  NGOs	  will	  contribute	  to	  a	  more	  stable	  post-­‐conflict	  situation.	  Both	  duration	  and	  number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  are	  significantly	  and	  negatively	  related	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  renewed	  conflict.	  The	  socialization	  occurring	  during	  long-­‐term	  T2+	  initiatives	  prepares	  belligerents	  for	  peaceful	  conflict	  resolution	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  setting.	  Returning	  to	  the	  causal	  pathways	  suggested	  in	  the	  introduction	  I	  find	  that	  this	  dissertation	  research	  supports	  five	  out	  of	  eleven	  mechanisms.	  Figure	  21	  highlights	  them:	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Figure	  24:	  How	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  lead	  to	  outcomes	  
Non-­‐state	  activity	   effects	   Outcome	  	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  
	  
Capacity	  building	  	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  
putting	  conflict	  on	  states’	  agenda	  prepare	  ground	  	  	  give	  parties	  tools	  for	  negotiations,	  build	  confidence	  improve	  attitudes	  	  clarify	  red	  lines	  
Mediation	   by	   states	   and	  IGOs	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  
	  
Capacity	  building	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  
unconventional	  approaches	  and	  low-­‐pressure	  process	  lead	  to	  success	  	  prepare	  for	  talks	  !	  lead	  to	  mediation	  	  reduce	  tension,	  build	  trust	  
Conflict	  termination	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  	  
negotiation	  rounds	  interrupt	  fighting	  	  gestures	  of	  goodwill	  	  personal	  connections	  changing	  perceptions	  
Decline	  in	  severity	  
Direct	  mediation	  	  	  
	  Capacity	  building	  	  	  Unofficial	  interaction	  
	  
less	  time-­‐pressure	  and	  more	  confidentiality	  more	  focused	  on	  resolution	  of	  underlying	  issues	  expertise,	  local	  knowledge	  	  	  familiarity	  with	  conflict-­‐resolution	  mechanisms	  applicable	  to	  post-­‐war	  conflict	  situations	  	  	  (alternatives	  to	  violence)	  trust,	  collaborative	  spirit,	  personal	  connections	  	  
Sustainable	  peace	  
	  Direct	  mediation	  is	  valid	  alternative	  to	  mediation	  by	  governments	  and	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  particularly	  with	  a	  long-­‐term	  solution	  to	  a	  conflict	  in	  mind.	  Further,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  is	  that	  capacity-­‐building	  takes	  a	  special	  place	  in	  a	  framework	  for	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management.	  These	  findings	  have	  consequences	  for	  both	  scholars	  and	  practitioners.	  
Implications	  
Implications	  for	  theory	  	   My	  dissertation	  research	  both	  supports	  previous	  literature	  on	  mediation	  and	  expands	  our	  knowledge	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  international	  relations.	  For	  example,	  studies	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of	  multi-­‐party	  mediation	  propose	  that	  conflict	  resolution	  is	  most	  effective	  when	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  occurs	  before	  high-­‐level	  negotiations	  (Crocker	  et	  al.	  1999).	  My	  work	  confirms	  this	  earlier	  finding,	  elaborates	  on	  the	  potential	  mechanisms	  behind	  the	  T2-­‐T1	  sequence,	  and	  provides	  the	  data	  to	  test	  the	  relevant	  hypotheses.	  With	  that	  I	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  non-­‐traditional	  diplomacy,	  which	  to-­‐date	  primarily	  consists	  of	  case	  studies.	  The	  project	  deepens	  the	  theory	  by	  studying	  what	  precisely	  it	  is	  about	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  that	  makes	  it	  effective.	  The	  data	  compiled	  for	  the	  dissertation,	  while	  limited,	  will	  be	  useful	  for	  testing	  of	  many	  other	  mechanisms	  (see	  next	  section).	  	  My	  interest	  in	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  grows	  out	  of	  the	  larger	  question:	  what	  roles	  non-­‐state	  actors	  can	  and	  should	  play	  in	  international	  relations?	  If	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  can	  influence	  events	  in	  areas	  previously	  restricted	  to	  states’	  high	  diplomacy,	  theoretical	  frameworks	  that	  ignore	  participants	  beyond	  state	  governments	  are	  missing	  important	  facets	  of	  politics.	  This	  dissertation	  shows	  that	  unofficial	  diplomacy	  actors	  contribute	  to	  conflict	  resolution.	  They	  both	  work	  with	  third-­‐party	  states	  that	  intervene	  in	  civil	  conflicts,	  e.g.	  when	  they	  prepare	  conflict	  parties	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  and	  they	  act	  instead	  of	  governments,	  e.g.	  when	  the	  conflict	  parties	  prefer	  a	  weak	  mediator.	  Theories	  on	  third-­‐party	  intervention	  in	  civil	  war	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  states’	  decisions	  whether	  to	  become	  engaged	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  whether	  NGOs	  have	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  negotiations.	  When	  considering	  which	  state-­‐led	  mediation	  efforts	  may	  be	  more	  effective,	  in	  the	  short	  and	  particularly	  the	  long	  term,	  scholars	  should	  also	  take	  into	  account	  concurrent	  T2+	  efforts	  that	  have	  their	  own	  independent	  and	  interactive	  effects	  on	  conflict	  outcome	  and	  sustainable	  peace.	  Omitting	  T2+	  from	  the	  analysis	  may	  give	  more	  credit	  to	  official	  mediation	  than	  deserved	  –	  or	  too	  little	  of	  the	  synergy	  of	  T1	  and	  T2	  is	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ignored.	  Going	  beyond	  the	  field	  of	  conflict	  resolution	  and	  mediation,	  I	  argue	  that	  research	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  international	  relations	  should	  be	  similarly	  mindful	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  impacts	  on	  the	  outcome	  variables.	  	  
Implications	  for	  practice	  	  An	  expansion	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  conflict	  management	  is	  important	  for	  the	  development	  of	  effective	  conflict	  resolution	  practices.	  The	  main	  finding	  is	  that	  T2+	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  conflict	  resolution,	  independent	  from	  official	  diplomacy.	  This	  is	  encouraging	  news	  for	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  managers	  who	  find	  support	  for	  their	  assertion	  that	  they	  can	  help	  to	  bring	  conflicts	  to	  an	  end.	  But	  beyond	  this	  general	  endorsement,	  more	  nuanced	  findings	  point	  to	  at	  least	  three	  potential	  practical	  policy	  prescriptions.	  First,	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  a	  precursor	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation,	  so	  those	  conducting	  T2+	  should	  use	  their	  access	  to	  conflict	  parties	  to	  prepare	  them	  for	  direct	  negotiations.	  In	  this	  way,	  a	  sequence	  of	  T2+	  !	  T1	  can	  effectively	  lead	  to	  conflict	  resolution.	  Second,	  sometimes	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  is	  superior	  to	  high-­‐level	  mediation.	  Earlier	  work	  has	  pointed	  to	  the	  dilemma	  that	  mediation	  often	  ends	  conflicts	  in	  the	  short-­‐term,	  but	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  recurrence	  of	  war	  (Beardsley	  2012).	  My	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  T2+	  has	  on	  peace	  durability	  finds	  support	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  mediation	  dilemma,	  but	  also	  indicates	  solutions	  to	  the	  problem:	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  same	  pitfalls	  as	  governmental	  mediation.	  I	  suggest	  reasons	  for	  the	  difference,	  including	  a	  mediation	  environment	  with	  less	  publicity,	  less	  time	  pressure,	  and	  more	  focus	  on	  long-­‐term	  solutions.	  Governments	  and	  intergovernmental	  mediators	  may	  learn	  from	  non-­‐state	  mediators.	  Alternatively,	  T1	  and	  T2	  actors	  should	  cooperate	  closely	  in	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mediations	  so	  that	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  leverage	  and	  low-­‐key	  dialog	  both	  immediate	  violence	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  and	  long-­‐term	  solutions	  will	  be	  found.	  Third,	  of	  those	  approaches	  considered	  here,	  capacity-­‐building	  has	  consistently	  positive	  effects	  for	  conflict	  management.	  This	  finding	  lends	  support	  to	  the	  ongoing	  development	  in	  conflict	  resolution	  practice	  of	  moving	  away	  from	  outside	  solutions	  towards	  supporting	  local	  solutions.	  Giving	  conflict	  parties	  the	  tools	  to	  solve	  their	  conflicts	  rather	  than	  expecting	  third	  parties	  to	  find	  solutions	  for	  them	  is	  not	  only	  the	  politically	  correct	  approach,	  it	  is	  noticeably	  effective.	  
Future	  research	  	  	   While	  presenting	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  project	  that	  introduces	  a	  refined	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  conflict	  management	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  provides	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  phenomena,	  the	  completed	  dissertation	  opens	  opportunities	  for	  a	  long-­‐term	  research	  program.	  I	  am	  considering	  extension	  of	  the	  research	  both	  in	  depth,	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  T2+,	  and	  width,	  to	  learn	  about	  the	  interplay	  of	  T2+	  with	  other	  conflict	  management	  activities.	  	  The	  present	  research	  focuses	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  T2+	  in	  ongoing	  conflict.	  It	  leaves	  for	  the	  future	  considerations	  regarding	  the	  entry	  of	  T2+	  actors	  into	  the	  mediator	  role.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  studying	  the	  internal	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  T2+	  organizations	  and	  how	  organizational	  considerations	  may	  influence	  the	  influence	  decisions	  in	  which	  conflict	  a	  group	  may	  decide	  to	  become	  active.	  Another	  topic	  yet	  to	  explore	  is	  whether	  cultural	  insiders	  (local	  peacemakers)	  or	  neutral	  outsiders	  (international	  organizations)	  are	  more	  effective	  conflict	  managers.	  Further	  I	  want	  to	  analyze	  whether	  local	  T2+	  actors	  use	  different	  approaches	  than	  outsiders.	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I	  find	  in	  my	  dissertation	  that	  the	  T2+	  leads	  to	  T1,	  and	  that	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  of	  certain	  T2+	  categories	  may	  change	  over	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  conflict.	  Matters	  of	  timing	  and	  sequencing	  deserve	  closer	  examination.	  In-­‐depth	  comparative	  case	  studies	  are	  better	  suited	  to	  approach	  such	  questions,	  and	  I	  am	  hoping	  to	  tackle	  this	  task	  in	  the	  future.	  	   While	  some	  of	  these	  research	  questions	  can	  be	  approached	  with	  currently	  available	  information,	  others	  will	  benefit	  from	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  data	  set	  compiled	  for	  the	  dissertation.	  I	  plan	  to	  collect	  data	  across	  more	  geographical	  regions	  so	  that	  the	  findings	  for	  African	  civil	  conflicts	  may	  be	  tested	  against	  situations	  in	  other	  countries.	  I	  also	  will	  revisit	  the	  conflicts	  included	  in	  the	  current	  sample	  and	  code	  T2+	  both	  before	  and	  after	  episodes	  of	  violent	  conflict.	  This	  will	  provide	  the	  means	  to	  test	  hypotheses	  regarding	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  T2+	  interventions.	  
Concluding	  remarks	  Wars	  are	  messy.	  Every	  conflict	  has	  its	  own	  history,	  trajectory	  and	  outcome.	  A	  “conflict	  dyad”	  consists	  of	  people:	  people	  with	  their	  individual	  motivations,	  grievances,	  willingness	  to	  accept	  risk,	  and	  disposition	  to	  violence	  or	  compromise.	  When	  considering	  the	  multitude	  of	  differences	  between	  the	  conflicts	  included	  in	  the	  sample	  for	  this	  dissertation	  research,	  the	  assumption	  that	  I	  can	  draw	  generalizable	  conclusions	  from	  them	  seems	  preposterous.	  When	  I	  contacted	  organizations	  working	  in	  track-­‐two	  diplomacy	  during	  the	  coding	  process,	  I	  encountered	  skepticism	  –	  occasionally	  even	  criticism	  –	  for	  throwing	  over	  thirty	  distinct	  conflicts	  in	  more	  than	  twenty	  unique	  countries	  into	  one	  pot,	  expecting	  to	  see	  enough	  commonalities	  to	  find	  statistical	  significance	  and	  from	  that	  to	  deduct	  support	  for	  my	  theory.	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Of	  course	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  loses	  detail,	  uses	  abstraction,	  and	  results	  cannot	  without	  further	  adaption	  be	  turned	  into	  policy	  prescriptions	  for	  individual	  cases.	  But	  even	  skeptics	  use	  abstraction.	  On	  a	  smaller	  scale,	  organizations	  compare	  diverse	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  have	  been	  engaged	  in	  conflict	  management	  activities	  in	  order	  to	  record	  best	  practices	  for	  future	  initiatives	  or	  to	  avoid	  making	  mistakes	  twice.	  I	  compare	  my	  cross-­‐sectional	  study	  to	  their	  program	  evaluations	  and	  lessons-­‐learned	  approach:	  for	  the	  sample	  employed	  certain	  T2+	  groups/approaches	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  than	  others.	  	  Practitioners	  may	  find	  a	  study	  of	  all	  African	  civil	  wars	  1990-­‐2010	  too	  broad,	  but	  quantitative	  scholars	  worry	  about	  generalizability	  based	  on	  a	  thus	  limited	  sample.	  Even	  if	  its	  focus	  is	  narrow,	  however,	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  dissertation	  are	  important	  both	  for	  the	  region	  under	  observation	  and	  beyond.	  They	  show	  that	  NGOs	  can	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  and	  increase	  the	  chances	  that	  negotiations	  will	  end	  in	  a	  peace	  agreement;	  they	  lead	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  level	  of	  violence;	  and	  they	  make	  peace	  more	  stable.	  Even	  marginal	  effects	  are	  significant	  when	  talking	  about	  civil	  conflicts,	  because	  they	  mean	  some	  lives	  were	  spared.	  The	  results	  may	  be	  weak,	  but	  they	  are	  essential	  stepping-­‐stones	  towards	  broader	  examinations	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  general	  and	  non-­‐state	  conflict	  management	  specifically.	  Thus,	  these	  findings	  can	  provide	  guidance	  for	  future	  work.	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Appendices	  
APPENDIX	  1:	  List	  of	  conflict	  episodes	  included	  in	  analysis:	  Africa	  1990-­‐2010	  
	  
Country	   Episode	  
ID	  	  
(UCDP)	  







(up	  to	  2010)	  
MM/DD/YYYY	  Algeria	   191.1	  	   Takfir	  wa'l	  Hijra	  AIS	  GIA	  AQIM	  
06/01/1991	   12/09/1991	   ongoing	  
Angola	   131.1	   FNLA	  UNITA	   11/11/1975	   11/11/1975	   12/31/1995	  Angola	   131.2	   UNITA	   11/11/1975	   05/02/1998	   04/04/2002	  Angola	   192.1	   FLEC-­‐R	   05/18/1991	   06/03/1991	   12/31/1991	  Angola	   192.2	   FLEC-­‐R	  FLEC-­‐FAC	   05/18/1991	   01/01/1994	   12/31/1994	  Angola	   192.3	   FLEC-­‐R	  FLEC-­‐FAC	   05/18/1991	   01/01/1996	   12/31/1998	  Angola	   192.4	   FLEC-­‐R	  FLEC-­‐FAC	   05/18/1991	   01/01/2002	   12/31/2002	  Angola	   192.5	   FLEC-­‐FAC	   05/18/1991	   01/01/2004	   12/31/2004	  Angola	   192.6	   FLEC-­‐FAC	   05/18/1991	   01/01/2007	   12/31/2007	  Angola	   192.7	   FLEC-­‐FAC	   05/18/1991	   01/01/2009	   12/31/2009	  Burundi	   90.2	   Palipehutu	   10/18/1965	   11/26/1991	   12/31/1992	  Burundi	   90.3	   CNDD	  Frolina	  Palipehutu-­‐FNL	  	  CNDD-­‐FDD	  
10/18/1965	   10/18/1994	   09/07/2006	  
Burundi	   90.4	   Palipehutu-­‐FNL	   10/18/1965	   03/01/2008	   12/04/2008	  Central	  African	  Republic	   222.1	   Military	  faction	  	  Forces	  of	  F.	  Bozize	   05/27/2001	   06/01/2001	   12/31/2002	  Central	  African	  Republic	   222.2	   UFDR	   05/27/2001	   11/27/2006	   12/31/2006	  Central	  African	  Republic	   222.3	   CPJP	   05/27/2001	   12/07/2009	   ongoing	  Chad	   91.4	   Islamic	  Legion	  MPS	  MDD	  CNR	  CSNPD	  Milit.	  fact.	  B.	  Abbas	  CSNF	  
07/01/1966	   03/03/1989	  	   12/31/1994	  
Chad	   91.5	   FARF	  MDJT	   07/01/1966	   10/30/1997	   12/31/2002	  Chad	   91.6	   RAFD	  FUC	  UFDD	  AN	  UFR	  PFNR	  
07/01/1966	   12/18/2005	   ongoing	  	  
Comoros	   213.1	   MPA/Republic	  of	  Anjouan	   09/03/1997	   09/05/1997	   12/31/1997	  Congo	   214.1	   Ninjas	   11/03/1993	   11/11/1993	   01/30/1994	  Congo	   214.2	   Cobras	  Cocoyes	  Ninjas	  Ntsiloulous	  
11/03/1993	   06/06/1997	   12/29/1999	  
Congo	   214.3	   Ntsiloulous	   11/03/1993	   10/04/2002	   12/31/2002	  Cote	  d'Ivoire	   225.1	   MPCI	   09/19/2002	   09/19/2002	   12/31/2004	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MPIGO	  MJP	  FN	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	   86.4	   AFDL	  MLC	  RCD	  RCD-­‐ML	  
01/18/1964	   10/18/1996	   12/31/2001	  
Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	   86.5	   CNDP	   01/18/1964	   11/25/2006	   10/29/2008	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	   254.1	   BDK	   07/02/1998	   02/01/2007	   12/31/2008	  Djibouti	   184.1	   FRUD	   11/12/1991	   11/13/1991	   12/26/1994	  Djibouti	   184.2	   FRUD	   1/12/1991	   07/24/1999	   12/31/1999	  Eritrea	   130.1	   Eritrean	  Islamic	  Jihad	  Movement	  -­‐	  Abu	  Suhail	  faction	   12/16/1993	   04/01/1997	   12/31/1997	  Eritrea	   130.2	   EIJM-­‐AS	   12/16/1993	   04/04/1999	   12/31/1999	  Eritrea	   130.3	   EIJM-­‐AS	   12/16/1993	   07/17/2003	   12/31/2003	  Ethiopia	   70.2	   EPDM	  EPRP	  	  TPLF	  	  Milit.	  fact.	  	  EPRDF	  
12/17/1960	   06/02/1976	   05/28/1991	  
Ethiopia	   78.1	   EPLF	   09/30/1961	   03/15/1964	   05/28/1991	  Ethiopia	   133.3	   AIAI	  ONLF	   01/11/1964	   10/13/1993	   12/31/1994	  Ethiopia	   133.4	   AIAI	  ONLF	   01/11/1964	   01/18/1996	   12/31/1996	  Ethiopia	   133.5	   ONLF	  AIAI	   01/11/1964	   01/06/1998	   ongoing	  Ethiopia	   168.2	   ARDUF	   06/01/1975	   06/01/1996	   12/31/1996	  Ethiopia	   219.3	   OLF	   08/01/1974	   07/01/1983	   12/31/1992	  Ethiopia	   219.4	   OLF	   08/01/1974	   01/01/1994	   12/31/1995	  Ethiopia	   219.5	   OLF	   08/01/1974	   01/01/1998	   ongoing	  Guinea	   111.1	   RFDG	   09/01/2000	   09/17/2000	   12/31/2001	  Guinea-­‐Bissau	   216.1	   Military	  Junta	  	   06/07/1998	   06/07/1998	   05/10/1999	  Lesotho	   217.1	   Military	  faction	   09/04/1998	   09/23/1998	   11/30/1998	  Liberia	   146.2	   NPFL	  INPFL	  	   04/12/1980	   12/29/1989	   09/10/1990	  Liberia	   146.3	   LURD	  MODEL	   04/12/1980	   08/01/2000	   08/18/2003	  Mali	   177.1	   MPA	   06/28/1990	   07/21/1990	   12/31/1990	  Mali	   177.2	   FIAA	   06/28/1990	   10/04/1994	   12/31/1994	  Mali	   177.3	   ATNMC	   06/28/1990	   08/31/2007	   01/22/2009	  Mauritania	   267.1	   AQIM	   09/15/2008	   09/17/2010	   ongoing	  	  Mozambique	   136.1	   Renamo	   01/01/1977	   01/01/1977	   10/04/1992	  Niger	   178.1	   CRA	   01/19/1994	   05/16/1994	   10/09/1994	  Niger	   212.1	   FDR	   03/23/1995	   07/10/1995	   07/10/1995	  Niger	   255.1	   FLAA	   10/01/1991	   12/01/1991	   12/31/1992	  Niger	   255.2	   UFRA	   10/01/1991	   10/19/1997	   11/29/1997	  Niger	   255.3	   MNJ	   10/01/1991	   07/01/2007	   10/30/2008	  Nigeria	   100.2	   Boko	  Haram	   01/15/1966	   07/26/2009	   07/30/2009	  Nigeria	   249.1	   Ahlul	  Sunnah	  Jamaa	   12/01/2003	   09/23/2004	   10/30/2004	  Nigeria	   250.1	   NDPVF	   06/05/2004	   06/05/2004	   09/20/2004	  Rwanda	   179.1	   FPR	   10/01/1990	   10/03/1990	   07/19/1994	  Rwanda	   179.2	   ALIR,	  FDLR	   10/01/1990	   07/12/1996	   12/31/2002	  Rwanda	   179.3	   ALIR,	  FDLR	   10/01/1990	   01/28/2009	   ongoing	  Senegal	   180.1	   MFDC	   12/01/1988	   08/01/1990	   12/31/1990	  Senegal	   180.2	   MFDC	   12/01/1988	   09/01/1992	   07/08/1993	  Senegal	   180.3	   MFDC	   12/01/1988	   04/27/1995	   12/31/1995	  Senegal	   180.4	   MFDC	   12/01/1988	   03/23/1997	   12/31/1998	  Senegal	   180.5	   MFDC	   12/01/1988	   04/11/2000	   12/31/2000	  Senegal	   180.6	   MFDC	   12/01/1988	   01/01/2003	   12/31/2003	  Sierra	  Leone	   187.1	   RUF	  AFRC	  Kamajors	   03/23/1991	   05/04/1991	   10/11/2000	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WSB	  Somalia	   141.2	   SNM	  SPM	  USC	  USC/SNA	  
01/18/1982	   03/03/1986	   12/31/1996	  
Somalia	   141.3	   SRRC	   01/18/1982	   05/12/2001	   12/31/2002	  Somalia	   141.4	   ARS/UIC	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  Harakat	  Ras	  Kamboni	  Hizbul	  Islam	  
01/18/1982	   10/24/2006	   ongoing	  
Sudan	   113.3	   SPLM/A	  NDA	  JEM	  SLM/A	  NRF	  SLM/A-­‐MM	  SLM/A-­‐Unity	  Forces	  George	  Athor	  
07/22/1971	   07/05/1983	   ongoing	  
Uganda	   118.3	   UPA	  LRA	   01/25/1971	   01/22/1979	   12/31/1992	  Uganda	   118.4	   LRA	  ADF	  WNBF	  UNRF	  II	  
01/25/1971	   02/21/1994	   ongoing	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APPENDIX	  2:	  List	  of	  T2+	  organizations	  included	  and	  their	  activities	  	  
	  	   Name	   Religious	  organizations	   Former	  head	  of	  state	   Mediation	   Training	   Dialog	   Frequency	  	  1	   Acholi	  Religious	  Leaders	  Peace	  Initiative,	  Uganda	   X	   	   X	   X	   	   1	  2	   Ad	  Hoc	  Peace	  Committee,	  Ethiopia	   X	   	   	   	   X	   2	  3	   African	  Centre	  for	  the	  Constructive	  Resolution	  of	  Disputes	  (ACCORD)	   	   	   	   	   X	   1	  4	   African	  Dialogue	  Center	  for	  the	  Prevention,	  Management	  and	  Resolution	  of	  Conflicts	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  5	   All	  African	  Council	  of	  Churches	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  6	   Berghof	  Foundation	   	   	   	   X	   	   1	  7	   Bigombe,	  Betty	  (Uganda)	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  8	   Carter	  Center	   	   X	   X	   X	   	   10	  9	   CECORE,	  Uganda	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  10	   Centre	  for	  Conflict	  Resolution,	  Cape	  Town	   	   	   X	   X	   	   4	  11	   Centre	  for	  Humanitarian	  Dialogue	   	   	   X	   X	   	   3	  12	   Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	   X	   	   X	   X	   X	   11	  13	   Ferrazzetta,	  	  Dom	  Settimio,	  Bishop	  of	  Bissau	  	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  14	   Fondation	  NIOSI,	  Congo	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  15	   Group	  of	  Oromo	  Elders,	  Ethiopia	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  16	   International	  Committee	  for	  the	  Red	  Cross	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  17	   Ijaw	  National	  Congress,	  Nigeria	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  18	   Independent	  Center	  for	  Research	  and	  Initiatives	  for	  Dialogue	  (CIRID)	   	   	   	   	   X	   1	  19	   Independent	  Diplomat	   	   	   	   X	   	   1	  20	   Initiatives	  of	  Change	  International	   	   	   X	   X	   X	   4	  21	   Institute	  for	  Multi-­‐Track	  Diplomacy	   	   	   	   X	   	   1	  22	   Institute	  for	  Security	  Studies,	  South	  Africa	   	   	   	   	   X	   1	  23	   Inter-­‐Faith	  Mediation	  Committee,	  Liberia	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  24	   Inter-­‐religious	  Council	  of	  Sierra	  Leone	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  25	   International	  Alert	   	   	   	   X	   X	   2	  26	   Interpeace	   	   	   	   	   X	   1	  27	   Life	  and	  Peace	  Institute	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  28	   Mandela,	  Nelson	  	   	   X	   X	   	   	   1	  29	   Mano	  River	  Women’s	  Peace	  Network	   	   	   	   X	   	   1	  30	   Mediation	  Support	  Project,	  Switzerland	   	   	   	   X	   	   1	  31	   Moi	  Institute	   	   X	   	   X	   	   1	  32	   Norwegian	  Church	  Aid	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  33	   Nyerere	  Centre	   	   X	   X	   	   	   1	  34	   Obasanjo	  Olusegun	  &	  Benjamin	  Mkapa	   	   X	   X	   	   	   1	  35	   Okumu,	  Washington	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  36	   Pax	  Christi	   X	   	   X	   	   	   2	  37	   Religious	  groups	  in	  the	  DRC	   X	   	   	   	   X	   1	  38	   Responding	  to	  Conflict	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  39	   Reunir,	  Congo	   	   	   X	   	   	   1	  40	   Rwandan	  Catholic	  Church	   X	   	   X	   	   	   1	  41	   Sudan	  Task	  Force,	  George	  Mason	  University	   	   	   	   X	   X	   1	  42	   Synergies	  Africa	   	   	   X	   	   X	   1	  43	   West	  Africa	  Peace	  Network	   	   	   	   	   X	   1	  44	   Wilson	  Center	   	   	   	   X	   	   2	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APPENDIX	  3:	  Coding	  Example	  
LIBERIA	  146	  Blurb	  from	  UCDP/PRIO	  Conflict	  Encyclopedia	  	  
Not	  considering	  the	  violence	  connected	  with	  the	  1980	  coup,	  the	  conflict	  over	  government	  power	  
in	  Liberia	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  main	  phases.	  The	  first	  phase	  is	  the	  armed	  conflict	  between	  
the	  government	  of	  Liberia	  and	  the	  NPFL	  [National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia]	  and	  the	  INPFL	  
faction	  [Independent	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia,	  led	  by	  Prince	  Johnson],	  from	  1989	  to	  
1995,	  following	  which	  NPFL	  leader	  Charles	  Taylor	  became	  president.	  The	  second	  phase,	  from	  
2000	  to	  2003,	  saw	  Liberian	  President	  Charles	  Taylor	  fight	  against	  LURD	  [Liberians	  United	  for	  
Reconciliation	  and	  Democracy,	  supported	  by	  Guinea]	  and	  MODEL	  [Movement	  for	  Democracy	  in	  
Liberia].	  The	  latter	  period	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  conflict,	  
but	  fought	  under	  new	  group	  denominations.	  (1) Mutwol,	  Julius.	  2009.	  Peace	  Agreements	  and	  Civil	  Wars	  in	  Africa:	  Insurgent	  
Motivation,	  State	  Responses,	  and	  Third-­‐Party	  Peacemaking	  in	  Liberia,	  Rwanda,	  
and	  Sierra	  Leone.	  Cambria	  Press:	  Amherst,	  NY.	  (2) Posthumus,	  Bram.	  1999.	  “Liberia	  -­‐	  Seven	  Years	  of	  Devastation	  and	  an	  uncertain	  Future,”	  in:	  Mekenkamp,	  Monique,	  Paul	  van	  Tongeren	  and	  Hans	  van	  de	  Veen	  (eds.)	  
Searching	  for	  Peace	  in	  Africa:	  An	  Overview	  of	  Conflict	  Prevention	  and	  Management	  
Activities.	  European	  Platform	  for	  Conflict	  Prevention	  and	  Transformation:	  Utrecht,	  The	  Netherlands.	  (3) Atkinson,	  Philippa,	  and	  Edward	  Mulbah.	  2000.	  “NGOs	  and	  Peace	  Building	  in	  Complex	  Political	  Emergencies:	  Agency	  Surveys	  from	  Liberia.”	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  10.	  Institute	  for	  Development	  Policy	  and	  Management.	  University	  of	  Manchester.	  (4) Scelzo,	  Vittorio.	  2013.	  “The	  Peace	  Process	  in	  Liberia”	  in	  Morozzo	  della	  Roca,	  Roberto	  (ed.)	  Making	  Peace:	  The	  Role	  Played	  by	  the	  Community	  of	  Sant’Egidio	  in	  the	  
International	  Arena	  New	  City:	  London,	  UK	  	  EPISODE:	  	  146.2	  (NPFL)	   	   	   146.1	  (Military	  faction	  (forces	  of	  Samuel	  Doe)	   	  TIME:	   	   12/29/1989	  –	  09/10/199082	  
YEAR:	   	   1990	  1.	   TRACK2:	   	   yes	  2.	   TRACK2NUMBER:	   1	  3.	   TRACK2EXACT	  	   1	  4.	  	   TRACK2TOTAL:	   	   1	  	  5.	   TRACK2START1:	   June	  12,	  1990	  6.	   TRACK2END1:	  	   June	  16,	  1990	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Often	  the	  Liberian	  civil	  war	  is	  said	  to	  have	  lasted	  1989-­‐2003,	  costing	  150-­‐250,000	  lives.	  A	  number	  of	  NGO	  initiatives	  happened	  during	  that	  decade.	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7.	   TRACK2LENGTH1:	   one-­‐time	  effort	  8.	   ORGNAME1:	   	   Inter-­‐Faith	  Mediation	  Committee	  (IFMC)	  9.	   ORGTYPE1:	   	   religious:	  leaders	  of	  Liberian	  Council	  of	  Churches	  &	  National	  	  	   	   	   	   Muslim	  Council	  of	  Liberia	  10.	   APPROACH1:	   	   Mediation.	  Brought	  NPFL	  and	  government	  delegations	  together	  11.	   MAINNAME1:	   	   -­‐999	  	   DETAILS	   First	  meeting	  of	  group	  in	  US	  Embassy	  Freetown,	  invitation	  to	  second	  	  	   	   	   meeting	  on	  June	  25	  rejected	  by	  NPFL	  (1:	  54;	  also	  Toure,	  Augustine.	  2002.	  	  	   	   	   The	  Role	  of	  Civil	  Society	  in	  National	  Reconciliation	  and	  Peacebuilding	  in	  Liberia.	  	  	   	   	   International	  Peace	  Academy,	  p.	  1).	  
	   	   	  EPISODE:	  	  146.3	  (NPFL)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  TIME:	   	   08/01/2000	  –	  08/18/2003	  
YEAR:	   	   2000	  1.	   TRACK2:	   	   no	  2.	   TRACK2NUMBER:	   0	  3.	   TRACK2EXACT	  	   0	  4.	  	   TRACK2TOTAL:	   	   1	  	  Liberia	  146.3	  
YEAR:	   	   2001	  1.	   TRACK2:	   	   yes	  2.	   TRACK2NUMBER:	   1	  3.	   TRACK2EXACT	  	   1	  4.	  	   TRACK2TOTAL:	   2	  	  5.	   TRACK2START1:	   2001	  6.	   TRACK2END1:	  	   2002	  7.	   TRACK2LENGTH1:	   one	  year	  8.	   ORGNAME1:	   	   MANO	  River	  Women’s	  Peace	  Network	  9.	   ORGTYPE1:	   	   network	  10.	   APPROACH1:	   	   organized	  meetings	  with	  presidents	  of	  Mano	  River	  Union	  	   	   	   	   (http://www.blackpast.org/gah/mano-­‐river-­‐women-­‐s-­‐peace-­‐network-­‐2001)	  11.	   MAINNAME1:	   	   -­‐999	  	  Liberia	  146.3	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YEAR:	   	   2002	  1.	   TRACK2:	   	   yes	  2.	   TRACK2NUMBER:	   1	  3.	   TRACK2EXACT	  	   1	  4.	  	   TRACK2TOTAL:	   3	  	  5.	   TRACK2START1:	   Summer	  2002	  (first	  contact	  with	  LURD,	  4:234)	  6.	   TRACK2END1:	  	   18	  August	  2003	  (signing	  peace	  agreement)	  7.	   TRACK2LENGTH1:	   one	  year	  8.	   ORGNAME1:	   	   Sant’	  Egidio	  	  9.	   ORGTYPE1:	   	   religious	  10.	   APPROACH1:	   	   go-­‐between,	  help	  rebels	  11.	   MAINNAME1:	   	   Mario	  Giro,	  Angelo	  Romano	  	  Liberia	  146.3	  
YEAR:	   	   2003	  1.	   TRACK2:	   	   yes	  2.	   TRACK2NUMBER:	   1	  3.	   TRACK2EXACT	  	   1	  4.	  	   TRACK2TOTAL:	   3	  	  5.	   TRACK2START1:	   Summer	  2002	  (first	  contact	  with	  LURD,	  4:234)	  6.	   TRACK2END1:	  	   18	  August	  2003	  (signing	  peace	  agreement)	  7.	   TRACK2LENGTH1:	   one	  year	  8.	   ORGNAME1:	   	   Sant’	  Egidio	  	  9.	   ORGTYPE1:	   	   religious	  10.	   APPROACH1:	   	   go-­‐between,	  help	  rebels	  11.	   MAINNAME1:	   	   Mario	  Giro,	  Angelo	  Romano	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Additional	  efforts:	  	  TRACK	  2+	  -­‐ April	  1994,	  February	  1995:	  Institute	  for	  Conflict	  Analysis	  and	  Resolution	  (ICAR,	  @	  George	  Mason	  University),	  Carter	  Center	  INN,	  Institute	  for	  Multi-­‐track	  Diplomacy	  and	  “Friends	  of	  Liberia”	  are	  “conducting	  a	  series	  of	  problem-­‐solving	  and	  reconciliation	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workshops	  involving	  members	  of	  the	  warring	  factions	  and	  influential	  civilians	  from	  Liberian	  society.”	  (http://fol.org/about-­‐us/accomplishments,	  accessed	  May	  17,	  2013)	  -­‐ International	  Negotiation	  Network	  (INN)	  has	  acted	  as	  mediator	  since	  1991.	  	  -­‐ Collaboration	  Carter	  Center	  -­‐	  Nairobi	  Peace	  Initiative	  (Carter	  Center	  1996.	  “International	  Guide	  to	  NGO	  Activities	  in	  Conflict	  Prevention	  and	  Resolution“).	  	  -­‐ Institute	  for	  Multi-­‐Track	  Diplomacy	  (IMTD)	  has	  program,	  but	  no	  activities	  during	  conflict	  years	  website:	  “IMTD’s	  involvement	  in	  West	  Africa	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  Carter	  Center.	  The	  initial	  focus	  was	  on	  facilitating	  dialogue	  among	  Liberians,	  beginning	  in	  1993,	  when	  the	  Carter	  Center	  invited	  IMTD	  to	  work	  with	  them	  as	  part	  of	  The	  Consortium	  for	  Peacebuilding	  in	  Liberia.	  In	  1994,	  Ambassador	  McDonald,	  along	  with	  three	  other	  conflict	  resolution	  experts	  from	  the	  Consortium,	  facilitated	  a	  problem-­‐solving	  workshop	  for	  Liberians	  in	  Akosombo,	  Ghana.	  […]	  The	  Consortium	  held	  its	  second	  training	  in	  1995	  in	  Abijan,	  Cote	  d’Ivoire,	  and	  expanded	  the	  original	  group	  to	  19.	  Much	  of	  this	  problem	  solving	  workshop	  focused	  on	  introducing	  key	  procedural	  concepts	  into	  the	  peace	  process.	  In	  July	  1996,	  then-­‐President	  Jerry	  Rawlings	  of	  Ghana	  asked	  the	  Carter	  Center	  to	  send	  a	  team	  to	  Liberia	  to	  restart	  the	  peace	  process,	  which	  Ambassador	  McDonald.”	  	  -­‐ Conflict	  Management	  Initiative	  (Private	  Diplomacy,	  CMI	  2008),	  but	  “post-­‐war	  state	  building”	  according	  to	  2008	  annual	  report	  -­‐ International	  Alert	  facilitated	  meeting	  Taylor	  -­‐	  Nigerians	  before	  1995	  Abuja	  agreement	  	  -­‐ 2006:	  West	  Africa	  Net	  for	  Peacebuilding	  (WANEP)-­‐Liberia	  section-­‐	  together	  with	  Wilson	  Center	  organized	  high	  level	  reconciliation	  seminar	  (WANEP	  Annual	  Report	  2006)	  -­‐ WANEP	  was	  approached	  before	  peace	  talks	  to	  train	  negotiators,	  but	  declined	  (Doe,	  Sam.	  2003.	  “When	  Mediation	  Becomes	  Manipulation”	  WANEP	  Annual	  Report	  2003,	  http://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/ar/ar_2003_en.pdf,	  accessed	  24	  May	  2013)	  GRASSROOTS	  -­‐ Conciliation	  Resources	  (Escola	  de	  Pau	  Yearbook	  2010)	  –	  “support	  activities	  in	  civilian	  society”	  -­‐ Friends	  of	  Liberia	  (5:	  “conducted	  fact-­‐finding	  missions,	  provided	  relief	  and	  medical	  assistance,	  implemented	  community-­‐based	  reconstruction	  projects,	  brought	  representatives	  of	  warring	  factions	  together	  in	  public	  forums	  and	  conflict	  resolution	  workshops,	  and	  advocated	  for	  effective	  policies	  on	  Liberia”):	  1998-­‐2004	  –	  FOL	  administered	  the	  African	  Women	  and	  Peace	  Support	  Group’s	  project	  to	  document	  Liberian	  Women’s	  peace	  actions.	  The	  project	  was	  funded	  by	  UNOPS	  (UN	  Office	  for	  Project	  Services	  (UNOPS)	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  book	  “Liberian	  Women	  Peacemakers,”	  published	  in	  English	  and	  in	  French	  in	  2004.	  [indicates	  consistent	  grassroots	  activity	  during	  the	  coded	  years	  2000-­‐2003]	  -­‐ Fondation	  Hirondelle	  –	  radio	  news;	  Dutch	  Interchurch	  aid	  and	  Oxfam	  –	  promoting	  peace	  locally;	  International	  Alert	  –	  radio	  programs	  to	  promote	  reconciliation	  (2:	  314-­‐315)	  -­‐ Sam	  Doe,	  Christian	  Health	  Association	  of	  Liberia	  (CHAL)	  launched	  conflict	  resolution	  clubs	  in	  schools	  (23	  Nov	  1998,	  Star	  Radio,	  Monrovia	  –	  LexisNexis)	  -­‐ Search	  for	  Common	  Ground:	  local	  media	  production	  facility	  (5	  Oct	  1999,	  Africa	  News	  –	  USAID	  report	  –	  LexisNexis)	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-­‐ Catholic	  Justice	  and	  Peace	  Commission,	  founded	  1989	  as	  human	  rights	  org,	  has	  peacebuilding	  /	  conflict	  resolution	  program	  OTHER	  -­‐ NGOs	  were	  formally	  included	  in	  peace	  talks	  2003,	  signed	  agreement	  as	  witnesses:	  Inter-­‐Religious	  Council	  for	  Liberia,	  Mano	  River	  Women’s	  Peace	  Network	  (www.wmd.org/resources/whats-­‐being-­‐done/ngo-­‐participation-­‐peace-­‐negotiations/history-­‐conflict-­‐liberia;	  accessed	  22	  May	  2013)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Checklist:	  Google	  Scholar	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Liberia	  AND	  “conflict	  resolution”	  	   	   	   "	  LexisNexis	  (1989-­‐2003)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Liberia	  AND	  “civil	  war”	  AND	  “conflict	  resolution”	   "	  The	  New	  York	  Times(1989-­‐2003)	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Liberia	  AND	  “civil	  war”	  AND	  “conflict	  resolution”	   "	  Uppsala	  Conflict	  Data	  Programme	   	   	   	   "	  Carter	  Center	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   "	  “International	  Guide	  to	  NGO	  Activities	  in	  Conflict	  Prevention	  and	  Resolution”	  (1996)	  Crisis	  Management	  Initiative	  	   	   	   	   	   "	  “The	  Private	  Diplomacy	  Survey”	  (2008)	   	  Beyond	  Intractability	  website	   	   	   	   	   "	  Escola	  de	  Pau	  Yearbooks	   	   	   	   	   "	  “Searching	  for	  Peace	  in	  Africa”	  (1999)	  	   	   	   "	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APPENDIX	  4:	  Codebook	  	  
Variable	  	   Label	   Source	  conflictepisode	   Conflict	  episode	  	   UCDP	  country	   Location	  of	  conflict	   UCDP	  dyadduration_mo	   Duration	  of	  conflict	  dyad	  (by	  episode)	  in	  months83	  	   	  dyaddurationlog	   Duration	  of	  conflict	  dyad	  (by	  episode)	  in	  months,	  logged	   	  dyadep	   Current	  dyad	  episode	   UCDP	  dyadepend	   1	  if	  dyad	  ended	  this	  year	   UCDP	  dyadid	   UCDP	  dyad	  identifier	   UCDP,	  Harbom	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  dyadyears	   Active	  dyad	  years	   	  epend	   1	  if	  dyad	  episode	  has	  ended	   	  sideb	   Name	  of	  rebel	  group	  in	  dyad	   UCDP	  year	   Year	   UCDP	  T2+	  VARIABLES	   	   Own	  data	  anyepdy	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  in	  this	  dyad	  episode	   	  cumt2numb	   Cumulative	  number	  of	  all	  coded	  T2+	  initiatives	  in	  episode	   	  longestT2	   Length	  of	  most	  sustained	  T2+	  effort	  in	  episode	  year:	  1	  =	  one-­‐time	  effort;	  2	  =	  projects	  lasts	  up	  to	  a	  year;	  3	  =	  long-­‐term	  initiative	  //	  dyadic	  data:	  length	  of	  most	  sustained	  T2+	  effort	  in	  dyad	  episode	  
	  
maxT2	   Interactive	  variable	  of	  track2number	  and	  longestT2	   	  meddyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  presdyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  led	  by	  former	  head	  of	  state	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  prevt2	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  in	  previous	  dyad	  year	   	  pswdy	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  dialog	  in	  preceding	  dyad	  episode	  (Chapter	  6)	   	  pswsdyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  problem-­‐solving/dialog	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  reldyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  by	  religious	  organization	  this	  year	   	  supportdyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  mediation	  support	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  t2meddy	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  mediation	  in	  preceding	  dyad	  episode	  (Chapter	  6)	   	  t2medsupdy	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  mediation	  support	  in	  preceding	  dyad	  episode	  (Chapter	  6)	   	  t2plusdyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  t2prof	   1	  if	  	  any	  T2+	  by	  professional	  NGO	  this	  dyad	  year	  	   	  t2traindy	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  training	  in	  preceding	  dyad	  episode	  (Chapter	  6)	   	  track2numbdyyr	   Number	  of	  T2+	  efforts	  this	  dyad	  year	   	  track2number	   Number	  of	  T2+	  initiatives	  in	  episode	   	  traindyyr	   1	  if	  any	  T2+	  training	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Chapter	  6:	  missing	  if	  ongoing	  in	  2009;	  Chapter	  3:	  if	  first	  date	  is	  December:	  coded	  as	  one	  month;	  if	  first	  date	  January	  –	  whole	  year	  is	  12	  months;	  otherwise	  subtract	  first	  date	  from	  last.	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CONFLICT	  	   	   	  bdbest	   Battle	  deaths	  in	  country	  year	   UCDP	  bdbestlog	   Battle	  deaths,	  logged	   	  cumdeathsdy	   Cumulative	  deaths	  in	  episode	  (Chapter	  6)	   	  deathlog	   Battle	  deaths	  by	  population,	  logged	   	  deathspop	   Battle	  deaths/population	  	   UCDP	  incomp	   Rebel	  motivation	  –	  separatist	  (1)	  vs.	  government	  (2)	   UCDP	  intensity	   1	  =	  minor	  conflict	  (at	  least	  25	  battle-­‐related	  deaths	  per	  year,	  less	  than	  1,000	  over	  course	  of	  conflict),	  2=war	  (1,000	  or	  more	  deaths	  per	  year)	   UCDP	  military_int	   Military	  intervention	  (0/1):	  1	  if	  UCDP	  codes	  an	  actor	  as	  supporting	  either	  side	   UCDP	  out_agree	   1	  if	  episode	  ends	  in	  peace	  agreement	  or	  ceasefire	   	  outcome	   (0=no	  outcome	  this	  year),	  1=peace	  agreement	  2=ceasefire	  agreement	  w/conflict	  regulation,	  3=ceasefire,	  4=victory,	  5=low	  activity,	  6=other	  	   UCDP,	  Kreutz	  (2010)	  prevt1	   Number	  of	  previous	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  attempts	  in	  dyad	  episode84	  	   MIC	  rebel_par	   1=	  rebels	  are	  as	  strong	  as	  government	  	   Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  rebel_strong	   1=	  rebels	  are	  stronger	  than	  government	   Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  repolwinglegal	   1	  if	  at	  least	  one	  rebel	  group	  in	  conflict	  episode	  has	  legal	  political	  wing	  (missing	  data	  coded	  as	  0)	   Cunningham	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  t1dy	   1	  if	  any	  official,	  direct	  (face-­‐to-­‐face)	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  episode	   UCDP/MIC	  (2013)	  	  –	  until	  2007	  t1dyyr	   1	  if	  official,	  direct	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  	   MIC	  	  t1gov	   1	  if	  official,	  direct	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  by	  third	  party	  government	   MIC	  t1igo	   1	  if	  official,	  direct	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	  by	  IGO	   MIC	  veto	   Number	  of	  parties	  challenging	  the	  government	  in	  year;	  in	  dyadic	  data:	  total	  number	  of	  dyads	  active	  in	  episode	   UCDP	  COUNTRY	   	   	  efsq	   Squared	  ethnic	  fractionalization	   	  elf	   Ethnic	  fractionalization	  index	   Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  (2003)	  ethfrac	   Ethnic	  fractionalization	  index	   Alesina	  et	  al	  (2002)	  formercol	   1	  if	  former	  British	  or	  French	  colony	  (in	  20th	  century)	   CIA	  World	  Fact	  Book	  2013	  gdp	   GDP	  per	  capita,	  in	  2005	  US$,	  Somalia	  estimates	  from	  UN	  Data	  (in	  current	  US$)	   WDI	  (2013)	  gems_and_carbon	   1	  if	  hydrocarbon	  or	  gemstone	  production	  in	  country	  (CIA	  Factbook	  for	  missing	  observations)	   Lujula	  (2009)	  Lifeexpect	   Life	  expectancy	   WDI	  loggdp	   Per	  capita	  GDP,	  logged	   	  mtnest	   Proportion	  of	  mountainous	  terrain	   FL	  2003	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  If	  same	  effort	  over	  more	  than	  one	  year,	  each	  year	  counted	  as	  separate	  effort	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neighbor_war	   1	  if	  there	  is	  an	  ongoing	  conflict	  in	  a	  neighboring	  state	   UCDP	  parcom	   Polity	  political	  competitiveness	  score	  (If	  coded	  -­‐88	  
(transition)	  I	  use	  closest	  previous	  score)	   Polity	  IV	  polity2	   Polity	  score.	  If	  coded	  -­‐88	  (transition)	  I	  use	  closest	  previous	  
score,	  if	  -­‐77	  (interregnum,	  collapse)	  or	  -­‐66	  (interruption)	  I	  
code	  as	  0,	  same	  a	  unregulated	   Polity	  IV	  poplog	   Population,	  logged	   	  population	   Population	   WDI	  	  relfrac	   Religious	  fractionalization	   Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  (2003)	  secdiamonds	   1	  if	  secondary	  diamonds	  present;	  info	  for	  Comoros	  from	  Lujala	  (2009)	   Gilmore	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  PEACE	   	   	  agreement	   1	  if	  peace	  agreement	  ends	  episode	   UCDP	  co_impl	   1	  if	  agreement	  that	  ends	  episode	  provides	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  commission	  or	  committee	  to	  oversee	  implementation	  of	  the	  agreement;	  0	  if	  not,	  -­‐1=no	  agreement	  
Högbladh	  (2011)	  
peacefail	   1	  if	  return	  to	  active	  dyad	  this	  year	   	  peacemonths	   Count	  of	  peace	  months	   	  peacespell	   Number	  of	  years	  since	  end	  of	  episode	  starting	  with	  year	  after	  which	  episode	  ends	   	  pko	   1	  if	  peace	  agreement	  has	  provision	  for	  peacekeeping	  mission	   Högbladh	  (2011)	  powershare	   1	  if	  peace	  agreement	  that	  ends	  episode	  includes	  provisions	  for	  extensive	  power-­‐sharing	  in	  new	  government,	  0=	  if	  not,	  -­‐1=no	  agreement	  	   Högbladh	  (2011)	  unpko_any	   1	  if	  UN	  peacekeeping	  in	  country	  addressing	  any	  conflict	   United	  Nations	  website	  unpko_dy	   1	  if	  mission	  (observer,	  verification,	  PK)	  in	  country	  explicitly	  addressing	  dyad	  (episode	  dataset:	  during	  dyad	  episode	  or	  within	  two	  years	  after	  end)85	   UN	  victory	   1	  if	  one	  side	  emerges	  a	  victor	   	  yearafterend	   Year	  of	  observation	  for	  Chapter	  6	   	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  e.g.:	  Angola	  has	  PKO	  1992-­‐1997	  addressing	  conflict	  with	  UNITA,	  but	  not	  FLEC.	  For	  1992,	  FLEC	  dyad	  is	  coded	  1	  for	  unpko_any,	  and	  0	  for	  unpko_dy.	  Ethiopia-­‐Eritrea	  Mission	  2000-­‐2008	  means	  that	  unpko_any	  is	  1	  for	  those	  years	  in	  both	  countries,	  but	  not	  unpko_dy	  for	  any	  of	  the	  dyads	  in	  the	  dataset.	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APPENDIX	  5:	  Summary	  tables	  of	  variables	  	  a)	  Chapter	  3	  
	  	  	  	  	  N	  =	  322	  dyad	  years,	  based	  on	  Model	  2	  Variable	   Minimum	   Mean	   Maximum	   SD	   Expected	  sign	  +	  =	  T1	  more	  likely	  High-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   0	   0.24	   1	   0.43	   DV	  T2+	  in	  preceding	  dyad	  	   0	   0.18	   1	   0.38	   +	  Number	  of	  previous	  T1	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  episode	   0	   0.34	   9	   1.05	   +	  /	  -­‐	  Separatist	  conflict	  	   0	   0.19	   1	   0.39	   -­‐	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	  	   0.04	   0.63	   0.90	   0.28	   -­‐	  Conflict	  Intensity	   1	   1.18	   2	   0.38	   +/	  -­‐	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	   0	   0.08	   1	   0.27	   -­‐	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   0	   0.03	   1	   0.17	   +	  Veto	  players	   1	   1.65	   4	   0.84	   +	  /	  -­‐	  Military	  intervention	   0	   0.13	   1	   0.33	   +	  Polity	  score	  	   -­‐8	   -­‐2.08	   8	   3.72	   +	  Population,	  logged	   13.27	   16.40	   18.73	   1.04	   +	  Former	  colony	  (UK	  or	  Francs)	   0	   0.57	   1	   0.50	   +	  Gems	  and	  carbon	  production	   0	   0.60	   1	   0.49	   +	  Dyad	  Episode	  duration,	  months,	  logged	   0	   2.84	   5.51	   1.44	   +	  /	  -­‐	  Time	  since	  last	  official	  mediation	  	   0	   2.49	   20	   3.85	   -­‐	  	  	  b)	  Chapter	  4	  
	  	  	  	  	  N	  =	  323,	  based	  on	  Model	  2	  	  Variable	   Minimum	   Mean	   Maximum	   SD	   Expected	  sign	  +	  =	  termination	  more	  likely	  Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management,	  lagged	  one	  year	   0	   0.18	   1	   0.38	   +	  Episode	  duration,	  logged	   0	   2.84	   5.51	   1.44	   DV	  Incompatibility	  	   1	   1.81	   2	   0.39	   -­‐	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	  	   0.04	   0.63	   0.90	   0.28	   -­‐	  Religious	  fractionalization	  	   0	   0.48	   0.78	   0.23	   -­‐	  Secondary	  diamonds	  	   0	   0.37	   1	   0.48	   -­‐	  Mountainous	  terrain	  	   0	   21.37	   82.20	   27.54	   -­‐	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  logged	  	   4.41	   5.60	   7.68	   0.80	   +	  Polity	  score	  	   -­‐8	   -­‐2.01	   8	   3.75	   +	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	   0	   0.08	   1	   0.27	   -­‐	  Rebel	  superiority	   0	   0.03	   1	   0.16	   +	  Battle	  deaths	  by	  population,	  log	  	   -­‐14.97	   -­‐11.12	   -­‐5.67	   1.89	   +	  /	  -­‐	  Military	  intervention	   0	   0.12	   1	   0.33	   _	  Official	  mediation	   0	   0.24	   1	   0.43	   +	  Veto	  players	   1	   1.65	   0.84	   4	   n/a	  Decade	  2000	   0	   0.42	   1	   0.49	   n/a	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c)	  Chapter	  5	  	  	  	  	  N	  =	  197,	  based	  on	  unrestricted	  OLS	  regression	  	  Variable	   Minimum	   Mean	   Maximum	   SD	   Expected	  sign	  +	  =	  higher	  death	  rate	  Annual	  battle	  deaths,	  log	   3.22	   5.56	   9.40	   1.53	   DV	  T2+	  mediation	   0	   0.21	   1	   0.41	   -­‐	  T2+	  training,	  lagged	   0	   0.01	   1	   0.26	   -­‐	  T2+	  dialogue,	  lagged	   0	   0.10	   1	   0.29	   -­‐	  Episode	  duration,	  log	   0.69	   3.65	   5.51	   0.92	   -­‐	  Incompatibility	  	   1	   1.85	   2	   0.36	   -­‐	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	  	   0.04	   0.60	   0.90	   0.29	   +	  Religious	  fractionalization	   0	   0.47	   0.72	   0.24	   +	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	   0	   0.08	   1	   0.27	   +	  Rebel	  superiority	   0	   0.03	   1	   0.16	   -­‐	  Natural	  resources	  	   0	   0.56	   1	   0.50	   +	  Democracy	  	   -­‐7	   -­‐2.16	   8	   3.58	   -­‐	  Military	  intervention	   0	   0.11	   1	   0.31	   +	  Official	  mediation	   0	   0.29	   1	   0.46	   -­‐	  War	  in	  neighbor	  country	   0	   0.75	   1	   0.43	   +	  	  	  d)	  Chapter	  6	  	  (N	  =	  841,	  based	  on	  logistic	  regression,	  Model	  2)	  Variable	   Minimum	   Mean	   Maximum	   SD	   Expected	  direction	  +	  =	  relapse	  into	  war	  more	  likely	  T2+	  in	  dyad	  episode	   0	   0.33	   1	   0.47	   -­‐	  Episode	  duration,	  months,	  log	   0	   2.38	   5.51	   1.45	   +	  Incompatibility	  	   1	   1.80	   2	   0.40	   +	  Total	  battle	  deaths,	  log	  	   3.22	   5.99	   11.75	   3.22	   +	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	  	   0.04	   0.69	   0.90	   0.23	   +	  Secondary	  diamonds	  	   0	   0.39	   1	   0.49	   +	  Negotiated	  agreement	   0	   0.42	   1	   0.49	   -­‐	  Victory	   0	   0.20	   1	   0.40	   -­‐	  Power	  sharing	  	   0	   0.07	   1	   0.26	   -­‐	  Amnesty	   0	   0.20	   1	   0.40	   -­‐	  Guarantees	   0	   0.19	   1	   0.39	   -­‐	  UN	  Peacekeeping,	  dyad	   0	   0.11	   1	   0.31	   -­‐	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  logged	  	   3.91	   5.97	   8.04	   0.87	   -­‐	  Life	  expectancy	   31.24	   51.21	   70.48	   6.13	   -­‐	  Democracy	  (Polity)	   -­‐7	   0.39	   8	   3.97	   -­‐	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APPENDIX	  6:	  Additional	  Figures	  Chapter	  6:	  	  a)	  Histogram	  of	  peace	  months	  by	  dyads	  that	  stay	  peaceful	  /	  return	  to	  war	  	  
	  	  b)	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APPENDIX	  7:	  Additional	  Results	  Tables	  Chapter	  3:	  Onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  	  -­‐Seemingly	  unrelated	  recursive	  bivariate	  probit-­‐	  	  	   	  
Selection:	  T2+	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  Separatist	  conflict	   -­‐0.36	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.31)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.56*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.32)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   1.45***	  	  	  	  	  (0.48)	  Veto	  players	   -­‐0.07	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.11)	  Conflict	  duration	  in	  months,	  logged	   0.04	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.06)	  Conflict	  intensity	   0.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.23)	  T2+	  in	  previous	  dyad	  year	   1.65***	  	  	  	  	  (0.26)	  2000	  decade	   0.14	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.16)	  Constant	   -­‐1.78***	  	  	  	  (0.45)	  
Outcome:	  onset	  of	  high-­‐level	  mediation	  in	  dyad	  year	   	  
T2+	  in	  dyad	  year	   0.55*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.31)	  Previous	  official	  mediation	  in	  episode	   0.66***	  	  	  	  	  (0.15)	  Separatist	  conflict	   -­‐0.93***	  	  	  (0.15)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   0.36	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.53)	  Religious	  fractionalization	   0.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.59)	  Conflict	  intensity	   -­‐0.30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.25)	  Conflict	  duration	  in	  months,	  logged	   0.07	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.07)	  Rebel	  parity	   0.11	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.34)	  Rebel	  stronger	  than	  government	   0.77*	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.42)	  Veto	  players	   0.09	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.10)	  Military	  intervention	  same	  year	   0.45	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.31)	  Polity	  score	   0.08***	  	  	  	  	  (0.03)	  Population,	  logged	   0.03	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.09)	  Former	  colony	  of	  UK	  or	  France	   -­‐0.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.25)	  Gems	  or	  carbon	  production	   0.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.25)	  Time	  since	  last	  high-­‐level	  mediation	   0.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (0.25)	  Constant	  	   -­‐1.88	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1.53)	  
N	   322	  (96	  clusters)	  Wald	  chi2	  (27)	   326.40***	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐260.11	  Rho	  (error	  correlation)	   -­‐0.26	  Note:	  Coefficients,	  with	  robust	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  on	  dyad	  in	  parentheses.	  Three	  cubic	  splines	  are	  included	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  not	  reported.	  
*Significant	  at	  the	  .1	  level,	  **significant	  at	  the	  .05	  level,	  ***significant	  at	  the	  .01	  level	  	   In	   order	   to	   model	   the	   endogeneity	   of	   independent	   variables	   in	   a	  simultaneous	   equation	   approach	   I	   need	   exogenous	   regressors	   that	   affect	   the	  dependent	   variable	   in	   one	   equation	   and	   not	   in	   the	   other.	   I	   consider	   that	   control	  variables	   measuring	   the	   strategic	   importance	   of	   a	   country	   might	   influence	   the	  decision	   of	   potential	   governmental	   mediators,	   but	   not	   the	   decision	   of	   non-­‐state	  conflict	  managers,	  and	  run	  the	  seemingly	  unrelated	  bivariate	  probit	  regression	  with	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these	   instruments.	   However,	   the	   instruments	   remains	   imperfect,	   because	   if	  strategically	   unimportant	   countries	   cannot	   count	   on	   intervention	   by	   third-­‐party	  governments,	  this	  in	  turn	  will	  have	  a	  potential	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  parties	  will	  turn	  to	  NGOs	  instead.	  	  The	  correlation	  of	  the	  errors	  between	  the	  selection	  and	  outcome	  stages,	  rho,	  is	   negative.	   The	   direction	   indicates	   that	   the	   unobserved	   factors	   leading	   to	   NGO	  interventions	   in	  civil	  conflicts	  have	  the	  opposite	  effects	  on	  the	  occurrence	  of	  high-­‐level	   mediation	   (Thyne	   2008).	   This	   finding	   supports	   the	   theory	   that	   official	   and	  unofficial	   mediation	   in	   the	   same	   year	   are	   interchangeable	   rather	   than	  complementary.	  	  However,	   the	   Wald	   test	   for	   rho	   misses	   acceptable	   significance	   levels.	   As	  expected,	   the	   model	   is	   not	   a	   good	   fit	   for	   the	   data	   because	   I	   do	   not	   have	   strong	  instrumental	  variables.	  	   	  
	  	   233	  
	  	  Chapter	  4:	  Results	  of	  Cox	  proportional	  hazard	  model	  	  	   Coefficients	  (Cox	  Hazard	  Model)	  
Duration	   	  
Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management,	  	  lagged	  one	  year,	  interacted	  with	  time	   -­‐0.02	  (0.08)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   -­‐0.85*	  (0.9)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐0.71	  (1.05)	  Religious	  fractionalization	  	   0.49	  (1.19)	  Lootables	   -­‐0.10	  (0.34)	  Mountains	   -­‐0.03***	  (0.01)	  GDP	  	  per	  capita,	  logged,	  interacted	  with	  time	   -­‐0.73***	  (0.09)	  Democracy	   -­‐0.08**	  (0.03)	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	  	   -­‐0.04	  (0.43)	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   0.95**	  (0.39)	  Battle	  deaths,	  by	  population,	  logged	   -­‐0.10	  (0.07)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐1.13**	  (0.56)	  Official	  mediation	   0.83***	  (0.24)	  Constant	   -­‐4.59**	  (2.12)	  
N	   323	  (97	  clusters	  in	  dyad	  id)	  Failures	   	  112	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐366.98	  
χ2(13)	   176.01***	  ***	  p	  <	  .01.	  **	  p	  <	  .05.	  *	  p	  <	  .10	  	  Table	  entries	  are	  coefficients,	  with	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	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Chapter	  5:	  Results	  of	  Two	  Stages	  Probit	  Least	  Squares	  -­‐Second	  stage	  regressions	  with	  corrected	  standard	  errors-­‐	  	  	   Coefficients	  (Cox	  Hazard	  Model)	  
Annual	  battle	  deaths	   	  
Non-­‐state	  conflict	  management,	  	  instrumented	   -­‐74.77	  (97.14)	  Rebel	  motivation	  	   355.70	  (270.12)	  Ethnic	  fractionalization	   -­‐342.43	  (395.00)	  Religious	  fractionalization	  	   311.20	  (480.69)	  Rebel	  strength	  parity	  	   1024.88***	  (287.02)	  Rebel	  strength	  superiority	   179.44	  (518.44)	  Democracy	   12.48	  (25.73)	  Gemstones	  and	  carbon	  production	   386.94*	  (213.62)	  Battle	  deaths,	  lagged	   0.21***	  (0.03)	  War	  in	  neighboring	  country	   173.72	  (200.97)	  Military	  interventions	   -­‐109.73	  (259.98)	  Official	  mediation	   158.05	  (188.79)	  Dyad	  duration,	  logged	   3.74**	  (1.54)	  Constant	   -­‐795.15	  (619.94)	  
N	   197	  (97	  clusters	  in	  dyad	  id)	  Log	  pseudolikelihood	   -­‐77.87	  ***	  p	  <	  .01.	  **	  p	  <	  .05.	  *	  p	  <	  .10	  	  Table	  entries	  are	  coefficients,	  with	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  	   In	   the	   first	   stage	   of	   2SPLS,	   the	   dependent	   variables	   are	   regressed	   on	   all	  exogenous	  variables.	  The	   second	   stage	  uses	   the	  predicted	  values	   for	  battle	  deaths	  and	  T2+	  as	  regressors	  in	  separate	  tests	  for	  occurrence	  of	  T2+	  and	  number	  of	  battle-­‐related	   deaths	   respectively.	   2SPLS	   does	   take	   into	   account	   temporal	   or	   spatial	  autocorrelation	  (I	  cannot	  cluster	  my	  standard	  errors	  on	  dyad	  id	  as	  I	  do	  for	  the	  OLS	  models).	  When	  I	  include	  country	  dummies,	  many	  variables	  are	  dropped	  because	  of	  collinearity.	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Important	  in	  any	  multiple	  equation	  model	  is	  finding	  instruments	  –	  variables	  that	   are	   predictors	   for	   one	   dependent	   variable,	   but	   unrelated	   to	   the	   dependent	  variable	  in	  the	  second	  equation.	  I	  choose	  “veto	  players”	  as	  my	  instrument.	  I	  expect	  the	   number	   of	   individual	   rebel	   groups	   simultaneously	   in	   conflict	   with	   the	  government	   to	   have	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   the	   likelihood	   of	   T2+	   onset	   (the	  more	  groups	   are	   fighting,	   the	   more	   possible	   entry	   points	   for	   an	   NGO).	   Because	   the	  government	  has	  only	   a	   limited	   amount	  of	   soldiers	   that	   can	   fight	   at	   the	   same	   time	  (and	   the	   rebel	   groups	   the	   same	   pool	   of	   potential	   recruits),	   I	   do	   not	   expect	   the	  number	  of	  individual	  groups	  to	  affect	  the	  severity	  level.	  I	  also	  use	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  the	  decade	  a	  conflict	  happens,	  expecting	  T2+	  to	  be	  more	  common	  in	  the	  2000s,	  but	  conflict	  severity	  not	  to	  change	  depending	  on	  the	  year.	  	  The	  Wu-­‐Hausman	  test	  after	  Two	  Stage	  Least	  Squared	  cannot	  reject	   the	  null	  hypothesis	   that	   variables	   are	   exogenous	   at	   the	   99%	   significance	   level	   –	   the	  instrumental	  approach	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  appropriate.	  
F-­‐statistic	  for	  test	  of	  instruments	  is	  13.50	  –	  when	  the	  statistic	  is	  larger	  than	  10	  instruments	  are	  considered	  strong.	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